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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the European Council in Lisbon, the use of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
and OMC-type processes have become widespread acr oss policy areas of the European 
Union, and also spilled over to non -governmental actors. This PhD thesis will compare and 
contrast two examples of OMC -like governance in the field of Education and Training 
which so far have been under -researched, namely the Open Method of Coordination in 
E&T and the Framework of Actions on the lifelong development of competencies and 
qualifications by the European social partners. In order to explain the creation, functioning 
and impact of these forms of governance, differ ent European integration theories are tested 
on how they explain the results. It is expected that different theoretical approaches can 
explain certain aspects better than others. To fully understand all of these aspects of OMC -
type governance, the combined  use of rationalist and constructivist approaches is promoted. 
The results will show that OMC -type governance is a third way between intergovernmental 
and supranational policy -making and significantly contributed to the deepening of E&T 
policy at EU level,  while at the same time guaranteeing national sovereignty, leading to a 
new form of integration. This thesis argues that OMC -like tools are able to serve diverse 
interests with respect to speed and nature of European integration. By being soft and 
flexible policy-tools, OMC-like tools are ideal for sensitive policy areas with very diverse 
national situations and represent rather a complementary form of policy -making than an 
alternative to the Community Method. Consequently,  European integration theories nee d to 
adapt to the possibility of EU policy -making methods that are neither purely 
intergovernmental nor fully supranational and lead to new types of integration. OMC -like 
tools also illustrate the need to return to the ambition of grand theories i.e. expla ining the 
whole picture, without relying only on one theory but rather using various approaches in a 
complementary fashion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU finds itself at a stage in its integration process where it faces various challenges 
regarding further integration. These i nclude the diversity of its Member States (MS) and the 
different existing visions for the future of the European integration process, which have not 
decreased since the last two accessions (in 2004 and 2007), plus the growing scepticism 
and even disagreeme nt of part of the European population with the current functioning of 
the EU. These difficulties demand a broad revision of the EU’s working methods. After the 
first initial attempt to describe and analyse the new forms of governance in the EU through 
the Commission’s (2001a) White Paper on European Governance, a general discussion is 
taking place, regarding whether the traditional Community Method (CM) can fulfil 
expectations and deliver results in a very diverse European Union or if new forms of 
governance are necessary.  
 
The Lisbon European Council in 2000 coined the term ‘open method of coordination’ 
(OMC), which is an umbrella term for the various changes and developments of the EU’s 
governance instruments since the 1990s. The OMC was chosen as a form of EU 
governance in order to enhance EU activity in specific policy areas where it has had 
traditionally little influence, while at the same time guaranteeing national sovereignty and 
control over the process. Since the Lisbon summit, the OMC has been intr oduced in a 
number of policy areas (pensions, social inclusion, etc…) with differing features and actors 
and a great deal of academic work has been written on this new form of governance. Most 
of its focus lay on the oldest OMC, the one in employment. At t his stage additional work 
has been done on the OMC in the area of social inclusion and pensions, but so far only very 
little attention has been given to the OMC -type of governance in the area of education and 
training (E&T). This is unfortunate, because ex actly this policy area has seen significant 
developments over the last ten years resulting in a fundamentally changed EU involvement 
in the education and training policy. Today the EU plays a substantial, while still 
secondary, role in the policy-making in this field. There is a relatively well functioning 
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form of the OMC in place that has established common objectives and benchmarks for the 
EU in E&T and allows the Member States to share their best practices with each other in a 
structured way. The argumen t is that the system of governance in E&T is not something 
imposed on the Member States by the Lisbon summit and the subsequent European 
Councils, but developed incrementally in a clear cooperation between the Member States 
and the European Commission. The  OMC does not coerce MS to do something, but gives 
them the choice and is flexible in nature. This ‘soft’ approach is also one of the main 
reasons why it has evolved so much in a relatively short time.  
 
The application and increased use of ‘soft governance  tools’, such as the OMC, can be 
identified at European level not only within the sphere of the European institutions but also 
within the decision -making structures of some of the non -governmental actors, such as the 
European social partners (ESP). Within their European Social Dialogue (ESD), which 
began in the 1980s under Jacques Delors and has gained in importance through subsequent 
treaty revisions as one of the main features of the EU Social Policy regime, the social 
partners (SP) have also developed ne w governance instruments. One of them is ‘the 
framework of actions’ (FoA), which can be described as the social partners’ own version of 
the OMC, as it is less binding and more flexible than some of the more traditional 
instruments of the ESD.  
 
Since the foundation of the European project, European integration theories have 
contributed in explaining its creation and development. From the late 1990s onwards, new 
theoretical approaches were added to the field of European integration theory (EIT), asking 
new questions and shedding light on new dimensions of European integration and its 
consequences.  
 
The main focus of this thesis will be to 1) examine how European integration theories 
explain the creation, functioning and impact of OMC -like tools in European policy-making 
in education and training and its role in the European integration process, and 2) understand 
their application by other actors, namely the European social partners in the European 
Social Dialogue. As part of this, the thesis will explore if OMC-like tools do represent a 
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valuable alternative or complementary mode of governance for further European 
integration, and whether their use leads to an Europeanisation of the given policy area or 
whether it keeps this policy firmly under the control of the Member States. 
 
By carrying out original research, this thesis will contribute in various ways to the 
understanding of the use of OMC -like tools in EU policy-making. The most important 
contribution that this research will make to the study of the EU is  by adding theoretical and 
empirical evidence to the use of OMC -like tools in general and in education and training in 
particular. This project has various potential benefits for academics and policy -makers. 
Firstly it will break new ground by providing further insight into an area of the European 
Union which to date is under -researched, namely the social dialogue, using it as a case 
study for the application of OMC -like tools. The analysis of the social partners’ own 
version of the OMC in the social dialog ue- the ‘framework of actions’ - shows the 
significant spillover potential of the OMC from the EU institutions to other players in the 
EU polity. The results of the comparison will show whether or not OMC is a valuable form 
of governance which not only appl ies to EU institutions but also in other EU arenas with 
non-governmental actors. Secondly, it will utilise traditional European integration theory to 
the case of OMC-like tools in order to examine their compatibility, thereby extending the 
field of application of European integration theories to an aspect of the EU which has so far 
been under-theorised. Thirdly, it will bring further insight into the development of 
European cooperation in E&T at EU level, another aspect that has been under -researched in 
the past, and examine how and why this cooperation has significantly increased over recent 
years. Fourthly, it will contribute to the existing body of work dealing with the OMC, in 
particular to the currently limited literature on the OMC in education and tra ining.  
 
The first hypothesis of this thesis is that the OMC is a useful tool to enhance the European 
integration process (in the area of Education and training policy), especially when 
discussing sensitive issues. This is also reflected by the argument th at OMC-style 
governance is being used not only more frequently by EU institutions but also by more and 
more non-governmental actors within the European political arena, such as the European 
social partners’ own version of the OMC in the ESD. The second hyp othesis proposes that 
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as OMC-like governance is mainly based on soft procedures, constructivist approaches are 
more likely to explain this phenomenon than rational choice approaches.  
 
In order to explore these hypothesises, the methodological approach of t his study will be 
based on a case study approach. The first case study will be the OMC in E&T and the 
second will be the framework of actions for the lifelong development of competencies and 
qualifications. The choice of the case studies reflects the doubl e aim of this thesis, 1) to 
show how OMC-like tools contribute to European integration and 2) how non -institutional 
actors of the EU system copy and apply these tools as part of their own internal processes, 
for similar reasons as the EU institutions. Qual itative data will be provided through a 
combination of participatory observation and a range of semi -structured interviews with 
national and European policy -makers. This will be complemented by an extensive analysis 
of primary sources, and literature revie ws on the OMC as well as on European integration 
theories. This combination of analytical tools has been chosen to benefit from the strengths 
of the different methodologies, while avoiding their weaknesses, thereby creating a 
balanced and more accurate res ult. In disciplinary terms, the research focuses on EU 
education and training policy, theories of European integration, and industrial relations at 
EU level.  
 
The structure of this thesis will be the following: Chapter one has the objective of 
introducing the OMC and the related literature to the reader. Starting by examining what 
new modes of governance are and to which extent the OMC fits into this grouping: the 
chapter will then outline its main characteristics and compare these with the traditional 
Community Method, analysing whether these modes of governance are exclusive or 
complementary to each other. Subsequently it will give an overview of the historical 
development of the OMC, outlining the causes for its creation, also presenting its 
functioning and its promises. Furthermore, it will investigate the existence of different 
OMC processes.  This chapter will then review the existing body of literature on the OMC, 
grouped together by topics. The main authors will be presented, outlining the main 
indicators they use in their work on the OMC, plus  highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of their research. By looking at the research questions of these academics, an 
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attempt will be made to group the evaluation results according to the theoretical starting  
point of the evaluator, tending more towards rationalism or constructivism. Finally it will 
identify further possible research on the different themes within the OMC literature.  
 
Chapter two  will provide a theoretical understanding for dealing with social  science in 
general, and European integration theory in particular. By exploring the notion of 
paradigms and paradigm changes, as well as outlining the differences between natural and 
social sciences, this chapter will look at how and why theoretical fashi ons change. This 
chapter will also give an overview of the development of European integration theory. It 
will identify different phases of European integration theory, outlining the change of 
academic focus from integration to governance and from looking at the cause of integration 
to its impact. Applying the earlier findings in regard to theory, the purpose of theory in EU 
studies will be explored and the paradigms in EU studies will be identified.  Then this 
chapter will review traditional and more recent  theoretical work on European integration, 
namely neofunctionalism, (liberal) -intergovernmentalism, multi -level governance (MLG), 
policy networks (PN), new institutionalism, approaches based on social constructivism and 
Europeanisation. Their main assumpti ons with their strengths and weaknesses will be 
presented. These theories will later be used to give meaning to the findings of the case 
studies.  
 
Chapter three  will outline the methodological foundation of this thesis. It will recall the 
rationale of thi s study, and specify the main hypothesises together with the supporting 
questions as well as the scope, the limits and the benefits of this work. It will also discuss 
the ontological and epistemological foundation of this research, before going into detail  on 
the research design, which is based on a case studies approach. The chapter will show that 
the choice of case studies is innovative with respect to other studies because the comparison 
is not between two OMC instruments used by the European Commission and the Member 
States in different policy areas but rather between one OMC instrument used by the 
European Commission and the Member States and one ‘OMC -like tool’ used by other 
‘European actors’ -i.e. the European social partners - in the same policy area.  The chapter 
will also outline  the different methods used for data collection, such as, mainly 
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participatory observation and semi -structured qualitative interviews, in addition to  an in-
depth review of the existing literature as well as an extensive analys is of primary sources. It 
will also be discussed how to identify and deal with the various challenges faced by this 
methodological approach. Furthermore, it will develop the indicators, which will be used 
for the interview questions, the analysis and the e valuation of the data.  
 
Chapter four will present the first case study, the ‘OMC in Education and Training 
policy’. The aim of this chapter is to present and analyse the creation and functioning of the 
OMC in E&T, looking in particular at its significance for European integration, as well as 
its impact at national and European level. This analysis will be based on the findings of the 
interviews, which will be outlined thematically. This chapter will examine how such an 
increased EU role was possible, in a p olicy area so heavily guarded by the Member States 
to retain as a national competence . It will start by placing the creation of the OMC in E&T 
within a historical perspective and look at how this form of governance was progressively 
applied in the area of education and training. Then the main elements of the OMC 
governance system in E&T will be outlined and the development and change of its 
structures over time will be explored. The priorities of this chapter will be to identify the 
motivation of the relevant actors for applying the OMC to this policy field, analyse the 
significance of its link to the Lisbon strategy, as well as look at the alternatives that existed 
and still do. Furthermore, this chapter will look at the results to date, and question the 
added value and the impact of using the OMC in E&T on national policy -making as well as 
its contribution to European integration. It will also look at the elements that foster or 
hinder impact at national level, show its achievements and outline some of the challenges 
that the OMC in E&T will be facing in the future.  
 
Chapter five will then examine the second case study, the framework of actions for the 
lifelong development of competencies and qualifications,  reporting on how OMC-style 
governance is being use d by non-governmental actors within the European political arena, 
the European social partners. The aim of this chapter is to report on the results of the 
interviews with the social partners concerning the creation, functioning and impact of the 
framework of actions. Before doing this, it will briefly present the development of the 
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European Social Dialogue and analyse to which extent and why OMC -like processes are in 
use. This second case study was chosen to complement the picture given by the first case 
study in explaining the use of OMC -like instruments and their relation to European 
integration.  
 
Chapter six will apply European integration theories to the OMC -like tools. The aim of 
this chapter is to highlight how the assumptions of the different Europea n integration 
theories fit with the findings of the case studies in relation to the creation, functioning and 
impact of OMC-like tools, as well as to assess which theory or combination of theories can 
best explain OMC-like tools in EU politics. In order to  do this, the chapter will draw the 
results of the previous two chapters together, comparing the framework of actions and 
OMC as instruments and outline the similarities and differences of the results. Then it will 
examine the usefulness of OMC -like tools as policy-making instruments as well as 
investigate into the (new) type of integration to which OMC -like tools are leading. Then it 
will examine how the different theories of European integration, introduced earlier on, 
could explain the different aspects of the OMC-type governance (i.e. genesis, functioning, 
socialisation, impact and integration). Finally, it will establish a matrix for the 
complementary use of different theoretical approaches, from both a rationalist and a 
constructivist perspective.  
 
The conclusion will summarise and evaluate the main findings of this thesis.  The aim of 
this chapter is to outline the main achievements and shortcomings of this research, to 
examine the accuracy of the hypotheses and to identify promising follow -up work. It will 
indicate that the case studies showed that OMC -like tools have enhanced cooperation at EU 
level, which led to a new type of integration. It will also argue that European integration 
theories can bring an added value to the understanding of OMC -like tools, but should be 
used in a complementary fashion in order to capture all aspects of the picture. Based on the 
thesis’ findings, promising further research in this area will be proposed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, 
MAIN FEATURES AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
Introduction   
This chapter has as an objective to analyse the open method of coordination. In order to do 
so, the chapter is divided into two sections: section one will look at what the OMC is and 
how it functions, how and to what extent it is new, and why it was created. It will do so by 
looking at new modes of governance in general and the OMC in particular. This analysis 
will explore the OMC’s main characteristics, comparing and contrasting them with the 
traditional Community Method and seeing if these modes of governance are exclusive or 
complementary to each other. Then this section will give an overview of the historical 
development of the OMC, which will be the background for examining the cause for the 
creation of the OMC. Following this, the different OMC processes will be analysed before 
presenting the discussions on the OMC in the European Convention. Section two will then 
give an overview of the existing literature on the OMC grouped together thematica lly. The 
overview will outline the main writers of a given topic and how they evaluated the OMC by 
using certain indicators, present the strengths of their work and comment on their 
shortcomings.  The section also will look at whether the evaluation result s depend on the 
theoretical starting point of the evaluator, and if it is possible to group different writers 
together according to theoretical and ideological believes, by looking at the questions 
which they ask in order to asses the OMC. Finally the conc lusion will draw an analytic 
summary of the findings of the previous sections. It will recall the achievements and 
shortcomings of the existing literature and identify further possible research on the different 
themes within the OMC literature.  
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1. Defining the open method of coordination 1  
 
New modes of governance and the OMC  
During the 1990s, the EU has included various so called ‘new modes of governance’ in its 
arsenal of policy-making instruments. 2 Before looking at what these new modes of 
governance are, it is imperative to give two caveats on new modes of governance (NMG) 
right at the beginning. First of all, so called ‘new’ forms of governance might be seen as 
new only because our conceptual lenses have changed (Smismans 2006).3 That is why 
Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006: 475) argue that the new modes cannot be considered  
‘new’, while Heritier (2002: 190) is more precise and argues that while this mode of 
governance is nothing new, as it has been applied at national level before, its use in the 
European context does constitute a novelty. Second, the existence of new forms of 
governance does not mean that the old ones have disappeared, or even that the new ones are 
the predominant forms of governance (Smismans 2006).4  
 
The concept ‘new modes of govern ance’ includes a variety of policy -making instruments, 
some of which include framework directives, soft law, co -regulation, voluntary agreements 
and economic instruments (Idema and Kelemen 2006) .5  Therefore one has to be aware that 
they are not a homogenous group. 6 Some academics even go so far as to argue that the only 
common thread among these processes is that while they all have normative content they 
are not formally binding (Trubek, Cottrell & Nance 2005: 1). For some academics the 
characteristics of new modes of governance are that “in general, they a re based on 
procedures that are voluntary, open, consensual, deliberative, and informative.” (Caporaso 
and Wittenbrinck 2006: 472) , and that they are “characterised by heterachy rather than by 
                                                   
1 The author acknowledges that various forms of the OMC exist in the different policy areas. When speaking 
about ‘the’ OMC, the ideal type outlined at the Lisbon Council is referred to.  
2 The author is aware that using new modes of governance more frequently is an international trend, analysing 
this falls out of the realm of this dissertation.   
3 This question will be a ddressed in more detail in the next chapter.  
4 The relation between old and new forms of governance will be dealt with later in this chapter.  
5 This is not an exclusive list.  
6 For a detailed comparison of different soft methods of policy -making see Ahonen  (2001). 
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hierarchy, creating horizontal models of governance among a multitude of actors” 
(Smismans 2006: 4) . 
 
Heritier (2002: 187) summarises the main characteristics of the new forms of governance 
as: 
· The principle of voluntarism (non -binding targets and the use of soft law);  
· Subsidiarity (measures are decide by the Member States);  
· Inclusion (participation of concerned actors).  
 
Some writers try to group the different tools and instruments which are considered as new 
modes of governance togethe r and distinguish the groups from each other. Caporaso and 
Wittenbrinck (2006: 473) separate the new modes of governance between new policy 
processes, such as the OMC, policy process adjustments , such as gender mainstreaming, 
and policy instruments such as benchmarking. Nonetheless they argue for dealing with 
them all together for two main reasons: first of all, they include a move toward ‘soft law’ 7 
at the policy instrument level, and secondly they are all part of a more abstract move from 
‘government’ to ‘governance’. 8 Heritier (2002: 187) also differentiates between two types 
of new modes of governance: one which develops substantive targets, and one which only 
defines procedural norms. Other writers try to establish stricter boundaries between the 
different types of new modes of governance and differentiate between two main categories 
of new governance (Scott and Trubek 2002: 2). The first is called ‘new, old governance’ 
which still presents strong elements of continuity with the Community Method 9 but also 
departs on various important issues from it. The second category is the pure ‘new 
governance’ as it represents a complete alternative to the Community Method. This 
includes the OMC and the European Social Dialogue. Laffan and Shaw (2006) recall that 
various authors (such as Radaelli 2005 or Rhodes 2005) point out that “the distinction 
between new and old, hard and soft modes of governance is one of degree rather than of 
                                                   
7 The phrase soft law is used to describe instruments with doubtful, or only partial, legal effects (Hartley 
2003). 
8 The author is aware of the extensive debate on the term ‘governance’. This debate exceeds the limit of this 
work and therefore wh enever talking about governance, the following definition is used: Governance is ”the 
exercise of authority with or without the formal institutions of government”  (Rosamond 2000: 109).    
9  The term Community Method will be discussed in more detail furth er on. 
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category.” So while differentiating might be useful as a general overview, one has to be 
aware that the borders are not as rigid as presented.  
 
Many authors see the OMC as an example of these new modes of governance and some 
even describe the OMC as the primus inter pares of the new governance tools of the EU 
(Idema and Kelemen 2006) . Regent (2003: 213) considers the OMC as a new mode of 
governance and also argues that the OMC was initially an intergovernmental commitment 
by Member States, and has subsequently  developed to ‘a supranational’ 10 form of 
governance. Radaelli (2003: 8) argues that the OMC in its ideal -type form is a new mode of 
governance, and illustrates this with six points:  
1 New and more limited role of law;  
2 New approach to problem solving;  
3 Participation as a key feature of the process;  
4 Diversity and subsidiarit y are inbuilt features;  
5 New ways to produce usable knowledge;  
6 Considerable potential for policy learning.  
 
Having established what new modes of governance are, and that the OMC is one form of 
them, it is time to look at the specific characteristics of the OMC in more detail.  
 
 
Definition and characteristics  
It is difficult to find a general definition for the OMC, as there are many characteristics and 
academics often focus more on one than on others when describing the OMC. This 
variation can be seen in the  following list of descriptions for the OMC. These range from ‘a 
special form of multilateral surveillance’ (Schäfer 2006: 15), ‘the most systematic attempt 
to establish a voluntary process of policy coordination’, (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 200 6: 
473), ‘a mutual feedback process of planning, examination, comparison and adjustment of 
the policies of Member States’ (Vandenbroucke 2002: 31) , a ‘supranational organised, 
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promoted and coordinated bottom -up procedure’”11 (Behning 2004; 2006), ‘a practically 
orientated policy instrument, because it focus es on process flexibility rather than on macro -
institutional flexibility’ (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 186)  or as “a ‘post-regulatory’ 
approach to governance, in which there is a preference for procedures or general standards 
with wide margins for variation, rathe r than detailed and non-flexible (legally binding) 
rules” (de la Porte, Pochet and Room 2001: 14).  The EU’s own view on the OMC can be 
seen in the following statement: “The OMC is designed to be a method of benchmarking 
best practices in a decentralised a pproach in line with the principle of subsidiarity” (Lisbon 
Presidency Conclusions No 38).  
 
These descriptions of the OMC need to be complemented by presenting some of the 
perceived nature of the OMC. Some argue that the OMC is  “about changing ideas in th e 
absence of law” (Laffan and Shaw 2006: 6) , while others see “the aim and the challenge of 
the OMC is to facilitate policy convergence while also recognising national diversity”  
(Maher 2004: 2). Others again stress the fact that the “OMC creates informal debates of 
subjects on which European countries are unlikely to reach a formal agreement easily” 
(Berghman and Okma 2003: 2) . Trubek, Cottrell and Nance (2005: 15) summarise the 
characteristics of the OMC in six general principles, namely: participation and power 
sharing, multi-level integration, diversity and decentralisation, deliberation, flexibility and 
revisability and knowledge creation. This reflects closely the statement of Goetschy:  
 
“In broad terms this method aims at organising and implementing 
coordination and cooperation between Me mber States on the basis of close 
articulation between an intergovernmental logic and an EU community 
logic, combining EU competences and subsidiarity, relying on modern 
public management tools based on benchmarking, evaluation of Member 
State performance, peer review and comparison.” (Goetschy 2001: 406)  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
10 Regent stresses that she sees supranationalism in this case not as a transfer of competences from the 
national to the European level, but empowering the European institutions with specific tasks central to the 
process.   
11 Own translation, any mis interpretations are fully my fault.  
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As a consequence, many academics identify the OMC as neither primarily national nor 
primarily EU level, but as genuinely being of a multi -level nature (de Búrca 2003: 3) . The 
European Commission itself argues that  
 
“the open method of coordina tion is used on a case by case basis. It is a way 
of encouraging cooperation, the exchange of best practice and agreeing on 
common targets and guidelines for Member States, sometimes backed up by 
national action plans as in the case of employment and socia l exclusion. It 
relies on regular monitoring of progress to meet these targets, allowing 
Member States to compare their efforts and learn from the experience of 
others.” (European Commission 2001: 21)  
 
Another characteristic of the OMC concerns the cogniti ve and normative dimension. 
Vandenbroucke (2002: 10), writing on social policy, for instance, outlines that “the open 
method of coordination is both a cognitive and a normative tool. It is a ‘cognitive’ tool, 
because it allows us to learn from each other a nd it is a ‘normative’ tool because, 
necessarily, common objectives embody substantive views. This open coordination 
gradually creates a European social policy paradigm.” The idea that the OMC combines a 
cognitive and a normative dimension is also supporte d by Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin  
(2006: 532) who stress that “through the OMC, the EU is a common forum for debate, and 
contributes to the development of a common conception of problems and solutions, which 
in turn, introduces a new mode of harmonisation whi ch is not institutional and constraining, 
but cognitive and normative.” The idea that the OMC is a forum for debate is absolutely 
valid. Moreover, it does promote the development of common conceptions of problems and 
solutions. However, the notion of ‘new mode of harmonisation’ is slightly more difficult to 
assess, as at this stage one cannot be sure whether Member States are only paying lip 
service or if they have really learned through the exercise. 12  
 
What one can clearly see here is that there are plent y of descriptions of the OMC, all 
highlighting different characteristics. One reason for this is the different conceptual starting 
points. Another is that the OMC takes different forms in different policy areas 13, and that 
the observers do not always speak about the same form of OMC. Being aware that the 
                                                   
12 The aspect of learning and impact at national level will be looked at in more detail later on.  
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OMC belongs to the family of ‘new mode of governance’ is useful when comparing it now 
to the Community Method. This will help to understand the significance of the OMC’s 
features and the differences to the C ommunity Method.  
  
 
OMC vs. the Community Method   
In order to compare the OMC with the features of the ‘classic’ method of governance, i.e. 
the Community Method, this section will first specify the main features of the Community 
Method, then examine the pa rticular situation of the actors and whether the different actors 
have gained or lost power relative to the classic method of governance, before comparing 
the OMC and the Community Method more in general. Finally it will show whether those 
two modes of governance completely oppose each other or whether they can function in a 
complementary way. 
 
The role of the different institutions within the OMC and the CM processes : 
The role for the institutions under the Community Method 14 is summarised by the European 
Commission (2001a: 8) as: “The European Commission alone makes legislative and policy 
proposals; legislative and budgetary acts are adopted by the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament; and the European Court of Justice guarantees respect for the  rule of 
law.” The specific roles of the different institutions, outlined in the conclusions of the 
Lisbon summit, will be presented in more detail in the section on the historical overview. 
However, at this stage it is important to point out that it is qu ite difficult to generalise the 
role of the actors in the OMC, because this differs from one OMC process to another. That 
is why some academics argue that the actor with the leading role is not predefined in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 The differences between the various OMC processes will be outlined later in this section.  
14 It has to be pointed out that  people have different understandings of the Community Method. Some, such as 
Wallace and Wallace (2006) see only the original division of power between the European institutions (with 
the Commission proposing, the EP advising and the Council deciding) whil e others see the Community 
Method as the post Maastricht division between the institutions (Commission proposing EP and Council 
deciding in the majority of cases together). In this thesis the following definition will be used: “The classic 
Community Method  of EU policy-making is based on binding legislation initiated by the Commission, 
enacted by the Council and the Parliament, and enforced by the Court of Justice” (Zeitlin 2005: 7). The 
important point here is, not the relationship between Council and parl iament, which has changed over time, 
but the fact that this form of policy -making is based on hard legislation and involves the EP and the ECJ in 
addition to the commission and the Council.  
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OMC. Generally, the EU Commission/ the respo nsible Directorate General (DG), the 
specific Council formation, expert committees, or stakeholder involved in the specific 
policy area at national or European level, are potential candidates for the job (Maucher 
2003: 9).15 
 
Nevertheless, judging from the ideal type of the OMC, as well as on its average application, 
one can say that the new procedures have strengthened primarily intergovernmental 
(Council) and executive (Commission) institutions, as all relevant decision -making 
processes of the OMC are deci ded through an interaction of the Council of Ministers and 
the European Commission (Wendler 2004: 5). Borrás and Jacobsson (2004: 198) add that 
the newly created committees (Social Protection Committee (SPC), the Employment 
Committee (EMCO) and the Economi c and Financial Committee (EFC)) play a crucial role 
within the OMC, while COREPER and Comitology are largely left out of the process. 
Furthermore, the technical working groups of the different Council formations select the 
indicators and benchmarks, which  are based on the proposal of the Commission (de la Porte 
2002). 
 
Concerning the Commission, most writers argue that so far it has played a key role in the 
OMC in many ways, although quite distinct from the one it plays in the classic Community 
Method, (Wincott 2003), as it focuses more on informal influe nce than on formal 
leadership (Dehousse 2002: 11) . Furthermore, the Commission also has the coordination 
role in the practical implementation of the different OMCs (de la Porte 2002: 44). 
Concerning the role of the  European Council, observers also point out that giving the 
European Council a monitoring and guiding role is undeniably in line with recent trends, 
marked by increasing the power of the European Council within the EU political system 
(Dehousse 2002: 17). Concerning the role of the EP, most academics agree that within the 
OMC, the role of the EP is reduced to issuing recommendations (Wendler 2004) and that it 
has a marginal influence at best. (Schäfer 2006) The same is true for national parliaments 
(Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 199) . Furthermore, the traditional strong role of the ECJ is 
sidelined because of the legally non - binding nature of soft law. However, the courts 
                                                   
15 Own translations, any misinterpretations are fully my fault.  
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sometimes draw on soft law in their conclusions. Nevertheless, B orrás and Jacobsson 
(2004: 200) argue, quite rightly, that the OMC has changed  the conventional balance of 
power between the EU institutions, resulting in the political leadership of the 
Council/European Council and with the cooperation of the Co mmission, while largely 
excluding the EP and the ECJ.  
 
Comparing OMC and CM  
Earlier on it was outlined how new modes of governance differ from the old forms, and the 
previous point showed the important differences in the role of the institutions under the  two 
forms of governance. Following on from there, one needs to examine the other differences 
between the OMC and the CM. Schäfer (2006: 14) proposes six differences between the 
European Employment Strategy (EES)  (as wel l as other forms of multilateral surveillance) 
and the Community Method. These are:  
· Definition of legally non -binding common goals;  
· Exclusively national implementation;  
· Monitoring and reporting by secretariat including bilateral contacts;  
· Multilateral discussions (peer pressure);  
· Country-specific recommendations (non -enforceable); 
· Publication of the results (public pressure).  
 
Lopez-Santana summarises these differences by arguing that  
 
“the OMC diverges from traditional EU legal instruments in that it is a  non-
binding regulatory instrument that leaves ultimate responsibility for a policy 
area within the nation -state. In addition under the OMC, the EU cannot 
punish non-implementers because it lacks tangible coercion mechanisms 
(such as infringement processes ) and institutions (the Court).” (Lopez -
Santana 2006: 482) 
 
While seeing important analogies in the way both operate, Dehousse (2002: 20) stresses the 
fact that the objective of the two are different: the OMC allows for the establishment of 
flexible forms of common action in policy areas where centralised decision -making is not 
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possible, or even desirable. 16 Awareness of these differences between these two forms of 
governance is important when looking at the relationship between them and trying to 
understand which is preferable over the other, or if the two are complementary.  
 
Based on these differences, some academics such as Ahonen (2001: 10) argue that there are 
tensions between the OMC and the Community Method. Others argue that the OMC is not 
the radical alternative to the Community Method, which some people hoped, and others 
feared for (Dehousse 2002: 20). Concerning this point, one can generally agree with 
Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006: 473) who argue that the sharp contrast between new 
modes of governance and authoritative law-making [i.e. the Community Method] is 
striking. However, one should not make the mistake to create unnecessary dichotomies. 
While some see the OMC as being at one end of a continuum, with the ‘classic Community 
Method’ being at the opposite (Scott and Trubek 2002; Ashiagbor 2004), others are more 
cautious and argue that all of the different OMC processes display aspects of ‘old’ 
governance, ‘new’ governance, hard and soft law (Laffan and Shaw 2006: 4), or that the 
OMC has several  different origins and sources of inspiration, including ‘soft cooperation’ 
and ‘hard coordination’ processes (de la Porte 2002). Therefore it is important to restate at 
this stage the point of Laffan and Shaw (2006) who argue that “the distinction between  new 
and old, hard and soft modes of governance is one of degree rather than of category.” So 
while the differentiating might be useful as a general overview, one has to be aware that the 
borders are not as rigid as presented.  
 
Being more differentiated is  not only important when placing the OMC in relation to the 
CM, but also when judging the future use of both. Building on the analysis so far, one can 
outline three possible scenarios for the impact of the OMC on the Community Method: 
firstly, the OMC can be as a substitution for the Community Method, secondly the OMC 
can act as a complement to the Community Method and thirdly it can be only a temporary 
instrument followed by the use of the Community Method in these policy areas (Laffan and 
Shaw 2006: 8). For some writers the first alternative is a likely scenario, presenting it in a 
                                                   
16 The decision whether or not something is desirable, is of a very normative nature and needs to be handled 
with caution.  
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very dramatic way by stating that “the OMC may lead to the slow death of the traditional 
Community Method” (Sisson, Arrowsmith and Marginson 2003: 25). Others see it in a 
more positive light arguing that “soft law is no longer seen as a second -best option in cases 
wherein legislation cannot be produced. Rather, the soft approach embodied in the OMC is 
seen as superior to traditional approaches because it fosters learning and prov ides flexibility 
to the policy process” (Radaelli 2003: 22). Other academics rightfully stress that “arguing 
that one is superior to the other fails to appreciate a distinctive place for each form of 
governance” (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 2006: 477). 17 Many observers agree that different 
policy areas have different needs for governing tools and procedures (Trubek, Cottrell and 
Nance 2005). This idea is continued by Laffan and Shaw (2006: 4) who point out that OMC 
processes may all operate within weakly const itutionalised areas of Community 
competences, which they see as its raison d’être. This view is supported by Heritier (2002) 
who identifies that new modes of governance are not becoming the predominant form of 
policy-making, and their use can mainly be fou nd in specific areas (environmental policy, 
where it adds to the existing acquis, and social policy, with strong importance in 
employment and social policy). A more practical reason why the traditional CM is 
inappropriate in some policy fields, such as som e areas of social policy, is the huge 
diversity between national welfare systems. The OMC can be applied as a form of 
governance while respecting these differences. Therefore it is not a second -best option to 
hard legislation, but sometimes it is a better way forward in certain policy areas.  
 
This approach reflects the view of the  Commission which outlines that the OMC is 
supposed to complement and reinforce the Community Method rather than a replacement 
for community actions. Therefore the Commission stres ses the point that “the use of the 
OMC must not dilute the achievements of common objectives in the Treaty or the political 
responsibilities of the Institutions. It should not be used when legislative action under the 
Community Method is possible” (Europea n Commission 2001: 22).18 This view of the 
OMC and the CM being complementary, while stressing their differences, is supported by 
Hodson and Maher (2001: 740 -41) who see this as not inconsistent with the revitalisation 
                                                   
17 For a good overview on the levels at which the different types of policy -making methods are used see 
Ahonen (2001).  
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of the Community Method advocated by t he Commission and argue that politically, the 
open method of coordination is an alternative to traditional governance methods without 
precluding a return to them. Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin (2006: 529) also agree that the 
OMC and the CM are not entirely dif ferent from each other, but the OMC is rather a 
mimesis.  
 
As outlined, the whole discussion on OMC vs. Community Method sometimes becomes 
very polarised. This observation is supported by Trubek and Trubek (2004) who also reject 
this either/or approach, wh ere one should either use only soft law or only hard law, as it 
limits the exploration of hybrid (hard and soft) governance modes and possible synergies 
between binding and non -binding mechanisms. They argue that these forms work well 
together, and already exist beside each other in different EU policy areas (such as 
environment).  This also seems to be the aim of the Commission, namely to “renew the 
Community Method by following a less top -down approach and complementing its policy 
tools more effectively w ith non-legislative instruments” (European Commission 2001: 4). 
Following this statement, one has to ask: to what extent the OMC has become the policy 
style of choice. The reasons for applying the OMC vary significantly from one policy area 
to another. In those policy areas where the CM cannot be used for reasons of treaty 
regulations, the OMC is the tool to secure involvement of the European level and 
discussions at the European level of this topic. Over time this might lead to the possibility 
of introducing the CM there also. At the same time there are policy areas where the use of 
the Community Method is perfectly normal, using the OMC in a complementary fashion on 
issues where hard legislation is considered either not appropriate or too burdensome, since  
it has the benefit of being more flexible and tailor -made for the specific national situation in 
the Member States, therefore respecting the subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, the 
involvement of more actors gives the EU a certain form of more legitimacy . Therefore one 
can see that there are good reasons why these two modes of governance should be applied 
in a complementary fashion rather than substituting each other.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
18 Whether this is really true will be followed -up in the case studies.  
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Historical development  
This part will give a brief overview on the development of the  OMC, including its creation 
and the preceding processes.  
 
The Lisbon summit  
The term ‘open method of coordination’ was coined at the European Council in Lisbon in 
2000, where the Portuguese Presidency also outlined the characteristics of the ideal type 
OMC, which is supposed to contribute to the implementation of the strategic goal [Lisbon 
strategy] by: 
 
· “Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables 
for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long 
terms; 
· Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored 
to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of 
comparing best practice;  
· Translating these European guidelines into na tional and regional 
policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking 
into account national and regional differences;  
· Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual 
learning processes .” (Lisbon Presidency conclusions, point 37) 
 
So the four key elements of the OMC are: setting EU level guidelines; establishment of 
benchmarks and specific indicators; translation of the European guidelines into national 
(and regional) policies according to the need of the different states  (and regions); and 
monitoring, evaluation as well as peer review on a periodic basis. The exact procedure is as 
follows: the Council agrees on EU level guidelines, which are proposed by the 
Commission, and then elaborates and adopts benchmarks and specifi c indicators. These are 
then translated by the Member States into national initiatives, which are supposed to 
involve national social partners. This process will then be evaluated by the Commission on 
the basis of national reports from the Member States an d discussed by the Council.  
 
The Lisbon Council also outlined that the actors, which should be involved in the OMC 
process, are the Union, the Members States, the regional and local levels, social partners 
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and civil society (Lisbon Presidency Conclusions N o 38). It should be outlined at this point 
that no specific comment was made at the Lisbon summit concerning the roles of the EP 
and the ECJ in the OMC while the roles of the European Council and the European 
Commission were outlined in more detail. The Eu ropean Council is supposed to:  
· Take a pre-eminent guiding and coordination role;  
· Ensure overall coherence;  
· Monitor the progress; 
· Hold a specific meeting every spring devoted to economic and social questions. 19  
The Commission should : 
· Present proposals on Eu ropean guidelines; 
· Organise the exchange of good practice;  
· Present proposals on indicators;  
· Support monitoring and peer review.  
 
It is questionable to which extent these features were truly novel, or based on already 
existing policy instruments and process es. In order to find the answer, one needs to look at 
the processes leading up to Lisbon.  
 
The way to Lisbon  
As shown, the term OMC was decided on in Lisbon. However, most academics agree that 
one also has to look at the years preceding Lisbon in order to  completely understand the 
OMC. Radaelli (2003: 18) hits the nail on the head saying, “Lisbon is a snapshot that has to 
be put in the context of a more dynamic film.” Furthermore, one should remember, as 
Wincott (2003: 533) rightly mentions that “the ident ification of a ‘turning point’ is always 
tricky, as change is rarely unheralded and wholly encapsulated in one moment.”  
 
                                                   
19 This was changed under the Austrian presidency in 2006. Starting with the Finnish Presidency during the 
second half of 2006, it was agreed that there should be two meetings every year, devoted to econo mic and 
social issues, one under each rotating presidency.  
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In general, observers agree that the procedure, which was called the OMC at the Lisbon 
summit, was based on a number of independent but  closely related processes that started in 
the early 1990s, entailing soft modes of governance, namely  
· The Luxembourg process;  
· The Cardiff process;  
· The Cologne process. 20 
  
None of these processes developed overnight and Larsson (2002) is right when he ar gues 
that one has to go back to Jacques Delors, who came up with the idea, which was then 
actually initiated at the Essen summit in 1994 and was subsequently constitutionalised by 
the Treaty revision in Amsterdam, which introduced a new Title on Employment  into the 
European Community (EC) Treaty giving the earlier Dublin agreed Stability and Growth 
Pact a legal basis, and eventually put into practise after the 1997 Luxembourg summit. 21 
Nevertheless, one should briefly look at these three individual processes . 
 
Luxembourg process (on employment) 22 
The Luxembourg summit, after which the Luxembourg process is named, launched the 
European Employment Strategy. As part of this EES process, annual common European 
employment guidelines are elaborated and adopted. Thes e are then translated into national 
action plans (NAPs) by the national governments, which are supposed to involve national 
social partners. This process will then be evaluated without any binding force but these 
evaluations are supposed to be of a very po werful symbolic nature. 23 This process clearly 
included already the elements of an exchange of practices, peer pressure, and 
benchmarking, which would later be at Lisbon the foundation of the OMC. Consequently, 
it is not surprising that as João Rodrigues (2001: 4)24 admits that “the main source of 
inspiration of the open method of coordination was that of the Luxembourg process 
                                                   
20 For an overview on these soft modes of governance preceding Lisbon see Laffan and Shaw (2006) .   
21 For an excellent overview of all these events see Regent (2003).  
22 For a more detailed overview on the Luxembourg process see Trubek (2003), Mosher and Trubek (2003) or 
Goetschy (2001).  
23 As to which extent this is true will be examined in the fieldwork.  
24 Maria João Rodrigues was special advisor of the prime minister and coordinator of the Lisbon Eu ropean 
Council and is considered by many as the ‘mother of the OMC’.  
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regarding the European Employment Strategy” and therefore many writers see the EES as 
the possible ideal type (Barbier 2004) or at least the closest to the ide al type (Radaelli 
2003). 
 
Cardiff process (on economic reform)  
A European Council meeting took place under the UK Presidency in Cardiff in June 1998, 
where the heads of state and government decided to put into place a macroeconomic 
dialogue on economic reforms. The Member States were urged to achieve coherence 
between reforms of different markets on the one hand and between reforms in labour 
markets and public finances on the other. The Cardiff process is described by some 
academics as “ a benchmarking pro cess on policy reform regarding capital, product and 
labour markets, and the ‘macroeconomic dialogue’ consisting of biannual discussions of the 
policy-mix at EU level between social partners, the European central bank, the Commission 
and the Council” (Smis mans 2004: 3). 
 
Cologne process (on macroeconomic dialogue)  
The European Council meeting in June 1999 in Cologne consolidated the European 
Employment Strategy  and created the basis for a Community employment policy. The main 
objective of the ‘Cologne process’ is to encourage dialogue between all parties involved in 
macroeconomic policy and to strengthen their confidence, in order to en courage growth and 
job creation. Therefore the cologne summit linked the Luxembourg process together with 
the Cardiff process, and “aims at a cooperative macroeconomic policy mix between 
Member States, including smooth interaction between the various macro economic policy 
instruments” (Ahonen 2001: 6).  
 
 
So what is new about the OMC?  
As the OMC clearly reflects elements of these preceding processes, some academics argue 
that Lisbon did not really create anything new. This can be seen in the comment of Larsso n 
(2002: 5) who identifies that there are “no new processes, just improving and refining what 
we already do …adjusting the methods to the particular conditions of each policy area. 
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Radaelli (2003: 5) supports this and argues that even the Lisbon Council it self did not see 
the OMC as something new because it states “no new processes are needed” (Presidency 
conclusions, point 35) and therefore it was looked at as a continuation of the Luxembourg, 
Cardiff and Cologne processes. Ahonen (2001: 6) adds that proce dures that resemble the 
now open method of coordination have been pursued for years but the first explicit 
mentioning was the EES, with Goetschy (2001: 405) agreeing that “the OMC takes over the 
method of the EES.” Consequently, some authors strongly criti cise the fact that many 
writers welcomed the OMC as something revolutionary new although soft law has been 
around for a while (Schäfer 2006).  
 
So if Lisbon was just repeating earlier procedures, only with different words, what was the 
real added value of the Lisbon summit? While most academics recognise that the OMC 
resembles many features of earlier methods, many also believe that the OMC brought 
something new, and even see the Lisbon summit as a key milestone (de la Porte 2002). For 
Larsson (2002: 7), Lisbon baptised this new method, and broadened the scope of action and 
integrated the economic and social pillar. Szysczak (2006: 488) sees the innovation of the 
OMC in “the acceptance of a generic name for the processes and the attempt to create a 
core of common features with the systematic attempt to formally, and proactively, use the 
OMC in defined policy arenas.” 25 
 
Another novelty coming from the Lisbon summit was that “rather than creating new 
instruments, ‘Lisbon’ suggested that various existing instrume nts, processes and strategies 
should be thought of as part of a new method’, the ‘open method of coordination’” 
(Wincott 2003: 534). This is echoed by Radaelli (2003: 17), who sees two main innovations 
at Lisbon. First of all, the OMC should be seen as a l egitimising discourse 26, namely a focal 
point for bringing together existing policy practices in a new discourse, which yielded 
political coherence. Secondly, it created task expansion i.e. applying the now OMC to areas 
where there was no such practices bef ore. To sum up, although the OMC is not entirely 
new, one can agree that it has various new elements. Although the Lisbon Council itself 
                                                   
25 We will see later that it is important to stress the aspect of a core of common features, as other features vary 
significantly between the different OMC processes.  
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stressed that no new processes are needed, the fact that new elements in the OMC can be 
identified, clearly shows that the introduction of the OMC was accompanied by the same 
rhetoric of downplaying the significance of the event/change, as many other (major) 
changes within the European political system, (e.g. the introduction of the Single European 
Act (SEA)), in order to limit political resistance.  
 
Being aware of ‘when’ and ‘how’ the OMC was created is important in order to understand 
the historical background for ‘why’ it was created, which will be examined next.  
 
 
Causes for its creation  
This part will now look at diffe rent elements for explaining why the OMC was chosen as an 
instrument for policy-making.27 While certain reasons will be considered as more important 
than others, it should be pointed out that any event or action is caused by the combination 
of multiple factors. Depending on their theoretical starting point, academics often choose 
one explanation above another. Not acknowledging the multitude of causes by ignoring 
them, strongly limits the completeness of the overall picture. First a number of possible 
reasons for the creation of the OMC will be presented before then examining if there is any 
support for them from academics and other observers.  28  
 
In order to explain the creation of the OMC one can highlight the following reasons 29:  
· Institutional redistributi on of power; 
· Integration (stronger or weaker);  
· Balance between the social and economic dimension;  
· Addressing the rising discontent of the citizens with the EU;  
· Improving efficiency of policy outcomes;  
                                                                                                                                                          
26 Legitimacy within the circle of EU leaders.  
27 This overview does not claim to be exhaustive, but outlines the main causes.  
28 This part should also be read in close relation with the overview of evaluations, as the preferred explanation 
for the creation of the OMC chosen by  a writer also reflects the final evaluation i.e. if an author considers for 
example that (one of) the main strength(s) of the OMC is the increase of legitimacy, it is very likely that she 
will concentrate her evaluation on this aspect, while ignoring othe rs, and very likely come to the conclusion 
that the OMC was chosen in order to increase the legitimacy.    
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· Shifting blame for drastic (and often unpopular) nation al reforms; 
· General move towards new forms of governance;  
· A combination of some of the above mentioned factors.  
 
Institutional redistribution of power  
This cause summarises the different interests for a redistribution of power between the 
European institutions. As has been shown earlier, certain institutions gained power within 
the OMC while others lost it, relative to other modes of governance. This seems to confirm 
the argumentation that the OMC was created, at least partially, because of the wish to 
change the institutional balance. Some, such as Maucher (2003: 6) argue that the OMC was 
chosen mainly to enhance the role of the European Council and also to find a third way 
between intergovernmentalism and Community Method 30, while others such as Regent 
(2003) see the Commission’s wish to prevent Member States from acting independently in 
the employment sphere as the underlying interest. Others outline the ambitions of both 
institutions, such as Heritier (2002) who points out that for the Commission the OMC 
offers the possibility to expand European policies in the face of national resistance, while 
the Member States see the OMC as giving them more autonomy in shaping policy. The 
limitation of the role of the EP can be seen in the interest of both of these inst itutions. An 
interesting argument is given by Szysczak (2006: 488), who believes that the OMC is being 
used in order to coordinate sensitive policy areas which have been eroded by the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) e.g. in the area of healt h care policy. While many 
authors see the argument of expanding the influence of the EU into sensitive policy areas as 
one of the main reasons for the creation of the OMC (therefore a proactive choice), this 
view gives a certain spin on that argument seein g it more as a damage control mechanism 
needed to address and prevent ECJ rulings (therefore making it a more reactive choice). 
Additionally one should not only look at the power distribution between the institutions, 
but also at the overall capacity of th e institutions to function. Therefore one should consider 
the argument of Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006: 475) who believe that moving ahead 
                                                                                                                                                          
29 Some of the arguments used for the different possible causes, are contradictory to each other.   
30 Own translations, any misinterpretations are ful ly my fault.  
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was difficult within the traditional Community Method, as the veto would be encountered, 
and remaining still riske d worse than paralysis. 31 
 
Integration 
While some felt that integration was not going fast enough, others were of the opinion that 
it already went further than they wanted. For some, the deepening of integration goes hand 
in hand with the strengthening of t he power of the Commission, which some support and 
others reject. Both the arguments of strengthening or limiting integration are plausible 
when explaining the decision to use the OMC. Two of the policy -makers most heavily 
involved and partially responsibl e for the creation of the OMC, Mr Larson 32 and Mrs João 
Rodrigues, agree with this view. Mr Larsson (2002: 5) recalls that there was the clear 
ambition from the EU Commission and the Portuguese Presidency of the EU to accelerate 
integration by having more E urope in social, educational and industrial policies while at the 
same time facing restrictions regarding institutional innovations. This is complemented by 
João Rodrigues’ (2001: 4) statement that the definition of the OMC was done at Lisbon in 
order to develop the European dimens ion in new policy fields, namely information society, 
research, enterprise policy, education and fighting social exclusion. Some authors see the 
OMC as part of an inherent logic within the EU, where political actors switch from 
traditional to alternative m odes of policy-making in areas where EU regulation is necessary 
but no compromise is currently able to be reached on what level and how this should be 
achieved (Szysczak 2006).  
 
Balance between the social and economic dimension  
Linked to the point on inte gration, but being more specific to one policy area is the 
argument of balancing the social and economic dimension of the EU. There was a strong 
sentiment that the European integration process was still mainly focused on economic 
integration, with all the bigger projects coming from the economic field (e.g. EMU and the 
completion of the internal market). This is why some academics stress that the creation of 
the OMC needs to be considered against the background of the socio -economic contents of 
                                                   
31 This argument will be examined further as part of the fieldwork.  
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EU politics. (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 186) An additional argument for this is that 
during this time there was a majority of social democratic led governments in Europe. 
These social democratic parties needed to find a balance between economic and social 
Europe, which gave significant symbolic value to Lisbon and the OMC (Dehousse 2002; 
Behning 2006; Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin 2006). This point is supported by 
Vandenbroucke (2002: 10) who sees the “open coordination as a weapon to fight the 
erosion of the welfare stat e in Europe and a means to contribute to the realisation of the 
European Social Model.”  
 
Addressing the rising discontent of the citizens with the EU  
During the 1990s the existence of a democratic deficit together with a conceived delivery 
gap on policy results led to decreasing support of the European citizens for the European 
project. If one follows the argument that the OMC was partially a response to these 
developments, one can see ways in which the OMC could offer alternatives to this problem. 
The first is by raising the legitimacy of the EU through increased participation of actors 
such as social partners and non -governmental organisations (NGO). This view is supported 
by Behning (2006: 11), who argues that the White Paper on Governance in 2001 identif ied 
the OMC as the ultimate system of governance to eliminate the EU’s democratic deficit. 
The second is by placing topics on the European Agenda, which are of real concern to the 
European citizens. Larsson (2002: 8) believes that there was a political mom entum at this 
time for the idea that the EU should have a role in employment issues, as employment was 
a top priority of ordinary citizens in Europe. This point also needs to be seen in relationship 
to the arguments of increasing integration as the driving  force behind the creation of the 
OMC. As Radaelli (2003: 7) argues, the OMC provides a ‘legitimising discourse’, enabling 
policy-makers to deal with new tasks in policy areas that are either politically sensitive or 
in any case not amenable to the Communi ty Method.33 Furthermore, the role and strength 
of the OMC as a legitimising discourse, has been increased with the support of many 
academics heralding the OMC as a new form of governance (Radaelli 2003: 51). The 
                                                                                                                                                          
32 Allan Larsson was formerly Director General of DG Employment in the European Commission and was 
heavily involved in the creation of the OMC.  
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argument of a legitimising discourse covers both possible causes, namely deepening 
integration and gaining the support from the public, which had become more sceptical 
towards integration.  
 
Improving the efficiency of policy outcomes  
As the OMC is a fundamental part of the Lisbon strategy, which had  as its ambitious goal 
to become the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge -driven economy by 2010”, the 
argument that the aim of improving the efficiency of policy outcomes was the main 
motivation for the creation of the OMC cannot be easily set aside. T here are various 
academics, such as Dehousse (2002: 18), who see the establishment of the OMC highly 
motivated by considerations of efficiency or as an attempt to come to grips with long 
standing problems in the search for competitiveness (Radaelli 2003: 1 9). Here one can link 
the wish to improve the efficiency of policy outcomes with the need to address negative 
side affects of integration. Dehousse (2002: 6) therefore believes in a dual reasoning: the 
existence of challenges common to all European countri es-unemployment, ageing of the 
population- and the negative impact of unbridled competition between Member States. 
While this is certainly true, it only explains why the EU might be seen as a useful arena, but 
not why the OMC would be chosen as the instrum ent of choice. What partially explains the 
use of the OMC is the twin desire of the Member States to deal with this issue at the 
European level, as they recognise that it has a European dimension which they cannot 
handle alone, but at the same time want to  remain in the drivers seat.  
 
Shifting blame for drastic (and often unpopular) national reforms  
As national governments were facing the triple challenge of globalisation, technological 
change and the modernisation of the social (protection) systems, the O MC could be seen as 
a welcome scapegoat to allow MS to put the responsibility for unpopular national reforms 
on other actors. Some academics believe that the OMC facilitates the shifting of blame and 
enables the domestic actors to hold the EU responsible f or unpopular decisions (Falkner 
2003; Schäfer 2006). Pochet and Natali (2004: 4) outline that even the Commission has 
                                                                                                                                                          
33 Again this shows a normative be lief, outlining that certain policy areas are not suitable for the Community 
Method. What would be more accurate is that the political climate is not ready (yet) to apply the Community 
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admitted in one of its studies that “besides economic arguments, coordination can also play 
a useful role from a political -economy view-point by helping to implement unpopular but 
necessary policy actions at national level.” While this argument is undoubtedly true, 
Member States would not need to create the OMC to do this. Therefore this argument does 
not represent a significant cause for cr eating the OMC, but rather for using it once it was 
created.  
 
General move towards new forms of governance  
Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006: 476) believe that the introduction of new modes of 
governance, such as the OMC, can be related to moves away from a  state-centred model to 
other models of authority. As outlined before, this applies not only to the EU and therefore 
one should not forget that the move to new forms of governance, which the OMC can be 
seen as an example of, is part of a broader internatio nal phenomenon which has various 
reasons for its appearance (de Búrca 2003).  
 
A combination of different factors  
An argument that combines a number of the above elements, (such as integration, the social 
dimension and form of governance) is that the situa tion where the integration process 
approaches the core areas of the welfare state, but that Member States are not prepared to 
compromise their sovereignty over social policy areas, has accentuated the need for 
alternatives to the Community Method (Borrás a nd Jacobsson 2004: 186). This view is 
supported by Scharpf (2002), who sees the logic of EU harmonisation by law clashing with 
the reality of very diverse welfare state models in Europe. Therefore as there was simply no 
political support for the further tr ansfer of legal competencies to the EU in these areas, 
(Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 190), a different policy -making instrument needed to be 
applied. Radaelli (2003: 21 -23) sees a combination of three reasons for the use of new 
modes of governance/OMC:  
· The ‘coordination’ of the OMC refers to coordination both in the policy area (between 
Member States) and between social and economic policies (This reflects the 
‘efficiency’ argument and the balance between economic and social issues);  
                                                                                                                                                          
Method in this area.   
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· New policy paradigms. (T his reflects the governance argument);  
· Legal constraints: very weak treaty base in some policy areas. (This reflects the 
integration argument.)  
 
Behning (2006) also looks at a combination of factors, which mainly include:  
· The coordination objective ‘national welfare state reform’ (this can be a mixture of 
arguments on efficiency and passing on the blame);  
· The demand to develop new forms of partne rships in which actors and citizens can 
participate and be included in the political processes on all political levels of the 
European Union (legitimacy argument);  
· The objective of creating a new single European social model that will be represented in 
the institutions of each Member State by the year 2010 (social Europe argument).  
 
Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin (2006: 525) see the OMC as a compromise at  two levels, on 
the one side between economically and socially minded actors restoring the ‘political 
balance’, and on the other side between Commission and Council. This combines the 
causes of institutional change with balance between social and economic Europe. 
 
This overview has shown that, even when trying to identify individual causes for the 
creation of the OMC, one has to realise that these are intrinsically connected to other 
possible explanations.34 However, the argument for improving the social dim ension is very 
dominant because of the historical development focusing mainly on economic integration, 
the political climate during that time with a majority of European governments being led by 
social democrats and the need to improve the opinion of the E uropean citizens regarding 
the EU. This of course also was supported by the European Commission which saw the 
OMC as an excellent opportunity to argue for more legitimacy through the participation of 
more actors in the policy-making process and simultaneou sly increase their involvement in 
policy areas from which they were previously excluded and thereby using the OMC to 
                                                   
34 Nevertheless, for individuals involved in the p rocess, their ideological beliefs might have significantly 
influenced them e.g. their belief in social rights and justice lead then to see the OMC as a tool to create or 
defend a European Social Model.  
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enhance integration.  Choosing the OMC in relation to integration also makes a lot of sense, 
seeing it from the perspective of the Commissi on as well as the Member States. For some 
countries, it was about finding a way of dealing with common problems without further 
integration. Others looked more at how uniform legislation could work with this diversity 
of Member States. Others again searche d for a way to continue the integration process, 
which was often slowed down or blocked by more reluctant Member States. Another idea 
to keep in mind is that whatever the original aims the OMC developed a life of its own , 
adapting to the ever-changing political climate with different actors trying to use the OMC 
to achieve their objectives. This overview clearly confirms that the OMC was a solution to 
very diverse sets of problems and to accommodate different, often opposing interests, one 
of the most influential being the challenge on the competing interests concerning the speed 
and type of integration (Gornitzka 2005).    
 
Knowing the different influences for choosing the creation of the OMC is useful for 
understanding how the OMC has been dealt with subse quently. There is a causal 
connection between the arguments given for the creation of the OMC, the outlined 
strengths of the OMC and the areas where academics evaluate the OMC. As the OMC is 
addressing various problems (effectiveness, legitimacy, better go vernance and integration) 
it is not surprising that the list of potential strengths and promises of the OMC is extensive. 
Those who believe that the OMC was chosen to address a particular problem focus on this 
promised strength and evaluate then the OMC on  its delivery concerning this aspect. A very 
good example of the link between the reasons for creating the OMC and its promises can be 
identified in the discussions in the Convention and the Constitutional Treaty on the role of 
the OMC, which will be brief ly outlined later. First, it is necessary to understand the 
differences between the various OMC processes.  
 
 
Different OMC processes  
Although the Lisbon Council gave a template for the OMC, one can observe that no one 
OMC process is identical to another, a s different processes apply the method differently, 
sometimes introducing new elements while ignoring others. As its application varies widely 
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across different policy areas, one can agree with de Búrca (2003: 14) that “there is no one 
‘open method’ but rather a range of differen t kinds, all broadly sharing a number of 
characteristics, but with variations and distinctive features according to the particular policy 
area.” Furthermore, these broad characteristics can be identified in the proposal of the 
Social Working Group of the C onvention which states that the OMC is  
 
“a new form of coordination of national policies consisting of the Member 
States, at their own initiative or at the initiative of the Commission, defining 
collectively, with respect for national and regional diversi ties, objectives 
and indicators in a specific area, and allowing those Member States, on the 
basis of national reports to improve their knowledge, to develop exchanges 
of information, views, expertise and practices, and to promote, further to 
agreed objectives innovative approaches which could possibly lead to 
guidelines or recommendations.”  (European Convention 2003)  
 
Despite these shared characteristics, Laffan and Shaw (2006: 6) argue correctly that “a 
priori definition of new modes of governance provi de a rough template for classifying 
OMC, but their usefulness breaks down when applied across all instances of OMC.” 
Therefore it is necessary briefly to look at the elements on which the OMCs can differ and 
propose various ways of grouping them together. Some academics criticise the OMC on the 
ground that no policy area complies with the blue print given at the Lisbon summit. The 
response by its presumed creator, João Rodrigues (2001: 6) should be sufficient: “An 
empirical and flexible approach is being us ed, in order to develop and to adapt this method 
to the specific features of each policy field” i.e. it was never meant to be the same in all 
policy areas, but rather to be adapted to the specific situation and needs of the particular 
policy area. The most  common quote on explaining and justifying the existence of different 
OMCs is from Vandenbroucke (2002: 9) who outlined that the OMC “is not some kind of 
fixed recipe that can be applied to any issue. (…) Policy coordination and open 
coordination together constitute a cookbook that contains various recipes, lighter and 
heavier ones.” The existence of lighter and harder versions of the OMC is also supported by 
other academics such as Radaelli (2003: 9). So while having established that there are 
different forms of OMC processes, one needs now to look at on which issues they differ 
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and if there are certain types of OMCs. Some of the main features on which the OMC 
processes can differ are: 35 
· Whether or not there is a strong treaty provision in this area;  
· The role of the different institutions;  
· To which extent other actors can participate in the process;  
· The existence of benchmarks, indicators and targets.  
 
Knowing that there are various OMCs, some academics tried to categorise these different 
versions. Radaelli (2003: 31) for example proposes to divide the different types of OMC 
into three categories, which orders the policy areas according to the significance of the 
OMC as a working method. These are:  
1. Policies where there is a deliberate attempt to use the OMC as  the main ‘working 
method’ 
· Broad Economic Policy Guidelines;  
· European Employment Strategy;  
· Social Inclusion; 
· Pensions; 
2. Policy areas where the intention to use OMC was manifested but so far only limited 
instruments of the ‘method’ have been applied  
· Innovation and RDT policies; 
· Education; 
· Information society; 
· Environmental policy;  
· Health Care. 
3. ‘Open coordination in disguise’  
· Direct taxation. 
 
                                                   
35 For an excellent and more extensive mapping exerci se of the different OMCs and the differences and 
similarities between them see Laffan and Shaw (2006), Borrás and Jacobsson (2004) or Radaelli (2003).   For 
a more specific comparison between the OMC in employment and the one in social inclusion see De la P orte 
(2002). 
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Borrás and Jacobsson (2004: 191 -92) also divide the various OMCs into three groups 
according to policy areas, but exp lain in more detail why these forms of the OMC are 
applied in the specific policy area. The first group is made up of policies where previous 
attempts to develop stronger forms of coordination failed, e.g. pensions, social inclusion, 
and Research and Techn ological development; the second group consists of policy areas 
which are relatively new fields of public involvement, where traditionally regulatory 
instruments are not appropriate, e.g. employment policy, information society; and the third 
group includes policy areas, which are showing very strong functional interdependence 
with the EU level, e.g. national economic policies and their relation to the European 
monetary policy. 
 
These differences in the rationale for establishing an OMC in the various policy  areas, 
partially explain the variations of the OMC, but other elements need to be considered as 
well. 
 
One explanation for the spread of the OMC to so many other policy areas is the idea of 
political experimentalism at a reduced political cost (Laffan and  Shaw 2006: 18). MS are 
willing to experiment and see without having to invest too much at the beginning and 
without fearing institutionalisation. As a consequence they apply the OMC to their specific 
policy area and make specific adaptations. However, ano ther argument in explaining the 
differences is that as each OMC is associated with a specific DG and Council formation, 
and there are different policy cultures within a DG. As Laffan and Shaw (2006: 12) argue 
one can speak of the logic of ‘one DG, one OMC’ . If this is true, different OMCs of the 
same DG and Council formation should be similar. However, a comparison of the EES and 
the OMC in social inclusion, which are both within DG employment, shows they are not. 36 
So this explanation needs to be complement ed by other decisive elements for shaping the 
type of OMC process. The most appropriate is ‘time’. As outlined, the term OMC was first 
used at the Lisbon Council, nevertheless the OMC has several different origins and sources 
of inspiration predating Lisbo n, which explains why OMC processes originating before 
                                                   
36 One of the main differences is the strong treaty base of the EES compared to the OMC on social inclusion; 
furthermore the significance of the social partners also varies between the two processes.  
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Lisbon have slightly different features from OMC processes originating post Lisbon. This 
notion could be linked to the concept of ‘path dependency’ (Pierson 1996; Schmidt, 
Tsebelis and Risse 1999). As they were created at different times, the rules of the day were 
also different: MS could not change the OMC that already existed but they could limit or 
adapt the new ones.37 Laffan and Shaw (2006: 16) categorise the different OMC procedures 
according to the relative level of institutionalisation, separating them between very strong, 
strong, nascent and weak. They then cross -check this with the years since interception of 
the OMC. The result is that older processes are also more strongly institutionalised. 
Therefore one can argue that the OMC becomes more imbedded over time, and the 
currently weaker OMCs are the most recent ones. Various authors support this explanation 
(e.g. Borrás and Greve (2004)).  
 
This brief overview has shown that there is no single OMC  but rather various forms of it, 
which differ across issues such as stakeholder participation and the existence of 
benchmarks and indicators. Also there are various elements in explaining why the OMC 
processes in the different policy areas vary; these incl ude the internal political culture, 
whether or not there is a treaty basis, and the time factor. One of the reasons for why there 
are different OMC processes is of course that the OMC is not mentioned in the European 
Treaties. To which extent this would ma ke the OMC processes more harmonised is 
debatable. The question of whether or not to give legal status to the OMC, by integrating 
the concept into the European Constitution, was discussed in the European Convention, 
which will be looked into now.  
 
 
The European Convention  
In order to give a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the OMC, the 
discussions in the European Convention, which prepared the text for the Constitutional 
Treaty, will be briefly outlined. The European Convention, whi ch was aimed at adapting 
                                                   
37 This, for example, explains to a certain e xtent the limited participation of UEAPME, one of the European 
Social partners, in some of the advisory committees as part of the OMC. Those committees, which were set 
up before UEAPME joined the European Social Dialogue, are still closed to their particip ation, while the new 
ones, created afterwards, all include it.  
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the institutions and the policy-making of the EU in order to facilitate the functioning of an 
EU 25 (and plus), was an ideal opportunity to adapt, expand and constitutionalise the OMC. 
However, although various working groups of th e convention proposed to insert an article 
on the OMC in one form or another, 38 this was not done in the end. Radaelli (2003: 8) 
argues that various members of the Convention saw the OMC as a way to balance 
economic logic with the value of the ‘European soc ial model’. The reason why it was not 
included in the final text is not easy to pinpoint, as the convention was made up of 
representatives from the Member States, the European Parliament, the Commission and 
others, which all had their own interests regardi ng the inclusion (or not) of the OMC into 
the text. The official explanation from the Presidium of the Convention, was that they 
feared that this might weaken instead of strengthen the OMC, and that it might lead to 
confusion on the delimitation of the com petences between the EU and the Member States 
(de Búrca (2003: 30). 39   
 
Other explanations are for example the fact that potential variations in the OMCs 
application exists outside the main characteristics laid down in Lisbon (Maher 2004: 2), 
which highlights the flexibility inherent in the OMC processes (Szysczak 2006). While 
others, such as Zeitlin (2005) argue there was a deadlock inside the convention (in the 
Social Europe Working group as well as the presidium) over the OMC, creating a de facto 
alliance of opposites, namely defenders of MS prerogative against further intrusion of the 
EU and those who feared a dilution of the Community Method by soft law processes, 
which led to the result of not including an article on the OMC. 40 This fear that the OMC 
would supplement existing competences is also supported by Szysczak (2006: 488) as one 
of the reasons not to include the OMC in the convention text. Another opinion is that OMC 
was not mentioned in the Constitutional Treaty because of its lack of transparenc y and 
democratic control (de la Porte and Nanz 2004: 268). Two other concerns why the 
convention was dubious about including OMC in the text are 1) the concern that 
constitutionalisation of the OMC might lead to its rigidification which would limit its 
                                                   
38 See for example European Convention (2002).  
39 Quoting Dehaence’s statement in the convention session April 3 -4, 2003. 
40 We will come back to this kind of coalition between opposite visions w hen looking at the evaluations of the 
OMC. 
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flexibility and 2) the concern that the OMC might be (wrongly) used, in order to replace 
hard law by soft law, where hard law exists, which would also more generally undermine 
the wider European integration project (de Búrca and Zeitlin 2003: 2).   
 
This list of reasons could probably be extended. However, one can generally say that the 
OMC was not included because some were still sceptical of the OMC being a Trojan horse, 
either for unwanted further integration, or for the opposite, namely a softening up of t he 
Community Method. Still others, more positive towards the OMC, believed that it could 
only work in a flexible way outside of a formal legal framework and would lose its added 
value if constitutionalised. Nevertheless, Ashiagbor (2004: 331) argues that a lthough the 
term OMC is not mentioned in the text, the OMC has been de facto included in the areas of 
public health, industry, social policy and employment. This is supported by Gornitzka 
(2005: 5), who argues that the text of the draft constitution includ ed on several instances 
‘OMC-like’ descriptions, which means that the OMC method in reality is there, but without 
calling it by its name.   
 
Would a constitutionalised OMC be better or worse than a de facto OMC? It is difficult to 
answer. This judgement de pends very much on one’s own opinion of law and the relation 
between formal and informal powers. In any case there is no constitution, and even the 
Lisbon treaty (if it will be adopted) has no specific mentioning of the OMC. Furthermore, 
even by not being integrated in the text, the OMC processes continued to develop and 
expand, such as through the streamlining and reinforcing of the OMC processes in health, 
social inclusion and social protection. 41   
 
 
Summary of the open method of coordination  
This section has presented the EU’s new modes of governance and the OMC as one of its 
main examples. The characteristics of the OMC have been outlined, which include seeing 
the OMC as a third way between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Then the 
                                                   
41 See European Commission (2005) and European Commission (2008a).  
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differences between the OMC and the CM where revisited and the possible future scenarios 
were examined. The analysis showed that while different, certain elements of old 
governance can also be found in new governance modes, such as the OMC. Therefore one 
should not generalise on the superiority of the one mode over the other, but see their 
usefulness by being applied to different areas and circumstances in a complementary 
fashion. Following this, a historical overview of the development of the OMC was given, 
which identified that the Lisbon summit needs to be seen as part of a broader process 
creating the OMC and its main features. Leading on from there the origin of the OMC was 
examined, trying to find the main reason why the OMC was created. The result was that it 
is a combination of various reasons, and depending on the academic’s theoretical beliefs 
one reason is often preferred above the others. However, what became evident was that the 
OMC was created as a compromise between divergent interests, particularly conce rning the 
speed and type of further integration.  Then the existence of not one but various forms of 
the OMC was identified and explanations for this were presented, including the time 
difference between when they were established, as well as the policy ar ea. Finally this 
section looked at how the OMC was dealt with in the Convention and outlined the 
argument for whether or not the OMC should have been included in the constitution.  
 
 
2. Literature review of the OMC   
The aim of this section is to present an d summarise the main themes in the established 
literature on the OMC, outlining the main perspectives and divisions within it. It will also 
give an overview of how the OMC is evaluated by the various academics within the 
different fields and which indicato rs they use for their evaluation. On this basis the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of these bodies of literature will be assessed.  
 
When examining the evaluations of the OMC it is important to be aware that these often  
assess the OMC according to dif ferent scales, depending on which aspects the evaluators 
see as the most important. Furthermore, the evaluation of the OMC depends heavily on the 
theoretical starting point of the evaluator, for two reasons: first of all different questions are 
asked, which leads to different findings. Secondly, even if the questions are the same the 
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evaluation might differ significantly depending on what value is given to specific 
outcomes. While it is impossible to avoid this, being aware of the theoretical differences 
helps to understand contradicting evaluations based on the same findings.  
 
Idema and Kelemen (2006: 5) argue that most academic writings on the OMC are based 
either on a rational choice perspective or a mixture of constructivist theory and learning. 
Bernhard (2006: 42) even identifies three different groups: the first looking at the 
effectiveness of the OMC, using a rationalist approach; the second looking at the learning 
potential using an institutionalist approach; and the third looking at elements such as 
common language, common knowledge and common discourse, using constructivist 
arguments and theories. Consequently, one can identify that some of the questions asked in 
order to evaluate the OMC are clearly more important for one research tradition than for  
another, while others have the same importance for different theoretical families. While this 
theoretical divide applies across all the different themes, within each theme one can often 
also identify a certain predominance of one theoretical belief over a nother. The following 
overview of questions used when evaluating the OMC 42, attempts to indicate whether a 
research question tends to be asked more by rationalists, by constructivists or by both 
equally43:  
  
Questions related more to rationalist theory:  
· Is the OMC announced at Lisbon really something new?  
· Has the OMC led to something? Did it have any impact on national policy -making? 
· Is the OMC a tool in strengthening the European Council and to reduce the control of 
the Commission? 
· How strong is the role of the Commission in the OMC really?  
· Did the OMC spread from one policy area to another?  
 
                                                   
42 This does not attempt to be an exhaustive list but rather give a broad indication.  
43 For reasons of simplification, this will only distinguish between constructivism and rationalism. The author 
will show in chapter two that he is aware of a more fragmented theoretical belief system.  Furthermore, this of 
course can only be seen as indicative as these theoretical families are by no means homogeneo us in 
themselves.
  
51
Questions related more to constructivist theory:  
· Did policy-makers engage in socialisation?  
· Is real learning happening?  
· Did it reduce the democratic deficit?  
· Did it lead to more openness? 
· Does the OMC really lead to common perceptions of problems?  
· What is the real power of persuasion? Does persuasion exist?  
 
Questions used by both:  
· Is the OMC an instrument to enhance integration?  
· Do MS talk to each other in sensitive are as they did not do so before?  
· Is the OMC replacing the Community Method as the main form of governance, does the 
OMC reinforce or complement other modes of governance and does it work only in 
policy areas where the Community Method does not exist?  
· Are there short term or long -term effects? 
· Were the aims of the creators achieved?  
 
Finally, while examining the literature on the OMC, one has also to be aware of the issue of 
time. First, there is a time difference of writing between the authors, and it is not  likely that 
the analysis of academics even older than a few years correctly mirror the current situation, 
as the different OMCs are still in development and still spreading to new policy areas and 
empirical data is only starting to roll in. Furthermore, s ome writers who were relatively 
optimistic towards the OMC at the beginning changed their minds, as empirical evidence 
seemed to negate their hopes. Borrás and Greve (2004) emphasise that the OMC created a 
lot of optimism among scholars, but as time goes b y more and more of this optimism turned 
out to be conditional. At the same time some of the initial criticisms raised by others may 
not be valid either. The second point regarding time is outlined by writers such as Schäfer 
(2006), who reminds the reader o f the difficulty of evaluating the effects of the OMC as it 
is hard to establish what would have happened without it and possible positive effects may 
only become visible in the long run. A third point concerning time is the development of 
the focus of the academics. In the early years the discussions were mainly on a very 
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theoretical and abstract level concerning the issue of the OMC as a new form of 
governance. After the OMC was established for a few years, these discussions where in a 
second phase furthe r enlarged to examine its impact more.  
 
 
Themes in the literature review  
In recent years the body of literature on EU governance and the OMC has significantly 
grown44, while at the same time the academic literature on European integration has greatly 
expanded with a multiplicity of perspectives being employed to theorise developments. 
Unfortunately these two trends have so far been to a great extent separate from each other.  
 
Academic work on the OMC has concentrated on the following main areas:  
· OMC as a new mode of governance;  
· Legitimacy and democracy;  
· Impact on national policy -making; 
· Integration. 
 
While it is valuable to distinguish between different themes, it is important to emphasise 
that any piece of academic work rarely fits 100% into one of the ou tlined areas, but rather 
often deals with various aspects. However while saying this, normally there is always one 
aspect predominant on which the writer concentrates. Nevertheless some writers attempt to 
address the various aspects of the OMC in their eva luation (Radaelli 2003). 
                                                   
44 The Journal of European Public Policy devoted an entire special edition to the issue of OMC (Volume 11 
No.2 2004).  
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Table 1.1: OMC literature  
Theme Achievement Weakness  Further research  
OMC as a new 
mode of 
governance 
It places the development of 
the OMC in a wider (time) 
frame (than only Lisbon) 
and compares it to the 
traditional mode of 
governance, which helps to 
explain the origins of the 
OMC as well as to  
understand its novel features  
Very often there is an 
either/or approach on the 
usefulness of soft and 
hard law respectively, 
which rather limits the 
level of examination.  
 
Develop further analysis on the 
complementary between the 
OMC and the CM  
Legitimacy and 
democracy 
It helps to examine whether 
the OMC contributes to 
increased legitimacy as 
promised. It also provides 
an overview of the actors 
involved in all the OMC 
processes in order to 
evaluate the participation 
aspect. 
The main shortcomings of 
this group of writers is 
that it concentrates too 
much on the legitimacy 
issue without taking the 
other aspects into account 
and that the involvement 
of non-state actors is only 
analysed in a quantitative 
dimension 
The analysis of the involvement 
of actors such  as social partners 
and NGO should shift from a 
purely quantitative dimension 
(i.e. have they contributed to 
reports or participated in 
meetings?) to a more qualitative 
dimension (i.e. does the 
involvement impact on the 
results?) 
The topic should be used i n a 
more complementary form to the 
other main themes in the OMC 
debate  
Impact on 
national policy-
making 
It outlines that there is not 
only one OMC, but rather 
various processes which are 
based on a general 
blueprint, and then adapted 
to the political rea lity of the 
policy field. It offers also a 
more in-depth analysis and 
comparison of the different 
elements between the 
different OMC processes in 
the different policy areas.  
 
Work on this aspect is 
still limited. So far little 
independent empirical 
evidence has been 
available on which to base 
the evaluation of the 
impact at national level, 
as most of the data used is 
based on the responses of 
the MS to their NAPs.  
Looking at changes in policy -
making at national level while at 
the same time identifying if 
other internal (e.g. change of 
governments) and/or external 
(e.g. WTO discussions) 
processes could be the cause of 
the policy shift  
Clearly identifying the 
dimensions of impact at national 
level and examining if some 
form of impact is more likely 
than another 
Using the concepts of ‘best fit’ 
and ‘misfit’, and uploading and 
downloading of policy, in 
examining if certain MS show a 
greater or lesser impact  
Integration It examines how the OMC 
can contribute to the whole 
European integration 
process. 
Lack of using appropriate 
theories in further 
explaining the reason for 
this form of integration  
Applying European integration 
theories to the development of 
the OMC and examine if, and 
how the different theories can 
explain this 
Source: Author  
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Governance  
By far the most extensively addressed theme within the body of literature concentrates on 
the issue of the OMC as a new mode of governance (Behning 2006; Berghman and Okma 
2003; Bernard 2003; Borrás and Greve 2004; Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; de Búrca 2003; 
Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Dehousse 2002; Eberlein and Kerwer 2002; Hodson and Maher 
2001; Idema and Kelemen 2006; Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; Laffan and Shaw 2006; 
Mosher and Trubek 2003; de la Porte 2002; de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Radaelli 2003; 
Regent 2003; Zeitl in 2005; Zeitlin 2005; Schäfer 2006).  
 
The principal point of analysis is whether or not the OMC really is a new mode of 
governance and what the difference to traditional governance is. One of the main debates is 
the relationship between the OMC and the Co mmunity Method, which is reflected in the 
substantial work done on comparing these forms of governance. In this context the analysis 
focuses on whether or not the OMC is only a transitional mode of governance or a real 
alternative able to substitute the CM  or both being complementary. In order to support or 
reject the claim of the OMC being a better governance mode, this body of literature looks at 
the promises that are associated with the OMC. As argued in section one, there is an 
important causal link bet ween the arguments for the creation of the OMC and the focus on 
a specific perceived strength of the OMC. Therefore various academics might focus on 
different promises or simply use dissimilar terms and vocabulary for them. While not 
claiming to be exhaust ive, this overview reflects the main issues discussed in the debate on 
the OMC as a new mode of governance. Furthermore, some of these promises are then the 
basis of analysis for different groups of writers evaluating specific aspects of the OMC. Out 
of various academic and political statements, one can draw the following promises, which 
argue that the OMC is more suitable in comparison to other policy -making instruments and 
is supposed to:  
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· Provide a new form of governance as an alternative to hard law  
The OMC might deter the move to hard law. 45 Therefore some writers believe the OMC 
processes serve as testing ground for new methods and new policy ideas and create the 
basis for future collaboration (Berghman and Okma 2003), as well as being a risk free 
method of path finding in new policy areas (Laffan and Shaw 2006: 19). Many academics 
see the OMC as a third way for the EU between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism (Ashiagbor 2004; Dehousse 2002; Zeitlin 2005) 46 and more particularly 
as a third way for social policy between regulatory competition and harmonisation (Zeitlin 
2005), with the absence of sanctions distinguishing it from hard law.  
 
· Enhance the democratic dimension through multi -level governance  
There are various ways in which the OMC is su pposed to enhance the democratic 
dimension. First of all the OMC is supposed to enhance democratic participation and 
accountability through being ‘open’, 47 and allowing participation of employers, trade 
unions (TU) and NGO at various levels in the process. The other way of enhancing the 
democratic dimension is seen in the assumption that decisions would be more adapted to 
the local level and could thus appear more democratic and legitimate than rules imposed 
from Brussels (Trubek 2003) This would represent a  decentralised and bottom -up approach 
rather than the traditional centralised and top -down approach.  
 
· Promote deliberation:  the ways knowledge and learning are created and diffused 
across countries  
One of the main aims of the OMC is to promote mutual lea rning through the exchange of 
good practices. Some academics believe that the OMC not only facilitates learning but also 
helps to incorporate new knowledge (Trubek 2003). This might also include public servants 
serving as intermediates between the worlds o f academia and politics (Berghman and Okma 
2003). 
                                                   
45 Depending on ones personal beliefs and theoretical standing, this might be positive as well as a negative 
feature of the OMC. 
46 This view of the OMC has also been expressed by the British and Swedish governments, traditional 
eurosceptic countries, see Jacobsson and Vifell (2003: 5).  
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· Increase flexibility  
The OMC allows for flexibility i.e. policy initiatives can be adapted to the diverse 
institutional arrangements, legal regimes and national circumstances in the Member States 
(Schäfer 2006), which gives diverse solutions for common problems (Trubek 2003). By 
focusing on process flexibility rather than institutional flexibility, the OMC finds the right 
balance between the need for respecting diversity and the need for unity of EU action 
(Borrás and Jacobsson 2004). This flexibility could also help to overcome political 
resistance, as flexible agreements may surmount Member States’ opposition to EU 
mandates considered too disruptive of or alien to national arrangements (Schäfer 2006).  
 
· Create depoliticalisation as a condition for further integration  
Many observers believe that one of the main characteristics of the OMC is to make 
progress in politically sensitive areas by avoiding politicisation, e.g. Radaelli (2003). This 
depoliticalisation can actually have various effects. The first would be being able to discuss 
a sensitive issue at European level, as it offers the national governments the distinct 
advantages of being able to reach agreement without having to fear binding consequences 
(Schäfer 2006). If this happens, depoliticalisation can have a second effect, namely 
enabling real reforms, which would not happen otherwise, as they would normally be 
paralysed by multiple vetoes (Dehousse 2002). This can then lead to a third effect of the 
OMC, namely being a catalyst for further integration, particularly in sectors with multiple 
veto possibilities, by giving a new role to the EU in policy areas where, until now, there 
was none (Maher 2004).  
 
· Respect subsidiarity  
This issue is closely linked  to the previous one, as the OMC is supposed to be ideal for 
applying the principle of subsidiarity (de la Porte 2002) since it represents a compromise 
between the desire for common action and the desire of the national governments to 
maintain some control  (Dehousse 2002). It is also supposed to minimise sovereignty losses 
(Schäfer 2006).  
                                                                                                                                                          
47 The question of ‘openness’ will be dealt with in more detail later on.  
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An excellent summary of the main assumed strengths of the OMC argues that  
 
“the value of the OMC, in our view, lies not simply in its general 
usefulness, efficiency, and  flexibility as an instrument of EU policy -making. 
Because the OMC encourages convergence of national objectives, 
performances and policy approaches rather than specific institutions, rules 
and programmes, this mechanism is particularly well suited to iden tifying 
and advancing the common concerns and interests of the Member States 
while simultaneously respecting their autonomy and diversity. It is neither 
strictly a supranational nor an intergovernmental method of governance, but 
one that is genuinely joint  and multi-level in its operation. By committing 
the Member States to share information, compare themselves to one another 
and reassess current policies against their relative performance, the OMC is 
also proving to be a valuable tool for promoting deliber ative problem-
solving and cross -national learning across the EU.” (Búrca and Zeitlin 2003: 
2) 
 
A group of writers  within the new mode of governance debate focuses, as a sub theme, on 
the functional dimension by concentrating on the tools and instruments of  the OMC, such 
as benchmarking, peer review and target setting (Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson 2004; 
de la Porte, Pochet and Room 2001; Hodson and Maher 2001; Schäfer 2006; Sisson, 
Arrowsmith and Marginson 2003). While analysing the exact processes and t he use of these 
tools, they then try to evaluate to which extent the OMC introduces changes to the 
governance system of the EU. These writers also examine what benchmarking has to offer 
and whether these new tools are more effective in policy -making than the traditional 
Community Method. Some argue that empirical studies provide some evidence that peer 
pressure and benchmarking influence the behaviour of national governments (Chiatteli 
2006). Others argue that so far peer review has been less effective (Kro eger 2006). 
 
Another sub theme, where a significant number of writers have concentrated their efforts, is 
the legal dimension of the OMC (Ashiagbor 2004; Borras and Jacobsson 2004; de Búrca 
2003; Hodson and Maher 2001; Maher 2004; Schäfer 2004; Teague 2001 ; Trubek and 
Trubek 2004; Wincott 2003). Some of the main debates evolve around the following 
questions: 
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· How do old and new governance differ in the legal dimension? Academics look at the 
relation between hard and soft law;  
· Where can the OMC be located bet ween the methods of soft law and hard law? (A 
certain problematic evolves from defining the OMC. Writers outline that even if the 
OMC cannot be defined as anything else than soft law, it differs from traditional soft 
law measures (Regent 2003). Therefore s ome establish a typology of different soft 
policy-making methods (Ahonen 2001);  
· Is the OMC, as an example of soft law, better or worse than hard law?  
· How important is the OMC in EU policy -making? How many EU policy activities are 
based on the OMC and how m any on traditional modes of governance?  
· How does the lack of sanctions within the OMC impact on the effectiveness of the 
method? One of the major concerns is whether the OMC as a soft law instrument, can 
really deliver results;  
· How appropriate is the use of the OMC in politically sensitive areas? For various 
writers looking at the legal dimension, there is a link between the form of law and the 
policy area. They consider that the OMC, as a form of soft law, is particularly 
appropriate in politically sensit ive issues (de la Porte 2002).   
 
Indicators 
The following indicators are used by this group of writers to answer these research 
questions and evaluate the OMC:  
· Difference from traditional governance;  
· Comparison with the Community Method;  
· Presence or absence of sanctions; 
· Use in specific policy areas i.e. with legal basis or not;  
· Whether it is a normative form of governance and what exactly this includes.  
 
Evaluation 
Most academics agree that the OMC is a new governance approach, indeed some see it as 
part of a new policy paradigm (Dehousse 2002). The real debate is whether or not it 
delivers as a form of governance. Critics argue that OMC cannot work without sanctions, as 
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this restrains the OMC from being really effective. They identify the lack of sanction s as a 
weakness because MS are not directly forced to comply. Others believe that one can 
identify certain sanctions, namely the introduction of indicators (Regent 2003). While 
others again do not perceive the absence of sanctions as a problem in a governa nce 
architecture based on incentives for learning (Radaelli 2003: 8) or they even argue that ”the 
weaknesses of the OMC might turn out to be its strengths” (Borrás and Greve 2004: 333). 
Some see the Luxembourg process as having acquired a normative status (Ashiagbor 2004: 
312), as the view of the Commission, their peers and the public opinion through the media 
can pressure the individual MS to comply rather strongly, which can be seen as ‘light 
versions’ of sanctions with some quiet ‘hard’ impact. 48 There are various academics who 
support the notion that even in the absence of law the OMC can have possible constraints 
on national governments (Dehousse 2002; Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2005). 49 
 
The choice for a non -constraining instrument without sanctions is s een by some as a 
compromise at two levels: on the one hand, between economic and socially minded actors, 
and on the other, between the Commission and the Member States 50 (Bruno, Jacquot and 
Mandin 2006). Furthermore, those seeing the non -binding nature of the OMC as positive, 
also argue that it increases the willingness of the Member States to discuss sensitive issues 
in the first place as they do not have to fear legislation and therefore can discuss an issue in 
a more constructive way. The discussion on th e perceived absence of sanctions clearly 
divides observers from different theoretical standings, in particular concerning the question 
of the nature of law, as the one (more rationally informed) group of writers sees no possible 
impact with the absence of sanctions, while the other group of academics (more 
constructively orientated) believe there is.  
 
Some critics, who argue against applying the OMC and soft law to the EU, raise not only 
the absence of sanctions, but also other concerns. These include:  
· It lacks clarity and the predictability necessary in order to establish a reliable 
framework for actions;  
                                                   
48 This is again an  aspect which needs to be further examined in the fieldwork.  
49 The authors specially indicate that these ideas draw on the work of constructivist minded academics.  
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· Hard law on market regulations can only be balanced with hard law on social issues;  
· Soft law does not prevent a race to the bottom e.g. in Social policy in the EU; 
· Soft law has no real effect but is a covert tactic to enlarge the Unions legislative 
competence; 
· Soft law bypasses normal systems of accountability;  
· Soft law undermines EU legitimacy, because it creates expectations on which it cannot 
deliver (Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2005: 2).  
 
Another aspect considered by this literature is whether or not the OMC respects the 
principle of subsidiarity . While some argue that the OMC goes against the principle of 
subsidiarity, others argue it offers the policy -maker an attractive ‘logic of appropriateness’, 
as it delegates responsibility to find tailor -made solutions to a lower level (Arrowsmith, 
Sisson and Marginson 2004: 312). Finally, some observers fear that the OMC could 
become the victim of its own success . If the OMC really leads to the growing of common 
values, as a result of the learning process, the possibility of a transfer of competences to the 
EU level could increase, which would mean that the OMC would be only a transitional 
instrument and not a ful ly-fledged alternative (Hodson and Maher 2001).  
 
Strengths and weaknesses of this literature  
One of the strengths of this literature is that it places the development of the OMC in a 
wider (time) frame (than only Lisbon) and compares it to the traditional mode of 
governance, which helps to explain the origins of the OMC as well as to understand its 
novel features. By doing this, the reader gets a better overview not only of what the 
differences are to other forms of governance, but also how these methods were developed 
and why. The discussions on the legal dimension provide the reader with an interesting 
overview of the different opinions on the nature of law. It also gives an understanding of 
how the use of law has contributed to European integration, how t his use varies across 
policy areas and how it has changed. However, the danger exists that one takes an either/or 
approach on the usefulness of soft and hard law respectively, which rather limits the level 
                                                                                                                                                          
50 This issue will be discussed in the case studies.  
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of examination. Also, as the OMC is a political pr ocess and not a legal one, focusing on the 
legal dimension can be helpful only to a certain extent.  
 
The work on benchmarking and peer review is very useful because it helps to identify the 
advantages and shortcomings of these tools when applying them to s uch a diverse group as 
European nation states. It sheds some more light on what exactly benchmarking is, and 
what its different forms are. Moreover, comparing the use of benchmarking and peer 
review procedures in the OMC with those of other international o rganisations, makes the 
scientist aware that the tools of the OMC processes are not limited to the EU, but the same 
instruments, are used at the national, European or international level by other international 
organisations e.g. European Monetary Union, In ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, this is also a 
shortcoming of this literature, comparing regimes of a very different nature (OECD, IMF) 
with that of the EU which might be more c onfusing than helpful. The problem here is not 
the general n=1 debate, the real difference, and worth taking into consideration in the 
further analysis, is that while the other international organisations use tools such as 
benchmarking as their main form o f operation, the EU has a wider range of tools and it 
chose to use soft tools rather than harder ones. Furthermore, this literature concentrates too 
much on the functional side of the OMC, which leads to neglecting the bigger picture, such 
as for example ( further) integration or the division of power between the actors.  
 
While this work is essential for laying the groundwork, the analysis of the OMC must be 
extended beyond the governance discourse, and explore whether or not the OMC fulfils 
these promises, in order to show clearly the many meaningful contributions the OMC can 
make to the study of the EU. Therefore while most work starts from analysing the 
governance perspective, many writers then look at different aspects more in detail and try 
to answer: 
· ‘How does it contribute to more democracy in and legitimacy of the EU’; by looking at 
participation in and transparency of the process;  
· ‘Whether this mode of governance is more effective than traditional policy -making’; by 
looking at the impact at national level and at learning;  
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· ‘How the OMC relates to integration’; by looking at the spread of the OMC across the 
different policy areas.  
 
The literature on these three separate aspects will now be looked at more closely.  
 
 
Legitimacy and democracy  
The body of literature on legitimacy and democracy is the second most prominent theme in 
the OMC literature (de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Eberlein and Kerwer 2002; Idema and 
Kelemen 2006; Jacobsson and Vifell 2003, Radaelli 2003; Regent 2003; Smismans 2004; 
Wendler 2004). This group of writers looks at whether or not the OMC improves the 
legitimacy problems of the EU and the democratic deficit. They examine how the OMC is 
supposed to contribute to increasing the legitimacy and to which extent it is successful in 
doing so. The theme of legitimacy and democracy involves a range of concepts, along 
which different academics can be divided into various sub groups. A major part of this 
discussion focuses on whether or not the open method of coordination is really open, and 
debates what ‘open’ actually means. Another focus lies on the participation  of the various 
actors in the different OMC processes in order to evaluate the added value of the OMC in 
the legitimacy discourse. For these authors, greater involvement of actors which leads to a 
systemised communication and cooperation between the private and the public in the 
sphere of policy instruments is essential for increasing the legitimacy of the EU. This 
stream of literature also deals with the question of, to which extent the OMC presents a 
‘decentralised or a centralised process’ as well as a ‘bottom -up or top-down approach’ 
(Smismans 2004). In their belief a more ‘bottom -up’ approach is the basis for  better 
governance. 
 
Another key concept of this body of literature is ‘delib erative governance’. For some 
writers public deliberation is the basis for legitimacy. They analyse whether or not the 
OMC is a deliberative -democratic form of governance or at least supports a deliberative 
mode of policy-making in the EU (de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; 
Teague 2001). In their opinion the arenas of ‘deliberative supranationalism’ are the EU 
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committees. Therefore they concentrate their examination on the SPC, the EFC, and the 
EMCO. Applying their criteria to different e mpirical case studies shows that the strength of 
the OMC for legitimising EU policy -making differs strongly between policy areas. 
Elements which are taken into consideration include: looking at which extent action 
coordination such as the OMC is based on f air arguing rather than coercion and power 
relations, and whether the OMC contributes to normative integration. Some of these authors 
establish criteria, which are based on deliberative democracy theories, in order to examine 
if the OMC fulfils these norma tive criteria in practice. The criteria are: transparency, public 
debate, learning, participation and responsiveness.  In order to place the debate of the 
OMC’s legitimacy into a broader perspective some writers apply democracy theories in 
order to evaluate the democratic dimension of the OMC (de la Porte and Nanz 2004; 
Wendler 2004). Some writers place the OMC within the discourse between output 
legitimacy and input legitimacy (Behning 2004; de la Porte and Pochet 2003; Scharpf 
1999). 
 
Indicators 
The indicators used by this group of writers to evaluate the OMC include therefore : 
· Openness of the process;  
· Participation of different actors;  
· Accountability of the actors involved;  
· Transparency of the policy -making process; 
 
Evaluation 
One of the proclaimed advan tages of the OMC is that it is ‘open’. However, before looking 
at the different evaluations on this issue one should point out that different observers not 
only disagree whether the OMC is open or not, and if this is a good thing, but also have 
different ideas on what the concept of ‘openness’ actually addresses. The Lisbon Council 
conclusions also did not give any clarification; as (Radaelli 2003) points out, ‘open’ is one 
of the two of the most crucial terms of the OMC, which was not defined at Lisbon (wi th 
‘coordination’ being the other).  The only indication is point 38 of the Lisbon conclusions:  
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“A fully decentralised approach will be applied in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local 
levels, as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively 
involved, using variable forms of partnership. A method of benchmarking 
best practices on managing change will be devised by the European 
Commission networking with different providers an d users, namely the 
social partners, companies and NGO.” (Lisbon conclusions 2000, point 38)  
 
However, this is not very clear and ‘openness’ therefore can refer to a number of the 
promising features of the OMC. One way of understanding the term ‘open’ is t hat it can 
refer to state action, policy outcome or à la carte involvement by states (Hodson and Maher 
2001: 724). However, this neglects, amongst other things, the participation of non -state 
actors as part of the openness. Therefore one should also consid er two further elements: 
firstly, the results are not predefined, which makes it ‘outcome open’. Secondly, it 
expresses the fact that NGO can participate in this process at national level or European 
level respectively (Maucher 2003: 4). 51 This makes it ‘open’ to a broader range of actors. 
Consequently, one can identify three issues that are related to the concept of ‘open’ in the 
context of the OMC: 
· Openness of the content: the European guidelines as well as the best practice can be 
adapted to the national context; 
· Openness of the results: openness can mean the fact that it is relatively open to the 
Member States how seriously they take the practical implementation;  
· Openness of the participation: as the development of this method in its different stages 
should be open to the participation of the various actors of civil society at national and 
European level.  
 
Observers trying to identify whether the OMC is actually ‘open’ consider one, several or all 
of these avenues when making their analysis. While some co me to the positive conclusion 
that “it is a truly open’ method in sum (Laffan and Shaw 2006: 18), others argue that “the 
‘open’ nature of the OMC is merely being open ended in its outcomes.” (Smismans 2004: 
2) Among those academics who straight forwardly r eject the claim of the OMC as open, 
some argue that the OMC suffers from a ‘double deficit’ of both a lack of open access to 
                                                   
51 Own translations, any misinterpretati ons are fully my fault.  
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academic scrutiny of underlying issues and concepts, and a lack of access to democratic 
debate on political ramifications (Berghman  and Okma 2003: 6), while others point out the 
irony of the term ‘open method of coordination’ as it is supposed to be so open, but it is 
perceived as being more closed than the Community Method (Jacobsson and Vifell 2003: 
23). 
 
Concerning participation, de la Porte (2002: 44) points out that in theory the OMC should 
involve all relevant stakeholders: the Union, the Member States, the local and regional 
collectivities, as well as social partners and civil society. Observers supporting the OMC on 
this ground believe that the OMC can lead to a new form of governance which is more 
democratic through deliberation and participation, and thereby reduce the democratic 
deficit. Some authors use the involvement of various actors in a non -hierarchical way as 
argument for praising the new forms of governance over the old governance, because of its 
participatory features (Smismans 2006). De Búrca (2003: 2) considers that “a new model of 
European constitutionalism may be emerging which is less top -down in nature than befo re 
and which is premised on a more participatory and contestatory conception of democracy.” 
Some argue that the social partners are involved in various degrees, depending on their 
traditional role and the level of recognition of social dialogue in that cou ntry (de la Porte 
2002).52 Others conclude that despite considerable promises, the new modes of governance 
have not delivered a substantial increase in the meaningful participation of social actors 
(Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 2006). Zeitlin (2005: 23) argues  that the social partners are 
profoundly ambivalent about deeper involvement in the EES, which they often regard as a 
threat to their bargaining autonomy, and feel a less acute need than other actors for new 
channels of influence on public policy because o f their privileged constitutional status in 
employment matters, both at EU level 53 and in many Member States, and their wish to 
protect this constitutional status against infringement by other actors, including NGO 
(Zeitlin 2003). While Jacobsson and Vifell  (2003: 7) see the OMC as having “a potential 
for legitimacy” and of being a form of deliberative supranationalism, others argue that 
“there is nothing (or very little) in the current practice that resembles participatory 
                                                   
52 This comment can be confirmed by actual participation of the author.  
53 See case study two.  
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democratic governance, democratic experimentalism based on bottom -up learning, or 
directly-deliberative polyarchy” (Radaelli 2003: 49 -50). 
 
When looking at the concept of  accountability, one has to remember that i n a liberal 
democracy accountability is normally assured through parliamentar y elections. As outlined 
earlier, the role of the EP and national parliaments in the OMC processes is limited. 
Therefore even some of the strongest supporters of the OMC admit that the dimension of 
public accountability remains so far poorly developed with in most, if not all of the OMC 
processes (Zeitlin 2003), and conclude that although there are differences between the 
OMCs in these areas, they are not living up to their democratic ambition (Eberlein and 
Kerwer 2002; Idema and Kelemen 2006; Radaelli 2003;  Wendler 2004).54  There is no 
common conclusion on this aspect of the OMC with some observers arguing that the OMC 
is providing a pragmatic solution to the EU’s legitimacy problem (Hodson and Maher 
2001), while many critics reject the view that the OMC bri ngs further legitimacy to EU 
policy-making, but in fact the opposite (Idema and Kelemen 2006: 1).  
 
Strengths and weaknesses  
The benefit of this literature is providing the reader with an awareness of the different 
understandings of legitimacy, which helps to examine whether the OMC contributes to 
increased legitimacy as promised. It also provides an overview of the actors involved in all 
the OMC processes in order to evaluate the participation aspect. However, while intensive 
research has been done on the q uestion of to which extent social partners and NGO are 
involved in the different processes, there is less analysis of the quality and impact of this 
involvement i.e. whether their views have been taken into account or if they are just there 
for window dres sing. Moreover, as increased legitimacy is only one proclaimed advantage 
of the OMC, a main shortcoming of this group of writers is that it concentrates too much on 
the legitimacy issue without taking the other aspects into account. Furthermore, some of th e 
discussions are too theoretical and concentrate more on philosophical debates on legitimacy 
than using theoretical understanding to explain the changes that occurred within the EU 
which led to the OMC or resulted from it. While the other main themes surr ounding the 
                                                   
54 One has to keep in mind that there are different understandings of legitimacy.  
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OMC are often interlinked in order to give a more complementary picture, the legitimacy 
discourse rarely addresses them. Therefore it does not consider that even if the OMC does 
not, or only marginally, contributes to more legitimacy, it might improve the efficiency of 
policy-making, leading to better cooperation between Member States or to other positive 
results.   
 
 
Impact of the OMC on national policy -making  
This theme concentrates on analysing and evaluating the impact of the OMC processes at 
national level (Barbier 2004; Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Lopez -Santana 2006; Noaksson 
2006; Trubek and Trubek 2004; Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2005). In order to understand 
the novelty of this form of governance, many authors look first at the different O MC 
processes and examine the features, trying to understand how these processes work and 
how they differ from each other. Therefore substantial and very focused empirical work has 
been carried out, examining and comparing the different elements of the vari ous OMC 
processes. The most extensive work has been done on the European Employment Strategy 
(Ashiagbor 2004; Gore 2004; Mosher and Trubek 2003; Regent 2003; Smismans 2004; 
Trubek 2003; Van Riel and Marc 2002; Wendler 2004). Others concentrate on the OMC o n 
social inclusion (de la Porte 2002) or the OMC on pensions (de la Porte and Nanz 2004  ; 
Pochet and Natali 2004). Laffan and Shaw (2006) examined and compared all existing 
OMC processes on their individual characteristics.  
  
One key concept analysed by th is group of writers is the notion that the OMC is supposed 
to be, through peer review and benchmarking, a learning process that leads to  policy 
learning. Szysczak (2006: 488) identifies two levels where policy learning can take place 
within the OMC. The fi rst is by creating a common discourse with a common language, 
which leads to identifying common problems and the diffusion of shared beliefs. Second, it 
can lead to policy convergence and policy transfer by defining good policies and bad 
policies.  
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A number of academics examine the impact of the different OMC processes on national 
policy-making and analyse whether the OMC really promotes policy learning (Borrás and 
Jacobsson 2004; Kerber and Eckardt 2005; Kroeger 2006; Mosher and Trubek 2003). Some 
apply advocacy coalition framework  theory, arguing that within a system different 
competing advocacy coalitions, each with different beliefs, exist. Therefore policy change 
is a result of the transformation or substitution of one belief system by another (Deganis  
2006). The example used by Deganis (2006: 27) argues that within the EES some countries 
form a liberal coalition while an opposing coalition is formed by other Member States 
around the social model.  
 
The concept of  deliberative governance , mentioned above, plays an important role under 
this aspect as well . Some authors argue that Member States preferences are influenced by 
continual discussions and exchange of arguments, and that the expert deliberations in 
committees lead to Community -compatible interest s (Szysczak 2006). Other writers, such 
as Kroeger (2006) look at the institutional fit/misfit  of Member States when examining the 
impact at national level through policy learning. She comes to the conclusion that policy 
learning depends less on the institu tional fit but more on the political will (or the lack of it). 
As shown earlier, the scholars focusing on the governance aspect examine if the OMC has a 
normative dimension. The scholars looking at the impact of the OMC at national level 
analyse if it is possible to have national policy change driven by normative processes in the 
absence of clear cohesive mechanisms. Borrás and Jacobsson (2004) outline that scholars 
from different fields (EU studies, international relations, public administration) have 
different explanations for this.  
 
Indicators: 
In order to evaluate the OMC according to its impact on national policy -making academics 
focus on the following questions and indicators:  
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· Have policy change and national reforms happened, and if so what kind of c hange? 
o Substantive policy change (including broad shifts in policy thinking);  
o Procedural shifts in governance and policymaking (including administrative; 
reorganisation and institutional capacity building;  
o Participation and transparency;  
o Mutual learning (Zeitlin 2005).  
· How has this change happened?  
o Cognitive dimension;  
o Power politics; 
o Discourse analysis;  
o Learning; 
o Knowledge creation;  
o Persuasion; 
o Networks and policy communities.  
 
Evaluation 
When attempting to evaluate the impact of the OMC at na tional level, it is important to 
realise that in a EU of 27 Member States, with different socio -economic foundations and 
various modes of governance, the impact of the OMC will be unequal across countries. 
This impact will depend on factors such as the dom estic opportunity structure and 
socialisation effects (Radaelli 2003: 54), and therefore it is very challenging to capture all 
the various impacts of the OMC throughout all different types of Member States. 
Furthermore, it is very difficult to assess to wh ich extent policy coordination and policy 
transfer are a result of the OMC and how far other externalities are responsible for this 
(Szysczak 2006: 488). 
 
While many observers say it is still too early to tell, or that not enough empirical studies on 
the OMC exist in order to be able to make this evaluation (Zeitlin 2005), others are more 
willing to judge the impact of the OMC at national level. Critics of the OMC on the one 
hand, such as Idema and Kelemen (2006: 1) argue that the “impact of the OMC has bee n 
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greatly exaggerated and the OMC, and new modes of governance more generally, are a red 
herring and distract attention from the more important and pervasive increase in the 
formality and judicialisation of EU policy -making.” A more balanced statement come s 
from Radaelli (2003: 15) who points out that while overall, the results achieved fall short of 
the grandiose expectations launched at Lisbon, the potential of open coordination is still 
there, ready to be exploited. He also argues that the reason why the  results in cross-national 
and bottom-up learning have been limited so far can be explained by the following factors:  
· Lack of participation at national and local level because there are no incentives for 
participation. This shortcoming cannot be resolved in Brussels55 but must be made in 
the capitals of the MS; 56  
· The underestimation of the peculiarities of learning in a transnational political context;  
· Limitations in the current use of benchmarking  
 
More positive observers on the other hand report certain  impacts. For example Barbier 
(2004: 15) argues that the research results confirm that the OMC has modified national 
systems and created new rules and institutions at European level. He then continues to 
propose a typology for possible and actual transform ations (policies) in the context of the 
EES. Another impact at national level can be seen in the convergence at the levels of ideas 
in some policy areas (Radaelli 2003). Szysczak (2006: 488) even goes as far as stating that 
“the OMC penetrates into nationa l systems changing internal policy, re -configuring 
political institutional frameworks.” Therefore she argues that the EU has moved from 
coordination of national policies towards attempting a system of policy transfer, as it is not 
only agenda-setting but also sets the parameters as how polices should operate. She even 
believes that the OMC can lead to the aggregation of preferences at the same time as 
leading to preference transformation.  
   
Lopez- Santana (2006) also argues that the supranational level had  various impacts on 
employment and labour market policies in the Member States by:  
                                                   
55 The European Commission points out in its general repor t whether in its opinion actors such as social 
partners and NGOs have been sufficiently involved in the NAPs at national level, but it cannot force the MS 
to change their behavior.  
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· Defining the problems which national authorities should look at;  
· Pointing out or reinforcing that a certain policy is good, bad or necessary;  
· Restricting the policy options  of domestic policy-makers; 
· Providing potential courses of action for lesson -drawing and learning between the 
policy-makers.  
 
While being aware that its opinion is clearly subjective, it is nevertheless worth looking at 
one statement of the Commission on this issue, claiming: “there have been significant 
changes in national employment policies, with a clear convergence towards the EU 
objectives set out in the EES policy guidelines.” 57  
 
One of the major elements when looking at the relationship between the EU and the 
national level are the concepts of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ (Börzel 1997, 1999; 
Börzel and Risse 2000; Börzel 2001, 2003, 2005). 58 Keeping this idea in mind, one should 
consider Zeitlin’s (2005: 11) argument that “the relationship between th e OMC process and 
the Member State policies should be analysed as a two -way interaction rather than a one - 
way causal impact.”  
 
Strengths and weaknesses  
This stream of work is also very important as it attempts to give a more concrete and 
factual dimension  to many of the theoretical discussions by looking at concrete results. By 
outlining the different OMC processes, the reader understands that there is not only one 
OMC, but rather various processes that are based on a general blueprint, and then adapted 
to the political reality of the policy field. It offers also a more in -depth analysis and 
comparison of the various elements between the OMC processes in the different policy 
areas. While the work on this aspect is still limited, it is also very promising. T he difficulty 
here relates to the data availability. So far little independent empirical evidence has been 
available on which to base the evaluation of the impact at national level, as most of the data 
                                                                                                                                                          
56 Speaking from personal experience, one should mention that in many MS the  social partners are either not 
consulted at all on the NAPs or their views are not taken into account.  
57 Quoted in Szysczak (2006: 496).  
58 This mutual relationship is also one of the main focuses of theorists on European integration today.  
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used is built on the responses of the MS to their NAPs . As Zeitlin (2005: 10 -11) points out 
“governments may likewise deliberately over - or understate the influence of OMC 
processes on domestic policy in reporting to the EU, depending on whether they want to 
burnish their credentials as “good Europeans” by de monstrating consummate compliance 
with guidelines and recommendations, or instead to present themselves as defenders of 
subsidiarity and the national interest against Brussels.” Since enlargement, there is another 
dimension to this problem of over or under  representing the impact of the OMC at national 
level. While some representatives from the new Member States often outline that they 
needed advice and the financial contributions from the EU to be able to carry out these 
policy reforms, in an attempt to se cure further financial support from the EU, others argue 
that the OMC offers nothing new and their countries are way ahead in this policy area, only 
in order to prove to the other MS that their country belongs fully to the club and they 
should not be treated as second class Europeans. 59 
 
A second problem comes with defining the meaning and the recognition of impact, as there 
is not always a clear manifestation of impact and different authors focus on different types 
of impact. Zeitlin (2005: 4) points out th at the practical impact of the OMC at national level 
on policy-making is not one-dimensional but one has to consider four different dimensions 
of policy-making, when evaluating them: substantive policy change (including broad shifts 
in policy thinking); pr ocedural shifts in governance and policymaking (including 
administrative reorganisation and institutional capacity building; participation and 
transparency and mutual learning. These criteria are taken up by more and more scholars 
(Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2005; Noaksson 2006) and should be kept in mind during any 
research on the impact of the OMC at national level.  
 
Furthermore, authors also disagree on the different types of causes for the policy change 
(using more rational or constructivist arguments i .e. power politics vs. learning), which 
makes it difficult to compare the findings. 60 A way that could help to overcome these 
difficulties is to apply the notion of uploading and downloading of policy to the analysis 
                                                   
59 This argument will be followed up in the case studies.  
  
73
(Börzel 1997, 1999; Börzel and Risse 200 0; Börzel 2001, 2003, 2005). One of the 
shortcomings of this literature is that not enough writers have done so, and this should be 
remedied in any further work. 61 
 
 
Integration 
Another important issue is whether or not the OMC is a successful tool in enhan cing 
European integration. While having a different foci, the issue of integration and the theme 
of looking at the impact of the OMC at national level are different sides of the same coin, 
as one leads often to the other. 62 Writers look at the extent of the  OMC’s contribution to 
increasing integration, to slowing it down or even stopping it (Behning 2004; Bernard 
2003; Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin 2006; Dehousse 2002; 
Goetschy 2001; Heritier 2002; Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; Regent 200 3; Trubek and 
Trubek 2004). One group of researchers focuses on a specific aspect of integration, namely 
social versus economic integration (Barbier 2004; Bernard 2003; Laffan and Shaw 2006; 
Larsson 2002; Wincott 2003; Zeitlin 2005). The discussion on this  topic deals mainly with 
whether or not the OMC is successful in balancing the social with the economic dimension 
of the EU. For example, Behning (2004) applies Scharpf’s model of integration in social 
policy, to the OMC. 63 
 
Scholars in the field of European integration theories have only recently found their way to 
the theme of the OMC and their numbers are still limited. Some exceptions worth 
mentioning are: Gore (2004), Kaiser and Prange (2002), Schäfer (2004), Trubek, Cottrell 
and Nance (2005), Van Riel and Marc (2002), Wendler (2004). Some of the main queries 
for them are: 
· Why has the OMC been introduced?  
                                                                                                                                                          
60 However, they can always be evaluated individually, based on the usefulness of what they are doing and the 
extent to which they meet their goals.  
61 Some  of the few exceptions are Borrás and Jacobsson (2004) and  Zeitlin (2005). 
62 This argument will be discussed in more detail in chapter six when looking at European integration and 
Europeanisation.  
63 Scharpf (2002) himself places the OMC somewhere between the mode of intergovernmental negotiations 
and the mode of ‘mutual adjustment’.  
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· What are the main actors?  
· How has it developed?  
 
These scholars try to find the answers by applying different European integration theories 
to the OMC. Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2005 outline the differences bet ween rationalist 
and constructivist explanations for the OMC. Wendler (2004) applies new institutionalism 
in order to explain policy -making through the OMC, while Pochet and Natali (2004) apply 
policy networks to the use of the OMC in the field of pensions, and Van Riel  and Marc 
(2002) try to explain the origin of the European employment strategy by ap plying 
intergovernmental and neofunctionalist theory, while Schäfer (2004) uses historical 
institutionalism.64 The views of the academics not only diverge on the question whether 
integration has taken place and what are instances for this, but also on whether i ntegration 
is seen as something positive or not.  
 
Indicators 
For the evaluation of the OMC concerning fostering integration, writers working on this 
aspect use the following indicators:  
· EU/Commission involvement in policy areas not foreseen by the treaties ; 
· Is the OMC a tool preparing for the Community Method at a later stage?  
· Potential ability of the OMC to transform the EU polity:  
o Informal functional expansion;  
o Fostering transnationalisation;  
o Strengthening the multi -level dimension; 
o Accommodation of diver sity (Borrás and Jacobsson  2004). 
· What does this integration lead to? Strengthening of the social model or downgrading 
of it? 
· Functional interdependence of socio -economic issues; 
· How can the OMC through promoting social integration gain support amongst the 
European citizens for th e European project, also in non -social areas? 
                                                   
64 These writers will be discussed in more detail when looking at how to apply European integration theory in 
chapter six. 
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· Is the type of integration the traditional one, or does it represent a new form of 
integration/ the partial delegation of power?  
· How are the roles of the actors distributed? I.e. change in comparison to the CM.  
 
Evaluation  
Has the OMC really led to further integration, and if so, to what type of integration? Many 
writers point out that since its introduction the OMC has expanded into various other policy 
areas. Dehousse (2002: 6) believes “the open coordination procedures have enabled the EU 
to penetrate in areas where the treaties do not envisage common policies, as they are largely 
considered the preserve of the Member States.” This notion can be supporte d, by looking at 
the various new policy themes (education, health, immigration) that are discussed at 
European level, and in which areas the Commission has now at least some role.  Borrás and 
Jacobsson (2004: 201) speak of informal functional expansion (i.e . using OMC in policy 
areas not foreseen by the treaties) which is partly a solution to the gridlock between the 
political limits of transferring competences and the pressure for further national 
coordination in competitiveness -fostering and welfare-fostering areas, but also resulting 
from the functional interdependence of socio -economic issues. Additionally one can also 
differentiate between three types of policy areas where the OMC is applied: policy areas 
where integration attempts failed previously, pol icies representing new areas of public 
involvement and those which are functionally linked to existing EU policy areas . 
 
But does this integration include the transfer of competences? Some observers highlight 
that the OMC, while not implying any transfers of competences from the n ational to the 
European level, has given nevertheless the European institutions a role in this area (Regent 
2003). Therefore one can see the OMC as a third way between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism, which is needed when moving into core areas of national policy -
making (Heritier 2002). This specific form of integration under the OMC is called by some 
writers “integration without supra nationalism” 65 and they argue that the nature of 
integration has changed, where the role of the EU now is not only to set minimum 
standards (Jacobsson 2003). Others agree that the OMC has changed integration, to a 
                                                   
65 Former Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, quoted in Larsson (2002).  
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process of Europeanisation by figures, replacing the Commu nity integration by law (Bruno, 
Jacquot and Mandin 2006: 530). Linked to the earlier outlined concepts of deliberation and 
normative governance, Jacobsson and Vifell (2003: 2) argue that the OMC c ontributes to 
normative  integration.66 
 
Concerning the question whether the OMC fosters social integration in the EU to balance 
economic integration, the literature is divided in  two sides: The first group of researchers 
sees the OMCs as a tool in a process  leading to the downgrading of the national social 
protection systems while the second argues that the OMCs have at least the potential to be a 
tool to achieve a specific ‘European Social Model’, and resisting liberalisation (Barbier 
2004). However, both groups  agree that the EES has the capacity to modify national 
systems substantively and both adopt a normative standpoint making recommendations for 
improving the OMCs’ efficiency. The socially orientated writers believe that the OMC can 
help to secure Social Eu rope and create a common European Social Model. Some suppose 
that in the social dimension, the OMC can be seen as a vehicle for the pursuit of a social 
and cultural rights agenda (Bernard 2003). Larsson (2002: 11) argues that the different 
processes (such as the Luxembourg process) created new avenues for economic and social 
policy governance, for an  integration of areas, which until then were almost taboo in 
European policy-making, such as social protection and social inclusion. These new avenues 
were further deepened by the OMC through adding healthcare and other areas to the 
European agenda. This i s why some writers, such as Borrás and Jacobsson (2004) see the 
OMC as potentially unleashing new integration potential. Other writers see the OMC as a 
tool to reform the welfare states in a way which reduces the social burden and makes 
Europe more competi tive. These critics are mainly from a social democratic origin, fearing 
that the OMC gives the Member States an excuse to weaken the European welfare state. 
Others argue that OMC is not capable of constructing social Europe without ‘hard law’ 
(which returns to the question of OMC vs. CM outlined earlier). Therefore, some authors 
link the question of integration with the legal dimension when analysing the contribution of 
soft law to the construction of Europe and its practical effects on European integration  
(Trubek and Trubek 2004) . 
                                                   
66 In italics in original.  
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An earlier argument for increasing the support  of the citizens for the EU and further 
integration was to deal with issues they really care about, one of which is employment and 
social policy. The importance of the social dimension is clearly expressed in the statement 
of Idema and Kelemen (2006: 13): “the OMC will be a s uccess simply if it contributes to 
move social policy from the periphery of EU policy -making to the core and sets the stage 
for more ambitious initiatives in the future.” They also believe that policy -makers have the 
goal of the EU playing a greater role i n the social policy area. In the end one can agree with 
Goetschy (2001: 407), who argues that Lisbon managed to please the liberals with 
economic reforms and the socialists with safeguarding the EU Social model. By adopting a 
longer time perspective for EU  developments spread over ten years, such a balanced 
ideological stance gains even more weight as it renders EU developments less sensitive to 
nationally contingent electoral change.  
 
Many Member States now speak of Lisbon as a turning point and a sort of  milestone and 
breakthrough in the history of EU Integration (Goetschy 2001: 407). This is complemented 
by political scientists describing Lisbon as “a true watershed in the Europeanisation of 
employment and social policy.” 67 Various academics could generally agree with th is 
notion, while then having very diverse opinions on whether or not this is a positive or 
negative development. 68 The more critical group is made up of commentators with very 
different ideas on what Europe should be. For the one faction, the OMC is bad bec ause it 
helps the EU/ Commission to be involved in policy areas that lie in the strict sovereignty of 
the Member States. The other faction is made up of people fearing that the EU would 
weaken the Community Method and let go of the idea of a ‘united states  of Europe’. The 
more supportive group of the OMC’s role in the integration process, mirrors the group of 
critics, namely being made up of people from very different beliefs on the future of Europe, 
but instead of seeing the glass half empty, they see it h alf full.  For the ones who favour a 
Europe of the nation states, OMC is acceptable as it is carried out intergovernmentally, is 
                                                   
67 Esping-Anderson et al quoted in Larsson (2002).  
68 The members of these groups are internally strongly divided on nearly everything besides whether the 
OMC is useful or not. Furthermore, it is very interesting to note that observers and academics, who normally 
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non-binding and has limited participation by EU institutions. 69 The other group includes the 
pragmatic supporters, who see the O MC as a second best solution to increase integration, 
but accept it in the absence of other possibilities such as legislation. This group considers 
the OMC as a stepping stone. Borrás and Jacobsson (2004: 197) express this notion in a 
slightly different way, namely that the OMC entails a ’partial delegation of power’. 70 This 
leads to the situation that in “formal terms the division of tasks between the EU and its 
Member States remains unchanged, but beneath this formal surface, a series of apparentl y 
minimalistic changes might have deep effects on EU politics.”  
 
Following the earlier discussion, where it was accepted that the OMC is not there to replace 
the Community Method but rather to compliment it, one could believe that in the long run 
this might lead to stronger community actions in the areas currently under national control. 
In order to appreciate the OMC for what it is, under the circumstances that exist in the EU, 
one should take a pragmatic view and see how the OMC can actually contribute po sitively 
to further integration. 71 
 
Strengths and weaknesses  
The advantage of this literature is that it examines the OMC not only from one perspective 
such as legitimacy or efficiency, but how the OMC can contribute to the whole European 
integration proces s. It shows how the OMC leads to further integration, but of a different 
kind. While the discussion of the relation between social and economic integration is very 
helpful in understanding the origin of the OMC and outlining the political forces behind it,  
the refocusing of the Lisbon agenda in 2005 on competitiveness shows that the social 
dimension is played down again and therefore does not support the argument that OMC is 
the tool to create or to protect the European Social Model. One of the major shortcomings 
of this body of literature is that it does not apply sufficient theory, in particular European 
                                                                                                                                                          
have very different theoretical starting points and political beliefs find each other both supporting or rejecting 
a certain aspect of the OMC, naturally motivated by different reasoning.  
69 One of the best examples is the British treasury seeing OMC as ”not only a  means to privilege 
intergovernmentalism over supranational harmonisation, it is also a useful technique to minimize reliance on 
regulation.” Quoted in Ashiagbor (2004: 325).    
70 Based on Helen Walace’s (2001:592) notion of partial delegation.  
71 This of course assumes that integration is seen as something positive, which is this author’s conviction.  
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integration theory. This would support the argumentation by providing a theoretical 
framework to the analysis, which would also give an improved structure . 
 
While having outlined earlier that divergent theoretical understandings lead to different 
evaluations of the OMC, in this theme the comments and analysis made by academics and 
politicians are often based on different political beliefs, and often with op posing notions on 
key ideas such as the role and the future of the EU. This makes the analysis often even less 
objective than is generally the case. This is a crucial factor to be aware of when looking at 
other evaluations and carrying them out oneself.     
 
 
Summary of the literature review  
This overview of the literature has shown that different authors have analysed the OMC 
according to different themes, which broadly reflect the promised strengths of the OMC. As 
one can see, while the various authors fo cus on different aspects, they all start with the 
basic analysis of whether the OMC is a new form of governance. Research on the OMC is 
not always clearly focused on one characteristic; it often involves various elements and 
sometimes the different bodies of literature overlap. This is to be expected as many of the 
issues are closely linked. Therefore it is not surprising that some of the indicators used in 
evaluating the OMC appear in several strains of literature. Furthermore, this overview has 
shown that the evaluation results depend heavily on the theoretical starting point of the 
evaluator, which is reflected in the variety of questions asked and consequently in diverging 
results. It was outlined that the different evaluations in the various themes can to a certain 
extent be grouped together according to theoretical and ideological beliefs by looking at the 
questions which are asked in order to asses the OMC. These findings will be taken into 
consideration when applying European integration theories for the OMC in chapter six.   
 
When evaluating the promising characteristics of the OMC, the conclusions were as varied 
as the themes, and even within the same theme there were some very different evaluations 
of the performance of the OMC. So what is really ex pected from the OMC, agenda-setting 
or problem-solving? Concerning the agenda -setting purpose some academics conclude that 
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the OMC has been very successful in placing policy topics on the political agenda 
(Berghman and Okma 2003: 6; Lopez -Santana 2006). Some believe, this author included, 
that the OMC is a success as it facilitates discussions at European level of topics so far 
limited to the national level. Furthermore, one can reach the conclusion that the OMC has 
contributed to further integration in cer tain sectors, albeit in a different form from the 
Community Method, and that the Commission has a significant role in this process, maybe 
not as decision -maker, but as an agenda-setter which is often even more important. This 
notion is shared by Pochet and  Natali (2004) who argue that the Commission has become 
an agenda-setter with the power to impose issues which are not on the national agenda or at 
least not at that time.72 Concerning the problem -solving purpose, disagreement between 
academics exists on whether certain aspects of the OMC can improve European policy -
making or if not even worsen it. Not surprisingly, some aspects are outlined by one group 
as being improved while others argue that exactly these aspects are worsened. 
Consequently some authors p resent the OMC as either a magic bullet, solving everything 
that one conceives as wrong with the EU, or as the end of the EU, since the OMC is 
perceived to only worsen the current situation in nearly every single aspect. Gore (2004: 
125) identifies a division in the literature on the OMC between three different groups. The 
first sees the OMC as a justifying discourse, i.e. as a means to validate existing policies and 
reforms which would have happened anyway. The second group sees th e OMC as a new 
supra-national form of governance in its own right, to be used whenever the actors, systems 
and levels in the policy -making process are so diverse that it is impossible to integrate them 
in any other way and limit divergence between Member S tates. The third group looks at the 
OMC in a more long-term perspective, aiming at the convergence between Member States 
and ultimately the transfer of competences for social policy from national to European 
level, and then falling back into traditional mo des of policy-making.73 
 
However, ultimately only a few authors completely reject or completely endorse the OMC. 
The majority of the writers come to the conclusion that the OMC has potential, but that this 
potential has not been fully realised. While one ca n agree that the OMC might have been 
                                                   
72 Own experiences reflect this comment, in particular in regards to the new Member States.  
73 This will be looked at more in detail when applying theory to the  OMC in chapter six.  
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more significant concerning some points than others, the verdict always depends on the 
composition of the jury.    
 
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter can generally be divided into two main parts, which are 
complementary to each other in understanding the whole picture on the OMC. Firstly, this 
overview presented the main characteristics of the OMC and outlined its historical 
development. One of the main findings was that the OMC represents a third way between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Additionally, the necessity was outlined, to 
see the Lisbon summit, which coined the term OMC, in a wider historical framework in 
order to comprehend the whole picture. Furthermore, it became clear that there is no si ngle 
OMC process, but rather various processes which apply the template given at Lisbon to 
different extents, depending on multiple factors such as the time of creation and policy area. 
The analysis of the relationship between the OMC and the Community Met hod showed that 
while there are significant differences between old and new governance, such as the role of 
the different institutions, one cannot always draw a clear cut line between them. The 
examination showed that the OMC and the CM can be quite comple mentary rather than 
being a zero-sum game, especially in policy areas where the competences lie mainly in the 
hands of national governments, and that the OMC is currently far from replacing the CM. 
Nevertheless, the creation, promotion and expansion of the  OMC in addition to the CM 
underlines the need of an EU of 27, which is more and more diverse and which started 
discussing issues previously limited to the national level, for a policy -making tool that 
complements the CM, seemingly not able to deal with al l aspects of the new situation. It 
also became evident that it is difficult to isolate one cause for the creation of the OMC, as 
there were multiple causes at the time and highlighting any single one would be 
incomplete. The OMC is a tool of compromise, as  is nearly everything in EU politics, 
satisfying very different, often opposing interests such as: economic vs. social integration, 
efficiency vs. legitimacy, or integration vs. keeping policy areas under the control of 
Member States. However, one of the m ost influential causes was the challenge on the 
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competing interests concerning the speed and type of integration. The question whether the 
OMC can fulfil the balancing act between continuing integration, into more and more 
national policy areas without cau sing backlashes from the Member States, who fear their 
sovereignty threatened, and at the same time deal adequately, efficiently and legitimately 
with the challenges in these policy areas, will be one of the main elements of analysis of 
this thesis.  
 
Secondly, this chapter outlined the various major themes in the existing literature on the 
OMC, which has significantly expanded in recent years. The issues discussed by the 
various academics greatly depend on what the individual academic identifies as the cau ses 
for the establishment of the OMC in the first place.  Therefore, one can clearly see a 
common thread between the possible causes for the creation of the OMC, the different 
promising characteristics emphasised, and how the OMC is evaluated. Furthermore, the 
theoretical starting point of the analyst predefines the issues analysed, the questions asked 
and the expected results, which are linked to the assumed reasons for its creation as well as 
the evaluation of the OMC. As a consequence one can broadly grou p some of the questions 
asked in relation to evaluating the OMC according to theoretical beliefs. Therefore it is 
obvious that the OMC is evaluated very differently by academics from diverse theoretical 
backgrounds.  
 
Analysing the main themes in the exist ing body of literature on the OMC has highlighted 
various accomplishments and shortcomings in the individual themes. These are summarised 
in table 1.1, also including a column with some proposals for further research on the 
individual themes. A shortcoming  that nearly the complete existing literature shares, is that 
while the evaluation showed that there is a clear case for arguing that the creation of the 
OMC has fostered European integration by involving more actors, by spreading to more 
and more policy areas, formerly firmly in national hands, and that national policies change 
as a reaction to European recommendations, none of the bodies of literature addressed 
sufficiently the relationship between this form of integration and existing theories on 
European integration. Therefore the main focus of this thesis will not be evaluating the 
OMC on its effectiveness and its legitimacy, but to examine how European integration 
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theories explain the creation and use of the OMC and understand the spread of the OMC to 
more and more policy domains and its application by other actors, namely the European 
social partners in the European Social Dialogue. Consequently, this thesis will review 
traditional and more recent theoretical work on European integration and examine wh ich of 
these theories could explain the creation, features and development of the OMC. The 
subsequent chapter will look first at the use of theory in general before then examining the 
development of  European integration theory.  
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CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY AND 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
 
Introduction 
 Since the beginning of the European project, European integration theories have been used 
to explain, predict and understand the developments accompanying this phenomenon. They 
have helped observers to ma ke sense of the events and processes going on in Europe and 
broaden our understanding of what the European Union is and how it affects the way we 
understand European politics. Like theory in social science in general, European integration 
theory experienced change and development. The aim of this chapter is to give an insight 
into the purpose of theory in social science in general and European integration theory in 
particular, to indicate how theories differ as well as to outline how and why theoretical 
fashions change. Section one will present the purpose of theory in social science and show 
how theories can differ between each other. It will indicate how and why theoretical 
fashions change by examining the notion of paradigms and paradigm changes. Section two 
will then give an overview of how the study of European integration theory has differed 
and evolved over time and how these developments reflect the changing views in the 
understanding of sound social science theory. It will examine if paradigms exist in EU 
studies, which they are and if they change. The existence of different phases of the 
theoretical study of the EU will be outlined, including the changing foci of each of these 
periods. Section three will then present some of the major theories and th eoretical 
approaches on European studies, including their main assumptions, criticisms and 
evaluations. The conclusion will draw together the findings in order to provide a theoretical 
understanding for dealing with social science in general, and European integration in 
particular. It will argue that despite the evolution of European integration theory the 
continuing and complementary use of various theoretical approaches to the study of the EU, 
differing in the questions that are asked, is necessary.    
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1. Theory in Social Science 
“Theorising in the social sciences is a path to making sense of complex social reality” 
(Chryssochoou 2001a: ix).  
 
 
The purpose of theory  
So why use theory? The above quotation summarises in a nutshell the main aim of theory 
in social science, namely to organise research on social reality. According to Young (1968), 
a theoretical approach performs three functions 74: 
· To guide the scholar to select data, deciding what is of interest and where to find it;  
· To create a framework for o rganising data, according to its importance;  
· To provide a common language for those engaged in this research.  
 
Taking Young's approach as a basis, three main advantages of theory will be explored in a 
more convenient manner for the purpose of this chapter:  
· Theory as an organising tool: Taking Young’s points 1 and 2 of together;  
· Using theory for academic clarity: Young’s third point;  
· Using theory as an awareness -raising tool: one use of theory not mentioned by 
Young.  
 
Theory as an organising tool : 
Theories are used because they bring meaning to empirical facts. Theories help to identify 
the most relevant factors for explaining an event (Rosamond 2000) . Theories assist to 
decide which facts are relevant and which are not, and help to interpret them. They also 
help to distinguish the appropriate units of analysis, show the links between them and 
decide the right level of analysing them. Theory is used f or providing a framework for 
ordering events, processes and set ups (empirical data), making sense out of them and 
possibly predicting their consequences for future developments. Events and processes can 
                                                   
74 Quoted in Pentland (1973).  
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only be interpreted and understood by conceptual fra meworks (theories). On this basis, 
theories select to narrow their focus of inquiry, as they have to put more emphasis on 
certain actors, processes and events than on others. It is to be expected that theorists who 
focus on certain events, actors and proce sses come to different conclusions than the ones 
focusing on other events, actors and processes. This will be seen later in this section.  
 
Using theory for academic clarity:  
Furthermore, theory is used to provide academic clarity. Theorising creates plura lism, 
which produces choice, which creates alternatives that lead to debate. Theorising increases 
awareness and should reduce dogmatism (Chryssochoou 2001a: 1). It should serve to 
develop understanding by using the same concepts, which is like having a sha red 
‘language’ for scientist in the same area.  
 
Using theory as an awareness raising tool:  
Another use of theory is to identify the different theoretical assumptions or conceptual 
lenses that oneself and other theorists have when commencing their work. B urchill (2005) 
points out that theory is fundamentally concerned with asking questions about our prior 
assumptions. His notion of constitutive theory acknowledges that everyone comes to social 
science with preconceptions, beliefs and experiences which predefine their approach to the 
object of analysis. Language, culture, religion, class, ethnicity  are only a few factors which 
determine our worldview. These lenses predefine our theoretical approach. One purpose of 
theory is to be aware and examine how our worldview is (pre) defined and why we place 
focus on certain actors and processes, and not on o thers. Subsequently, one must be aware 
of one’s own assumptions, prejudices and biases, when trying to understand the theoretical 
position of other academics. This is crucial, as these conceptual lenses of the theorists 
determine the perception of things a nd lead to different evaluations of the same event, 
process or set up. This use of theory is as important as the use of theory as an organising 
tool. Therefore Burchill (2005: 17) stresses that theory is as concerned with how we 
approach social sciences as with which actors, events and process we choose.   
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Differences between theories  
 
One has to be aware that theories are also referred to as approaches, perspectives, 
paradigms, discourses, schools of th ought, images and philosophical traditions. This variety 
of concepts makes it difficult sometimes to define theory, as some writers apply different 
terms to different scopes of theoretical thinking. 75 While not having a universal definition 
of theories, Burchill (2005) outlines four points on which theories can differ:  
· Object of analysis and scope of the enquiry (level of analysis debate) : Here one differs 
on which actors or phenomena should be studied, which characteristics of political 
processes one should be concerned with and what kind of outcomes are favoured;  
· Purpose of social and political e nquiry: This looks at the reason behind the theoretical 
undertaking.  The different purposes for social and political enquiry are the basis of 
distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory; 76 
· The appropriate methodology for the study of the  field: Differences here are whether it 
should be based on empirical vocation, on rigorous application of scientific method, a 
systemic or functionalist approach;  
· How the different theories see the relation of the field to other disciplines : either as 
being distinct from or related to them.   
 
Ontology and epistemology 77 
The ontology and epistemology are main areas where a theory can differ from another, as 
they fundamentally shape the theory and the methods used in the inquiry. Each theory starts 
with its own basic image of social reality (an ontology) upon which a theoretical 
superstructure is built which includes ways of gathering knowledge (epistemology) 
(Rosamond 2000). Thus the ontological position comes first as it deals with the question of 
whether there is a real world out there, independent of our knowledge. Then the 
                                                   
75 For an overview of different definitions on theory see Burchill (2005). 
76 Problem solving theory does not question the existing order, but rather legitimises it. Critical theory does 
not accept the existing order but rather seeks to bring about an alternative order.  
77 The understanding of ontology here is based on Blaikie (2000: 8) who identifies the specific sense of this 
concept as “to refer to the claims or assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about 
what exists, what it looks like, what it is made up of and how t hese units interact with each other.” Therefore 
ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality. Epistemology is 
understood as “the claim or assumptions made about possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality” 
Blaikie (2000).  
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epistemological position can be determined.  It is important to realise that  different 
theoretical perspectives produce and reproduce different types of knowledge (Rosamond 
2000). While being aware of the close relationshi p between ontology and epistemology, 
one has also to know that the ontological position affects but not necessarily determines the 
epistemological position of a theory (Marsh and Stoker 2002) . Some important 
epistemological questions posed by Hermann (2002), outline where theorists in social 
science are utterly divided:  
· Is there a knowable objective reality out there, which can be separated from our 
subjective interpretation?  
· Can we generalise across time, space and people, or are our observations culturally, 
historically and geographically bounded? Therefore is grand theory possible or are 
middle range theories necessary, which specify the conditions in which theories apply?  
· What are the implications of different methodologies for the results of the inquiry?  
 
The epistemological posi tion then expresses the view of what we can know about the world 
and how we can recognise it. Therefore choosing one’s epistemology shapes to a strong 
extent one’s methodology. According to Mjøset (1999) (and taken up by other theorists 
such as Chryssochoou 2001) there are four types of theory (epistemological positions):  
1. Law-oriented; 
2. Idealising;  
3. Constructivist;   
4. Critical.  
 
Mjøset (1999) argues that these four notions of theory in social science differ along three 
dimensions: firstly, whether or not they support the deductive nomological ideal; secondly, 
if they accept that social sciences are distinct from natural science and finally whether 
ethical fundamentals matter for social science theory. The first two types of theo ry are 
different modifications of the deductive -
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which assumes that truth can be proven with empirical facts and the existence of an 
external reality, while the other two reject this starting point. 78 
 
When examining the field of political science (or at least international relations (IR) theory) 
for these theoretical positions, one sees that rationalism 79 (which is based on the first two 
types of theory as outlined by Mjøset), has been the dominant metatheoret ical position, 
arguing that identities and interests of actors are given and that the actors under analysis are 
states rather than individuals (Wendt 1992; Smith 2001). This position was challenged in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s by writers from a critic al and reflectivist persuasion, being 
post-positivist in their approach, who questioned whether one can apply theories in social 
science in the same way as in natural science. They also argued that the researcher is not 
purely an observer, but actively sha pes and influences the subject of his or her study.  A key 
question in this respect concerns the agent -structure problem: do social structures determine 
an individual's behaviour or does human agency? While the one group focused on the 
structure, taking the agent’s interests for granted, the other group focused on the agent and 
its impact on structures. Another perspective introduced to the domain of IR theory at that 
time was social constructivism. This metatheoretical view is based on theoretical 
approaches from the field of social philosophy/sociology, expressing the criticism that the 
dominant theoretical view in IR paid insufficient attention on the social construction of 
actors Wendt (1987; 1992a; 1992b). 80 Like reflectivist theories, constructivism argu es that 
identities and interests of actors are not given, therefore questioning the materialism and 
methodological individualism on which rationalism operates (Jupille, Caporaso and 
Checkel 2003). One of its main claims is that structures shape agents and agents shape 
structure. Consequently, constructivists argue that social constructivism can be the bridge 
between rationalism and constructivism (Adler 1997; Wendt 1992; Wendt and Fearon 
2002). Adler justifies this argument, by stating that  
 
                                                   
78A critical rationalist’s view on theories, which dominates in social sciences and was promoted by scientists 
such as Popper, who argues that “no theory can ever be verified, only falsified. Theories are not just 
generalisations, they are hypotheses on universal relations which have not been falsified”; quoted by Mjoset 
(1999: 2).  
79 For a comprehensive overview of rationalist assumptions in IR theory see Snidal (2002).  
80 For a comprehensive overview of constructivist assumptions in IR theor y see Adler (2002).  
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“Unlike positivism and materialism, which take the world as it is, 
constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming 
rather than being. Unlike idealism and post -structuralism and 
postmodernism, which take the world only as it can be imagined or t alked 
about, constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same 
epistemic value and there is consequently some foundation for knowledge.” 
(Adler 2002: 95) 
 
As a result, most constructivists claim that social constructivism presents ‘the middle 
ground’ between the two poles of rationalism and reflectivism (Adler 1997; Rosamond 
2007; Wiener 2006). However, while all social constructivists share the habit of distancing 
themselves from the rationalist and the reflectivist poles respectively, they do s o in different 
fashions thereby creating different groups within social constructivism. Some academics 
divide social constructivist into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ constructivist (Smith 2001), with the first 
group believing that there is a real world out there, but this world is not entirely determined 
by physical reality and is socially emergent (Adler 1997), and a second group refusing that 
there is an objective world out there (Christiansen, Jørgense n and Wiener 1999). Others 
identify three (Checkel 2006) or even four different groups within social constructivism, 
which are made up of modernist (thin or conventional) constructivists, modernist linguists, 
radical constructivists and critical constructivists (Adler 1997; 2002). Sometimes, 
constructivism is set against rationalism, thereby ignoring reflectivist writing completel y 
(Geyer 2003). Wendt and Fearon (2002) point out that like constructivism, rationalism also 
falls victim to over-generalisation and remind the r eader that there are many rationalist 
positions, with some rationalists, which other academics call ‘thin’ rationalists (Checkel 
2005), seeing social sciences as different to natural sciences and believing in the 
importance of ideas. Rather than seeing constructivism and rationalism as competing 
alternatives, many constructivists prefer to see them as debates between in principle 
complementary approaches (Greve 2004; Wendt and Fearon 2002). Wendt (1998) criticises 
the fact that the (third) debate in IR has tended to conflate two different issues, namely the 
questions on what things are made of and what questions we should as k, and by 
disentangling these two aspects one can see that explanation and understanding are not 
mutually exclusive but mutually implicating. Therefore he pleads for the ‘mutual 
recognition’ of each other’s research questions by positivists and post -positivists.  
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The important conclusion of Mjøset (1999:12) is that “there are clear ties between 
substantial theoretic al perspectives and notions of theory in the social sciences. A number 
of the fundamental debates in social science in fact imply debates between different 
understandings of theory and knowledge more generally.”  So depending on what notion of 
theory one has, its objectives change also.  
 
When evaluating a theory one has to be aware of the different characteristics of the specific 
theory, as one cannot evaluate a theory according to the criteria of another, if this other 
theory varies significantly on its c haracteristics. Furthermore, Chryssochoou (2001a: 2) 
argues that “theory in social science is to ‘illustrate’, not to ‘prov e’.” Therefore, the real 
question should not be whether a theory is false or not, but how much of the world the 
theory can help us explain (Johnson 2006). 
 
 
How and why do theoretical fashions change?  
In order to understand why theoretical fashions change, the concept of a paradigm 81 is very 
useful. A very general definition would be that a paradigm is a basic set of beliefs that 
guides action (Guba 1990). For Kuhn (1970: 10-11) paradigms are models which are the 
foundations for particular coherent traditions of scientific research, in which the members 
of this community are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. A 
paradigm has two main functions: firstly, deciding what constitutes valid knowledge, an d 
secondly creating communities of researchers. This is expressed by Janos (1986) as: 
”theoretically, paradigms  organise research, and psychologically and sociologically, they 
bind researchers into a community.” 82     
 
                                                   
81 There has been some debate in the literature on the use of the ‘paradigm’ concept. See Ball (1976); Farr 
1988; Pettigrew (1996);  Wagner and Berger 1985.  
82 Janos quoted in Farr 1988.
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Furthermore, within a paradigm, there  is room for different theories of different scopes 
(grand theories, middle range theories and micro theories) because paradigms are 
metatheoretical frameworks in which theorists carry out their research and create theories.  
 
So a paradigm is not a single theory but establishes what ‘normal science’ is i.e. the 
acknowledgement of a particular scientific community for a time and supplying the 
foundations for its further practise (Kuhn 1970). So one of the central features of a 
paradigm is to decide what kind of knowledge is acceptable. This is stressed by Rosamond 
(2000:192) who argues that “paradigms define the guiding assumptions of research, what 
counts as valid knowledge and how work should proceed” and therefore “the search for 
knowledge, indeed the establishmen t of what counts as valid knowledge, is socially located 
and socially constructed.” So what is considered as knowledge in one period of time is not 
objective but paradigm dependent. What is important with the concept of paradigms is that 
phenomena which do  not fit into the box of the paradigm are usually ignored. Kuhn (1970) 
admits that paradigms do not help to look at ne w phenomena or create new theories, but to 
focus on phenomena and theories which are already part of the paradigm.  
 
Paradigms are the basis for any scientific work in a specific field until a paradigm shift 
occurs. A paradigm shift is the development from one accepted set of what consists of valid 
knowledge and how to gather it, to another. “When the paradigm shift is complete, the 
profession will have changed its view on the field, its methods, and its goals” (Kuhn 1970: 
85). A paradigm shift occurs when the empirical findings cannot be any longer explained 
by the dominant paradigm and when the scientists using this paradigm accept the n eed for 
this change. Therefore, the willingness to change paradigms must come from within the 
scientific community using this paradigm and not from outside. However, this does not 
mean that because of a paradigm shift, facts become interpreted in a differe nt way. Rather, 
new facts are being recognised as facts. “Scientists do not see something as something else; 
they simply see it” (Kuhn 1970: 85). Finally, focusing on a new phenomenon does not 
automatically mean rejecting an older one, as the new phenomena had just not been 
considered beforehand.  
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As Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm focused on natural science, one has to consider the 
question whether or not social science and the study of politics can be scientific, like 
natural sciences. If so, one can apply the notion of paradigms directly to social sciences. On 
the other hand, for academics that see a difference between natural and social  sciences, the 
idea of a one to one transference of the paradigm idea from the natural sciences to social 
sciences is contested. One has to be aware of the differences before using the notion of 
paradigms in social science. These are:  
· Intellectual progres s in ‘hard’ science is quite different to progress in social science.  In 
the former, progress occurs when older ideas are superseded by newer ones, while in 
the later the matter under investigation cannot be proven, however new ideas add to the 
existing knowledge (Burchill 2005: 11); 
· Social structures, unlike many natural structures, change. The refore in most senses the 
social world varies across time and space and a paradigm is only valid for certain 
conditions, while in the natural science it should be universally applicable (Marsh and 
Stoker 2002); 
· Social structures, unlike natural ones, do not exist independently of the agents’ views 
on them (Marsh and Stoker 2002); 
· In natural science there is always one predominant paradigm. In social science there i s 
always a battle between different competing paradigms;  
· Paradigms in social science are typically combined rather than substituted (Pettigrew 
1996); 
· A main difference between social and natural science is that in the latter research 
tradition would never experience a revival, while in the former it does (Dryzek 1986).83 
 
So which paradigms exist in social sciences? Ball (1976) argues that at least one research 
programme can be identified in political science, namely rational choice. Guba (1990) 
argues that in social science the main paradigm is ‘traditional positivism’ with the other 
paradigms, ‘post-positivism’, ‘critical theory’ and ‘constructivism’ challenging it. 84 Other 
writers argue that no other paradigm is on the way to replacing positivism as the dominant 
                                                   
83 This can then be very much applied to European integration theory, where various theories experienced 
revivals, most and foremost neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.  
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paradigm (Kegley 2002). Applied to international relations in particular, some authors 
claim that realism is the old est and most prominent theoretical paradigm in international 
relations with the other paradigms being the liberal, epistemic and institutionalist paradigms 
(Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 5) . So there is some disagreement about whether one 
paradigm is dominant in social science or if there are alternatives. Nonetheless positivism, 
post-positivism, constructivism and critical theory can be seen as the main paradigms in 
social science.85  
 
 
Summary on theory in social science  
This analysis showed that the purpose of social science theory is twofold: one main purpose 
is to provide a framework w ith which events and issues can be interpreted and understood; 
the second is to be aware of one’s conceptual lenses and those of other theorists when 
analysing the world. Furthermore, it was also outlined that theories differ depending on 
their ontological and epistemological positions. The metatheoretical debate between 
rationalism and constructivism was also illustrated. When explaining the change in fashions 
in theory, the notion of paradigms is useful. It firstly explains how certain concepts of 
theory dominate the field and certain empirical facts and questions are not considered from 
the outset, as they lie not within certain boundaries established by a group of scholars or 
even a field. It re-emphasises the notion that our theoretical lenses restrict us in the 
questions we ask and in the answer we receive. This leads to the idea that concepts are 
social constructions, and the same action could be regarded in totally different perspectives 
in different societies (Pettigrew 1996) . Second, it illustrates how the understanding of 
‘sound social sciences’ changes. Using the words of Rosamond (2000:7) “Knowledge is not 
neutral. We gather it according to rules that change over time and which in turn influence 
the sorts of questions we ask. In other words, knowledge  has its own sociology.” Knowing 
the different paradigms that exist in social sciences can help to identify ones own and 
others' theoretical work.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
84 For a detailed analysi s and comparison of the different beliefs of these paradigms see Guba (1990).  
85 These reflect Mjøset’s four notions of theory outlined earlier.  
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2. Overview of European integration theory and its developments  
The study of European integration has meant  different things to theorists during different 
periods, and therefore the objective, the assumptions and the theories have varied over time. 
The fact that theories and approaches of different time periods focus on varied aspects of 
European integration pr oves that European integration is not a static object, but is 
constantly changing and evolving. Over time certain concepts become integrated into newer 
theories which shows that despite all the difference between the various approaches, there 
is a connection between them and that only by being aware of all of the different objectives 
and assumptions can one begin to understand the greater picture of European integration.  
 
Purpose and differences of theories in European integration  
The reasons for using theo ry in studying European integration are the same as those for 
using theory in social science in general. Broadly speaking, it is to gain more knowledge 
about the EU’s institutions, the policy -making processes, and the actors who shape them. 
Just as in social science in general, “different theoretical approaches to European 
integration are informed by different understandings of the meaning and purpose of 
theorising” (Wiener and Diez 2004: 3) . One can distinguish between various analytical 
levels of European integration theories. This is outlined by Chryssochoou (2001) when 
speaking of different scales of theories:  
· Those which only want to capture the larger picture;  
· Those which want to capture only a specific part of the overall picture;  
· Others which focus on the relationship between different realities;  
· Others which concentrate on the process of theorising.  
 
If one divides theories and approaches of EU integration according to their scope, one 
distinguishes between macro, meso  and micro theories. While macro theories aim at 
explaining the complete object, in this case European integration 86, meso theories focus 
their explanatory power on a general feature of the research object such as the decision -
making process in the EU and the actors inv olved, and micro theories look at a very 
                                                   
86 This has shifted later to European governance.  
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specific issue of the object, for example policy -making in one specific area. Theories of 
European integration have changed over time, and one of the main points where European 
integration theories have changed is o n their scale. Nowadays, the most prominent are no 
longer the theories that want to capture the larger picture (grand theories), but those that 
want to capture only a specific part of the overall picture (middle range theories). When 
looking at the differe nt theories in more detail later, their scope will be pointed out.  
 
European integration theories might be additionally distinguished by the relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables, i.e. this is what Wiener and Diez 
(2004: 18) call “the area of theory.” The focus might be on: the polity, the policy or the 
policy-making process. Each of these areas can serve as either independent or dependent 
variable, which then leads to different purposes of the theories. Nugent (2003) for example 
outlines three broad types of conceptual and theoretical work on EU integration and the 
study of the EU: 
· Attempts to conceptualise the organisational nature of the EU, determining the ‘nature 
of the beast’. These attempts treat the EU as a political system. They include: 
federalism, consociationalism and multi -level governance;  
· Theories which attempt to explain the general nature of the integration process. Their 
aim is to develop a broad understanding of th e factors underlying the whole of 
European integration and to predict how the integration process would continue. These 
are mainly what Wallace and Wallace (2000) call the ‘old theories’, which are less 
fashionable nowadays but are the point of departure for any other theoretical work. 
These are neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and  interdependence theory, which 
come from international relations theory and are also macro or grand theories ; 
· Theoretical approaches to specific aspects of the functioning of the EU, in particular 
policy and decision -making. These are the meso or middle range theories , using tools 
from comparative politics (CP) and public policy studies, such as policy networks.   
 
One possible definition of European integration theory, which tries to integrate all the 
different types of theories, is the following:   
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“European integration theory is the field of systematic reflection on the 
process of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development 
of common political institutions, as well as on its outcomes. It also includes 
theorisation of changing constru ctions of identities and interests of social 
actors in the context of this process” (Wiener and Diez 2004: 3). 
 
Being aware of the possible differences between the different European integration theories 
is also important for the evaluation of them. Theory normally has not only to be tested 
against empirical evidence, but also against the best alternat ive theory which have the same 
function (competitive testing) (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). However, not all 
theories cover all or the same of these functions, as theories vary in scope and aim. 
Therefore Wiener and Diez (2004) are quite correct when they argue that theories based on 
different functions should not be judged on the criteria of o ther  European integration 
theories when compared with each other, because they serve different purposes. This point 
is important as some theorists believe very strongly in the evaluation and comparison of 
theory (for example Moravcsik), while not consider ing that these theories are not always 
comparable, because of their different aims and functions. Therefore research has to be 
judged on the question it is asking, and cannot be evaluated against research with different 
questions, which is examining differ ent aspects of the EU. Greve (2004: 28) brings it to the 
point when stating: “what you see depends on what you look for: state centred theorists will 
tend to emphasise political processes and primarily focus on intergovernmental big bang’ 
bargaining, whereas ‘disaggregativists’ focus on how non -political functional imperatives 
affect political decision -making on a more incremental basis.”  
 
These different theoretical approaches with their varying scopes and dependent variables 
can be roughly divided into di fferent phases of European integration theory.  
 
 
Different phases of European integration theory  
Overviews of European integration, which are organised along different time phases of the 
European project, leave the exact beginning, end and length of the di fferent periods often 
unclear. This is because theories frequently still influence other theories of the new age or 
try to adapt themselves to take on board the reflections and criticisms of the new 
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generation. Also it takes time until a theoretical approa ch is established. Therefore various 
authors who distinguish between different phases of European integration theory, remind 
the reader not to be too strict in separating these phases and to leave some space for 
overlapping (Warleigh 2004; Wiener and Diez 2004).  
 
A sensible way of looking at the development of integration theory is to follow Wiener and 
Diez (2004) who argue for three main phases. The first phase of European integration 
theory started in the late 1960s. The main aim of the theories of that period was to explain 
why integration happened and who were the main actors of this process. The E uropean 
project was seen as a form of international organisation, nothing comparable to a state like 
entity. Neofunctionalism established itself as the champion of European integration theory 
with intergovernmentalism being its main rival theory. Other the ories included Karl 
Deutsch’s transactionalism and interdependence theory. All theories of that time were part 
of the discipline of international relations, however, inspired by different schools of 
thought, such as realism or behaviourism. The dependent v ariable of these theories was 
integration itself and the great debate was about ‘more or less integration’ with the 
dichotomy between the supranational and the national level. During this period the EU was 
seen as sui generis, i.e. one of a kind. Today mos t writers believe that the EU is sui generis 
but stress that whether the EU is sui generis or not does not affect the efforts made to 
conceptualise it (Caporaso et al. 1997; Hix 1994; Nugent 2003; Risse -Kappen 1996).  87  
 
The second phase of integration the ory began approximately in the 1980s, and saw an 
important shift in the dependent variable. As the process of integration was the focus of the 
first phase, the second phase looked at how the EC functioned. Kaiser (1967) was one of 
the first writers who argued that one should not only look at the process of change but also 
at the nature of the socio -political system. The importance of this change is reflected by the 
fact that many academics only see the theories of the first phase as ‘theories of European 
integration’, with theories of the second phase being ‘theories of EU governance’ (Bache 
and George 2001). Furthermore, the difference between the classical integration theories 
                                                   
87 For an extensive treatment of this topic and representation of different views on this issue see Caporaso et 
al. (1997).  
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and the governance approach is t he shift from the EU polity being the dependent variable to 
becoming the independent variable (Jachtenfuchs 2001). The exchange of dependent 
variable was not the only important development during the second phase. In order to 
analyse and explain the functioning of the EU, theories of IR were not sufficient but had to 
be complemented or replaced by theories from other fields. This was first proposed by Hix 
(1994). Following this call, theories of the second period aimed at bringing EU studies 
from IR studies to comparative politics and public policy analysis and saw the EU as more 
than an international organisation (Hix 1994) and  started to see it as a ‘regulatory state’ 
(Majone 1994). These second generation theorists did not try to analyse the whole but only 
pieces of the picture. They still see the EU as uni que, but argue that the n=1 problem can be 
avoided by only analysing individual components of the EU system (Jachtenfuchs and 
Kohler-Koch 2004). Some of the more significant theoretical approaches coming from this 
phase are new institutionalism, multi -level governance and policy networks. The shift to, or 
better the addition of, a new angle to European integration was quite logical. For th e 
theorists of the first day, the existence of this European project was a novelty and its 
process was the independent variable. By the 1980s the European Community, despite all 
its ups and downs, had proven that it was here to stay and even developed cert ain 
characteristics which made it resemble more a national political system or polity than an 
international organisation. Some see the move from treating the EU as an international 
organisation to considering it as a polity, as the most straight forward ch ange between the 
first and second phase of European integration theory (Bache and George 2001) .  
 
Another importan t novelty of the European governance idea is that theorists are now 
looking at the outcomes of the integration process (Jørgensen 1997). Not only the EU polity 
itself, but also the impact of the EU on domestic affairs in the Member States became a 
topic of analysis (Jachtenfuchs 2001). Furthermore, part of the ‘governance turn’ and 
treating the EU as a polity is the emphasis of theorists on questions such as democracy, 
legitimacy and effic iency. Another of the new issues was the democratic deficit. 88 As 
classical integration theories looked at the process of integration, they did not concern 
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themselves with the problem of the democratic deficit. Intergovernmentalist writers, such 
as Moravcsik, would see the question of the democratic deficit as irrelevant, as the EU is an 
international organisation and the legitimacy is secured at national level (Schimmelfennig 
2004). Furthermore, a general trend among theorists of European integration during this 
period was moving away from ‘grand theories’ towards middle range theories. Some 
authors highlight that the new focus on European governance, caused the shift away from 
grand theories to more defined and specific areas of research with the establishment of 
middle range theories (Bulmer 1998). This can be explained not only by the fact that the 
grand theories had problems explaining certain realities of the EU, such as the empty chair 
crisis or the deepening of the integration process w ith a growing influence of supranational 
actors, but also that the EU had become so multifaceted and diverse that a single theory 
could not capture all parts of the picture. Theoretical approaches tried therefore to limit 
themselves to explain certain aspe cts of European integration and the EU. The advantages 
of a governance perspective over ‘classical integration theories’ is seen by its theorists in its 
capacity to link policy-making and institution building, allowing for discussions of 
normative issues without losing contact with empirical research (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler -
Koch 2004). However, governance approaches are not directly compe ting with classical 
integration theories. While the first focus on the causes and outcomes of polity 
development, the latter focus on forms, outcomes, problems and development paths of 
governance in the Euro -polity (Jachtenfuchs 2001). Exactly because they have different 
scopes and ask different research questions, they can b e complementary with each other.  
 
The third phase , as identified by Wiener and Diez (2004), started in the 1990s. However, 
they themselves highlight that the content and definition of the third phase is not shared by 
all academics. The main focus of that phase was on the goal or finality of the EU, our 
understanding of integration, normative implicatio ns of particular EU policies and 
‘constructing’ European integration. Theorists of this period again turned towards the study 
of international relations for inspiration. The main theoretical approach being added to the 
study of European integration during this phase was social constructivism. This approach 
                                                                                                                                                          
88 “The loss of democracy caused by the transfer of power to the European institutions and to Member State 
executives arising out of European integration. It implies that representative institutio ns (parliaments) lose out 
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challenged the existing theories not on differences of epistemology but on ontology. As a 
consequence, and reacting to the real world developments of the EU, some of the classic 
theories tried to update t hemselves and adapt to the new circumstances, resulting in neo -
neofunctionalism (Schmitter 2004), and liberal-intergovernmentalism. The third phase 
clearly shows how the study of European int egration has evolved. The main questions are 
now not only why and how integration happened or how the EU works and what the 
structures are, but also about (European) identity, socialisation and to what integration 
really leads. Part of this change is very well captured by some social constructivists who 
argue that as “European integration itself has changed over the years, it is reasonable to 
assume that in the process agents’ identity, their interests and behaviour have changed as 
well” (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001: 2). Furthermore, the concept of 
‘Europeanisation’, which will be discussed in detail later, makes a valid attempt in trying to 
capture this transformation. The concept of EU governance is the link between the second 
and the third phase, as the main additional theoretical approach of the third phase, social 
constructivism, draws on and expands the notion of governance (Wiener and Diez 2004) .  
 
The theoretical discussions between constructivism and rationalism represent the great 
debate of the third period. This shows that the debate between rationalists and 
reflectivists/constructivists identified  earlier in the field of IR spilled over to the domain of 
European studies. However, constructivism, like rationalism, is a metatheory. 89 This 
separates them from the theoretical approaches which will be outlined in section three, as 
they are ‘first-order’ theories, while constructivism and rationalism are ‘second -order’ 
theories (Pollack 2009). Consequently, there are various  theoretical approaches in EU 
studies based on either rationalist 90 or constructivist91 positions. Some constructivist writers 
argue that this is sometimes forgotten by rationalist critics, such as Moravcsik, when 
evaluating their approaches (Risse and Wiener 1999). The earlier outlined differentiation 
between various groups of social constructivists applies also to European integration 
                                                                                                                                                          
in this process” (Cini 2007: 458).  
89 For an excellent overview on metatheory in EU studies see Jupille (2006).  
90 For a comprehensive overview of rationalist assumptions in EU studies see Scully (2006) and Pollack 
(2009). 
91 For a comprehensive overview of constructivist assumptions in EU studies see Checkel (2006; 2009) and 
Wiener (2006).  
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theory, with some social constructivists tending more to the rationalistic pole, with writers 
like Checkel (1999), right up to the othe r end which is more reflectivists such as Diez. 92 
While constructivists do not share the same epistemological position, they agree on the 
relevance of ontology over epistemology, with the main aim of social constructivists being 
to show the impact of ‘socia l ontologies’ and ‘social institutions’ on the process of 
European integration (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001). Therefore they challenge 
rationalist theories on an ontological ground and differ from reflectivism on 
epistemological grounds (Risse and Wiener 1 999). The debates between rationalist and 
constructivist approaches have been well documented in the literature (Jupille, Caporaso 
and Checkel 2003). Nevertheless, sometimes there exists confusion on the exact claims of 
social constructivism, as some acad emics equate it with a reflectivist position (or at least 
with the social constructivist type which tends most to the reflectivist pole) and treat 
constructivists as a homogenous group. Some writers, both rationalist and social 
constructivists (those with a tendency towards the reflectivist pole), try to set up a 
rationalism vs. constructivism debate, while others attempt to build bridges between the 
poles. However, they admit that so far bridge building between the poles goes on only in 
one direction, from social constructivism to rationalism, while the bridge from social 
constructivism to reflectivism is underdeveloped (Checkel 1999; 2006; 2009).  
  
For a deeper understanding of the progress between the three phases of European 
integration theory, this fiel d will be now examined for paradigm changes.  
 
Paradigms and paradigm changes in European integration theory   
Applying Kuhn’s notion of paradigms to the field of European integration theory, one can 
see that each of its three phases was accompanied by a c ertain paradigm change. One can 
identify a paradigm shift from a supranational to an intergovernmental paradigm, and then 
to a ‘syncretic’ paradigm, as the insights of multiple perspectives are synthesised 
(Rosamond 2000). Another example of a paradigm shift in EU studies is the move from 
using mainly IR theories to comparative politics. Chryssochoou (2001) argues that the 
                                                   
92 The location of social constructivism in relation to other IR theories, as well as of individual writers and 
strands within social constructivis m is well presented by Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener (2001).  
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increased theoretical interest in the EU as a multi -level polity or system of governance 
represents a significant paradigm shift with in European integration theory, namely from 
policy to polity. Furthermore, the ‘normative turn within European studies from theory to 
metatheory and the questions of ‘who governs’ to ‘who is governed’ (Chryssochoou 2001a: 
16) during the third phase can als o be seen as a paradigm shift.  
 
Some writers argue that European studies is only a subfield, 93 and that the paradigms in 
European integration are likely to be found in the broader disciplinary fields, such as IR or 
comparative politics (CP) (Rosamond (2000)  quoting Hollis and Smith). One can argue that 
during some periods theories of European integration are influenced more by the one and 
sometimes more by the other (Wiener and Diez 2004: 14) . Being aware of the influences 
from other fields is important in order to understand why these paradigms changed in the 
field of European integration. Theories nee d to be contextualised, which includes not only 
the real life developments, but also, and maybe more importantly, the developments within 
social science that gave rise to these theories and the social scientific environment in which 
they operate. Debates i n one scientific field are very often stimulated, or reflected, by 
debates in the wider scientific field. Therefore if methods and understanding of sound 
social science theory change in one field, sooner or later this will lead to a change of the 
theories within a related field. This of course is a two -way street; developments in EIT can 
spill back to the larger field. An example is given by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003)  
who argue that in IR neofunctiona lism provided the ‘intellectual opening’ of a neoliberal 
rival to the dominant realist paradigm. So one can see how developments in the study of 
European integration, also influences theoretical developments in other fields of social 
science. Jupille and Caporaso (1999: 430) summarise this by stating that “EU scholarship 
reflects and reinforces broader trends in political science.” Chryssochoou (2001) outlines an 
example of this, namely that the ‘normative turn’ in EU studies followed the constructivist 
discourse in IR theory. This notion is supported by Geyer (2003), who argues for a division 
between a rat ionalist and a reflectivist research paradigm, with constructivists trying to 
bridge this divide. Greve (2004) sees rather a general divide between rationalists and 
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constructivists. This idea shows similarities with Pollack’s (2001) notion that the different 
rational theories converge around a rationalist model which assumes fixed preferences and 
rational behaviour among all actors in the EU and with constructivism being the only, but 
less developed, rival approach in European integration study.  
 
Contextualisation includes also the consideration of developments in the real world. 
According to Rosamond (2000: 11) theories need to be seen “in the light of the context -in 
terms of the social science as well as in  the ‘real world’ of integration practice - in which 
they arose and in terms of the relationship between theories of European integration and the 
practise of integration and EU governance.” 94 Furthermore, “political science indeed often 
changes its theories because of new political developments external to its theories and the 
academy itself” (Farr 1988: 1186). One can observe that real world events have led to, or at 
least contributed to, three main developments of European integration theory, which reflect 
the three different phases of European integration theory. First of all, follo wing the 
evidence from the real world, such as the ‘empty chair crisis’, but also the deepening of 
integration through law and the strengthening of the supranational level, showed that 
classical theories such as neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism re spectively, were 
not in line with it. Secondly, by changing its political nature, from international 
organisation to ‘would be polity’ and quasi (con) federation, theories of the EU were in 
need of new tools and therefore integrated instruments and reasoni ng from CP. Thirdly, 
because of the growing expression of dissatisfaction by the EU citizens with the 
development of the EU (i.e. negative referendums, growing anti -Europeanism and success 
of anti-European parties), the study of integration was in need of,  and ready to accept, new 
theories and methods which provided the normative turn.  
     
Another crucial aspect of the paradigm reasoning has been identified as belonging to a 
community of scholars. Wiener and Diez (2004) point out that theories can often be 
influenced by geographic origin, e.g. different approaches between American and European 
                                                                                                                                                          
93 The field of EU studies is undergoing a process, which reflects the same discussions that were previously 
carried out in IR, namely , if it is a field by itself or only a subfield of some b roader field, in this case IR 
theory, or CP or comparative regional integration.  
94 Emphasis in the original.  
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scholars, and specific theories coming from one particular region (e.g. Germany, 
Scandinavia). This idea is reflected also by Jupille and Caporaso’s (1999) observation that 
American scholars of the EU are more often informed by IR theory, while European writer s 
on the EU use mainly comparative politics approaches.  
 
Summary  
As the different approaches to the study of European integration focus on different actors, 
this clearly pre -distinguishes the type of events, processes and policy areas they look at. 
Therefore their findings and explanations of why European integration happens, what it is 
and what the future will bring, depend on the choices they make when selecting their main 
independent variables. Rosamond (2000) therefore speaks of a ‘sociology of knowled ge’ 
which one has to be aware of, if one wants to understand the answers to European 
integration. The overview of the development of European integration theory also outlined 
‘why theories change and how’. Often there is a very close relationship between a  given 
European integration theory and the situation in the ‘real world’. If the object of study 
changes, theorists are required to make revisions in the way they analyse it. If this 
relationship changes to the extent that the theory is not any longer able  to explain the 
developments in the real world, it will be replaced by a new theory which is able to explain 
the new situation. Therefore the question of whether different periods of integration need 
different theoretical perspectives, must be answered pos itively, but with the condition that 
former theories are not only not forgotten, but build part of the foundation of the new ones, 
as the EU does not lose its older characteristics, but rather adds further components to it. 
One has to remember that Europea n integration theories do not exist in a vacuum of each 
other. Newer theories build on older ones, and even theories from the same time borrow 
from each other in order to adapt to the circumstances, criticisms and empirical findings. As 
realised during the  second phase, no theory is capable of explaining every aspect of the EU. 
Many theorists agree that the different theories are appropriate in explaining the different 
pieces of the EU mosaic (Nugent 2003; Rosamond 2000) and, as there is no single dynamic 
of European integration, therefore no single theory can describe the totality of European 
integration (Mazey 2001). The multi -dimensional nature of European integration and the 
EU itself require the existence of multiple approaches. Theorists argue that no analytical 
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framework is available to account for history -making and day-to-day politics 
simultaneously (Gstöhl 2000), and that different theories are better suited to conceptualise 
the different stages of the policy -making process in the EU polity (Richard son 2001; 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). More and more writers argue for the added value of 
supplementing theories with other theoretical approaches (Checkel 1999) and have 
undertaken work and research on framework theory of the EU, combining various 
compatible theoretical approaches under one framework (Mazey 2001; Peterson 1995; 
Peterson and Bomberg 2000; Richardson 2001), e.g. Gstöhl (2000) arguing for a liberal -
intergovernmentalism+ framework, and Warleigh (2000) for a Multi -Level Confederation 
as well as combining the theoretical approaches of multi -level governance with policy 
networks (Warleigh 2006).  
 
3. Different theoretical approaches to European integration  
This literature overview seeks to present some of the key theoretical approaches applied  to 
European integration. 95 Being aware of the different foci and assumptions of the conceptual 
approaches (see table 2.1) is necessary, so that one can try to apply them when analysing 
the OMC at a later stage.  
                                                   
95 The overview of theoretical approaches is not aimed at being exclusive, nonetheless it represents what the 
author sees as the most influential th eories of European integration. The constraints of this thesis also limit the 
possibility of dealing with the individual theories in depth. The author also does not want to judge which 
theory is the best to analyse and explain European integration, but to give an overview of the main existing 
theories, their assumptions and what part of European integration they want to account for, in order to apply 
them later on to the phenomenon of OMC. It has to be kept in mind that theories, while often originating wit h 
one writer, or a small group of writers, are interpreted differently and expanded separately by the various 
followers of it. The following overview will concentrate on the main assumptions and concepts of the 
different theories, on which the majority of the writers agree.  
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Table 2.1: Overview of European integration theories  
Governance approaches public policy analysis Theoretical 
approach 
Neofunctionalism Intergovernmentalism 
 New Institutionalism 
Constructivism 
Variations Traditional Neo-
functionalism 
Revisionist 
Neofunctionalism 
Traditional inter-
governmentalism 
Liberal- inter-
governmentalism 
Multi-level 
Governance 
Policy Networks Rational choice 
Institutionalism 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Social Constructivism 
 
Dependent 
Variable What 
does the 
approach 
want to 
explain 
European 
integration  
Why and how 
does integration 
happen. Explain 
institution 
building above the 
state 
European 
integration96 
Why and how does 
integration happen 
European 
integration 
Why and how 
does integration 
happen 
European integration 
Why and how does 
integration happen 
EU polity and EU 
Politics: How the 
EU works; 
Efficient and 
legitimate 
governance; 
Impact on the 
national level (but 
not on identities) 
European 
Governance 
How the EU works 
Efficient and 
legitimate 
governance 
Policy making 
Impact on the 
national level (but 
not on identities) 
What are the 
effects of 
institutions  
What are the effects 
of institutions 
The role of 
institutions in further 
integration 
What are the effects 
of institutions 
Effects of European 
integration on individuals 
and states 
 
How does integration 
influence identities 
Inspired by 
which 
theoretical 
considerations 
Behaviourism, 
Functionalism, 
Pluralism 
Neofunctionalism, 
Transactionalism, 
Institutionalism? 
Realism Inter-
governmentalism, 
Rational choice 
Institutionalism, 
Liberal theories of 
IR 
Neofunctionalism 
Inter- 
governmentalism 
 
Network theory Neofunctionalism 
Institutionalism 
LI 
Neofunctionalism 
Institutionalism 
Neofunctionalism 
Institutionalism 
Constructivism 
IR constructivism, 
Discourse analysis, 
Sociology 
What is 
integration? 
Integration is a 
process, not a 
condition 
Integration is a 
process, not a 
condition 
The practice of 
ordinary 
diplomacy under 
conditions 
creating unusual 
opportunities for 
providing 
collective goods 
through highly 
institutionalised 
exchange 
The interaction of 
state actors and the 
result of interstate 
bargaining 
A polity creating 
process in which 
authority and 
policy influence 
are shared across 
multiple level of 
government 
A polity creating 
process in which 
authority and policy 
influence are shared 
across multiple level 
of government and 
between a network 
of public and private 
actors 
States pursuing 
their interests but 
in the context 
provided by 
international 
institutions 
A political process 
that unfolds over 
time 
A political process 
affecting the 
identities of actors 
that unfolds over 
time 
Effecting the identities of 
actors 
Social-science 
field 
IR IR plus CP IR IR IR and CP IR and CP IR and CP IR and CP IR and CP IR 
                                                   
96 Within a specific policy field (e.g. social policy), or a specific aspect of enlargement (PHARE), or a specific dimension (e.g. legal)  
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Governance approaches public policy analysis Theoretical 
approach 
Neofunctionalism Intergovernmentalism 
 New Institutionalism 
Constructivism 
Variations Traditional Neo-
functionalism 
Revisionist 
Neofunctionalism 
Traditional Inter-
governmentalism 
Liberal- Inter-
governmentalism 
Multi-level 
Governance 
Policy Networks Rational choice 
Institutionalism 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Social Constructivism 
 
Ontology Soft rational 
choice 
Actor centred 
Soft rational choice 
Actor centred 
Rational choice 
Actor centred 
Rational choice 
Actor centred 
Rational choice Rational choice Rational choice 
 
Rational choice 
Institution centred 
Constructivism, 
sociological 
Social ontology 
Constructivism 
No comment epistemology 
The role of 
European  
institutions 
Strong Strong Weak Weak Medium-Strong Medium Medium Strong  Strong Medium 
The role of 
interest group 
Strong Strong Weak Weak Varied Strong As part of a 
network 
Varied Varied Varied Varied 
The future of 
the EU 
Supranational 
state 
Federal state International 
organisation 
International 
organisation 
MLG/Federation Agnostic Agnostic Agnostic Agnostic Agnostic 
The focus of 
study 
Process Process History making 
events 
History making 
events 
Every day politics Every day politics Every day politics Every day politics Every day politics Ideas and knowledge 
Agency vs. 
structure 
Agency Agency Agency Agency Agency Agency Agency Agency Structures and agents 
are mutual 
codetermined 
Agency shapes structure & 
structure shapes agency 
Level of focus European European International Two level game Multiple European but also 
domestic 
European but also 
domestic 
European but also 
domestic 
European but also 
domestic 
Domestic but also 
European 
What is the 
EU? 
Sui generis Supranational 
governance form 
International 
Organisation 
Forum for 
interstate 
bargaining 
International 
Organisation Forum 
for interstate 
bargaining 
Multi-level, multi- 
actor and multi-
centred 
Polity 
Sui generis 
Multi-level, multi-
actor and multi -
centred 
Polity 
Polity 
 
Polity 
 
Polity 
 
Polity 
Scale of theory Grand theory Middle range Middle range Grand Theory Metaphor, 
Theoretical 
approach 
Metaphor, 
Theoretical approach 
Middle range Middle range Middle range Metatheory 
Belief in 
Socialisation 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
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Governance approaches public policy analysis Theoretical 
approach 
Neofunctionalism Intergovernmentalism 
 New Institutionalism 
Constructivism 
Variations Traditional Neo-
functionalism 
Revisionist 
Neofunctionalism 
Traditional inter-
governmentalism 
Liberal- inter-
governmentalism 
Multi-level 
Governance 
Policy Networks Rational choice 
Institutionalism 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Social Constructivism 
 
Main authors 
of this 
approach 
Haas, Lindberg, 
Schmitter, 
Scheingold, 
Sandholtz, Stone 
Sweet, Caporaso, 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen 
Hoffmann, 
Milward 
Keohane 
Moravcsik,  Marks, Hooghe Kohler-Koch, Eising Scharpf 
Tsebelis/ Garrett 
Pierson, Bulmer, 
Wincott 
Checkel, 
Risse, Trondal 
Wiener, Christianes, 
Jorgenson, Ruggie, 
Main concepts Various forms of 
spillover, 
externalisation, 
epistemic 
communities, 
socialisation 
engrenage 
Supranational 
governance 
Rescue of the 
nation state 
Two-level-game Multi-level 
governance 
Consociation, issue 
networks, policy 
communities, 
epistemic 
communities, 
Governing by 
persuasion, 
Politikverflechtung, 
advocacy coalition 
Joint decision trap Path dependency, 
lock in,  
deliberation 
Logic of 
appropriateness, 
institutional 
isomorphism 
Logic of appropriateness, 
deliberation, socialisation, 
learning, constituitiveness 
of structures and agents, 
discourse 
Interest 
Preferences  
Crucial but 
changeable 
EU Membership can 
influence preferences 
of MS 
Fixed National level 
defines preferences 
of MS 
Fixed  Fixed Changeable EU Membership can 
influence preferences 
of MS 
EU Membership can 
influence preferences 
of MS 
National level defines 
preferences of MS and EU 
Membership can influence 
preferences of MS 
Source: Author  
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Neofunctionalism 
Theorists have described neofunctionalism as the quintessential theory of integration 
(Rosamond 2000). This statement is plausible as neofunctionalism was until the end of the 
1960s the main theory of regional/European integration. It originated in the field of 
international relations theory, and was developed by a group of writers around Ernst B. 
Haas (1958), including Lindberg, Scheingold and Schmitter, who were theoretically 
influenced by Mitrany’s functionalism, behaviourism, and pluralism. Its dependent variable 
was how and why nation-states cease to be wholly sovereign, and how and why they 
voluntarily transfer competences to the European level (Haas 1958). They wanted to show 
how economic integration in important economic sectors would lead to wider economic 
integration, which then would lead to political integration and how the establishment of 
supranational institutions would accelerate this process.  
 
Neofunctionalism is based on t he following assumptions : 
· Integration is a process, not a condition:  Neofunctionalism focuses on the process and 
less on the outcome. That does not mean neofunctionalism has no predictions for the 
future. Haas (1958: 5) saw the end goal as a  political community, “a condition in which 
specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institution 
than to any other forms of political authority”;  
· Institutions matter and can influence the process: National governments are not in full 
control of the integration process and the supranational institutions can also influence 
the process. “No single government or coalition controlled the decision -making process. 
The Commission, because of its power of initiative, was able to construct a dif ferent 
coalition of supporting governments on each major issue” (Haas 1967: 325);   
· Interdependence between economies as well as between sectors;  
· Gradual withering of the powers of the nation state;  
· Political integration follows economic integration;  
· Multiple groups with varying interests exist and participate in society;  
· Neofunctionalism’s ontology is the underlying belief in instrumental self -interest. 
However, differently from other rational approaches, neofunctionalism allows for the 
possibility that interests can change during the process. Consequently 
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neofunctionalism’s ontology “is ‘soft’ rational choice: social actors, in seeking to 
realise their value-derived interests, will choose whatever means are made available by 
the prevailing democratic order.  If thwarted, they will rethink their values, redefine 
their interests, and choose new means to realise them. Therefore the ontology is not 
materialistic: values shape interests, and values include many non -material elements” 
(Haas 2001: 11). 
 
Based on these major assumptions, neofunctionalism developed various concepts 97 in order 
to explain why integration takes place. The most famous concept is the notion of spillover . 
In its most general formulation, “spillover refers to a situation in which a given actio n, 
related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only 
by taking actions further, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more 
action, and so forth” (Lindberg 1963: 10) . So cooperation in one area would lead 
automatically to cooperation in other related areas. The initial neofuctionalis t writings 
included two forms of spillover: functional and political. Revision and second generation 
neofunctionalist writers added further forms of spillover, such as cultivated, geographic and 
institutional.  
· Functional spillover:98 integration in one (economic) sector creates pressure for 
integration in another related sector. Later, Haas added that some sectors have more 
spillover potential than others, particularly the ones that affect the day -to-day lives. 
Schmitter (1969: 162) sees two forms of functio nal spillover: “Spillover can increase 
integration either by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the 
scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector 
(increasing the level of mutual commitm ent) or both.” The first is then functional 
spillover while the other is called task expansion (Lindberg 1963). One can therefore 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal spillover; 
· Political spillover : Once a sector is becoming integrated, national and later European 
interest groups shift their loyalties and lobby their governments for further integration. 
Therefore “political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
                                                   
97 As there are various neofunctionalist writers and neofunctionalist writing has been revised by fir st and 
second-generation neofunctionalist, sometimes, different labels are used for similar ideas.  
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national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities towards a new centre” (Haas 1967: 16). While Haas focused more on i nterest 
groups, Lindberg examined governmental elites. Through interaction with each other on 
a daily, often informal basis, this would lead to a gradual convergence of interest and 
expectations, with these elite groups (Lindberg 1963). This engrenage (or socialisation) 
process is the process whereby national civil servants through their increasing 
involvement with each other are encouraged to take integrative decisions (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970: 16). An example is the Council, where the representatives develop 
personal relations with their counterparts, learn to trust them and feel a common 
understanding (principle of staendiger Vertreter vs. Staendiger Verraeter). 99 
Furthermore, the shifting of loyalties does not depend on whether these groups 
necessarily believe in the project and are convinced integrationists or not. By shifting 
their activities to a new c entre they are acknowledging the significance of the 
supranational institutions and are giving further legitimacy to the process (Lindberg 
1963). Thus the forming of regional interest groups is equally a result and a condition 
for regional integration;  
· Cultivated spillover : Later neofunctionalists added that in order for spillover to occur, 
political activism (of the High Authority) was necessary (Haas 1961). This was later 
named cultivated spillover (Tranholm -Mikkelsen 1991). It sees central institutions a s 
policy entrepreneurs and agenda -setter, and the Commission can actively influence the 
integration process by moving beyond the minimum common denominator and actually  
‘upgrading the common interest’, which would lead to an expansion of its power. 
Examples for cultivated spillover can be seen in the Commission’s Cockfield report 
which led to the Single European Act (SEA), the Commission’s social program as a 
reaction to economic forces, and the PHARE project (Niemann 1998);   
· Externalisation and geographi c spillover: Successful regional integration between 
certain states will lead to extending the number of states that want to be part of the 
regional integration, therefore having a geographical spillover effect (Haas 1958). 
Schmitter (1969) builds on this when he discusses his externalisation concept, in which 
                                                                                                                                                          
98 Haas (1958) referred to this in his original work as the expansive logic of sector integration.  
99 Permanent representative vs. permanent traitor see Niema nn (1998).   
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the members are forced to form common policies and increase their integration in order 
to respond adequately to the outside pressures. Lindberg (1963) argued already earlier 
that participation in a cu stoms union would probably elicit reactions from non -Member 
States, a situation which may create problems that can be resolved only by further 
integration. In a more recent example, Niemann (1998) applies these concepts to the 
situation of the EU’s eastern  enlargement and the PHARE project;  
· Institutional/legalistic spillover : This concept was developed by (Jensen 2000), a 
second generation neofunctionalist, who considers that legalistic/institutional spillover 
represents amendments to the treaties and argues that spillover happened in the area of 
social and labour market policy. Although not calling it a legalistic spillover, Tranholm -
Mikkelsen (1991) already argued earlier that legal integration corresponds remarkably 
closely to the original neofunctionalist beliefs.  
 
Criticism 
The main weaknesses of neofunctionalism have been summarised by Moravcsik (1993) 
who argues that it mispredicts both the trajectory and the process of EC evolution. As 
neofunctionalism was closely linked with the Monnet method 100, its success as a theory was 
also linked with the success of the community project itself. The notion of  automatic 
progression towards deeper integration and greater supranational influence was part of 
early neofunctionalist writing, but when policy integration did not develop automatically as 
anticipated by neofunction alists, instead slowing down with the empty chair crisis in 1965 -
66 and the world recession in the 1970s, neofunctionalism was challenged on empirical 
grounds as being too deterministic. Intergovernmentalists, such as Hoffmann (1966) 
criticised neofunction alism for not taking global developments into account. Furthermore, 
neofunctionalism had the ‘n=1 problem’ 101, where the European Economic Community was 
the only case study and the attempts of neofunctionalists to apply their theory to other 
areas, showed its limitation (Moravcsik 1993). As a result, neofunctionalists set 
preconditions for regional integration: pluralistic society, high level of economic 
development, common ideological patterns and a high level of bureaucratisation (Haas 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
100 Also referred to as the Community Method.  
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1967). Neofuctionalis ts tried on various occasions to revise and reformulate their theory to 
keep up with real life events and addressing its weaknesses. Haas in particular tried to 
explain the ‘de Gaulle factor’ in his revision, and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) tried to 
add new concepts such as spillback to explain the possible reversal of the integration 
process. Furthermore, the idea of automaticity was dropped. However, the final blow to 
neofunctionalism as a base line theory came when its own founder declared the theory 
obsolete (Haas 1976). This at the same time ended the era of grand theory building, and 
limited the interest in European integration in general. Nonetheless, from the early 1990s 
onwards a new generation of political theorists argued for the usefulness of 
neofunctionalism in explaining the latest developments of the EC/EU. Padoa -Schioppa 
(1987) looked at the spillover from the 1992 project to EMU, Leibfried and Pierson (1995) 
did the same from the single market to social policy. Others tested the concept of  spillover 
to specific policy areas, such as Jensen (2000) in social policy, or Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet (1998) in telecommunications. These authors argue that neofunctionalism, though 
with some adaptations and updates, still represents the best theory in  explaining the process 
of European integration.  
 
Evaluation 
Rosamond (2005) points out the contradiction that neofunctionalism is considered as the 
European integration theory per se but is often presented as a theory of the past without use 
for the current study of the EU.102 This mis-representation contradicts the fact that 
neofunctionalists terms and assumptions have been integrated and further developed by 
newer theories,103 some also seeing a link between neofunctionalism and social 
constructivism (Haas 2001). In line with other academics such as Rosamond (2005) or 
Cram (2001) one would have to conclude that while considering the weaknesses of this 
theory, it still has great potential for explaining major parts of the European integration 
process.  
                                                                                                                                                          
101 For an excellent analysis see Rosamond (2000).  
102 Even Moravcsik, nowadays the main proponent of intergovernmentalism called neofunctionalism “the 
most comprehensive and sophisticated attempt to pr ovide a general theory of European integration and a 
touchstone for subsequent scholarship” (Moravcsik 1993). The interesting fact is that in a more recent work 
he downgrades neofunctionalism from a theory to a framework (see Moravcsik 2005).  
103 See for example Pierson (1996), Warleigh (2000) or Bache and George (2001).  
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Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism was (and some say still is) the main opposing theory to 
neofunctionalism, and the literature was for many years dominated by the great debate 
between them. One of the main differences between neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism is that the former is a theory of change and transformation, and the 
latter is a theory emphasising international politics as usual, just with new conditions 
(Rosamond 2000). This overview will briefly outline the ‘classical intergovernmenta lism’ 
before concentrating on liberal -intergovernmentalism, its more refined and updated version.  
 
· Classical intergovernmentalism  
Intergovernmentalism, just as neofunctionalism, comes from the more general field of IR 
theory and also concentrates only on the question why and how integration happens instead 
of looking at how the EU functions. Furthermore, intergovernmentalism is strongly 
influenced by realist writing. The main representative of classical intergovernmentalism is 
Stanley Hoffman (1964, 1966) who argued for the ‘logic of diversity’ rather than the ‘logic 
of integration’ (Nugent 2003).  
 
The main assumptions of intergovernmentalism are:  
· The integration process is perceived as a series of bargains carried out by sovereign 
states following their na tional interest (Hoffman 1966);  
· The state is a unitary actor;  
· The national governments are in control of the integration process;  
· Separation between ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics. Intergovernmentalists acknowledge that 
integration is possible in areas of low politics but high politics sectors are out of the 
scope of integration (Hoffman 1966).  
 
Criticism 
Intergovernmentalism has been criticised for its rigid separation between high and low 
politics as well as playing down the interdependence between states (Ci ni 2007). 
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Intergovernmentalists have also problems explaining why nation states would hand over 
power through integration, but some tried to turn the tables around and even proclaimed 
“the rescue of the nation state” as a result of membership in the Europe an project (Milward 
1992). 
 
· Liberal-intergovernmentalism (LI)  
This theory was developed by Andrew Moravcsik (1991; 1993; 1995; 1997; 1998; 1999). 104 
It is mainly influenced by classical intergovernmentalism, as well as neo -liberal 
institutionalism, contemporary theories of international political economy and applies 
negotiation analysis and regime theory to the EC/EU. Liberal -intergovernmentalism is 
Moravcsik’s attempts to create a grand theory 105 of European integration, which focuses on 
the main (history-making) events of integration. In his writings he concentrates on a sequel 
of negotiations (SEA, Treaty on the European Union and Treaty of Amsterdam) and its 
impact on the integration process.  Liberal -intergovernmentalist theory seeks to analyse the 
EU as a result of strategies pursued by rational governments, acting on the basis of their 
preferences and power (Moravcsik 1993). Therefore he defines European integration as a 
series of rational choices by national leaders (Moravcsik 1998).  
 
Main assumptions:  
· EC/EU is an international organisation: Like classical intergovernmentalists, liberal -
intergovernmentalists see the EU as an international organisation. “EC can be analysed 
as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic 
interdependence  through negotiated policy coordination.” (Moravcsik 1993: 474);  
· States are the central actors in European integration: Not only do they not lose 
influence, they even become stronger as regards to their national parliaments and 
national interest groups, as  results of European integration;  
· Rational choice: Actors behave rational, based on the calculation how best to maximise 
their interest (Schimmelfenning 2004);  
                                                   
104 LI is based on Moravcsik’s earlier approach called “intergovernmental institutionalism (Moravcsik 1991; 
1993). 
105 Although Moravcsik’s LI is considered as a grand theory, he himself argues t hat more than one theory is 
needed to explain the complexity of EC policy -making (Moravcsik 1993 and Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999).  
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· Role of supranational institutions is limited: Institutions play a role, but only the one 
foreseen by the nation states, namely to reduce transaction costs for international 
negotiations; 
· Policy-making takes place in intergovernmental negotiations;  
· Bargaining power depends on information.  
 
Based on these assumptions Moravcsik’s LI is a liberal theory  of national preference 
formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations and a functional theory of 
institutional choice (Schimmelfenning 2004). As Moravcsik (1993) applies Putnam’s two 
level game, LI is based on two levels: On the first (national) level, national preferences are 
defined by domestic interests; on the second (international) level, there are two processes: 
Agreement on common policy response through interstate bargaining, followed by an 
agreement on the institutional setting.  
 
· National preference for mation: The main difference to classical intergovernmentalism 
is that LI acknowledges the importance of domestic players, and does not treat the state 
as a ‘black box’. For Moravcsik (1993; 1995) an understanding of domestic politics is a 
precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among 
states. He argues that state preferences are based on the economic interests of different 
domestic interest groups which are in competition with each other to influence the 
government. This makes state preferences dependet on the most powerful interest group 
at the time. Therefore according to him, state preferences are neither fixed nor uniform 
but depend on domestic political processes (Rosamond 2000; Schimmelfennig 2004). 
However, during certain periods of time the constraint of the national government by 
the domestic interest groups might be reduced, and this ‘agency slack’ gives the 
government more autonomy in its decision -making (Moravcsik 1993);  
· Interstate bargaining : Moravcsik (1993) continues, giving an in -depth analysis of 
interstate bargaining which he based on three assumptions: Intergovernmental 
cooperation in the EU is voluntary, the environment in which European governments 
bargain is relatively information -rich and the transaction costs of intergovernmental 
bargaining are low. Liberal -intergovernmentalism sees the results of interstate 
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bargaining reflecting the relative bargaining power of the actors, based on economic 
and political weight (Moravcsik 1993; 1995) and by issue -specific interdependence, or 
state vulnerability resulting from substantive asymmetric interdependence (Moravcsik 
and Nicolaïdis 1999). Other factors that affect the negotiations are the possibilities for 
coalition-building, the threats of exclusion, exit veto, the potential for compromise and 
linkages, as well as the cost of non -agreement (Moravcsik 1993);  
· Institutional choice : Different to classic intergovernmentalism, liberal -
intergovernmentalism foresees a role for supranational institutions limited how ever to 
the task foreseen by the Member States. Applying principal -agent theory to the EC/EU 
explains the conditions under which governments delegate power to international 
institutions. Furthermore Moravcsik (1993) argues that delegating power to 
supranational institutions, augments rather than restricts the ability of governments to 
achieve domestic goals in two ways: It increases the efficiency of interstate bargaining 
by reducing transaction costs and it strengthens the autonomy of the government vis -à- 
vis domestic social interests.   
 
Schimmelfennig (2004) points out that intergovernmentalists, such as Moravcsik or 
Milward, are trying to use this argument of na tional governments gaining more 
independence at national level, as a result of European integration, in order to explain why 
nation states participate in the EU/international organisations and hand over certain powers, 
which is normally difficult for inter governmentalists to explain.  
 
Main criticism 
A number of criticisms have been launched against liberal -intergovernmentalism: 
· Biased case selection: First of all, it focuses only on history making events and not on 
informal processes and day -to-day politics (Wincott 1995). Secondly, even if one 
accepts this limitation, as Moravcsik limited himself to these kind of events, the cases 
are biased as he does not look at constitutional changes brought by the Commission and 
the ECJ (Schimmelfennig 2004); 
· Neglecting integration dynamics: LI heavily underestimates the impact of supranational 
actors on the integration process (i.e. as agenda -setter). New institutionalists, such as 
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Bulmer (1998) mainly criticise that LI treats institutions only as neutral arenas for 
political actors; 
· Internal theoretical problems: Schimmelfennig (2004) argues that LI has internal 
theoretical problems based on the analytical separation between substantive bargain ing 
and institutional choice;  
· Only two levels: LI does not consider multiple levels possible (Cini 2007);  
· Impact of domestic and European interest groups: LI limits the role of interest groups to 
the national level. Many authors, such as Sandholtz and Ston e Sweet (1998) argue that 
the gatekeeping role of the nation state is undermined from two sides: 1) by letting the 
EU having direct impact on national politics and 2) by giving national interests access 
to a forum at European level without going through th e national government;  
· It neglects the idea of socialisation: LI ignores the possibility that identities (can) 
change and develop;  
· Some even argue that liberal -intergovernmentalism is not a theory but only an approach 
to European integration (Forster 1998 ; Wincott 1995). 
 
Evaluation  
As LI is a single author theory, it is relatively homogenous in its assumptions and 
predictions, compared to theories of multiple writers, which often use different terminology 
and sometimes contradicting ideas (Schimmelfennig  2004). Therefore LI is relatively 
straightforward, with a testable set of propositions and many authors agree that LI is useful 
in ordering of data and the testing of hypotheses (Rosamond 2000). Furthermore, one of the 
main strengths of LI is its way of a pplying aspects from realism as well as from liberal -
pluralist theories, which have long been opposing theories with contradictory assumptions. 
Consequently, even its critics agree that it explains much of state behaviour in the EU 
(Schimmelfennig 2004). T herefore it is not surprising that liberal - intergovernmentalism is 
today the baseline theory against which any new theory is tested (Schimmelfennig 2004). It 
has replaced neofunctionalism in being this theory. However, Rosamond (2000) argues that 
LI is out of touch with the developments in integration theory as it still focuses on 
integration rather than on EU governance. Therefore it can only be taken as a first cut 
before moving on to other theories to complete the picture.  
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Governance approaches  
The theoretical approaches of the governance perspective are not a comprehensive theory 
of European integration but the governance perspective is supposed to give a broader view 
of the integration process (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler -Koch 2004). Furthermore, the con cept 
of European governance is not that clear cut. Different scholars from various disciplines 
relate different things to the concept of governance (Jørgensen 1997). Some theorists define 
governance as “the continuous political process of setting explicit goals for society and 
intervening in it in order to achieve these goals” (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler -Koch 2004: 99). 
Others argue that the term governance has been used for analysing the patterns of rule 
generally and in the EU in particular (Bulmer 1998). Ho wever, most authors agree that 
European governance varies over time and across policy areas (Kohler -Koch 1999; Wallace 
and Wallace 2000). Furthermore, theorists using a governance approach reject the 
intergovernmental notion that changing EU governance is purely steered by (a series of) 
history-making events, but that changes are evolutionary and (also) occur through day -to-
day events. They argue that their approach is promising because it places the competition 
for political power as the core of integratio n research (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler -Koch 2004) 
and overcomes the borders between international and domestic politics, as well as between 
IR theory and comparative politics (Jørgensen 1997). Approaches to European governance 
share certain assumptions, while  then focusing on different parts of the European polity. 
Governance approaches see government now as involving a wide range of actors and 
processes beyond the state, focusing more on regulation than on redistribution and the 
relationships between state an d non-state actors are more interactive and less hierarchical 
(Nugent 2003). Jachtenfuchs (1995) argues that the idea of governance beyond the state 
does not mean governance above the state. The various theoretical approaches, which can 
be associated with the ‘governance approach’ to European study, should be seen rather as 
complementary than as opposing theoretical stands, because they have the same focus on 
governance instead of integration and they use each other’s concepts. The most popular 
ones, multi-level governance, policy networks and new institutionalism, will now be 
presented in turn.  
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Multi-level governance  
Multi-level governance’s most prominent writers are Marks and Hooghe (Marks, Hooghe 
and Blank 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001) who follow the co mparativist belief that politics 
in the EU is more like that found within nation states and not among them. Therefore its 
main focus is the nature of the EU.  
 
Main assumptions as outlined by Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996):  
· Decision-making powers not only l ie with, and are exercised by, national governments 
but with institutions and other political actors as well; 106 
· MLG rejects the intergovernmentalist view that national governments stay in total 
control of the integration process;  
· Political arenas are inter connected: The separation between domestic and international 
arenas, as in the state centric model, is rejected.  There are multiple channels, and 
national actors do not always have to go through the national government to input in the 
EU decision-making process; 
 
Portraying the EU as a form of multi -level governance carries along with it the assumption 
that actors at different levels are interdependent, and ‘network’ with each other (Peterson 
2004). Furthermore, Hooghe and Marks (2001) argue that governanc e must be multi-level 
in order to internalise externalities. Therefore multi -level governance sees the EU as a 
polity or polity in the making, where power and influence are exercised at various levels: 
supranational, national, regional or local. The concep t of multi-level governance has shed 
light on two important features of the EU polity: policy -making is shared between actors at 
various levels e.g. European, national, regional (Peterson and Bomberg 2000); and 
secondly, public/private networks have joined  the core representative institutions in the 
decision-making process (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The notion of partnership principle 
sums up the MLG belief that formal and informal roles and powers are distributed between 
                                                   
106 For an analysis of this dispersion of authority using different conceptions of multi -level governance see 
Hooghe and Mark s (2001). 
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various governmental and non -governmental actors across different levels in the EU 
(Warleigh 2006). 
 
Criticism:107 
The most prominent criticism is that MLG is based only on the case of one policy area 
(Warleigh 2006). Most criticism comes from state centric theorists, who argue that many 
nation states have no substantial subnational structure and that sub -national actors are not 
involved in other policy areas besides cohesion policy (Warleigh 2000). Furthermore, the 
focus of many theorists using the MLG approach was mainly on the aspect of multi ple 
levels and less on the governance part (Börzel 1997). Moreover, it is only a limited 
theoretical approach, as it explains neither the development of the EU nor the motivation of 
its main actors (Warleigh 2000). Finally, even its most prominent writers,  argue that MLG 
is unlikely to be a stable equilibrium and the outcome is uncertain (Marks, Hooghe and 
Blank 1996).  
 
Evaluation 
The MLG approach is very useful because it sheds light on the structure of the EU polity 
and the interconnection of the differe nt levels and actors. Furthermore, it outlines the 
involvement of sub -national actors better than any other theoretical approach (Warleigh 
2000). Nowadays it has been generally accepted to treat the EU as a multi -level polity 
(Peterson and Bomberg 2000; Ri sse-Kappen 1996; Warleigh 2004). However, MLG needs 
to be supplemented by other theoretical approaches which can explain the origins of the EU 
and the decision-making process within it (Warleigh 2000).  
 
 
Policy networks  
There are various academics working  with the concept of policy networks, often with 
varying research questions and even different understandings of the concept itself. 108  
Writers commentating on the concept of policy networks outline that there is no common 
                                                   
107 For an in-depth overview of MLG see Warleigh (2006).  
108 For an excellent overview of the different uses of the policy networks approach see Börzel (1997).  
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understanding of what constitutes a policy network and if the concept is a metaphor, a 
method or an analytical tool (Börzel 1997). Therefore policy networks should be used as a 
generic term, as there is no one way of policy -making, there is also no one type of policy 
networks (Richardson 2001). Theorists using the concept of policy networks see the EU as 
a system of network governance (Kohler -Koch 1999; 2002), with networking being the 
most characteristic feature of EU governance (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler -Koch 2004). 
Among the various writers using the policy networks concept, some see policy networks as 
a specific kind of governance, a tool to mobilise political resources, where these are widely 
disperse between public and private actors (Börzel 1997).  
 
The application of the concept of poli cy networks is based on the notion of the EU as a 
multi-level system, considered not as a layer cake, but rather as a marble cake (Kohler -
Koch 2002).  Furthermore, Börzel (1997) argues that the interest in policy networks can be 
mainly understood as a reac tion to the critique of multi -level governance. As discussed 
above, the concept of multi -level governance has two aspects: multiple levels and the 
relationship between public and private actors. Therefore the concept of policy networks 
was perceived as ‘pu tting governance back into multi -level governance’.  
 
Assumptions:  
· Modern governance is non -hierarchical, but rather involves mutuality and 
interdependence between different actors in various policy sectors;  
· Interests of actors are fixed, but can change o ver time; 
· The focus of attention is not on organisations (be it national, international or 
transnational) but the linkages between them (Peterson 2004);  
· The rules and actors in the EU polity vary significantly between policy sectors 
(Peterson 2004) and can be compared to policy -making in other international 
organisations; 
· As soon as the EU extends to new policy areas, policy networks emerge (Kohler -Koch 
2002); 
· Various committees in the EU sub systems can sha pe policy, even before political 
decision-makers officially set the policies (Peterson 2004);  
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· EU policy outcomes are determined by how integrated and exclusive policy -specific 
networks are and how mutually dependent actors are within them (Peterson 2004).  
 
One of the main factors which divide writers on policy networks is whether they treat 
European governance as the dependent or independent variable. One group would focus on 
the relationship between the Commission and different interest groups and how they  
influence the policy -making in different policy areas, while the other group focuses on the 
conditions under which multi -level policy-making takes place instead of inter -
governmental bargaining (Börzel 1997). The idea of networks is to guarantee the broad est 
involvement as possible of individuals and particular groups in decisions which affect 
them, through direct and active participation (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998). Therefore 
writers using the analytical tool of policy networks reject the idea that  the national 
government has a gatekeeper function and controls domestic interest group activity to act at 
European level, but rather such groups can bypass the national government and act directly 
in the EU arena (Börzel 1997).    
 
The term policy network  has been defined as a cluster of actors, each of which has an 
interest or stake in a given policy sector, and the capacity to help to determine policy 
success or failure (Peterson and Bomberg 2000). Moreover, Börzel (1997) sees policy 
networks as arenas for non-strategic, communicative action providing solutions for 
collective action problems and accounting for more efficient and legitimate policy -making. 
The different types of policy networks existing in the EU depend on three variables 
(Peterson 2004): the stability of networks; the insularity of the network and the strength of 
resource dependencies. Depending on these three variables, the different policy networks 
lie between policy communities  and issue networks , with the former being very strong and 
consistent and the latter being weaker and limited in time. An example of a very strong 
policy network is an epistemic community . “An epistemic community is a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy -relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area (Peter 
Haas 1992: 3).” 
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Criticism 
Warleigh (2006) outlines that there have only been limited criticism s on the use of policy 
networks in EU studies. The main points of criticism have been summarised by Peterson 
(2004): 
· The policy networks concept is not a model or theory but only a metaphor;  
· EU policy-making is too fluent and uncertain to have stable netwo rks; 
· The concept lacks theoretical power;  
· Discussions about policy networks are too theoretical.  
 
Additionally, IR theorists argue that tools such as policy networks, coming from CP, are 
not suited to analyse international organisation (Warleigh 2006).  
 
Evaluation 
The main contribution of EU policy analysis to European integration theory is seen as the 
emphasis on the Union’s diversity and complexity, and proving that the differing structures 
of the various EU policy sectors determine policy outcomes (Peter son 2004). A further 
advantage of using the concept of policy networks is that one overcomes or avoids the 
discussion of strengthening vs. weakening of the state through European integration, by 
accepting that transformation processes take place at both le vels and that new forms of 
governance exist (Börzel 1997). However, even theorists using a policy networks approach 
admit that it does not represent a theory about European integration or EU policy -making. 
In any case, the policy networks concept reminds t heorists of EU integration that 
governance by networks is an essential feature of the EU (Peterson 2004). Finally, it can be 
argued that policy networks works best when applied together with classical integration 
theories because they can complement each o ther as they are looking at policy -making and 
integration respectively (Warleigh 2000; 2006).  
 
 
New institutionalism 
New institutionalism is not one coherent theory but a broad category of theoretical 
approaches, having mainly in common that they believe t hat institutions matter in shaping 
  
126
the European integration process. 109 It is based on traditional institutionalism, with the 
difference that the latter was only looking at the structure and power of decision -making 
institution, while the former takes a broa der view and includes formal and informal 
processes, practices, relationships, customs and norms (Nugent 2003). Moreover, new 
institutionalism focuses on institutional arrangements and the distribution of power. For its 
writers, institutions are not only s een as neutral arenas for political actors but as political 
actors themselves, and can shape the behaviour of other political actors (Bulmer 1998). 
There are three main strands of institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, which will now be reviewed. 110 
 
· Historical institutionalism  
Some of the most prominent writers of historical institutionalism are Bulmer (1998) and 
Pierson (1996). Bulmer (1998) locates new institutionalism, and histori cal institutionalism 
in particular, at the intersection of comparative politics, international relations and legal 
theory. Historical institutionalism is also seen by some as the middle ground between 
sociological and rational choice institutionalism (Schm idt, Tsebelis and Risse 1999). Some 
academics attribute it more to the one, and others more to the other.  
 
Assumptions: 
· The analysis is institution -centred rather than being actor -centred and behavioural in 
character; 
· Informal and formal institutions are s een as structuring actors’ political behaviour;  
· Past choices restrict subsequent policy action;  
· Values and norms embedded within institutions are ascribed explanatory value;  
· Political developments must be understood as a process that unfolds over time (Pierson 
1996). Therefore once an institution is established it can constrain o r influence the 
behaviour of the actors within it (Pollack 2004).  
 
                                                   
109 For an excellent analysis of the differences and similarities of the different types see  Aspinwall and 
Schneider (2000).  
110 Jachtenfuchs (1997) and Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) speak of cultural institutionalism, which generally 
reflects historical and sociological institutionalism.  
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Based on these assumptions, historical institutionalists propose the concept of lock-in 
which means that previous commitments by national governments influence later decisions 
(Pierson 1996). These lock -ins make a change of policy difficult and create path 
dependency. Therefore historical institutionalists base their approach on the logic of path 
dependency (Schmidt, Tsebelis and Risse 1999). Furthermore, this can lead to an increase 
in the independence of supranational institutions. As a consequence, an institution is not 
designed according to its functional performance but because of past decisions. Pier son 
(1996) uses historical institutionalism to explain the importance of evolutionary change at 
the systemic level. 
 
Historical institutionalists claims the following advantages for their work:  
· It helps to organise and exercise process -tracing in policy case studies. Pollack (2004) 
outlines the strength of historical institutionalism, as not only arguing that history 
matters, but also showing under which conditions past events and decisions do (or do 
not) influence future political choices and outcomes;  
· It illustrates the ways in which institutions structure the policy process. Bulmer (1998) 
sees the main advantages of historical institutionalism as being able to explain both the 
involvement of key institutions and actors in the transfer of competence at par ticular 
junctions of the integration process and explain systemic change between those critical 
moments in integration;  
· It is argued that historical institutionalism can bring together history making politics 
with day-to-day politics (Bulmer 1998).  
 
· Rational choice institutionalism  
Here the focus is placed on how institutions shape, channel and constrain the rational 
actions of political actors. Rational choice institutionalists analyse why and under which 
conditions Member States delegate power to institu tions, using principal-agent theory. 
Their main argument for the transfer of power is because it decreases transaction costs 
(Pollack 2004). It is very close to liberal-intergovernmentalism, as this form of 
institutionalism focuses on intentional, interest -motivated action and wants to predict 
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generally how actors behave in a given set of institutions (Schmidt, Tsebelis and Risse  
1999). 
 
Assumptions: 
· Rational choice insti tutionalism regards actors as strategic utility -maximisers with 
given preferences (Pollack 2004); 
· It assumes that actors have complete information and are aware of the c onsequences of 
their decisions and the final outcome (Farrell and Héritier 2005). Therefore, the speed 
and extent of integration is explained by negotiations and the relative bargaining power 
of the actors (Farrell and Héritier 2005);  
· Rational choice insti tutionalists focus on processes of institutional bargaining using 
game theory (Farrell and Héritier 2005), which brings this approach very close to 
liberal- intergovernmentalism;  
· Rational choice institutionalism treats institutions as being a strategic co ntext which 
provides incentives or information, thereby influencing the strategies that agents 
employ to attain given ends (Checkel 1999). 
 
While acknowledging the usefulness of the lock -in concept, rational choice institutionalists 
criticise historical institutionalists for not explaining which institutions experience lock -ins 
and under which conditions (Pollack 2004). Furthermore, rational choice institutionalism is 
very useful in identifying the interests and motivations, as it is based on ‘the logic of 
interest’ (Schmidt, Tsebelis and Risse 1999). Although rational choice 
intergovernmentalis ts argue that Member States are not fully in control of the integration 
process and institutional outcomes only reflect the intentions of the Member States to a 
certain extent (Farrell and Héritier 2005), they still treat institutions as very ‘thin’ (Check el 
1999) and mainly as arenas for political actors. Therefore rational institutionalists 
underestimate the importance and impact of EU institutions (Pollack 2004). Furthermore, 
rational institutionalists have problems in explaining individual’s reasoning f or action and 
change over time (Schmidt, Tsebelis and Risse 1999).  
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· Sociological institutionalism   
This approach looks at how institutional structure and behaviour can be explained by 
culture. It shows strong similarities with social constructivism. 111 It focuses on culturally 
framed actions, ideas and identities that follow cultural specific rules and norms (Schmidt, 
Tsebelis and Risse 1999).  
 
Assumptions: 
· Sociological institutionalists speak of the constitutive dimension of institutions. They 
argue that institutions can construct, by way of interaction, the identities and interests of 
Member States and groups within them (Checkel 1999);  
·  For them people act according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Pollack 2004);  
· Sociological institutionalists argue tha t actors, their interests and preferences must be 
analysed and explained as products of intersubjective structures and social interaction 
(Schimmelfennig 2001) .  
 
Therefore sociological institutionalism claims that the goals and procedures of international 
organisations are led by questions of legitimacy and appropriateness rather than for 
efficient problem solving (Schimmelfennig 2001). Social constructivists oppose the 
rationalist ‘logic of consequentiality’ with the social constructivist ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. One of the  benefits of sociological institutionalism is that it can explain 
individual’s reasons for action (Schmidt, Tsebelis and Risse 1999). Therefore, sociological 
institutionalists argue that the other types of institutionalism should be supplemented by a 
more sociological understanding of institutions emphasising their interests - and identity-
forming roles (Checkel 1999).  
 
Criticism and Evaluation  
While admitting that it only represents a mid -range theory and by itself does not embody an 
adequate theory of European integration (Bulmer 1998; Pollack 2004), new institutionalists 
argue that one of the big advantages of their approach is that it limits the divide between 
international relations and comparative policies (Pollack 2004; 2007). The different forms 
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of institutionalism show different aspects of institutions and their behaviour, and in order to 
understand the full picture of how institutions matter, all three types have to be applied 
together (Schmidt, Tsebelis and Risse 1999). Furthermore, some argue new institutionalism 
needs to be part of a broader theory of EU decision -making to use its full potential 
(Warleigh 2000). 
 
Social constructivist approaches to European integration 112  
Social constructivist approaches to European integration are based on the met atheoretical 
approach, constructivism, which is the view that “the manner in which material world 
shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and 
epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler 1997: 322). Soci al constructivism is 
not one homogenous theory, but is made up of various different types of social 
constructivism, as outlined earlier. Their main research interest is the social construction of 
European integration (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 199 9). 
 
For social constructivists the main question is not why or how integration happens but what 
integration is, how it is perceived by people and their reaction to it. Furthermore, they look 
at ideas, norms, institutions, identities and the interdependenc e between agency and 
structure (Wiener and Diez 2004). For social constructivists identities and interests are the 
dependent variable (Wendt 1992). The principal assumption shared by all constructivists is 
that theorists are so embedded in the environment they work in, that they contribute to the 
development of the object they want to study (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001). 
Consequently, social constructivists believe in the importance of norms and ideas, 
construction of identities and behaviour, s ocialisation and communication. Therefore, for 
them the study of politics or integration is not so much about agents with fixed preferences 
but about trying to explain the content of actor identities/preferences and the models of 
social interaction (Checke l 2001). Communication and discourse is an important point in 
the research agenda of some social constructivists, such as Risse (2004), with some writers 
                                                                                                                                                          
111 See next section.  
112 Chapter two outlined constructivism as a  metatheory. Here ‘social constructivism’ is understood as the 
body of (first world) theoretical approaches applied to the European integration process based on 
constructivism as a metatheory.   
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even making the point that ‘eurospeak’ can be an example of the power of language in 
arguing and persu asion (Diez 2001). 
 
Assumptions: 
· Human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its 
collectively shared belief system;  
· Bargaining depends on communication and intersubjectivity (discourse);  
· Interests are shaped by social identiti es and are endogenous;  
· Participation in the EU leads to transformation of ideas and identities;  
· Actors’ behaviour is guided by the wish to do the right thing;  
· Structures and agents are mutual co -determined; 
· Behaviour is shaped for constructivists by a logic of appropriateness.113 
 
Social constructivists explain change of identity by concepts such as socialisation, social 
learning, deliberation and rule -driven behaviour  with the former two often characterised as 
processes of argumentation. L earning and deliberation may transform even the interests of 
state agents in supranational settings at EU level (Checkel 2001). Social constructivist 
writers describe socialisation, as the process by which actors internalise the norms which 
influence how they see themselves and what they perceive as their interest (Risse and 
Wiener 1999).114 Therefore they treat socialisation not just as a behavioural process, but 
also as a cognitive process (Wendt 1992). The concept of socialisation shares a striking 
similarity to the neofunct ionalist concept of engrenage. When analysing the similarities 
between social constructivism and neofunctionalism, Haas (2001) argued that 
neofunctionalism is a precursor of constructivism, which is supported to some extent by 
some social constructivists ( Adler 2002; Risse 2004). Other social constructivists, although 
accepting that social constructivism shares various beliefs and assumptions with 
                                                   
113 This concept entails the belief that actors’ behaviour is b ased on trying to do the right thing and opposes 
the rational concept of a ‘logic of consequentialism’ where behaviour is driven by strategic and instrumental 
calculations Risse (2004).  
114 Checkel (2001) presents five scope conditions, where agents are in p articular open to socialisation and 
change of interests.  
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neofunctionalism, warn that this should not lead to a conflation between the two 
(Christiansen, Jørgensen and W iener 2001).  
 
Criticism 
One of the strongest critics of social constructivism is Moravcsik (1999; 2001). He argues 
in particular that constructivists contribute far less to the empirical and theoretical 
understanding of European integration than other the oretical approaches and that they are 
unwilling to put their claims to empirical testing. He argues this is because the theory has 
neither testable hypotheses nor methods to test these against claims from other theoretical 
approaches. These claims are part ially reflected by Checkel (2006: 3), who auto -critiques 
constructivist writing and argues that (conventional) constructivists need to ‘get serious’ on 
metatheory and other (interpretive) constructivists should pay more attention to methods. 
There is also some criticism from reflectivist writers, who, while agreeing on the important 
contributions that social constructivism has made to the theoretical developments, argue 
that social constructivism fails in one of its main aims, namely to build bridges betwee n 
rationalism and reflectivism, but rather tends towards the rationalist pole (Smith 2001). 
Others claim that social ontology of con structivism cannot be reconciled with rationalist 
epistemology (Friedrichs 2004).  
 
Evaluation 
In spite of this criticism social constructivism has made theorists of the EU aware of the 
importance of identities, norms and ideas. They argue that the effects of ideas, values and 
identities have to be taken into consideration, which are often overlooked in rationalist 
theories (Sjursen 1999). One has to agree with Risse (2004: 165) who identifies three 
contributions of social constructivism to EU study, namely the focus on the mutual 
constitutiveness of agency and structure, the imp act of European integration on identity 
shaping, and realising how the EU is constructed and understood by actors. Furthermore, 
social constructivists do not want to dismiss rationalist theories from being applied, but to 
add a new (social constructivists)  supplement which asks new questions, using new 
techniques, in order to find out how and under which circumstances new European 
institutions-norms- are constructed through processes of non -strategic exchange (Checkel 
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1999). Therefore several social constru ctivists argue that their approaches could be 
integrated into other theoretical frameworks on European integration, rather that 
substituting for them (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001; Risse -Kappen 1996; Risse 
2004). 
 
Europeanisation  
Europeanisation has become a popular concept in the study of the EU in recent years, 
applied by various writers to different phenomena. As a consequence, the term 
Europeanisation has become so widely used that nearly everything related to the EU is 
being described as Eu ropeanisation.115 Olsen (2002; 2003) outlines five major phenomena, 
which have been labelled as Europeanisation. 116 These are: 
· Changes in external boundaries : In relationship to this phenomenon, Europeanisation 
means the geographic expansion of the European Un ion through means of enlargement;  
· Developing institutions at the European Level : Here the main focus of Europeanisation 
is the creation of institutions at the European level, meaning European integration itself;  
· Central penetration of national systems of g overnance: Europeanisation is seen as the 
change of domestic institutions of governance and politics as a result of the creation of 
European institutions, policies and norms. This view is the most popular understanding 
of Europeanisation (see table 2.2); 
· Exporting forms of political organisation : European institutions, culture, political 
beliefs, languages and religion are spread around the world. Traditionally this has been 
associated with the idea of colonialism;  
· A political unification project : Here Europeanisation is seen as the development of a 
state like European polity. It is very similar to the political ideological approach of 
Federalism.
                                                   
115 Europeanisation can be analysed beyond the scope of the EU, but the limits of this section do not allow for 
a broader comparison.  
116 For the use of a similar categorisation see Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.) (2003) “The 
Politics of Europeanisation” Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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Table 2.2: Overview of approaches on Europeanisation  
 Europeanisation literature 117 
What is 
Europeanised?118 
Governance Institutionalisation  Discourse 
Variations  Rational choice Sociological  
Dependent 
Variable 
Change at national level: 
Changes in the 
understanding of 
governance  
Change at national level:  
Changes in political 
organisation 
Change at national level:  
Changes of structures of 
meaning and peoples 
minds 
Change at national level:  
Process of translating EU 
ideas and paradigms into 
national policy 
What does the 
approach want to 
explain 
What is the impact at 
national level? Why do es 
Europeanisation differ 
across MS? 
Is Europeanisation 
producing good and 
legitimate governance?  
What is the impact at 
national level? Why does 
Europeanisation differ 
across MS? 
Why does 
Europeanisation happen?  
What is the impact at 
national level? Why do es 
Europeanisation differ 
across MS? 
Why does 
Europeanisation happen?  
What is the impact at 
national level? Why does 
Europeanisation differ 
across MS? 
How doe European 
discourse impact on national 
ideas and identities?  
Inspired by which 
theoretical 
considerations 
MLG and PN Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Sociological 
institutionalism 
Social Constructivism 
What is 
Europeanisation 
A process of changing 
understandings of 
governance in Europe  
A processes of institution -building at the European 
level which impact on the Member States  
A vehicle through which 
discourses on globalisation 
are institutionalised at 
domestic level 
Social-science field Comparative politics and 
International relations  
Comparative politics and 
International relations  
Comparative politics and 
International relations  
Comparative politics and 
International relations  
Ontology Rationalism Rationalism Constructivism Constructivism 
                                                   
117 Europeanisation meaning the phenomenon of European integration’s impact on the domestic level.      
118 Theoretical approaches grouped around Europeanis ation. Divisions in the Europeanisation literature are most of the time not that clear -cut and often 
academics use a combination of the three views (Radaelli 2004).  
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What is 
Europeanised?  
Governance Institutionalisation  Discourse  
The role of 
European 
institutions 
Important Important Important Important 
The role of interest 
group 
Important Medium Important Important 
The future of the 
EU 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
The focus of study  Partnership between 
private and public actors  
The conditions under which domestic change occurs 
in response to Europeanisation  
Language and discourse  
Agency vs. 
structure 
Agency (Material) Structure  (Cognitive) Structure  Agency shapes structures 
and structures shape agency  
Level of focus Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic 
What is the EU N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Scale of theory  Middle range Middle range Middle range Middle range 
Belief in 
Socialisation 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Main authors of 
this approach119 
Kohler-Koch; Bomberg 
and Peterson 
Börzel; Cowles et al  Olsen; Radaelli; Trondal  Rosamond; Schmidt; 
Checkel 
Main concepts Policy Transfer Goodness of fit; up and 
downloading 
Socialisation  Policy Learning 
N/A= not applicable  
Source: Author
                                                   
119 These are often the same theorists as the ones from the main EIT theories.  
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Definition of Europeanisation  
Probably the most quoted definition of Europeanisation is from Ladrech (1994: 96): 
“Europeanisat ion is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to 
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic 
of national politics and policy -making.”120 However, the choice of definition depends very 
much on which approach the writer takes. Some academics start with a ‘top -down’ 
approach, and others with a ‘bottom -up’ equivalent. The ‘top -down’ approach focuses on 
the effect the evolving European system of governance has on the political instituti ons, 
policies and political processes of the Member States (Börzel 2003). This reflects the 
‘second type’ of phenomena associated with Europeanisation as described by Olsen earlier. 
Within this approach Europeanisation is defined as:  
 
“The emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions 
associated with the problem solving that formalise interactions among the 
actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative 
European rules.” (Risse, Cowles, and Cap oraso 2001: 2) 
 
The ‘bottom-up’ approach focuses on the reaction of Member States to the creation of 
institutions on the European level (Börzel 2003). Here the concept of Europeanisation is 
about the impact of European policy within Member States. European isation is defined as 
the “domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU 
membership” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 60). This is very much in line with Olsen’s 
‘third type’ of phenomena labelled as Europeanisation, as desc ribed above. 
 
This Europeanisation literature looks at why, how, when and to what degree Europe matters 
on domestic settings (Lopez -Santana 2006), in other words the domestic consequences of 
the process of European integration (Radaelli 2004). 121 Nevertheless, these authors are also 
aware of the limitations of trying to isolate European effects on the domestic scene from 
                                                   
120 Quoted in Vaquer i Fanes (2001); Featherstone and Radaelli (2003); Smith (2004).  
121 This is just one understanding of the concept of Europeanisation (Olsen 2002; 2003).  
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global, national and sub -national factors for change (Olsen 2002). Theoretical approaches 
based on the notion of Europeanisation, take off w here traditional integration theories end, 
with a post-ontological focus, once European integration has taken place (Radaelli 2000; 
2004; Schmidt 2002). So while the latter looks at the creation and functioning, the former 
starts with analysing the consequ ences. 
 
Criticism: 
Focusing on only one of these possibilities limits the concept of Europeanisation and its 
explanatory power too much. Olsen (2002: 923) underlines this notion by stating: 
“Different conceptions of Europeanisation complement, rather than exclude, each other.”  
Thus one has to be aware of the fact that Europeanisation goes both ways: ‘top -down’ and 
‘bottom-up’. Member States, especially smaller ones, are forced to adapt their political 
structures (e.g. the change of the UK’s voting procedure s in EP elections). On the other 
hand the EU can include features of the Member States in its institutional set -up (e.g. taking 
the Scandinavian model of the ombudsman and creating an European Ombudsman.). Being 
aware of this connection, Wallace (2000: 370 ) combines the two views to define 
Europeanisation as “the development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements 
to manage cross -border connections, such that a European dimension becomes an 
embedded feature which frames politics and policy within  the European states.” Other 
writers have also recently included both dimensions into their approach towards 
Europeanisation. The following definition shows the various aspects of the concept and the 
relationship between them. For them “Europeanisation con sists of processes of a) 
construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the EU polic y process and then incorporated in 
the logic of domestic (national and sub -national) discourse, political structures and public 
policies” (Radaelli 2000: 4).  
 
Evaluation: 
Keeping both approaches in mind, Europeanisation is first and foremost ‘change’. Schm idt 
(2001: 2) brings it to the point by defining Europeanisation as “a set of regional, economic, 
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institutional and ideational forces for change also affecting national policies, practices, and 
politics.” An important question is how much of this change ca n be assigned purely to 
Europeanisation and how much is caused domestically or internationally. To answer this 
one would have to compare and contrast Europeanisation with globalisation. Is 
Europeanisation a sub category of globalisation or is it the opposi te and reacts as an anti -
pole to globalisation? Wallace (2000: 381) sees Europeanisation as “sufficiently deeply 
embedded to act as a filter for globalisation.” Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 9) on the 
other hand see Europeanisation as a “defensive strat egy with respect to the onset of 
globalisation and the neo -liberalism associated with it.” Schmidt (2001: 4) argues both 
ways and sees Europeanisation as a “regional foil to globalisation as much as a regional 
variant.” It is also important to keep in mind  that there are other important factors for 
(domestic) change than Europeanisation.  
 
Radaelli (2004) admits that Europeanisation should be seen rather as a research agenda 
with more questions than answers. However, this research agenda includes different 
approaches towards the domestic impact of Europeanisation. These can be grouped around 
Europeanisation in relation to governance, institutionalisation and discourse. 122 In outlining 
and explaining ‘change’, the concept of Europeanisation can help to explain aspects of 
European integration, often overlooked by other approaches. Ginsberg (2001: 38) argues 
that “the concept of Europeanisation is a healthy corrective to the overemphasis on 
interstate bargaining and opens the door to new, more nuanced theoretical insights.” 
Schäfer (2004) identifies the move of the foci of European integration study from 
integration to governance to Europeanisation.  
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Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the purposes of theory in social science and 
integration theory, outline how theories differ, and identify how and why theoretical 
fashions change. The examination showed where theories can differ, such as in their 
ontology and epistemology. The most important purposes of theory are to provide a 
framework for ordering empirical data and to inform the scientist about his or her own pre -
assumptions about the world, and making him or her see the starting points of the other 
theorists. In order to understand changes in social sciences in general and in integration 
theory in particular, but also to explain why change sometimes does not happen, the notion 
of paradigms proved useful. It makes the analyst aware of communities of scholars using 
the same academic ‘language’, seeing the world in the same way and developing simi lar 
and compatible hypotheses. While belonging to this specific paradigm the theoretical lenses 
are set, and one only analyses the factors (i.e. events, actors and processes), which are 
considered as important, using the accepted methods. Therefore it is q uite right to say that 
“what you see is what you look for” (Greve 2004: 28). Applying the concept of paradigms 
is useful as long as one is aware of the differences between natural and social sciences 
(most importantly that in social sciences various paradigms can exist at  the same time and 
compete with each other).  
 
The overview of European integration theory illustrated that the theoretical approaches 
presented varied in their scope, assumptions and in their dependent variable. They lead to 
different results, as they wer e being conceptualised at time periods with different political 
realities, asking varied questions, looking at different issues and using varying tools. This 
chapter showed that the development of European integration theory can be roughly 
divided into three different phases so far, each with their own specific theories. These 
phases coincide with a number of paradigm changes in European integration theory. These 
paradigm changes occurred because of progress in the academic community, as well as real 
world developments. Therefore it was also argued that there is a crucial relationship 
between the study of European integration and other fields of social sciences, as well as a 
                                                                                                                                                          
122 Not only is the Europeanisation literature divided on the concept of Europeanisation but also with in the 
same understanding of Europeanisation, namely as impacting on the domestic level, different foci exist.  
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between the academic and the real world developments, for the progress in the 
understanding of sound social science theory. Today the main paradigm debates in EU 
studies are between rationalism and constructivism.  
 
This chapter also presented some of the main theoretical approaches in the field of 
European integration, outlining their ma in assumptions and criticisms. Based on their 
differences the usefulness of the various theories depends on what exactly one wants to 
explain. Nevertheless, each of them further enriched the study of the EU. However, no 
conceptualisation of the EU managed to capture all aspects of European integration. 
Academics of nearly all theoretical backgrounds admit that their approach needs to be 
complemented by some other theoretical approach (mostly a macro theoretical approach) as 
the older grand theories cannot e xplain the detailed features of EU governance and more 
recent theories do not explain the historical integration of the EU. Therefore instead of 
creating dichotomies it should be accepted that different theories can exist beside each 
other and enrich the understanding of European integration. Sometimes, if their ontologies 
and epistemologies allow, they could even be used together in one framework. The often 
cited example of Puchala (1972), which declares theorists as blind men who touch and 
describe different parts of the elephant, and therefore have varying notions  on the 
constitution of the whole animal, is valuable in describing the purpose of theory and the 
differences between them. Chryssochoou (2001a; 2001b) changes the elephant to a 
chameleon. This is very useful in explaining the development of the understanding of sound 
theory in social science. As the object of analysis constantly changes, and theories discover  
new elements which they were previously not considering, theories and their understanding 
need to be continuously updated. This is the only way in order to try to understand the 
whole ‘elephant’.  
 
Having looked at different theories on European integratio n and their specific assumptions, 
being aware of their strengths and their weaknesses will be helpful when trying to explain 
and analyse the development and use of the OMC. The next chapter will now outline the 
methodology used in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Introduction 
The use of a sound methodology is important in any academic research project, as it 
identifies the theoretical starting point of the academic and helps to structure the empirical 
data gathered during the research. Furthermo re, it helps to identify possible challenges of 
the research giving the academic the possibilities to prepare for them. It also provides the 
framework for evaluating the results of the research and defining its added value for the 
research community.     
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in this PhD thesis. Section one starts by 
restating the rationale of this study, the research problem, the main hypothesis together with 
the supporting questions as well as the scope, the limits and the benefits o f this work. This 
is followed by a brief discussion of the ontological and epistemological foundation of this 
research. Section two will concentrate on the research design. It will first argue for using 
case studies as the research strategy. This includes the presentation of the case study on the 
OMC in education and training and the case study from the European Social Dialogue, and 
justifying the choice of these case studies. Then the different methods for collecting and 
analysing data will be outlined, na mely participatory observation within the European 
Social Dialogue (and partially within the OMC in education and training) and the semi -
structured interviews carried out with some of the main actors within the two processes. 
This section will also present  the indicators for analysing whether or not OMC -like tools 
have increased integration, how it has done so and in which way different European 
integration theories explain this. Finally, the challenges faced by this research will be 
outlined as well as the  strategies that have been selected in order to overcome them. The 
summary will then bring this chapter to a close.  
 
 
  
143
1. The research problem 
 
Research rationale  
The rationale underpinning this research is based on the one hand on the growing 
importance of the OMC topic within the literature on the European Union, and European 
governance in particular, and on the other hand on the lack of applying European 
integration theories to this process, which have been used to explain every other major 
event, underlying process or future direction in the history of the European integration 
process. Since its official baptism at the European Council in Lisbon in 2000 and the 
subsequent expansion into various policy areas, the OMC has become a significant theme 
and the work on it is constantly increasing. Some of the reasons for applying European 
integration theories to the OMC are:  
· The Lisbon process represents a significant event, a process as well as a normative 
project, namely better governance, which normally are us ed for testing and supporting 
the different types of European integration theories,  
· The choice of the case studies includes original work where European integration 
theories are not only used to explain the traditional EU policy -making procedures, but 
also to explain why non-state actors involved in these procedures copy and apply them 
as part of their own internal processes,  
· It contributes at the same time to the literature on European integration theory as well as 
to the literature on the OMC.  
 
 
Main research question and hypothesis  
As stated in the introduction of this project, the main research question is ‘how do different 
theories of European integration explain the development and use of OMC -type approaches 
in European policy-making and their role in the European integration process?’  
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Propositions  
The first hypothesis of this PhD is that the OMC is a useful tool to enhance the European 
integration process (in the area of education and training policy), especially when 
discussing sensitive issues. Som e of the supporting arguments include the increase of 
policy areas where OMC is practised and the use of OMC governance by other EU actors. 
The second hypothesis is that as the OMC is mainly based on soft/informal procedures, 
more constructivist approaches  are more likely to explain this phenomena rather than 
rational choice approaches. 123 This hypothesis is applied because, first of all, constructivist 
approaches look for evidence of socialisation and policy learning, while rational choice 
approaches ignore these possibilities, and secondly the policy area under examination is not 
a domain of power bargaining but rather one where ideas and norms, identities, 
communication and language are decisive. Therefore this piece of work will examine if and 
how the OMC has contributed to further integration, and how this can be explained by the 
different theories on European integration.  
 
 
Independent variables and supporting questions  
The following independent variables are taken from Warleigh -Lack (2006: 762) and 
applied to this research as they cover all of the different dimensions of the OMC -like tools 
this thesis wants to deal with:  
· The rational for applying OMC, and the framework of actions’  respectively to the 
education and training policy field (genesis);  
· The way the OMC and FoA processes work respectively (functioning);  
· The ideational /affective factors at work (socialisation);  
· The effect of using these instruments (OMC and FoA) on the national level (impact);  
· An additional variable will be the effect of using the se instruments (OMC and FoA) for 
the European level (integration).  
 
Some of the supporting questions that will be answered as part of the overall analysis are:  
                                                   
123 While assuming that no one theory will be able to explain all aspects of the OMC.  
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· ‘Does OMC-like governance represent a valuable alternative or complementary mode 
of policy-making for further European integration?  
· How do OMC-like tools fit into traditional theories of European integration and to what 
extent do these theories explain the promotion and use of soft instruments such as 
benchmarking use of good practices and peer press ure, as an alternative to the 
traditional tools of EU legislation and intergovernmental methods?  
· Why was the OMC method applied to the area of education and training?  
· Is there spillover between policy areas? Does OMC in one policy area lead to OMC in 
another? 
· Are there concrete results from using OMC -like tools? Do they present an added value 
or only additional administrative work for Commission and Member States?  
· Does the use of OMC -like tools lead to an Europeanisation of the given policy area or 
do they keep this policy firmly under the control of the national level?  
· How is the OMC applied in the European Social Dialogue?  
· What are the origins of applying an OMC like process in the European Social Dialogue 
and what are the interests of the different actors  for using it instead of other tools?  
 
Scope 
Reflecting on the literature review of the OMC, one can agree that the OMC provides 
various worthy research topics, many of which have already been taken up extensively. 
However, while being aware of theses diff erent themes within the OMC literature, the 
decision was taken for this study to have a very specific focus. While touching upon them 
at the right moment, as they are all linked with each other to a certain extent, the following 
aspects will be only dealt with in a limited way:   
· Legitimacy discourse; 
· Policy learning discourse;  
· Better form of governance;  
· Benchmarking. 
 
These limitations are based on two main reasons. The first is the length restrictions of this 
project. The second is that the focus lies on the integration potential of the OMC and the 
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explanation and understanding capacity of European integration theories for this, and not 
on the other promises of the OMC. Follow -up studies could then look at the relationship 
between the lessons learned and t he added value for the other issues.  
 
Potential benefits of this study  
This research will contribute in an original way to the understandings of the use of OMC in 
EU policy-making and the research output from this project promises to be significant. The 
most important contribution that this thesis will make to the study of the EU is by adding 
theoretical and empirical evidence to the use of OMC in general and in education and 
training in particular.  This project has various potential benefits for academics  and policy-
makers, as: 
· Firstly, it will provide further insight into an area of the European Union which to date 
is under researched , namely the social dialogue, and using it as a case study for the 
application of OMC-like tools. In particular the analysi s of the social partners’ own 
version of OMC in the social dialogue, as part of their new instruments, shows the 
significant spillover potential of OMC;  
· Secondly, it will place the OMC in the framework of traditional European integration 
theory and examine the compatibility of the OMC with the various theories thereby 
extending the field of application of European integration theories to an aspect of the 
EU which there have not (or only very limited) been used for so far;  
· Thirdly, it will bring further in sight into the development of European cooperation in 
E&T at EU level, another aspect which has been under -researched in the past, and 
examine how and why this cooperation has significantly increased over recent years;  
· Fourthly, it will contribute to the existing body of work on the OMC and to the 
currently limited literature on the OMC in Education and training.   
 
 
Theoretical propositions  
As this author agrees with the notion that ‘all knowledge is conceptually formed’ (Goetz 
and Hix 2000)  it is necessary to present the theoretical basis of this research.  
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Ontology and Epistemology 124 
What is the author’s understanding of integration? As already discussed in more detail in 
the theory chapter, European integration is not a static object, but is constantly changing 
and evolving. Nevertheless, it is important at this stage to outline that  European integration 
is understood by this author as a process, and is informed amongst others by the following 
two descriptions: 
 
“[European integration is] the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift  loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre -existing national states.” (Haas 1958: 16)  
 
“European integration comprises two interrelated processes: the delegation 
of policy competences to the supranational level to achieve particular policy 
outcomes; and the establishment of a new set of political institutions with 
executive, legislative and juridical powers.”  (Goetz and Hix 2000: 3) 
 
The epistemological position expre sses what we can know about the world and how we can 
know it. Therefore choosing one’s epistemology shapes to a strong extent one’s 
methodology. While the theoretical dimension has been dealt with extensively in chapter 
two, at this stage it is important to outline this author’s responses to Hermann’s (2002) 
questions presented earlier, in order to clarify the epistemological starting point of this 
thesis:  
· Is there a knowable objective reality out there, which can be divorced from our 
subjective interpreta tion? The author believes it is not possible to be 100% objective as 
an academic, because the researcher is part of the social fabric, he or she is influenced 
by it and influences it at the same time;  
· Can we generalise across time, space and people, or are  our observations culturally, 
historically and geographically bounded?  Values and behaviours, norms and ideologies 
change over time and differ across space. People of a different age were driven by other 
factors than later generations. Certain things were acceptable which are unacceptable 
today, and vice versa. Furthermore, the way of carrying out research changed over time 
and with it, the notion of what makes up knowledge. Therefore this author believes that 
                                                   
124 See chapter two.  
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it is only limited possible to generalise acros s time and space, rather it is important to 
understand the different underlying factors of a society at a given time and space 
compared to other times or other societies;    
· Therefore is grand theory possible or are middle range theories necessary, which 
specify the conditions in which theories apply; and what are the implications of 
different methodologies for the results of the inquiry? The implications of choosing a 
certain methodology, rather than another, predefines certain aspects of the results as it  
decides which data will be taken into considerations, which ways of data collection are 
acceptable and how to evaluate the given data. The choice of methodology is therefore 
dependent on the epistemological starting point of the research. 125    
 
Qualitative and quantitative research  
The literature indicates that researchers who have an epistemological belief which says that 
one can be totally objective from one’s study of enquiry, prefer using methods such as 
quantitative research which provides a certain di stance between the researcher and the 
object of enquire.  Researchers who come from the epistemological tradition of insisting on 
the need of understanding the culture and worldviews of the social actor under 
investigation, rather apply qualitative researc h methods (Arkey and Knight 1999; Blaikie 
2000). As the main aim of this research is to identify the principal reasons and motivations 
behind the actions of political actors and decisions, the research approach must be 
necessarily be of a more qualitative nature. 
  
 
2. Research design 
Research strategy 126  
As a method of data selection, the case study approach has been chosen for this project. The 
advantage of using the case study method has been described by Yin (2003: 2) as it “allows 
                                                   
125 While outlining the epistemological and ontological starting point of the author, the aim is to examine the 
explanatory power of the different European integration theories according to their own epistemological and 
ontological positions.  
126 A way of investigating an empirical topic by following a set of pre-specified procedures (Yin 2003: 15).  
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investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real -life events.” The 
literature on research methodology identifies qualitative methods, such as case studies, as 
being more suitable for answering questions such as ‘how’ and ‘why’ than more 
quantitative methods, which are more suited to answer ‘how many’ or ‘what’ questions. As 
this research mostly concerns ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, the choice of these methods is 
appropriate. Yin (2003) stresses that the case study approach should not be confused with 
‘qualitative research’, as some case studies also apply quantitative methods. Nevertheless, 
most of the case studies are based on qualitative research methods and therefore choosing 
the case study approach fits well with the epistemological starting point of this work.  
  
 
Selection of case studies  
This thesis will examine two case studies. The first is the OMC process in the field of 
education and training; the second is the policy instrument ‘framework of actions’ in the 
European Social Dialogue. It was deci ded to examine two case studies rather than a single 
one because they would complement each other and avoid some of the challenges faced by 
this project which will be explained in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
More specifically, the OMC process in t he field of education and training has been chosen 
as a case study for various reasons:  
· It is one variation of the standard OMC processes used by the European Commission 
and the Member States;  
· It is a core policy area of Member State control;  
· It is far less researched than the different OMC processes in the social field;  
· It is a policy area which arguably, is even more strictly protected by Member States 
than the social policy area;  
· The author can provide in -depth first-hand experience in this field.  
 
The European Social Dialogue, with its policy instrument ‘framework of actions’ was 
selected for this analysis for rather different reasons, although some overlap with the earlier 
ones described earlier for the OMC in E&T:  
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· First of all the author used to work f or one of the European social partners 
organisations, namely UEAPME 127, during most of the research process and has 
extensive first-hand experience in this field; 128  
· It does not present another ‘typical’ OMC process by the same actors (Commission and 
Member States) in a different policy field, but rather shows how other actors (social 
partners) apply an OMC -like method in the same policy area (education and training);  
· It investigates how other European actors, in particular European social partners, have 
adapted their policy tools to include an OMC like process;  
· While not being a classical OMC process, as the Commission is not directly involved, it 
nevertheless provides valuable insights why actors would choose an OMC -like 
instrument rather than other options such as binding legislation;  
· The inclusion of this case study may provide the possibility to extend the theoretical 
framework beyond purely Commission -Member States processes, but look at any 
process of political integration between political actors.  
 
The choice of research methods 129  
The data collection of this study will be based on a combination of different methods in 
order to gather the empirical data needed for this project. This includes: an in -depth review 
of the existing literature on the OMC as wel l as on European integration theory, an 
extensive analysis of primary sources, participatory observation and interviewing.  
 
Literature review 
This method is used in order to be aware of the existing research on these issues and to be 
able to create links and synergies between other academic work and this project. 
Furthermore, the literature reviews highlight the main questions asked related to the topic, 
but also help to identify gaps where original research is needed. The results of the literature 
reviews have been presented in chapter one and two.  
 
                                                   
127 Union Européenne d’artisanale,petite et moyenne entreprises.  
128 The advantages and challenges of this will be further discussed later on.  
129 Research methods are understood as “the techniques or procedures  used to collect and analyse data.” 
Blaikie (2000: 8).  
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Primary sources 
An extensive analysis of primary sources, among others, Commission documents, joint 
declarations and agreements between the European social partners will be carried out in 
order to have comparable data with the findings from the interviews and the participatory 
observation methods.  
 
Participatory observation  
The method of participatory observation was primarily chosen based on practicalities as the 
author has worked during the period from Novemb er 2004 to December 2007 in the 
secretariat of UEAPME in Brussels. 130 UEAPME is the European association for craft, 
small and medium sized Enterprises with over 81 member organisations in the 27 Member 
States and candidate countries. It was founded in 1979, but really only became an active 
force in Brussels from the early 1990s onwards. Today, while being on the one hand a 
business organisation lobbying for the interests of craft, small and medium enterprises, 
UEAPME is also one of the four European social pa rtner organisations participating in the 
European Inter-Sectoral Social Dialogue. 131  
  
During this author’s time working for UEAPME he had, among other responsibilities, the 
duty to work closely with the other European social partner organisations, includin g 
participating in negotiations, in particular the negotiation of the ‘framework of actions on 
gender equality’132 and the follow-up and evaluation of the framework of actions for the 
lifelong development of competencies and qualifications. This experience w as essential for 
carrying out this research, as it allowed to access first -hand information, rarely available to 
other researchers, as well as helping to understand the decision -making processes within an 
European organisation. Moreover, it helped to ident ify processes and specific behaviour, 
which would not make sense or seen as relevant from the outside. The author’s position at 
UEAPME also brought him close to the OMC process in the Directorate General of 
Education and Training where the author could obs erve the particular processes and 
                                                   
130 Nevertheless, as participatory observation is, according to the literature on social research, supposed to be 
the most extreme form of qualitative research ( ibid). This fits very well with the theor etical starting point of 
the author, as outlined above.    
131 See chapter five.  
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elements of the OMC in education and training as well as make contacts with relevant key 
actors at European and national level in this process in order to sample their opinions on 
this method. These circumstances support t he arguments used in the literature on social 
research for using participatory observation as a data collection method. The advantages are 
outlined by Yin (2003): having access to events or groups otherwise not accessible, 
perceiving reality from an ‘insid er’ point of view and manipulating minor events. 133 
 
The added value of applying the method of participatory  observation  cannot be stressed 
enough at this stage. The researcher receives access to information and processes, which 
would most likely be closed t o him if applying another research method, and opens up the 
perception of the analyst from someone who writes about something he observes to 
someone who writes about what he experiences. However, the use of participatory 
observation also brings with itself  certain problems, which are discussed in more detail in 
the section on challenges. In addition to the already outlined theoretical and functional 
benefits for this research of working in UEAPME, it also ensured that the author had 
sufficient resources whi le carrying out the fieldwork, and potential difficulties, such as 
postponing interviews etc, could be dealt with relatively easily.  
 
Interviewing134  
For the interviewing process the following design has been applied:  
· Semi-structured approach; 
· Choice of interviewees; 
· Dates for field work and length;  
· Interview questions.  
 
Semi-structured interview approach  
The choice of using interviews, and the semi -structured approach in particular, is based on 
the nature of this study. As this research focuses on qualit ative data, the method of 
interviewing is more likely to provide this type of data than other methods such as surveys. 
                                                                                                                                                          
132 See http://www.etuc.org/a/991  (last accessed on 22.07.09).  
133 This means for example that the researcher is able to choose the time, date and location of the interview.  
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Based on the ontological and epistemological starting point, outlined before, the choice of 
qualitative research methods is appropriate. Furthermore, as many of the research questions 
lead to more subjective responses, semi -structured interviews were in addition to the 
participatory observation, the obvious choice.  
 
Choice of interviewees  
The choice of such a diverse group of interviewees 135 reflects the aim of having different 
data sets which on the one hand complement each other, and on the other hand provide a 
wide range of expertise that would not be available if the type of interviewees was more 
limited. While some of them were at the ti me working in the field of education and training 
policy and were involved in the creation of the OMC and the FoA respectively, others 
joined more recently and can report on the continuation and development of this method. 
Others were chosen for their gene ral expertise concerning the working methods of the 
Commission and the European social partners respectively. Furthermore, it was important 
to have representatives of both sides expressing their motivation and their interpretation of 
the motives of their c ounterparts for applying the OMC -like method to their policy area. In 
the first case study this means Commission and Member State representatives; in the 
second case study this means employer and trade union representatives.  
 
The choice for using interviews as a data collection method as part of the fieldwork in 
addition to the participatory observation method was made deliberately in order to be able 
to benefit from the strengths of the different methods, while avoiding their weaknesses, 
when used in isolation, thereby creating a balanced and more accurate result. 
Complementing this with a thorough analysis of the literature as well as primary sources 
also contributed to making the data more reliable. The importance of this triangulation 
method will be discussed in more detail when talking about the challenges of this research.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
134 Interview period Nov -Dec 2007, Aug-Sept 2008. 
135 See annex 1. 
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Interview questions  
The interview questions 136 were sent to the interviewees in advance to give them the 
opportunity to prepare themselves. These questions are based on the following indicators. 
 
 
Indicators  
The interview questions, the analysis and the evaluation of the data were based on a set of 
indicators. As the focus of this thesis is not to evaluate the OMC itself but to see how 
European integration theories can be applied to i t, the emphasis of these indicators will be 
on whether or not OMC-like tools have increased integration, how it has done so and in 
which way different European integration theories explain this. Therefore the analysis 
needs to proceed in two phases. In the  first phase this research will look at the contribution 
of the OMC-like tools to further integration, while the second phase will look at how the 
different European integration theories explain and evaluate this contribution. As seen 
earlier, there has been substantial work done on the theme of integration in relation to the 
OMC, but with only limited application of European integration theory to this inquiry. 
Therefore some of the indicators derive from the result of the literature review on the OMC, 
while others are taken from the work that has been done on European integration theories.  
 
Indicators and related questions for the first phase  
Indicators for examining the contribution of the OMC are basically divided into two 
groups, namely objective and sub jective indicators. The objective indicators will be used to 
provide hard evidence of the OMC’s contribution to European integration, such as 
expansion of policy areas used, official role of the European institutions in the process, the 
creation of committ ees and ‘upgrading’ the competences of the EU in a particular policy 
area where the OMC is used. The subjective indicators are for identifying the opinions and 
feelings that involved actors and policy -makers have on the existence or not of an added 
value for European integration originating from the OMC, and what this added value is.    
 
                                                   
136 See annex 2 and 3.  
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Objective indicators  
· Spreading of the OMC to more and more policy areas at EU level (vertical integration):  
o Number of policy areas;  
o Type of policy areas: 
i. Old policy areas o f the EU  
ii. New policies 
iii. Sensitive policies.  
· The institutional divide in OMC, and who the main actors involved are;  
· Increase of the OMC's strength over time (horizontal integration):  
o More powers, such as benchmarks and recommendations;  
o More responsibility fo r European institutions.  
· Level of involvement of the EU in OMC processes:  
o Formal or informal role;  
o Supportive or main responsible for the policy area.  
 
Subjective indicators  
· Usefulness of the OMC; 
· Impact on policy-making and policy change:  
o At European level: 
i. Uploading of national policy or downloading another state’s policy.  
o At national and regional level:  
i. Dealing with new topics at national level as a reaction to 
recommendations from the EU level;  
ii. Being more proactive, having more and different actions/initiatives and 
legislation and reforms on topics already dealt with  (or not) as a reaction 
to EU recommendations;  
iii. Involving more and other stakeholders at national level as a reaction to 
recommendations at EU level, such as social partners;  
iv. Evaluation of European frameworks of actions by the European social 
partners; 
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v. Use of the term (OMC) by policy -makers, stakeholders and official 
documents (language);  
vi. Analysing impact of the EU level on new policy areas which previously 
did not exist at national level an d on already existing national policy 
areas. 
 
Indicators for the second phase  
These indicators will be used when testing the explanation capacity of integration theories 
for OMC-like tools. Some of them are the same as in the first phase; others are taken from 
the literature review on European integration theories.  
 
General indicators  
· Aim of the MS and other actors for using the OMC in relation to integration:  
o Foster/Enhance it;  
o Slow it down/ stop it;  
o Change it to a new type of integration  
i. Why? 
· Level of involvement of the EU in OMC processes:  
o Formal or informal role;  
o Supportive or main responsible. 
· Reason for the spreading to more (sensitive) policy areas:  
o Choice of the MS; 
o Agency loss; 
o Functional interdependence.  
· Reasons for national policy changes:  
o Socialisation; 
o Learning; 
o Common perceptions of problems;  
o Persuasion; 
o Power politics; 
o Purely/mainly national reasons.  
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· Use of OMC-like tools in relation to its original aims:  
o Strictly follows them;  
o Aims have changed  
i. Why? 
· The extent to which discussing a topic at Eu ropean level is seen as a (first) step towards  
(further) integration; 
· Role of the main actors (at different levels):  
o European institutions;  
o National and regional governments;  
o Interest groups; 
o Networks. 
· Variations of power of the main actors:  
o Decision-making; 
o Agenda-setting; 
o Influencing. 
 
Indicators based on the literature review of European integration theory  
· How the institutional divide in the OMC, and the participation of the main actors can be 
explained; 
· The role of interest groups and the existence of policy networks;  
· Functional spillover;  
· Pre-dominance of national governments and national interests;   
· Legitimacy, efficiency and democratic deficit;  
· Multiple levels of governance;  
· Path dependency and the role of institutions;  
· Socialisation  
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Challenges 
Every academic research project faces challenges. These depend on the type of 
methodology one uses, such as the accessibility of data, validity of the data or potential 
biases of the researcher.  While the accessibility of data is in this case no major c oncern, 
there are certain challenges resulting from the choice of research methods, most 
prominently the participatory observation method, which needs to be addressed. These 
include: research ethics, independence of the researcher, data reliability and pot ential 
biases. 
 
Research ethics 
As this research is strongly based on a participatory observation methodology as well as on 
interviews and conversations with work colleagues and other practitioners, the aspect of 
research ethics is important and has to be kept in mind. Although in this research none of 
the people are in danger of any physical or psychological harm, certain aspects deserve 
additional consideration. How to deal adequately with any potentially confidential 
information that the researcher might  get either from his company and colleagues, through 
his employment status or through conversations with practitioners, which see the researcher 
as a peer rather than an analyst? Ethical challenges can be avoided by referring only to 
official public docume nts of the employer, as well as keeping this source of information 
anonymous, if the PhD researcher did not inform the source that the information received 
would be used as part of academic research. It is also essential to outline the aim of the 
study to the interviewees, as well as explaining in which way the data received through the 
interview would be used, and offering them the possibility of anonymity.   
    
Independence of the researcher  
In participatory observation the independence problem can take two dimensions. One is 
where the researcher is limited in his work due to fear of repercussions of people finding 
out about his investigation (e.g. loss of employment or loss of friendships with colleagues). 
The other is guaranteeing the independence of th e PhD researcher from the official line of 
the organisation. This means that the academic is, consciously or sub -consciously, 
becoming a supporter of the group, which is the object under research, and thereby losing 
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the (limited form of) objectivity. In th is specific study, these problems, while existing, are 
relatively unlikely to be insolvable. In particular the danger of becoming a supporter of the 
group (in this case UEAPME) would have no or only little impact as the unit of analysis 
has a wider focus than the organisation where the researcher was employed.  
 
Data reliability and possible bias  
Other main challenges resulting from using the participatory observation approach are data 
reliability and the possible bias. If data comes only from one specific method the chance is 
greater that certain aspects have been overlooked. The selection of a single data set has the 
risk of potential biases as the researcher could be tempted to choose data that is more 
favourable to the original hypothesis. In order to avoid this bias, the strategy of 
triangulation  will be used in this study. 137 Here triangulation is achieved by using 
participatory observation, interviewing and an analysis of primary documents which all 
together provide the data pool. By applying diverse set s of data derived from different 
methods, the author aims at overcoming the problems of validity and bias. Triangulation is 
normally used either to complete or to confirm the given data set. (Falkner 1998) In this 
case it is a bit of both. On the one hand, the interviews are supposed to confirm the 
information gained through the participatory observation, on the other,  they are aimed at 
complementing the participatory observation by getting additional information on purposes, 
motives and objectives for creating and using an OMC type method in this policy area by 
the different actors. This therefore is methodological triangulation.   
 
Another challenge in relation to data reliability, including access to data, is that as the 
researcher is known to many of the interviewees in his position as employee at UEAPME, 
the respondents might refrain from accepting the interview in the first place or limit their 
responses to neutral comments or information which is publicly available. In order to be 
prepared for the possibility of interviewee refusing, the list of interviewees was selected in 
such a way that in this case another pers on was identified on the grounds that he or she 
could give the same (or at least similar) view. Concerning the case that the interviewee 
                                                   
137 The basic idea of triangulation is that data are obtained from a wide range of different and multiple 
sources, using a variety of met hods, investigators or theories  (Arksey and Knight 1999: 21).  
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would be reluctant to give some more confidential information, or even make dishonest 
remarks, the researcher could ide ntify this by comparing the interviewees’ answers with the 
material he gathered during his participatory observation period and if they are 
contradictory, eliminate them and replace them with other interviewees.  
 
By being aware of these challenges and app lying the necessary safeguards, it will be 
possible to prevent or at least limit their impact on the study. Furthermore, the added value 
of using participatory observation, which includes better access to sensitive information and 
to formal and informal processes, which would most likely be closed to the public, as well 
as having a unique perception as someone who experiences the study under analysis, 
outweighs the potential challenges by far.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE OMC IN EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING POLICY 
 
 
Introduction  
In order to find out how OMC -like tools are being developed and how they are used, a case 
study approach based on semi -structured qualitative interviews was chosen as data 
collection method, in addition to  an in-depth review of the existing lit erature, an extensive 
analysis of primary sources and participatory observation. In order to benefit from first -
hand information on the creation, functioning and impact of the open method and the FoA 
in E&T and to test the hypothesis that “OMC -like tools were applied because they are 
better adapted to the specificities of this policy area and represent a new form of (doing) 
integration”, a series of interviews with Member State representatives, Commission 
officials and social partners was carried out betwee n November-December 2007.138 By 
using a wide range of different and multiple sources and a variety of methods, the concept 
of triangulation is being applied  in order to overcome the problem of validity and bias . 
Chapter three has discussed this intensively, as well as outlined the advantages of the case 
study approach.  
 
The decision to employ two case studies, rather than only one, was made because these 
complement each other and the findings of the two will make it possible to place the 
theoretical implicat ions in a wider frame than when looking only at the results of one 
specific case. The choice of case studies is innovative with respect to other studies because 
the comparison is not between two OMC -instruments used by the European Commission 
and the Member States in different policy areas but rather between one OMC -instrument 
used by the European Commission and the Member States and one OMC -like tool used by 
other European actors, i.e. the European social partners, in the same policy area. The 
benefit is that it shows that the development and use of OMC -like tools is, not only, not 
limited to policy areas but also not to specific actors, and that OMC -like tools are being 
  
162
used by more and more actors as one form of governance. This has been outlined in detai l 
when discussing the methodology of this research.  
 
This chapter will deal with the first case study, the OMC process in the field of education 
and training . The next chapter will then analyse the second case study, the framework of 
actions’ in the Europ ean Social Dialogue . The aim of this chapter is to present and analyse 
the creation and functioning of the OMC in E&T, looking in particular at its significance 
for European integration, as well as its impact at national and European level. This analysis 
will be based on the findings of the interviews. The results of these interviews are outlined 
thematically. The chapter will start with a brief overview of the main results of the 
interviews before looking in more detail at the individual aspects of the OMC . The first 
section will examine the creation of the OMC within a historical perspective. Then the 
individual elements of the OMC and its actors will be outlined before giving some 
explanations for the use of the OMC in this policy area. A section outlinin g the impact of 
the OMC on national policy -making will follow. Afterwards the OMC’s contribution to 
European integration will be presented. The last section will look at an evaluation of the 
OMC to date, showing its successes, its failures and the areas wh ere the OMC may need 
some adaptation. The conclusion will review the findings of this chapter and outline how 
they will afterwards be placed within a discussion on European integration theories, 
subsequently to looking at the other case study.  
  
 
1. Overview of the main interview results on the OMC in E&T  
This overview will first summarise the main findings before outlining the individual 
aspects more in detail.  
 
Nature of the OMC 
· The OMC is an elite driven process  and not very legitimate as the EP is not  involved; 
                                                                                                                                                          
138 Three additional interviews were carried out in 2008.  
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· The OMC is a flexible instrument,  enabling EU policy to adapt to specific situations in 
the Member States; 
· The OMC is a voluntary process, focusing on learning in order to inform national 
reforms;   
· The OMC is achieving the convergence of nation al policies without harmonisation.  
 
Elements of the OMC  
· Common objectives, good practices, clusters, reporting, peer reviews, indicators and 
benchmarks, multiple levels, regular committee meetings at European and national 
level. It has an initial time limi t until 2010. 
 
Lisbon and the OMC 
· To a certain degree the Lisbon summit was a continuation of earlier developments;  
· The Lisbon summit was important for making the link between E&T and 
competitiveness and giving a political mandate for further cooperation in E&T.  
 
Creation of the OMC and its causes  
· It was an incremental process  and not a single decision. Different elements were tested, 
resulting in a type of OMC. The name was almost accidental rather than a reflection of 
a deep vision; 
· Global competition an d societal changes made Member States more willing to 
cooperate in E&T;  
· Political will and commitment of the Member States are crucial;  
· Member States support OMC in E&T but for different reasons. Some want to limit the 
expansion of EU powers in E&T, othe rs want to enlarge them;  
· Currently there are no valid alternatives  to the OMC in E&T;  
· The huge diversity of national systems, subsidiarity and sensitivity of the topic requires 
a flexible instrument, such as the OMC.  
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Governance 
· The Community Method is used in E&T, but without legally binding force , 
complementing the OMC;  
· Complementary forms of governance: OMC proposes reforms and the programmes 
finance them. 
 
European integration 
· The EU opted for widening over deepening in E&T , with more topics to discuss  now; 
· The reluctance of some Member States can be partly explained by the position of their 
regions;  
· The OMC is a new form of integration;  
· For some it is a second best solution for integration;  
· There is a spillover between employment, competitiveness and  E&T. 
 
Added value of the OMC  
The added value of the OMC in E&T depends on the perspective. There can be added 
value:  
· In general: creation of networks, having common concepts and common terminology, 
improving quality of policy, the transfer of ideas and l earning, reconciling the 
responsible actors within the E&T system and common attention to topics;  
· For the economy: increased mobility of workers, more competitiveness and 
employment;  
· For the Member States : it helps them to modernise national E&T systems a nd support 
reforms, enhances the awareness of national policy -makers about their own situation, 
creates political commitment and forces them to state policy priorities;  
· For the EU: it gives a voice to policy areas where the EU has no treaty powers, it lead s 
to convergence while respecting Member States competences, discussing issues that 
Member States would normally not debate.  
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Consequences and impact  
· Impact at national level exists, but varies across the Member States . Change has many 
reasons. It may originate at national, European or international level. The impact 
depends also on the national level of E&T policy, the size of the Member State and its 
willingness to learn; 
· Impact on policy-making mainly concerns the content and less the national structures; 
· Learning happens, from others but also, about your own system;  
· Uploading and downloading  takes place, but depends often on the interest of Member 
States and the individual national representatives;  
· Socialisation happens between the participants, which is important for this form of 
governance to function as it is non -binding; 
· The influence of the Commission  in E&T has increased;  
· There is a transfer of European concepts  to the national level;  
· National interests  play a role but are less important than in o ther governance forms;  
· The role of the individual  for learning, disseminations and reforms is crucial;  
· Peer pressure is part of the OMC but is always difficult;  
· Political commitment is needed for change and the OMC can achieve this.  
 
Evaluation 
· For some interviewees it is too early to evaluate;  
· For most interviewees, it is a great success in: creating reform pressure, enhancing the 
capacity of Member States to learn from each other by providing structures and 
methods, changing the Commission’s attitude to  E&T and seeing that it is an integral 
part of the competitiveness agenda, making policy -making more realistic, improving the 
cooperation between E&T ministers significantly, improving the relationship between 
the Commissioner for E&T and the national mini sters for E&T and discussing the 
topics at national level;  
· Not reaching the benchmarks by 2010  should not be seen as a failure of the OMC;  
· Changes and improvements  are necessary especially concerning dissemination;  
· All of the involved actors want to continue with this method, as they find it useful;  
· A reflection process  on how to continue with the OMC in E&T has begun.  
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2. Results from the interviews on the OMC in E&T organised 
thematically 
 
 
Genesis of the open method of coordination in E&T  
Pre-Lisbon 
It is important briefly to look at the historical development of E&T at European level in 
order to understand the current regime of the OMC. The formation of an E&T policy at 
European level experienced a rocky road over the last 50 years with blockages, setba cks 
and turning points.139 While the EU’s involvement in vocational education and training 
(VET) already started early under article 128 of the Treaty of Rome, and the Advisory 
Committee on Vocational Training (ACVT) was already set up in 1963, education was  not 
discussed at European level until much later. Education was, and still is, a very sensitive 
policy area for the Member States and any attempt to Europeanise this policy area was 
doomed from the outset. On the other hand it was already acknowledged at that time that 
VET was linked to social and employment policy, such as the recognition of qualifications, 
which made it possible to discuss this topic at EU level. After the general EU crisis in the 
1970s the ministers met regularly on the topic of VET but  no real output resulted from this, 
as the Member States were not keen on EU involvement in E&T. For many participants and 
commentators the main work of the EU in the field of E&T concentrated between the late 
1970s and the mid 1990s on the programmes (COM ET, PETRA, later SOCRATES, 
ERASMUS, etc) and no real policy was produced.  
 
To a certain extent the profile of E&T at European level was first raised by Jacques Delors’ 
1993 White Paper on “ Growth, Competitiveness and Employment” ( Boomgaert 2007). 
Additionally, the role of the new Director General of the Directorate General for Education, 
Audiovisual and Culture (DG EAC), Nikolaus van der Pas, who was convinced of the need 
                                                   
139 For a detailed overview of the different phases see Pepin (2006), Ertle (2006) or Hingle (2001).  
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for a policy approach in E&T, contributed from 1996 onwards to its development. At th at 
time the Member States were creating networks outside of the EU framework, such as the 
‘Bologna process’ on higher education (HE) and another one on school education. The one 
on school education was then stopped because the Member States realised that s chool 
education was at the core of their nations’ cultural identity. In 1998 the ‘Rolling Agenda’ 
was created as a consequence of the Member States’ frustration about all the work being 
done in E&T at European level with no impact at all, as the EU preside ncies at that time 
always came with their own national priorities, which were then forgotten and not 
continued under the next presidency (Boomgaert 2007; Thiele 2008).  Under the Rolling 
Agenda the Member States continuously returned to the following three main issues: the 
role of education and training in employment policies, the development of quality 
education and training at all levels; and the promotion of mobility, including recognition of 
qualifications and periods of study (Council 2000). Thus, one can see that shortly before the 
Lisbon summit in 2000 there were already new developments and innovations in the 
policy-making regime of E&T at European level.  
 
Lisbon  
Although there were some important developments at the end of the 1990s, in particular 
with the creation of the Rolling Agenda, the strong impetus from the 2000 European 
Council for an increased cooperation in E&T at European level was surprising to most 
participants and observers. The Lisbon summit gave the go ahead for further cooperation i n 
E&T at European level by formulating two messages: First of all, it set itself “a new 
strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” 140 By formulating this, it created an 
implicit link between education policy and employment policy at European level and saw 
E&T as contributing to Europe’s competitiveness, which should become more explicit over 
time. Some interviewees outlined that is not possible to separate policy areas such as E&T 
and employment, and identified a strong spillover potential between them (Boomgaert 
                                                   
140 Presidency conclusions Lisbon Europ ean Council, 23 and 24 March 2000 Council 
 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100 -r1.en0.htm (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
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2007; Hingel 2007).   This created more awareness for the importance of E&T, upgrad ed the 
significance of E&T at European level and increased the scope for community activities.  
 
Secondly, the Lisbon summit made a clear request to the Member States concerning 
education and training by asking the Education Council to “undertake a general  reflection 
on the concrete future objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns and 
priorities while respecting national diversity, with a view to contributing to the 
Luxembourg and Cardiff processes and presenting a broader report to the E uropean Council 
in the spring of 2001.” 141 This demand for ‘joint’ objectives was truly the revolutionary 
aspect of the Lisbon conclusions and is seen by some people in the Commission, such as 
Anders Hingel (2007), the Head of unit in DG EAC responsible for Indicators and 
Benchmarks, as actually going further than the treaty allowed them. 142 This was the go 
ahead for what later would turn out as the OMC in E&T. The individual aspects of the 
OMC in E&T were constructed in the aftermath of the Lisbon summit in a number of steps 
which where then sanctified by a series of European Council conclusions. On all these 
occasions and in all the subsequent documents the importance of E&T for competitiveness 
was stressed. 
 
It is important to outline that the summit conclusi ons did not specify that the open method 
of coordination should be used for the cooperation in E&T (Hingel 2007). In article 37 and 
38 of the Lisbon conclusions, where the OMC as a method was mentioned, there was not a 
word about applying it in the area of  E&T. At that moment the structure of further 
cooperation in E&T was not clear at all, which shows that the Lisbon Council did not 
decide to have an open method in E&T. While Lisbon did not specify the use of the OMC 
in E&T, it was still a clear signal for  a changing political climate. On the one hand, Lisbon 
can be seen only as a follow -up to the developments in the 1990s in E&T but, on the other 
hand, one can also see it as a watershed for the field of education and training at European 
level. Consequently, Lisbon should be seen as a significant moment with an incremental 
nature of a process that also included Delors’ White Paper, the Rolling Agenda and the 
                                                   
141 Idem. 
142 For a detailed an alysis of this argument see Hingel (2001).  
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events that followed the Lisbon summit. David Coyne (2007), a director in the 
Commission143 described the importance of the Lisbon Council to this researcher by stating 
that “if the Lisbon summit would had not asked for creating something in E&T there would 
not have been an OMC in E&T, so you can not get more significant than that.”  
 
An interesting aspect is the reason for the Heads of State and Government’s decision to 
increase European cooperation in the area of E&T. This can partially be explained by the 
EU’s global situation at the time. There was a global move from an industrial society to an 
information society and then to a knowledge society (Richonnier 2007). This was not only 
an EU phenomenon but happened also at national and global level. The heads of state and 
government recognised that they were facing similar challenges resulting from these 
changes. They agreed that the EU and its Member States needed to make progress in the 
world and that E&T could contribute to this through its link with competition and 
employment. Member States knew that they had to update their national E&T systems and 
were now willing to discuss national reforms at EU level. In addition to the need for 
cooperation, the form of governance was important for agreeing on deepened EU action in 
E&T. It seems that there was, until that moment, the expectation and fear of the Member 
States that the Community Method was to be used in education and training (Coyne 2007). 
This caused deep suspicion from the Member States concerning any policy proposals from 
the EU level in this field. As they realised this was not the plan, they accepted  more 
willingly to deepen cooperation and consequently, they gave the mandate for closer 
cooperation in E&T at the Lisbon summit.  
 
After Lisbon 
The setting up of the OMC was not a fast affair. As presented above, the Lisbon 
conclusions did not specify tha t the OMC, as a method, was to be applied to the E&T 
policy area, only that the Council would reflect on concrete future objectives of education 
systems. To sum up the Lisbon Council, it gave a political mandate but not a clear template. 
The Commission and  the Member States then spent the following three to four years to 
work out the details for closer cooperation in E&T at EU level.    
                                                   
143 Formerly director in DG EAC.  
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The political mandate from the European Council went hand in hand with a greater interest 
in policy within the Commission’ s DG EAC. Nikolaus van der Pas, Director General of DG 
EAC at that time, drove this movement and reorganised the DG to have a particular policy 
unit. The Commission interpreted the mandate received from the Lisbon Council in a very 
broad way and became pro active. For example, it tried to build on the work done in the 
field of employment. Three years in a row, DG EAC published a report based on the 
national reports in employment outlining the E&T dimension of these reports. These 
reports were then presented to the Education Committee. The Commission had no mandate 
to do so, they just did it (Hingel 2007). It was then during the Education Council 
discussions on 9 November 2000, when the Commission proposed a two -stage follow-up to 
the Lisbon invitation: The fi rst stage should decide on the content, the second phase should 
define the method (European Commission 2001b).  
 
The Commission carried out surveys in order to identify the topics that groups of Member 
States were most interested in and selected the experi ence of the Member States that would 
be useful for the others. During this time there were also contacts with the European social 
partners, who were negotiating their framework of actions for the lifelong development of 
competencies and qualifications. One  could even argue that the FoA facilitated the creation 
of the OMC in E&T and inspired the work of the Commission. Commission officials 
attended the meetings of the social partners to observe their work and integrated for 
example one of the concepts emphas ised by the FoA, namely ‘validation of informal 
competences’, into their own policy programme (Decaillon 2007). This influence can be 
also seen in the fact that the OMC in E&T focused at the beginning more on education and 
less on training, which changed o ver time (de Liedekerke  2008; Schmitt 2007).  
 
Based on this preparatory work, the Commission (2001c) wrote a report, which laid the 
foundation for the report that was later adopted by the (Education) Council (2001) at its 
meeting in Stockholm, outlining t he concrete future objectives of education and training 
systems. The report outlined the issues where the Member States were willing to work on 
together in E&T at European level, as well as three common objectives (and some 20 sub 
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objectives), which formed  the basis for Member States to work together at European level 
over the next ten years to contribute to the achievement of the Lisbon strategy. The three 
common objectives were:  
· Increasing the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in  the 
European Union;  
· Facilitating the access of all to the education and training systems;  
· Opening up education and training systems to the wider world.  
 
The European Council also asked the Council and the Commission to draw up on this basis 
“a detailed work programme on the follow -up of the objectives of the education and 
training systems, including an assessment of their achievement in the framework of the 
open method of coordination.” 144 Based on the objectives adopted by the European 
Council, the Commission set up nine working groups 145 in the second half of 2001, hence 
establishing  ‘the objective process’. These so called ‘objectives working groups’ had two 
main roles. The first was “to identify the priority themes, make an inventory of existing 
experience, define a preliminary list of indicators for monitoring progress and to secure the 
consensus needed between all the interested parties” (European Commission 2003). The 
second was to start the exchange of good practice between experts. Through this exercis e 
and because of the political mandate coming from the Lisbon summit, many areas which 
were formerly out of reach for cooperation at EU level suddenly became possible.  The 
working groups initially comprised only representatives from the Member States and t he 
Commission. However, in January 2003 they were enlarged to include representatives from 
the candidate countries, the EFTA/EEA countries and stakeholder groups (such as the 
social partners).  
 
Although the Feira European Council had already suggested that  the OMC should be used 
in the field of education, 146 and restated in the 2001 Commission report, there was some 
                                                   
144 Stockholm Council conclusions see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueD ocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100 -r1.%20ann-r1.en1.html (last 
accessed 01/08/09).  
145 See http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/objectives_en.html#measuring  (Accessed last 9.12.2008)  
146 Feirera conclusions see  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200 -
r1.en0.htm (last accessed 01/08/09).  
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initial resistance from some Member States towards this idea. This was overcome only 
when the 2002 Barcelona European Council endorsed the earlie r requested work 
programme147, which was jointly transmitted by the Council and Commission. 148 This work 
programme announced that the OMC, as a method, was to be used in the field of education 
and training and outlining some of the tools to be used for the OMC  in E&T, namely: 
indicators and benchmarks, best practices, periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review.  
  
So the OMC was only applied to E&T when the work programme was adopted in 2002. 
The work programme ‘Education and Training 2010’ holds all of the se elements together 
by serving as the framework of the OMC in E&T. It is based on the three strategic 
objectives and refines them into 13 associated objectives. While the report presented to the 
Stockholm European Council outlined the content of the Europ ean cooperation in E&T, the 
work programme underlined the way in which the open method of coordination should 
work in E&T. While the adoption of the work programme symbolised the arrival of the 
OMC in the field of E&T, the main elements of the OMC in E&T s till had to be developed 
in detail. 
 
 
The functioning of the OMC in E&T  
The elements  
It took several years to set the OMC in E&T into place and several elements were added 
and altered over time. In general the OMC in E&T is very similar to the OMC templat e that 
was created and described at the 2000 Lisbon summit. It consists of:  
· Common objectives; 
· Indicators and benchmarks;  
· Reporting; 
· Clusters and peer learning activities.  
 
                                                   
147 Barcelona conclusions see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/71025.pdf  (last accessed 01/08/09).  
148 From 2004 onw ards the work programme would be called Education & Training 2010.  
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The functioning of the OMC in E&T is a process built on these key elements: the Mem ber 
States define common objectives and work on them according to an agreed programme and 
timetable; clusters and peer learning activities are carried out in order to identify best 
practices and to learn from each other; this is supported by a continued ch ecking and 
monitoring on the implementation, which happens through reports, benchmarks and 
indicators. Although initially the Commission distinguished its work in E&T from the 
OMC in employment, also because of the different legal basis of the policy area,  over time 
more and more elements of the OMC in employment were applied to the field of E&T 
(Coyne 2007; Hingel 2007). So while it was not a copy and paste exercise, the Commission 
recognised the usefulness of the different OMC elements for the E&T policy area. 
 
One should not try to identify any of them as the key element, as all the different elements 
of the OMC work in close collaboration with each other and contribute to the final result. 
Furthermore, some elements are more important for specific result s (such as learning) than 
others. These individual elements will now be looked at individually. 149 
 
Indicators & benchmarks  
As the work programme envisaged the setting up of European -wide benchmarks in the field 
of education and training (Council 2002), the Commission set up in 2002 the Standing 
Group on Indicators and Benchmarks (SGIB) whose role was to discuss the development 
and use of relevant and reliable indicators and benchmarks to monitor the progress towards 
the goals. While the work programme origin ally proposed 33 different indicators, these 
were later changed to 29, based on the results of the standing group’s work. Because of 
political sensitivity, these were not ‘adopted’ by the Council but ‘tolerated’ (Hingel 2007). 
It seems that the Council was  taking a more prudent approach, observing where the 
Commission was going with this new initiative in the field of E&T before deciding to fully 
endorse it. Then in November 2002 the Commission proposed six benchmarks (European 
Commission 2002) and subseque ntly the Education Council (2003) adopted five 
benchmarks in May 2003 after making some changes. They state that b y 2010: 
                                                   
149 The creation of the common objectives was already outlined above and need not be repeated here.  
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· All Member States should at least halve the rate of early school leavers, with reference 
to the rate recorded in the year 2000, in ord er to achieve an EU-average rate of 10% or 
less; 
· Member States will have at least halved the level of gender imbalance among graduates 
in mathematics, science, and technology whilst securing an overall significant increase 
of the total number of graduates,  compared to the year 2000;  
· Member States should ensure that average percentage of 25 -64 years olds in the EU 
with at least upper secondary education reaches 80% or more;  
· The percentage of low -achieving 15 year olds in reading, mathematical and scientific 
literacy will be at least halved in each Member State;  
· The EU-average level of participation in lifelong learning should be at least 15% of the 
adult working age.  
 
The adoption of the benchmarks was crucial as they were very concrete objectives that 
attracted a lot of attention.  Consequently, agreeing on them was not an easy undertaking as 
various Member States were uncomfortable with the use of benchmarks and targets and six 
meetings in the Education Council were necessary  until they were at last agreed on . The 
interviewees reported very tough discussions on indicators between the ministers, including 
on how to measure quality. At the beginning, Germany was one of the Member States that 
blocked the use of indicators and benchmarks, as it did not want nation al targets but then 
provided a compromise solution by suggesting that the indicators should be the average 
performance targets of the European Union. Benchmarks then became a European 
responsibility. Hingel (2007) reported that “the people came to the meet ings not to discuss 
national benchmarks but to discuss the European responsibility.”  
 
The use of indicators and benchmarks in E&T at EU level can be seen in a wider context, 
as this runs in parallel to other mechanisms, such as the Programme for Internati onal 
Student Assessment (PISA), 150 and are part of a general trend of looking at benchmarks and 
comparing (Pokorny 2007). However, their significance needs to be stressed also. As 
Hingel (2007) points out “everyone has statistical tools but politically agree d indicators is a 
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first in world history.” Some see the indicators and benchmarks, as the backbone of the 
OMC, as these form part of the Council conclusions.  
 
In 2003 the Commission made a first analysis of the progress towards these five 
benchmarks (European Commission 2004a), which provided also the basis for the 
Commission’s Communication “Education & Training 2010: The success of the Lisbon 
Strategy hinges on urgent reforms” (European Commission 2003). This analysis document 
is updated on an annual basi s and provides foundation for the Commission drafts of the 
joint biannual reports.  
 
The next step for a refinement of the OMC process, as foreseen by the 2004 interim report, 
was to revisit the indicators and benchmarks. The Commission developed a first in ternal 
draft at the end of 2004 (European Commission 2004b) and the Council (2005) gave the 
mandate to develop a concrete proposal for new indicators the year later. After discussing 
the usefulness of the different indicators in the SGIB the Education Coun cil (2007) agreed 
in May 2007 on 16 new core indicators for monitoring the progress in education and 
training. Only a few were not accepted such as the indicator on 2% spending on HE or the 
one on stratification i.e. division of secondary schools (e.g. in Germany this division is 
between: ‘Hauptschule’, ‘Realschule’, ‘Gymnasium’), which was directly eliminated by 
Germany (Teutsch 2007).  
 
The need for updating the indicators from time to time became also visible through the peer 
learning exercise and the wo rk of the clusters.  
 
Peer learning, clusters and the Education & Training 2010 Coordination Group (ETCG)   
During the period 2002 -2004 peer review only took place at the initiative of individual 
Member States. The first joint report in 2004 outlined the n eed for more peer learning 
activities.151 Therefore the Commission launched in 2005 a new peer -learning programme, 
the ‘cluster approach’, which built on the experience gained from the ‘objectives process'. 
                                                                                                                                                          
150 http://www.pisa.oecd.org/pages/0,2987,en_32252351_32235731_1_1_1_1_1,00.html   
151 For a descritption of a peer learning event see Kroeger (2006: 11).  
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Mr Richonnier (2007), former director in DG EAC, ca lls this activity “social voyeurism.” 
Each of the clusters is made up of some Member States representatives, Commission 
experts, and sometimes, social partners. Currently there are the following groups:  
· Cluster on Modernisation of Higher Education;  
· Cluster on Teachers and Trainers;  
· Cluster on Making best use of resources;  
· Cluster on Maths, Science and Technology (MST);  
· Cluster on Access and Social Inclusion in lifelong learning;  
· Cluster on Key competences;  
· Cluster on Information and Communication Tech nologies (ICT);  
· Cluster on Recognition of learning outcomes;  
· Working group on the Adult Learning Action Plan;  
· European Lifelong Guidance Policy Network (ELGPN). 152  
 
These clusters are responsible for discussing the current developments in the area of the  
specific topics of the cluster and for organising the peer learning activities on these E&T 
issues. In some countries, like Austria, national desk officers are actually obliged to 
participate in the peer learning activities of other Member States, because  they are seen as 
being useful (Kreiml 2007).  
 
The work of the clusters is coordinated in the ‘Education & Training 2010 Coordination 
Group’ (ETCG).153 It is supposed to be a forum for picking up the coordination, which is 
not being carried out in the Educa tion Committee. The ETCG organises the planning and 
implementation of the clusters and peer learning activities. It looks at the results of the 
clusters and examines what to do with these results. Not all Member States are in all of the 
clusters therefore the ETCG is seen as useful for the Member States to get an overview of 
the activities (Teutsch 2007). While officially the ETCG was created in order “to 
coordinate the activities of the clusters and the peer learning activities as well as providing 
                                                   
152 http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong -learning-policy/doc32_en.htm  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
153 The ETCG is made up of all European states involved in the E&T 2010, the Commission and the European 
social partners.  
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greater coherence, transparency and efficiency” ( European Commission n.d. 1) , some 
participants argued that it was created to reduce the work of the Council and to give the 
Member States more control over the reporting process (Boomgaert 2007; Kreiml 2007) 
The real impact of this committee is debatable. While some interviewees see it purely as an 
administrative and management committee (Pokorny 2007), others believe it has a strategic 
function for policy discussion (Clark 2007; Coyne 2007). Others again outline th at it is not 
as influential as the Social Protection Committee in the social inclusion OMC (Crowley 
2007).  
 
Within the Education Committee the Commission already tried earlier to discuss policy but 
was not successful with this because the appropriate expe rts were not included in the 
committee and the participants had no mandate to discuss policy (Coyne 2007). Having a 
debate at technical and political level is considered as very important as it obliges Member 
States (but also social partners) to investigat e their own systems and question them. Michel 
Aribaud (2007), a French national expert working currently in the Commission, outlined 
that  “in order to join the ‘club’ the participants must not only evaluate the proposals of the 
Commission but also their o wn systems. This brings people out of their own little world 
where they think that their system is the best that exists.” Additionally, the increasing 
network building of experts and administrators is seen as aiding the learning process from 
each other (Kreiml 2007). However, there are also voices that believe that peer learning is 
fine but the fact that it always has the same peers limits its effect. Social kinships are being 
developed but the whole effect is questionable. 154 Some of the best practices ident ified 
during the peer learning process are then presented in the biannual reports.  
 
Reports  
The reporting exercise forms an essential part of the learning process and is an important 
soft pressure element of the OMC. 155 The reporting exercise consists of tw o main 
documents: the annual indicators and benchmarks document and the biannual joint report of 
the Council and the Commission. The indicator and benchmark document can be more 
                                                   
154 This issue will be further discussed when looking at th e evaluation. 
155 See discussion below on soft pressure.  
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critical as it is a purely Commission document. While the joint report is less  critical, it is, 
however, politically more influential and binding, as the Commission can use it as a means 
of pressure by reminding the Member States of their agreed commitments. This joint 
document gives an overview of progress and points out the policy  areas where reforms are 
carried out and those where progress is lacking. Every two years it provides the possibility 
to look at short and medium -term priorities and to add new topics (e.g. efficiency and 
equity, pre-school education etc.). 156  
 
The first joint Council and Commission report was a crucial document and was presented to 
the European Council in Spring 2004 (Council 2004), as asked for by the Barcelona 
summit.157 The 2004 joint report proposed how to adjust the OMC procedure in order to 
make it more efficient. It stressed the need for more structured monitoring and proposed 
that a report would be presented on a biannual basis to the Spring European Council. 
Another element, which was outlined in the 2004 interim report as not reaching its full 
possibilities, was the peer learning activities. The 2004 joint report represented also the 
launch of a new more integrated approach in European E&T cooperation, as it streamlined 
most of the existing processes. The OMC was building on different, already existin g, 
initiatives within the EU education and training field, such as the Copenhagen process and 
the Bologna process. While the Commission tried, and is still trying, to streamline these 
processes into the OMC, they continue to keep a strong individual profil e, such as the 
Copenhagen process, or even stay formally out of the OMC, such as the Bologna process. 
Nevertheless both processes are closely linked and their policy developments are also 
discussed within E&T 2010.  
 
The final 2004 joint report was based on  an initial Commission draft but was substantially 
changed by the Member States. This example of the joint reports shows the balancing act 
for the European Commission in this policy area. On the one hand the reports need to be of 
value, on the other hand i t cannot be too critical in order to prevent resistance from the 
Member States. This is what happened with the 2004 joint report, where the Council 
                                                   
156 New topics identified in the 2006 report.  
157 http://www.bologna -berlin2003.de/pdf/Pres_Concl_Barcelona.pdf   (Accessed last 17.12.2008).  
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substantially changed the Commission’s draft, as it was highly critical and the Commission 
did not consult the SGIB on the last draft. The Commission learned from this experience 
and now the joint reports are based on national reports submitted by the Member States, 
and the national representatives are involved in the whole reporting process, before and 
after collecting the data. While all the national reports are published on the Commission’s 
homepage,158 the EU level document is of great importance, as the Member States will not 
read all the national reports from the other Member States (Pokorny 2007). The proper  
involvement of Member States is crucial and if their opinion is not taken into account 
accordingly this will create problems. Consequently, the joint reports in 2006 and 2008 
were hardly changed and reflect to a great extent the respective draft versions of the 
Commission (2006; 2008b) as the Member States already had the opportunity to influence 
the document earlier.  
 
There is a valid concern about the objectivity of the joint reports if they are based on the 
reports from national governments. Participan ts admit that there exists an element of 
painting the picture as rosy (Clark 2007) and that the national reports are often only 
window dressing (Thiele 2008). However, the Commission believes it was able to pass on 
all the messages they wanted while at the  same time having all Member States on board 
(Clark 2007). For the 2008 report the Commission added country specific information, 
which the Member States did not provide in the national reports, which led to some 
discussions, but eventually this also was h ardly changed.  
 
The role of the different actors in the OMC in E&T  
The Commission and the Council are the main actors in the OMC in E&T. However their 
relationship is very complex regarding the steering of the process. One could have the 
impression that the Council has by far the most significant role, by having the first word 
(deciding on the objectives, indicators and benchmarks) and the last word (adopting the 
reports and Council conclusions) within the OMC. However, the role of the Commission 
should not be overlooked. The Commission officially has only a supportive role in the field 
of E&T, and within the OMC it is formally a facilitator, helping the Member States to learn 
                                                   
158 http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/nationalreport_en.html  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
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from each other by setting up the structures and mechanisms. However, there are v arious 
aspects which show that the role of the Commission exceeds these limited decision -making 
powers and purely administrative role. The opinions of the interviewees show that ‘support’ 
goes hand in hand with leading (van der Pas 2007) and that  the Commission is the initiator, 
driver and main agenda-setter in the OMC process. Some interviewees even go as far as 
arguing that the Member States would not be active if the Commission did not push and 
they believe that an outside body is needed to provide momen tum and give a structured 
form to the cooperation (Aribaud 2007; Crowley 2007; Pokorny 2007). However, 
sometimes it is difficult to say whether the Commission is leading and the Member States 
are following or if the Commission is just taking the dominant p ath in the educational 
world at this time (Coyne 2007). The experienced Austrian representative for vocational 
education and training policy, Peter Kreiml (2007), described it as a circle, seeing the 
processes of political initiative as being multi -layered, where no clear separation is 
possible. Furthermore, the work of the clusters and that of the Commission feed off each 
other. Sometimes academic expertise originating from the clusters and study visits 
influence the content, but other times it is an indiv idual Member State which thinks it has 
something to present (Coyne 2007). Consequently, the division of labour between the 
Commission, the Council and the committees relies on cooperation. Basically, the 
Commission proposes the priorities and the Education  Council defines them. The 
Commission does the technical work, initiates and proposes, normally based on the 
feedback it received from the Member States, and consults the advisory committees 
(ACVT, ETCG, experts working groups). Then the Council committees  discuss the 
initiatives of the Commission, slightly adapt the wording of the texts and prepare decisions. 
The Education Council then decides and gives political guidelines and instructions. All of 
these initiatives are doomed to fail if they do not have t he general backing of the Member 
States and are not accepted by the Council. Therefore the Commission only makes 
proposals where it sees the demand and the support from a majority of the Member States. 
On the other hand if the Ministers want something done  the Commission normally follows 
up on it. An additional aspect that gives the Commission more importance within the OMC 
structure is the fact that it solely has the full overview on the process (Teutsch 2007). 
Finally, the Commission has a significant fun ction as provider of funding. Mr van der Pas 
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(2007) outlined that “it is not only important to give the policy for reforms but that the 
programmes then provide the money for these reforms to be carried out and financed,” just 
as the European Social Fund do es in the employment field.  
 
Besides the Commission and the Council there are also other actors involved in the OMC 
process at European level, but to a significantly lower degree. The role of  the EP in the 
OMC in E&T is very limited, as it is only informed  of relevant activities and does not 
participate in them. However, once the Community Method is used it plays an important 
role.159 The EP seeks more activities in the field of E&T at EU level, but not through the 
OMC. It tries to increase its influence thro ugh the use of its own initiative reports e.g. on 
the European Qualifications Framework (EQF). Even more limited than the EP’s role is the 
role of the European Court of Justice, who has no competence in the field of education and 
training.160 
 
The inclusion of other actors at national level varies across countries. Member States with a 
strong social dialogue tradition, like Germany, France or Austria, better involve social 
partners (Aribaud 2007; Boomgaert 2007; Kreiml 2007; Thiele 2008). Besides the SP, civi l 
society in general is rarely involved. When asking the social partner representatives if they 
felt sufficiently involved in the OMC processes at national and European level, in particular 
the E&T OMC, their responses were very diverse, which confirmed th e argument that 
involvement of social partners clearly varies between Member States and policy areas. 
Concerning the European level, some social partners feel sufficiently involved in the OMC, 
in particular the one in E&T, while others point out that while  there are enough possibilities 
to meet and discuss there still is the tendency of working with a “closed club” of national 
governmental experts in the E&T field and there is no real willingness to truly involve the 
SP. To a certain extent the European soc ial partners also do not want to be involved too 
much as they prefer to keep their autonomy and not be involved in  a tripartite exercise. 161 
Differences exist also concerning the regions. More federal states involve their regions 
better, at least regarding s ome aspects. In Austria for example, the regions are very much 
                                                   
159 See discussion on OMC vs CM  
160 Idem. 
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involved in the implementation but less in the decision -making process (Kreiml 2007). In 
Belgium the regions are well integrated in the policy -making process but less in the 
reporting exercise (Boomgaert 2007). 
 
The role of interests  
 
National interests  
National interests always exist in European politics. While they dominate at COREPER and 
Council level, they are less significant in the OMC because the Member States are less 
threatened by legis lation and therefore more relaxed (Crowley 2007; van der Pas 2007). 
Also, the dynamic in the OMC is different. The clusters have more thematic discussions 
and take a problem solving approach (Teutsch 2007). When the Commission outlined the 
priorities of the OMC, the Member States selected those that were in line with their national 
interest. Thus national interests do not run the OMC, but the topics are chosen on the basis 
of Member States’ interest. This is what the Commission wanted in order for the Membe r 
States to buy into this approach (Coyne 2007). National interests are important, but they are 
linked to the common goals (Boomgaert 2007; Kreiml 2007). The participants want to 
create something together, but they are aware of the difficulties this will c ause back home. 
National reality, not interest, is important in this area (Aribaud 2007). Often the 
socialisation of the national representatives makes them look at the greater good rather than 
at national interests and then they sell it back home by sayin g they had no other choice 
(Thiele 2008). So socialisation may not lead to forgetting national interests, but it plays a 
role in deciding their significance.  
 
Commission interests  
Some Member State representatives were convinced that the Commission contin uously 
manages to use the OMC for its own interest by setting the agenda and attaining more 
steering control (Kreiml 2007). Within the Commission there are some who reject the idea 
of an institutional interest of the Commission (van der Pas 2007) while oth ers admit that in 
every area the Commission is involved in, it also works for its own interest (Teutsch 2007). 
                                                                                                                                                          
161 See chapter five.  
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One should not forget that the OMC is, to a great extent, the creation of the Commission 
(Crowley 2007). Sometimes it is the national Member Stat es’ objectives that overlap with 
the Community’s (Coyne 2007).  
 
Peer pressure  
As seen in the chapter on the literature review, the OMC is known for being a soft tool, 
because it does not avail itself of sanctions and other ‘hard powers’. However, while 
seeming to be very soft, the OMC has a lot of potential (Pokorny 2007). One of these soft 
elements is the use of peer pressure through naming and shaming. The majority of the 
interviewees sees naming and shaming as important (Boomgaert 2007; Kreiml 2007; van  
der Pas 2007), in particular when there are no other competences. Some argue that it has a 
significant impact at national level to be presented as being worse than others. Ministers 
depend on this (Hingel 2007). Most Member States do not like the shaming,  but they like 
the naming (Boomgaert 2007). This is what makes the exercise so difficult. However, some 
Member States might like some form of shaming in order to press at national level for 
reforms where resistance exists (Teutsch 2007). While it could be useful for psychological 
reasons, it may not really lead to better results on its own (Kreiml 2007; Thiele 2008).  
 
One of the instruments for the naming and shaming is the reporting exercise. As outlined 
above, the Member States make reports on the improve ments of their E&T systems in 
respect to the indicators and benchmarks. Indicators can be used as a tool for national 
reforms because they point out weaknesses of the Member States and this leads to 
additional pressure and debates (Richonnier 2007; van der  Pas 2007). Some argue that the 
naming and shaming element has been reduced because of Member States refusal to be 
named and shamed (Kreiml 2007). Impartial and real data is crucial for naming and 
shaming, without it this is not taken seriously. If the Com mission has valid data it is easier 
for it to be more critical towards the Member States (Teutsch 2007). As the European 
analysis is nearly exclusively based on the national reports, real peer review like in OECD 
(where the data is produced by the OECD its elf and not the Member States) does not exist 
(Boomgaert 2007). This brings us back to the impartiality of the national reports outlined 
earlier on. For some this reporting leads to more than only soft pressure, because Member 
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States commit themselves. Thi s is a question of self-responsibility of the Member States, 
also towards public opinion. The OMC has the possibility of creating some public 
awareness and leading to EU and national debates (van der Pas 2007).  
 
Another tool for carrying out soft pressure are the peer learning activities (Clark 2007). 
There the host shows their guests the strengths and weaknesses of its E&T system. This is a 
big change in comparison to how it was done before. Just five years ago this openness 
would not have been possible. P eople were not willing to show their weaknesses and others 
were not ready to learn from them. Now the numbers of participants in the cluster visits are 
increasing and the participants are willing to discuss the problems of their country (Aribaud 
2007). 
 
For Mr Hingel (2007) the Commission should have more courage in using this tool and 
mention that country x is not following up on the Lisbon goals. It is the choice of the 
Member States whether to have a courageous Commission or one that mainly produces 
reports. He considers that the joint reports are very flat, and explains the lack of discussion 
and criticism of them in the Council by the fact that the comments are harmless. Still there 
are some Member States that believe that the Commission starts with sof t pressure, which 
then gradually becomes stronger until it turns into hard pressure, like legislation. Therefore 
the Commission has always to restate that the responsibility lies with the Member States 
(Coyne 2007). 
 
The role of the individual  
Many interviewees pointed out the crucial role that the individual plays within the OMC 
process, as they can bias the way things go forward. They need to be an expert in their 
fields, but also have an awareness of EU activities, as they are the ones that learn and th en 
have to transfer the new knowledge or practice to national level and disseminate it. Striking 
the right balance can be quite difficult (Pokorny 2007; Teutsch 2007). Moreover, in order to 
be able to change something at national level and initiate reforms  the person should also be 
at senior civil servant or minister level (Crowley 2007). These are the people who become 
interested in certain issues and over time this individual interest becomes an institutional 
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interest (Coyne 2007). Within the clusters the re are two possibilities: isolated experts 
and/or well-place administrators (Pokorny 2007). This can lead to the situation that 
sometimes the individual plays a disproportionate role, for better or worse (Boomgaert 
2007). 
 
The role of the individual is not  only important with regard to the national representatives 
and the impact at national level, but also concerning the functioning of the process at 
European level. Many people outlined in the interviews the significant role played by Mr 
van der Pas in deve loping cooperation of E&T at EU level. Mr Thiele (2008), veteran 
representative for Germany in vocational education and training policy sees with the arrival 
of Mr van der Pas a paradigm change in the Commission, where the Commission paid more 
attention to cooperating with the Member States, which explains to a certain extent why the 
Member States were willing to deepen their cooperation with the European Commission.  
 
 
Choosing the OMC for the E&T field  
After looking at the steps that led to the application  of the OMC in the E&T policy area and 
its functioning, it is necessary to analyse the reasons behind its creation and use.  
 
Specificity of policy area  
What immediately becomes clear when looking at the field of education and training is that 
this is not a policy area like any other. A combination of specific circumstances limits the 
choice of tools and the form of cooperation. First of all, there is a treaty base, which only 
allows for a limited cooperation in E&T. According to articles 149 and 150 Treaty  of the 
European Communities (TEC) the EU has only supporting competences in the area of 
education and training, respecting the subsidiarity principle, and therefore no legally 
binding community initiatives are possible. 162 Consequently one might think that the 
Community Method cannot be used in E&T. However, the reality is that the main features 
of the Community Method (Art 251 TEC) do apply in the E&T field, but without legally 
binding force and therefore no role for the ECJ. Recommendations are being made,  but 
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these are of a voluntary nature. 163 Examples are the recommendation on the EQF 164 and the 
recommendation on key competences. 165 Therefore there is a mixture of governance forms 
in E&T, made up of the OMC and a limited form of the Community Method. This coul d 
have been changed at any past treaty revision, but the Member States were, and still are, not 
willing to do so. Many interviewees stressed that legislation does not matter if the political 
will to implement it is missing (Aribaud 2007; Coyne 2007; van de r Pas 2007). This 
second, and main, obstacle also explains why earlier attempts in the 1980s did not succeed 
even in accordance with the treaty (Clark 2007). For the Member States, E&T is a very 
sensitive issue and belongs to the last core competences stil l remaining at national level. All 
respondents agreed that it is appropriate to use the OMC in those areas where no EU 
competences exist or subsidiarity applies. However, the OMC has to be adapted to the 
specific area and one cannot use the same OMC templa te for all policy areas (Clark 2007). 
A third element for choosing the OMC is the huge diversity of the various national E&T 
systems. This makes it very difficult to harmonise the different national E&T systems. 
However, Michelle Aribaud (2007) recalled th at the main difficulties between national 
systems are not because of technical differences, but because of the lack of political will. 
Mr van der Pas (2007) supported the idea that the degree of appropriateness depends on the 
willingness of the Member Stat es. What the Commission wanted was a political 
commitment from Member States (Coyne 2007). So the tool being used needed to be 
flexible enough to work with different systems and adaptable to the national political 
priorities while not imposing things on th e Member States. The MS like the OMC, because 
it helps to define joint goals but leaves the way to reach them up to the national level 
(Thiele 2008). Additionally, it is voluntary and does not lead to legal commitments from 
the side of the MS. As Mr Kreiml  (2007) outlined that “the overall objective was to 
achieving the convergence of the national policies without harmonisation.” The OMC is a 
voluntary and informal means of cooperation, which establishes a framework in which 
policy issues can be discussed a nd negotiated. It does not impose things on the Member 
                                                                                                                                                          
162 See annex 4. 
163 The significance of voluntary recommendations will be discussed further on.  
164 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:111:0001:0007:EN:PDF  (Accessed 
last 9.12.2008).  
165 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_394/l_39420061230en00100018.pdf  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
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States and it can be easily adapted to the national circumstances. Therefore it provides this 
flexibility and is well fitted for this kind of policy area.  David Coyne (2007) believes that “ 
for any meaningful cooperation in areas outside of the treaty basis, where Member States 
only cooperate if they want to, and you have to give them something they understand but 
that does not frighten them off. We call it OMC but you could call it something else.”  
 
Key players in its creation  
The results show clearly that the Commission together with (some of) the Member States 
were behind the creation of the OMC. The mandate came from the European Council and 
the reference to it gave pro -integration Member States a chance to move ahead. Also the 
role of the countries holding the presidency at that time (Portugal, Sweden) was very 
significant (Coyne 2007; Thiele 2008). Nikolas van der Pas (2007), recalled that the EP 
also supported more EU activities in E&T but was ver y hesitant towards the OMC as a tool 
in general as it strongly limits the role of the EP. 166 Others supported the notion that the EP 
had a marginal role at best in setting up the OMC (Thiele 2008).  
 
Why Member States participate in this process  
Concerning the Member States, nearly all interviewees agreed that they are very supportive 
of the OMC, though for different reasons. For some the OMC is a way of implementing 
reforms which are long overdue. Europe is seen as a good argument to open up something 
that is a very sensitive issue at national level (Coyne 2007; van der Pas 2007). Although 
many interviewees support this argument, one should remember that governments always 
use the EU for difficult reforms if it is in their interest, and this is not exclusive t o the 
OMC. Some even believe that because of the political commitment of the Member States in 
the OMC, the Member States cannot play the blame game as often as before (Thiele 2008). 
A number of responses suggest that some Member States may well believe in the OMC, 
while others cannot afford to be left behind (Coyne 2007).  
 
The different attitudes of the various Member States towards further European integration 
in E&T also play a significant role for supporting the OMC. There are basically two 
                                                   
166 The attitude of the EP towards the OMC will be discussed in mor e detail in the conclusion chapter.  
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conflicting positions: one is represented by a group of Member States (e.g. Belgium, 
Germany, United Kingdom) wanting to avoid harmonisation and to use the OMC to limit 
the EU’s role, and another group of Member States and the Commission try to use the 
OMC for the contrary (Boomgaert 2007). Mr Aribaud (2007) believes that some Member 
States, such as France, have the Europeanisation of E&T as their aim, while others want to 
use the OMC to leave Member States in control. This is why Peter Kreiml (2007) argues 
that for some, the OMC was created as a counter measure to a possible competence transfer 
in the field of education policy. So both groups participate in and support the OMC for 
contradictory long-term objectives. The resistance of the regions, who fear losing 
competences in this policy area, explains part of the reluctance in Belgium and Germany 
(Boomgaert 2007). On the other hand the departments in France use the OMC to gain 
power from the government (Richonnier 2007). The same applies to Spain, where the 
regions speculate on gaining power vis-à-vis the national administration by deepening EU 
cooperation. 
 
(Perceived) added value167 
Mr Thiele (2008) believes that citizens are not even aware of the OMC, while the people 
working in this area see a high added value. He con tinues with the notion that policy -
makers at home, who do not take part in the process, do not understand the added value 
either. They see it in individual products, such as the EQF, but it is difficult explaining to 
them the added value of the OMC process  in general. Mr Aribaud (2007) argues that one 
can see the added value from the perspective of the individual Member States or from the 
perspective of the EU as a whole, which is not necessarily the same. That is why the 
following overview distinguishes be tween general added value, added value for the national 
and the European level: 168 
 
                                                   
167 The ‘added value’ of something is rather a subjective concept.  Therefore some characteristics and 
consequences of the OMC might be (seen as) added value for some but not for others.  
168 Some of the following points refl ect what the interviewees identify as the added value of European 
cooperation in education and training in general while other points concern the specific added value of the 
OMC in E&T. Some interviewees do not distinguish between added value of cooperatio n in E&T in general 
and the OMC in E&T in particular, as for them the one is the same as the other or at least   
they are not separable from each other.  
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General  
· Increased mobility of workers, which leads to a strengthening of the internal market 
(Kreiml 2007; van der Pas 2007);  
· Added value for the economy, more competitivene ss and employment (Teutsch 2007);  
· Added value for the individual citizen (Teutsch 2007);  
· Creation of networks (Richonnier 2007);  
· Reconcile the responsible actors of the E&T system (Aribaud 2007);  
· Having common concepts and common terminology (Boomgaert 200 7); 
· Common attention to the same issues (Boomgaert 2007; Clark 2007);  
· It presses for improving quality of policy (Coyne 2007; Teutsch 2007);  
· Convergence while respecting Member States competences (Kreiml 2007; van der Pas 
2007); 
· Diploma recognition (van de r Pas 2007); 
· Political commitment of the Member States at EU level;  
· The OMC allows for Member States to adapt European concepts to the specific national 
situation, which is necessary because of the huge diversity between them (Boomgaert 
2007); 
· The transfer of ideas (Teutsch 2007) and learning from each other (best practices, peer 
learning) while all interviewees outlined that 100% transfer is not possible;  
· Better policy-making and more democracy, as better policy -making leads to reforms 
and bringing in more actors leads to more democracy (van der Pas 2007);  
· More quality in education, which is also linked to social inclusion. This would 
contribute to democracy as educated citizens participate more in society (Coyne 2007).  
 
National 
· It forces governments to s tate policy priorities (Crowley 2007);  
· The OMC gives more and better tools to the Member States (Hingel 2007);  
· It helps Member States to modernise their E&T systems (Richonnier 2007);  
· It leads to more awareness of national policy -makers about their own sit uation (Pokorny 
2007); 
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· Support for reforms in highly complex national education systems. It is like an ‘iching 
power’ for the Member States ie. causing them to react  (Richonnier 2007) and helps 
overcome national resistance (Kreiml 2007).  
 
European 
· It gives a voice to policy areas where the EU has no treaty powers (Hingel 2007);  
· As it is a soft tool, you can debate issues which would not normally be discussed at EU 
level (Hingel 2007).  
 
One can see that there are various dimensions to which the OMC is suppo sed to have an 
added value. This ranges from the socio -economic dimension, over European cooperation 
in E&T to national policy -making. Now it is important to examine if the expected added 
value is also reflected in the impact at national and European level . 
 
 
Consequences and impact at national level  
Impact is always difficult to measure as change consists of multiple factors and it is rarely 
possible to point out one factor as being the main cause. It also depends very much on 
where one is looking. Therefo re the impact of the OMC is not to be seen as a single cause 
for change, but needs to be observed within the national contexts as well as in a holistic 
perspective. Furthermore, the consequences and impact of the OMC need to be 
distinguished between the va rious Member States, and between the individual aspects of 
policy-making (e.g. structure, perspective and content).  
 
Impact on national policy -making 
While some argued that the main reason for changes in policy -making is still pressure from 
society, all respondents agreed that there was a direct and visible impact at national level as 
a result of participating in the OMC at European level. Also at the ETCG meetings the 
Member States continuously argue that their participation in the cluster has informed the ir 
national reforms. While saying this, it is also clear that national policy -making is still very 
  
191
diverse and they are becoming similar only slowly and in a limited way. However, this is 
also the aim of the OMC, ‘convergence without harmonisation’.  
 
The areas where national policy -making is becoming more similar are identified as the 
policy context, the objectives and the content (Coyne 2007; Kreiml 2007; Teutsch 2007; 
van der Pas). About five years ago, education was considered linked to social issues, w hile 
now it is more related to competitiveness, which shows a significant change of the policy 
context (Coyne 2007). Furthermore, policy -making is seen in a European context and not 
only in a national one, with joint objectives (Thiele 2008). The interview ees identify the 
greatest impact on national policy -making with respect to the content. Mr Thiele (2008) 
explains that everything that is on the European agenda in E&T is now also on the German 
agenda. One example for changes on the content of national pol icy caused by the OMC is 
“the recommendation on key competences”, which led to changes of the curricula in 
various Member States (e.g. entrepreneurial skills are now taken into account) (Coyne 
2007). 
 
The impact on policy content is stronger or at least mo re visible than on policy structures 
because, firstly, content changes can be implemented faster than structural changes, and, 
secondly, because the OMC does not provide blue prints for new structures (which the 
Member States would also not allow) but poin t out topics that need to be discussed. 
Wilfried Boomgaert (2007), a long -time representative for Belgium in the VET field, 
expresses this by saying that “the software is becoming more similar, but one wonders if 
this new software fits with the old hardwar e.” To a certain extent even structural changes 
will in the long-term result from the participation in the OMC, maybe not directly but 
indirectly, as they are needed in order to keep up with the other changes. This is illustrated 
for example by the nationa l reactions to the European qualification framework, which led in 
many Member States to the creation of own national qualification frameworks (Teutsch 
2007). Mr Kreiml (2007) sees an internationalisation of their national administrations as 
well as the use of new methods of quality evaluations at national level as consequences of 
using the OMC in E&T. These reflect structural as well as policy changes.  
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It seems clear that the Member States now have a greater understanding of the fact that they 
are facing the same challenges. However, the impact on national policy -making varies 
among the different Member States.   
 
Different impact according to Member State  
The unanimous response of the interviewees confirmed that the impact varies across 
Member States. Whi le this is to be expected, one should briefly look at why the impact 
varies. First of all, the level of impact depends on the national level of E&T policy. The 
Nordic countries have been very successful in E&T over the last decades, which is 
confirmed by M r van der Pas (2007) outlining that the Nordic countries need the OMC less 
than the countries in the south of Europe. Another group which has a lot of changes 
happening in their national E&T systems are the Member States that joined the EU after 
2004. The question is if the reforms in these Member States are caused by the OMC or if 
there was already reform pressure because of the huge gap between them and the countries 
already in the Union. It seems to be the case that the need for the reforms existed alrea dy, 
but the OMC helped to trigger the reforms and gave the national governments ideas in 
which direction to channel them. Secondly, one can see a greater impact on smaller 
Member States than on larger ones (Clark 2007). Mr Pokorny (2007), head of unit in D G 
EAC, believes that this can be explained by the fact the education and training systems of 
most large Member States are very monolithic and the tradition is to be less open to other 
Member States activities. At the same time the new Member States, and sm aller Member 
States in general, are more open to innovation than older and larger Member States (Clark 
2007; Pokorny 2007; van der Pas 2007). Thirdly, it depends on the individual issue and to 
which extent it has been discussed before at national level. Mr  Aribaud sees the conclusions 
on informal learning  as a good example for this difference. In France, there was no impact, 
because this topic existed already for many years. In Germany and Italy the situation was 
very different and there was a positive impa ct. The reverse example is the issue of quality 
assurance , which is a topic that was not discussed so extensively in France in the past 
(Aribaud 2007). Fourthly and finally, it also depends on how seriously the Member States 
take the European targets. New Member States plus the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway 
have taken the EU average benchmarks as their own national targets (Hingel 2007).  
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Impact of other processes on national policy -making  
As pointed out before, the OMC is only one cause for change and h as to be seen in a wider 
context. The interviewees all agreed that change to national policy -making has always 
multiple causes and it is difficult to isolate the exact percentage of each individual factor. 
The results of the interviews point out the import ant influence of the OECD and the PISA 
test on national policy-making, and therefore one should briefly look at the relation 
between the two instruments. One wonders what the added value of the OMC activities is, 
in addition to those carried out by the OEC D. All interviewees insisted that they are not at 
all the same and that they have different but complementary roles, feeding off each other. 
The OECD can do certain things the OMC cannot and vice versa.  First of all, not all 
Member States are members of t he OECD. Second, and more significantly, the OECD is 
stronger on data collection and analysis while the OMC is about policy cooperation of 
political decision-makers. This is reflected in the structural setting, as the OECD does not 
have anything like the Council where people meet in a policy context (Clark 2007; Pokorny 
2007; Teutsch 2007; van der Pas 2007).  
 
Concerning the impact at national level, PISA and similar comparative studies may have 
more influence on policy changes than the OMC; on the other han d, the OECD could have 
had a stronger impact than the EU in the past but now they are equal (Boomgaert 2007; 
Kreiml 2007), with some kind of convergence having taken place recently (van der Pas 
2007). Some argue that PISA has a great influence on some poli cy-makers in some 
Member States and maybe too much because it distracts them from the policy -making 
process (Pokorny 2007). Some see the OECD as mainly a marketing institution (Hingel 
2007). 
 
Impact on other aspects  
The cooperation in E&T at European level  within the OMC had a number of consequences 
in addition to, but also related to policy -making, such as: 
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Language and concepts  
The existence of so many different languages at European level makes true cooperation 
rather difficult. Even with good translati on (something always gets lost) it is very difficult 
to create a European terminology in a specific policy area. At the beginning the participants 
in the OMC did not have a common understanding, but over time and as part of the process 
they comprehend what is meant by these concepts at EU level and how they are used in the 
different Member States. The Commission tries to find out what the Member States 
understand under the various concepts and makes sure that the European concepts are clear 
in relation to the national interpretations (Teutsch 2007). This is not always easy and the 
participants believe that while they do speak the same (working) ‘language’, sometimes 
they might use the same concepts and terminology but the comprehension of them is very 
different, as the words just have different meaning at national level (e.g. competence vs. 
Kompetenz169) (Boomgaert 2007; Coyne 2007; Kreiml 2007; Thiele 2008). It also depends 
often on the audience; within the clusters there are fewer problems, because people are  
experts, but in the formal parts (i.e. the Council) of the OMC there are more 
misunderstandings (Coyne 2007; Crowley 2007).  
 
The real difficulty is when trying to transfer this terminology back to the national level as 
the same word at European level ofte n has different connotations back home. Things are 
easier when concepts are new and did not exist in this form at national level before. These 
transferred concepts often lead to new national discussions. Some of these concepts include 
transparency, peer learning method, lifelong learning, learning outcomes and permeability 
(Kreiml 2007; Teutsch 2007; Thiele 2008). As a consequence of cooperation in E&T at 
European level, a common European terminology is being developed. Mr van der Pas 
(2007) believes that this new community language is developing through socialisation. 
Other interviewees support this notion (Thiele 2008).  
 
                                                   
169 There are a number of differences between the use of the term ‘competence’ and the German concept of 
‘Kompetenz’. The basic difference is that the term ‘competence’ looks at the result of a learning process, 
while the term ‘Kompetenz’ focuses on the learning process itself and the input into this.  See CEDEFOP 
http://www.trainingvillage.gr/etv/Upload/Information_resources/Bookshop/491/42_de_Bohlinger.pdf  (Last 
accessed 09/12/2008).  
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Socialisation170 
All interviewees agree that some sort of socialisation takes place by participating in the 
OMC. While some point out that participation in any group leads to socialisation and 
creates a dynamism influencing the individual members of the group (Pokorny 2007), some 
limit their socialisation to people who are useful for them (Kreiml 2007). Mr van der Pas 
(2007) describes that “t he typical socialisation process would begin with the Member States 
representatives being very hesitant at first. Then they call each other by first names, and 
then they want to change the world together.”  
 
Long-term cooperation is needed to understand eac h other, and particularly the working 
groups and committees create a feeling of belonging to a club, where participants speak the 
same language. Over time, they accept each other and develop a willingness to listen to 
each other (Aribaud 2007; Teutsch 2007 ). Mr Crowley (2007) describes it as building up a 
“we feeling, a European feeling.” Socialisation prepares them to look beyond their own 
world, and leave behind the attitude that their own system is the best and the only true one 
(Aribaud 2007; Boomgaert 2007). Mr Thiele (2008) sees personal relations as important as 
the content because these create trust.  However, the participants have to be open and 
willing to cooperate (Teutsch 2007; Richonnier 2007). Mr van der Pas (2007) sees informal 
meetings as cruc ial for socialisation. One can see that over time the Commission has 
become very good in creating an atmosphere where people are relaxed and willing to 
discuss. Mr Boomgaert (2007) points out that through socialisation there is a growing 
knowledge of other  systems and thereby a precondition for learning.  
 
Learning  
Michael Teutsch (2007), DG EAC, describes the OMC as “a process that focuses on 
learning in order to inform national reforms.” Like impact on policy -making in general, 
learning can have various c auses and sources and it is difficult to distinguish between them. 
Particularly in this case, where the Member States have many other possibilities to learn 
from other Member States, be it on a bi -lateral or a multi-lateral basis (Thiele 2008). 
                                                   
170 Socialisation is understood as the process of adapting to a so cial group; social intercourse or activity. In 
this case it is the national representatives who get socialised by participating in the OMC activities such as 
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Therefore it is not surprising that some interviewees point out that they have already 
learned before, but now they do it in a more structured way (Boomgaert 2007). Most 
interviewees agreed that they learn from each other through their participation in the OMC 
(Richonnier 2007; van der Pas 2007), while some interviewees specified this by saying that 
the learning potential is even greater (Pokorny 2007). Mr Coyne (2007) sees the political 
priorities at the time in the individual Member States as an important factor imp acting on 
the learning willingness.  
 
After establishing that Member States learn from each other, the question is how this 
learning takes place. As outlined above, the clusters take a prominent role in the learning 
exercise, and participation can be seen a s another condition for learning (Clark 2007; 
Coyne 2007; Kreiml 2007; Pokorny 2007). Additionally, the Member States do learn to a 
certain extent from the reports (Teutsch 2007). Furthermore, while some believe that 
Member States learn whether they want t o or not (Kreiml 2007), Mr Aribaud (2007) 
believes that it depends on the attitude of the individual: if they want to learn they do, if not 
they do not. The role of the individual is highlighted in the learning process because they 
then transfer this to th e national level. Sometimes the transfer from the individual to a 
broader audience at national level is difficult (Aribaud 2007; Teutsch 2007).  
 
Legitimacy and democracy  
As outlined during the literature review, some academics believe that the OMC leads to  a 
greater involvement of other actors and see the word ‘open’ in open method of coordination 
as referring to the openness to actors, which would increase the legitimacy of this form of 
governance. However, as in the other OMC processes, this argument cann ot be supported in 
the context of the open method in E&T, as the number of actors involved is rather limited. 
In the opinion of Mr Hingel (2007), the OMC is a technocratic tool and the ‘open’ (method 
of coordination) means ‘legally open’. Mr Boomgaert (200 7) confirms this hypothesis and 
sees the OMC as “an elite driven process as there is a low number of key players.” Others 
agree that the legitimacy is limited as only experts are involved (Hingel 2007; Kreiml 
                                                                                                                                                          
committee meetings, peer learning visits etc.  
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2007). While the involvement of the social part ners171 increases this legitimacy, at least at 
EU level, the fact that the participants are nominated and the EP is not involved makes it 
less democratic (Pokorny 2007).  
 
In addition to the national level, the OMC had also significant impact on the European 
level, which will be looked at next.  
 
 
OMC contribution to European integration  
Impact at European level  
If one compares the level of cooperation in E&T at European level with only ten years ago, 
the difference is astonishing. Therefore it is not surprisi ng that all interviewees agreed that 
European integration has been enhanced through the use of the OMC in E&T. This can be 
seen in a number of ways: 
 
EU competences in E&T  
As there was no treaty revision concerning the E&T legal basis, there were conseque ntly no 
new competences transferred to the European level. Mr Coyne (2007) remembered the 
discussions during the Constitution debate and the convention asking if the Commission 
wanted more competences in this area and the Commission said ‘no’. The argument  is that 
this is not the sort of area where legislation is useful at European level. Nevertheless, while 
using the OMC in the E&T policy area definitely did not lead to the transfer of any formal 
competences, it is also indisputable that the Commission has  gained significantly in 
influence in this field, even in areas where this was not legitimated (Aribaud 2007; Hingel 
2007). This enlarged influence can be seen, on the one hand, on the range of issues where 
the EU is now involved, ranging from school and p re-school education to higher education 
and adult learning. On the other hand, the increased visibility and significance of the EU 
Commissioner for Education & Training and his position vis -à- vis the national Ministers is 
another indication of this strong er influence. Mr Coyne (2007) recalled that at first the 
Member States ministers more or less ignored the Commissioner, but later they turned to 
                                                   
171 See discussion above.  
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him to introduce the topics at their meetings. For Mr Aribaud (2007), the Commission has 
also gained influence because it progressed in the area of expertise and not only in 
administration.  
 
Horizontal integration/ expansion of topics  
The use of the OMC led to a huge increase in policy areas under E&T, which came under 
EU domain (even if only supportive competence s). This could be a conscious choice made 
by the Commission for ‘widening’ over ‘deepening’ (in the political sense). The 
alternatives were between to deepen the competence of the EU on a particular aspect or 
broaden the amount of policy issues. For deepen ing, the continued use of article 128 TEC 
would have been crucial, as it gave the EU 90% competence in some small areas of VET 
(Hingel 2007; Richonnier 2007). Mr Richonnier (2007) and Mr Thiele (2008) both argued 
that the Commission lost on regulation poss ibilities by using the OMC, but by giving up 
some of its power on more detailed issues, the Commission gained more influence in 
additional areas in this domain. Furthermore, the Commission still had significant 
budgetary powers, such as the programmes fund ed by the EU budget.  
 
While some Member States believe it might be the strategy of the Commission to address 
more and more issues in order to slow down or limit the oversight capacity of Member 
States (Kreiml 2007), Commission representatives reject the n otion that more topics mean 
more influence for the Commission, as it has just a certain capacity to work on a certain 
number of topics (Coyne 2007). Therefore some argue that the increase of topics did not 
contribute to making EU policy more efficient, and  there now exist various grey zones, 
where it is questionable whether or nor the Commission can do something (e.g. the topic 
‘schools’) (Richonnier 2007).  
 
Increased policy output  
There is now a substantial increase of policy output at European level in E& T as a direct 
consequence of this form of governance. 172 Some argue that the change of the internal 
                                                   
172 For an overview of the pol icy outputs see European Commission (2008c) or 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong -learning-policy/doc36_en.htm  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
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structure of the Commission, where Director General van der Pas created a specific policy 
unit with the specific objective of achieving more policy activity, was essential for this 
increase of policy output (Coyne 2007). While it shows that cooperation between the EU 
and its Member States seems to be currently working well, a wave of documents is arriving 
at national level to be worked on and followed up. Anoth er side effect is that the elite 
driven process is even increasing, as there is no time and way to explain to outside actors 
all of the details and integrate them into the process (Boomgaert 2007).  
 
Small steps approach: History making events vs. an increm ental process 
The majority concurs that there are always important points in a process, such as the Lisbon 
summit, agreeing on the first set of objectives and the adoption of benchmarks, but in 
general it was an incremental process (Boomgaert 2007; van der  Pas 2007). While saying 
this, the first three Spring European Councils after Lisbon were crucial to get momentum 
and start the process (Coyne 2007).  It was very much a trial and error approach. There was 
no history-making event, like a treaty revision, th at changed the E&T landscape, but it was 
a process. The fact that there was no initial Council decision to have an OMC in E&T, 
which was outlined already earlier, underlines this argument.  
 
Agenda-setting 
The significant role of the Commission as agenda -setter has already been mentioned above 
when looking at the roles of the different actors. However, the Member States also 
managed to influence the agenda by getting national topics on the European agenda. 
Examples are that Belgium and France got ‘equity’ as  a topic on the agenda, and the 
Scandinavian countries got ‘technology’, ‘new basic skills’ and ‘mathematics’ on the 
European agenda. Belgium also got ‘teachers education’ on the European agenda (Coyne 
2007). Additionally, the role of the presidency is als o important in influencing the agenda 
(van der Pas 2007).  The consequence is a mixed agenda between national priorities and 
European priorities (Boomgaert 2007; Coyne 2007).  Boomgaert (2007), therefore correctly 
identifies that “uploading as well as downl oading has happened.” Mr Thiele (2008) sees 
this cross-fertilisation between the national and the European level as very useful.  
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Political commitment and ownership  
The OMC has clearly led to more political commitment by the Member States towards 
cooperation in E&T at European level. This is political long -term commitment at national 
level, which surpasses national legislative periods and creates continuity (Kreiml 2007). 
Getting Member States to make structural commitments is easy, while commitments on 
content are more difficult. Making the link is the challenge (Coyne 2007). The willingness 
to discuss the issues at EU level is a huge change to before Lisbon (Teutsch 2007). The 
importance of this has been touched upon already earlier. The lack of political  commitment 
was also one of the main reasons why things did not advance in E&T before the OMC. 
Partially, this lack of political commitment from the Member States was the fault of the 
European Commission. The Commission’s attitude until the mid 1990s, supp orted by the 
French, was that it could just come with proposals and put pressure on the Member States, 
which led to their resistance. Another consequence of this political commitment by the 
Member States, is that it is also a lot more difficult than before  for the Member States to 
blame Europe for unpopular decisions (Thiele 2008). Voluntary recommendations play a 
significant role in this context; although they are not legally binding, they are very powerful 
tools. The Member States develop a feeling of own ership of the OMC process and 
whenever they forget this, the Commission can remind them that they voluntarily agreed to 
this (Coyne 2007; Hingel 2007; Teutsch 2007). Consequently, legally non -binding 
documents can have the same, or sometimes more, impact o n changing national political 
systems than legally binding acts. This confirms again the argument mentioned earlier that 
“legislation does not matter if the political will is missing.” For Mr Coyne (2007), 
integration is not only about more legislation, bu t also about creating a “community of 
thought.”  
 
The relation between the OMC and the Community Method  
Traditional forms of integration, such as the CM, aim at the harmonisation of a policy area 
(Pokorny 2007). As outlined before, the specific circumstan ces of this policy area do not 
allow for harmonisation (at least currently), and the OMC is the only possible way. The 
OMC is appropriate in areas where harmonisation is not, and therefore is used where the 
(full version) CM is not possible (Boomgaert 2007 , van der Pas 2007). While, the OMC 
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can be seen as an alternative to harmonisation and the CM, it exists in parallel to a limited 
form of the Community Method in the area of E&T. Here the two tools are fulfilling, 
different but complementary roles that sti mulate one another. As seen above the policy 
output in E&T at EU level has increased significantly over the last years, and the OMC 
gave strength and knowledge to do so (Hingel 2007). Mr Teutsch (2007) outlined that ”the 
OMC makes the topic selection and t he preparation, then the CM helps with the 
implementation.” Figure 4.1 shows that the OMC allows that the topics are being discussed 
in the clusters and initiatives are being developed, which originated either in national 
policies or European pilot project s, and the CM then leads to recommendations on these 
topics which influence the policy at national level and lead to new European projects. Here 
again the important role of the European education programmes for the testing phases 
needs to be mentioned.  
 
National 
policies
Clusters and 
technical working 
groups
Commission 
proposals
Council resolutions 
and recommendations
EP opinions and 
recommendations
Pilot projects 
financed by EU 
E&T 
programmes
Further 
testing 
financed by 
EU E&T 
programmes
Preparatory 
phase
OMC in E&T CM in E&T
 
Figure 4.1: EU policy development in education and training  
Source: Author  
 
Some argued that from the perspective of those who want to integrate even further, the 
OMC is a second best solution for European cooperation (Boomgaert 2007). For Mr Thiele 
(2008) the OMC is better than the CM, as it limits the conflicts between the Commission 
and the Member States and therefore creates political commitment from the Member States. 
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Consequently, the implementation also goes easier. At the same time he identifies a 
disadvantage of the OMC, namely that the Commission has fallen into a more passive role 
and lost the dynamism. In the CM the Commission is the official initiator while in the 
OMC the Commission has only the role of facilitator. He  qualifies this statement by adding 
that it also depends very often on the person in charge in the Commission. 173 Another 
explanation for the current possibly more monitoring role of the Commission is that a huge 
number of initiatives have been developed and  adopted at European level, and they need to 
be implemented at national level before proposing new ones.  
 
The OMC as a new type of integration  
As seen above, some Member States supported the use of the OMC in E&T in order to 
limit the transfer of competenc es to the European level. This was successful as far as 
official competences are concerned. This speaks against further integration in the field of 
E&T, at least in the traditional (limited) way of considering it (i.e. competences being 
formally transferred). Mr Kreiml (2007) believes that the EU has currently reached a limit 
in the integration willingness of the Member States and a further sovereignty transfer in 
additional areas is not presently imaginable. Therefore if one way does not lead to the goal, 
one has to find another way and change the method to reach this target by trying a different 
way, this being the OMC.  
 
When looking at the huge impact the OMC had on EU activities in E&T, one can clearly 
speak of an increase in European integration. Howev er, what is true, is that this form, at 
least so far has not taken the traditional way via the CM but through the OMC. While for 
some the OMC can be seen as a first step towards traditional integration (Kreiml 2007), 
others insist that it will never turn i nto the Community Method. Mr Coyne (2007) explains 
the latter by referring to the fact that the EU is often seen as a federation, but in all 
federations in the EU the E&T lies more at regional level than at federal level. Most 
respondents agreed that the O MC was neither preparing nor replacing the CM, but is rather 
a new form of integration, an alternative route (Boomgaert 2007; Clark 2007; Coyne 2007; 
Kreiml 2007; Pokorny 2007; van der Pas 2007). What is for sure is that the Commission 
                                                   
173 The role of the individual  in the OMC was outlined already earlier.  
  
203
benefited from apply ing the OMC to get its foot in the door in many other policy issues 
(Aribaud 2007, Richonnier 2007). How this will continue is not clear. Mr van der Pas 
(2007) argued that the OMC can be both, preparing or replacing the CM, depending on the 
consensus you can get. This is supported by others, who argued that it is not an utopian 
scenario that one day the CM will be used fully, depending where the Member States want 
to go (Aribaud 2007). In any case, further transfers of competences would require a treaty 
revision and would therefore be resolved intergovernmentally (Kreiml 2007; van der Pas 
2007). 
 
 
Evaluation of the results to date  
Taking stock 
Reforms take time and do not happen overnight. Therefore some interviewees were hesitant 
to give an evaluation as they argued that it was still too early to evaluate the success 
(Boomgaert 2007; Coyne 2007; Pokorny 2007 Teutsch 2007; Thiele 2008) Nevertheless 
they all outlined the aspects where they saw the OMC as successful so far and where they 
did not. 
 
Success174 of the OMC as a tool by:  
· Creating reform pressure (Crowley 2007; Kreiml 2007);  
· Enhancing the capacity of Member States to learn from each other by providing policy 
decision-makers with more policy options than they would have normally and with the 
structures to do so (the clusters) (Coyne 2007; Kreiml 2007; Pokorny 2007);  
· Changing the Commission’s attitude to E&T and helping to understand that it is an 
integral part of the competitiveness agenda (Coyne 2007);  
· Making the policy-making more realistic and more co mplete (Crowley 2007);  
                                                   
174 As with the term ‘added value’, ‘success’ is not a value free concept and needs to be treated with caution. 
What for some people might be a success, might be for others with a different agenda a failure. This var iation 
however is acceptable, because many of the interview questions were aiming at subjective responses, as 
outlined in the methodolgy chapter. Therefore ‘success’ is not something defined by this author but rather felt 
by the individual interviewee. For  example “success” was defined by various interviewees, as the case where 
people at national level say that it is useful to cooperate with other Member States through the EU in order to 
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· Improving the cooperation between E&T ministers significantly. The difference 
between the Council meetings before the OMC, and since then, is substantial (Hingel 
2007); 
· Improving the relationship between E&T ministers with their nati onal colleagues in the 
social and finance departments (Richonnier 2007). The same is seen regarding the 
relationship between the Commissioner for E&T and the national ministers for E&T 
(Crowley 2007); 
· Gaining the support from all the Member States to conti nue with this method (Teutsch 
2007);  
· Discussing these topics at EU level (Teutsch 2007) and accepting now the proposals 
(Aribaud 2007); 
· Leading to concrete actions (Teutsch 2007);  
· Transferring ideas and concepts to the national level for debate (Teutsch 2 007); 
· Making people in the international departments realise that a lot was going on in other 
Member States (Kreiml 2007).  
 
Preconditions for the success of the OMC are seen by some in the dialogue between the 
Member States and the Commission, a balance be tween the priorities of Member States and 
Commission, plus authentic, comparable and up -to-date statistics (Boomgaert 2007).  
 
Not successful 
In some ways the OMC can also be seen as unsuccessful:  
· The OMC in E&T has not been able to create a single comprehe nsive vision for the 
E&T field (Crowley 2007);  
· Some promoters hoped (like the Portuguese) that it would be a precursor to a much 
more binding or constraining process where Member States would do much more 
together and that there would be a process of conve rgence. Coyne (2007) argues that 
this was fortunately not a success;  
                                                                                                                                                          
implement national reforms and that the work is relevant. Mr van der P as (2007) sees “moving towards topics 
which concern the individuals and give an added value”, as strengthening EU Integration.   
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· The benchmarks will not be reached by 2010. However, is this really a failure? The 
interviewees do not consider it so. Firstly, the benchmarks are only ‘one’ instrument 
(Teutsch 2007). Secondly, as Hingel (2007) argues, the OMC gives more and better 
tools to the Member States. It is then their responsibility to apply them to achieving a 
knowledge-based reform. Thirdly, they were political goals, and ambitious targets were 
needed. The progress made towards these is a success. (Thiele 2008). The follow -
up/next work programme might see other benchmarks (Hingel 2007).  
 
Possible changes and improvements  
While the majority of the interviewees called the OMC successful and agree that the OMC 
has the potential to work well, nearly all concurred that changes and improvement were 
necessary. Mr van der Pas (2007) identifies a general wish among the Member States to 
start a reflection on how to sharpen the instruments of the OMC. The proposals for 
improvement concentrated on different areas:  
· Peer learning activities : While some interviewees criticised that the peer learning 
activities are dominated by Member States representatives and should have more of the 
other stakeholders from the grass roots invol ved (Kreiml 2007), others wondered if peer 
learning is really useful (Hingel 2007);  
· Reporting: Many agree that it is not yet functioning optimally. While some speak of an 
overproduction of documents and reports (Hingel 2007; Kreiml 2007), others address 
the fact that they are too long and a lot of richness is lost because the reports often tend 
towards consensus, which limits the learning possibility (Pokorny 2007). Therefore the 
way the material is presented by the EU can be improved (Hingel 2007; Pokorny 2007), 
maybe by having a country specific part in the joint report (Teutsch 2007);  
· Dissemination and coordination at national level:  While seeing the conceptual level as 
good, the implementation at national level is often considered as very slow (Boomgaert  
2007). This can be partially explained with the frequent existence of limited contact 
between the national experts participating at EU level and the national policy -makers 
(Aribaud 2007; Pokorny 2007). It is difficult to get the right target audience invo lved at 
national level. It is also argued that the national representatives in the different 
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committees do not know each other and give different messages. Therefore the OMC 
needs more coordination and preparation at national level (Hingel 2007);  
· Benchmarks and objectives: Some believe one should examine if the benchmarks and 
objectives are still the right ones and update them if necessary (Teutsch 2007). 
Germany criticises the use of the same quantitative benchmarks for all (Thiele 2008), as 
they are easier to reach for countries already close to the benchmarks;  
· Indicators: Indicators need to be seen within the context of the political objectives of 
the time and might need to be changed once in a while. Also they could be made more 
efficient (Clark 2007). Furthermore, when reporting on them it is important to show not 
only the (three) best countries, but also those that made the most progress (Boomgaert 
2007); 
· Strengthen the OMC:  Mr van der Pas (2007) identifies the need for more reporting, 
more indicators,  and more benchmarks and believes the Member States want to give it 
more teeth;  
· Learning: One needs to analyse why some experiences were successful in some 
Member States but could then not be transferred to another. The task is to find out 
which elements are transferable (Hingel 2007);  
· Structure: There is a general reflection on the structure of the OMC in E&T. Some 
identify too many parallel processes inside the OMC, making it more difficult to having 
an overview and call for a reduction of coordination g roups (Boomgaert 2007) and 
more focus, while knowing that this is difficult because of the different priorities of the 
27 Member States (Kreiml 2007). Others stress that an E&T political committee (like 
the Employment Committee or the SPC) is missing, as t he Education Committee is a 
Council-preparing committee, and no strategic and policy discussion take place. This 
happens only in the Council itself (Crowley 2007; Teutsch 2007).  Others see this role 
fulfilled by the ECTG (Coyne 2007).  
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Conclusion 
This chapter showed the development of the OMC in the field of education & training, 
outlining the key elements of this process and its main actors. The analysis was supported 
by the findings of a series of interviews carried out with a range of different actors involved 
in the process. Their feedback showed that there was clearly an impact at national and at 
European level from using the open method as the basis for the cooperation in E&T at EU 
level, while this impact varied between the Member States and across different issues. 
However, it was also pointed out that other national and international developments 
contributed to these changes and it is therefore not entirely possible to isolate the impact of 
the OMC. This discussion showed also that the use of the O MC clearly expanded the EU’s 
activities in this policy field, as Member States are now willing to discuss topics in E&T at 
EU level which lie within Member States competences. While this on the one hand clearly 
enhanced European integration, it did so not through the traditional way, using the 
Community Method, but in a new and alternative way. Before trying to see how European 
integration theories make sense of this new form of integration, the next chapter will look at 
whether the OMC-like tool of the European Social Dialogue, the framework of actions, was 
applied for the same reasons and if it led to the same results.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE FRAMEWORK OF ACTIONS: 
THE OMC OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS 
 
 
Introduction 
The development and increased use of ‘soft governan ce tools’, such as the OMC, can be 
identified at European level not only within the sphere of the European institutions but also 
within the decision-making structures of some of the secondary actors. In order to see the 
developments outlined in the last ch apter in a wider context, this second case study was 
chosen to complement the picture in explaining the use of these OMC -like instruments and 
their relation to European integration. In order to test the hypothesis that OMC -style 
governance is being used no t only more frequently in EU politics but also by more and 
more actors within the European political arena, a second series of interviews was carried 
out with representatives from national and European social partner organisations. The 
interviews concentra ted on the question why this type of tool was chosen, how it functions 
and what results can be observed.  The aim of this chapter is to report on the results of the 
interviews with the social partners, concerning the creation, functioning and impact of the  
framework of actions at national and European level. This chapter presents the findings 
from the analysis of the European social partners framework of actions for the lifelong 
development of competencies and qualifications. 175 Firstly, it will give a short overview of 
the development of the European Social Dialogue, in order to place the creation and use of 
the FoA within this context. Then the main findings of the fieldwork will be presented 
before looking at the individual aspects in more detail. As in the  previous chapter, these 
findings will be presented thematically. The conclusion will make the link to the previous 
chapter and outline the elements to be followed up in the next chapter, where these results 
of the two case studies will be compared.  
 
 
                                                   
175 This is the official name, but everyone just calls it the FoA on lifelong learning (LLL). This shorter version 
will be used th roughout the thesis.  
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1. The European Social Dialogue 
Before looking at the FoA itself, it is necessary to give an overview of the context in which 
it was created. This section will briefly look at the different phases in the development of 
the European Social Dialogue, while then  focusing on its current phase.  
 
 
What is social dialogue?  
The social dialogue (SD) is the main form of industrial relations between the social partners 
in Europe. ‘Social partners’ are the representatives of management and labour/ employers’ 
and workers' organisations. There are different forms of social dialogue. In some countries 
this dialogue is mainly organised between governments, employers’ organisations and 
workers' organisations, the so -called tripartite social dialogue , while in other countries t he 
dialogue is only between employers’ and workers' organisations, the so -called bipartite 
social dialogue .176 At European level both of these forms are used, which will be discussed 
later on in more detail. Furthermore, there are different types of social p artners, as the 
social dialogue takes place at different levels. One can distinguish between ‘sectoral social 
dialogue’ and ‘cross-sectoral’ (or ‘inter-professional) social dialogue. The difference is that 
cross-sectoral social partners cover the whole eco nomy and labour market while sectoral 
social partners restrict their work to issues concerning their specific sectors and conclude 
agreements just applicable to that sector. Both these types of social partners also exist at 
European level.177 This overview concentrates on the development of the inter -professional 
European Social Dialogue, as the case study is about one of their tools and because this 
European Social Dialogue is the most developed one at European level. Nowadays the 
European inter-professional social partners are the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC),178 representing the workers and three organisations representing the employers’ 
                                                   
176For an overview of the different national industrial relations systems see 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country_index.htm . (Accessed last 9.12.2008) For discussions on 
various forms of national social dialogue see Iankova and Turner (2004) or Mailand and Due (2004).  
177 For further information on the different sectoral European Social Dialogues see 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/sectoral_en.htm  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  Also 
Keller and Sörrier (1999) and de Boer, Benedictus and van der Meer (2005).  
178 For more information see http://www.etuc.org/   (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
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side,179 namely BusinessEurope, 180 Centre européen des entreprises à participation publique 
et des entreprises d'intérêt économique général (CEEP) 181 and Union européenne de 
l’artisanat et des petites et moyennes entreprises (UEAPME). 182 
 
 
The creation of the European Social Dialogue  
Franssen (2002: 60) identifies idealistic and pragmatic reasons in the literature for th e 
creation and strengthening of the European Social Dialogue. One idealistic reason is the 
theory that “the community is not just a bilateral arrangement between its institutions and 
Member States, but a complex polity which engages a wider range of other actors in social 
policy formation and implementation.” A more pragmatic reason is that “it was important 
for the Community institutions in general to avoid too much opposition towards their 
legislation.” As the Community was dependent on Member State coope ration in pursuing 
its policies, it was important to engage powerful national interest groups, such as trade 
unions and employers organisations, in the policy process. Based on this logic, one can 
argue that it was an attempt to gain the trade unions’ supp ort for the internal market policy 
of the European Commission, and the employers’ support for enhanced social policy. 
Falkner (1998) believes that the main reason for the creation of the European Social 
Dialogue, at least from the Commission’s perspective,  in breaking the stalemates in the 
social policy area in the Council. This argument is supported by Franssen (2002), who sees 
the ESD as an alternative route for social policy at EU level, necessary because of the 
consequent use of the British veto.  
 
Barnard (2002) sees four interconnected explanations for the involvement of social partners 
in EU governance, namely subsidiarity, effectiveness, legitimacy and democracy. 183 
Another possibility is seen in the argument that the involvement of the trade unions in EU 
                                                   
179 For a detailed presentation of the European employers organizations see Arcq, Dufresne and Pochet 
(2003). 
180 Until 2007 called UNICE. For more information see http://www.businesseurope.eu  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008).  
181 For more information see http://www.ceep.eu/   (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
182 For further information see  http://www.ueapme.com (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
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policy-making would give the Commission a more ‘human face’ (Franssen 2002). While 
many of these explanations are plausible and provide an added value of the ESD for the 
EU, probably the most important reason is the plain fact that the EU Commission rea lised 
they needed the support of the social partners if they wanted to increase the European 
policy-making in employment and social affairs.  
 
 
Development 
While some academics such as Pochet (2005) point out that some social partner activities 
have been already taking place since the 1950s, which were very informal and happening 
mainly at sectoral level, 184 the European Commission, as well as the European social 
partners themselves, identify three different phases in the development of the ESD. 185 
· The first period 1985-1991; 
· The second period 1991 -2001; 
· The third period 2001 onwards.  
 
The first phase  is generally identified with the term ‘Val Duchesse process’, named after 
the place where Jacques Delors, in his function as the Commission President, invited 
ETUC, UNICE and CEEP in 1985 to intensify their cooperation. The Single European Act 
then laid the ground for formal relations with the introduction of article 118b EC treaty. 
The tools during these years were mainly joint opinions. The importance of this ph ase was 
less the outcomes but more that such a political process was taking place (Pochet 2007). 
The second phase started in 1991 with the Maastricht treaty creating a strong legal basis for 
the consultation of the European social partners. 186 This legal base was drafted on the joint 
agreement of 31 October 1991 between UNICE, CEEP and ETUC. 187 Using this legally 
binding procedure, the European social partners agreed in the 1990s on a series of 
                                                                                                                                                          
183 A detailed analysis of the social partners contribution to enhancing the EU’s democracy is provided by 
Reale (2003).  
184 For more details on the period prior to 1985 see Falkner (1998) or Franssen (2002).   
185 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/docs/sds_actes_en.pdf   (Accessed last 9.12.2008) 
or http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10132.htm  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
186 See annex 5. 
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agreements,188 which were then transferred by the Council into Europe an directives.189 The 
possibility of having legally binding agreements did not make the use of joint agreements 
obsolete but rather added a new layer of tools to the disposal of the European social 
partners.190 At the end of this phase the number of participat ing organisations in the 
European Social Dialogue was extended with the arrival of UEAPME. 191 
 
 
The current third phase  
In 2001 the European social partners made a joint contribution to the Laeken summit 
outlining their willingness to achieve an independent European-level dialogue, the creation 
of an independent work programme, which would include the use of a variety of policy 
instruments. As a consequence they developed in 2002 their first autonomous work 
programme lasting from 2003 –2005.192 A second work pro gramme was adopted in 2006 
lasting until 2008.193 While the legal basis of the European Social Dialogue is still the one 
created with the Maastricht Treaty, the Laeken declaration introduced the latest phase of the 
ESD and led to the enhancement of the tools  at the disposal of the ESP. 194 An additional 
message coming from the social partners in their Laeken declaration was that the label 
‘social dialogue’ was incorrectly being used for any kind of activity involving the social 
partners. They therefore called fo r a clear distinction between three different types of 
activities involving the social partners:  
                                                                                                                                                          
187 See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText. do?id=10480 (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
188 On parental leave in 1995, on part time work in 1997 and on fixed term contracts in 1999.  
189 For an in-depth analysis see Falkner (2000).  
190 For more details on the first and second phase see Falkner (1998) or Franss en (2002).  
191 The exact standing of UEAPME as social partner is legally questionable. While not being officially 
mentioned as cross -sectoral European Social partner by the Commissions (see  
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/docs/list_art138_en.pdf ) (Accessed last 9.12.2008),  it 
still participates in all European social partners activities and signs all negotiated agreements. 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/ueapme.htm  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
192 See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText.do?id=10416  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
193 See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText.do?id=10969  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
194 For a detailed analysis of this new phase see Branch (2005), Prosser (2006) and Gold, Cressey and 
Leonard (2007).  
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· Tripartite concertation : to designate exchanges between the social partners and 
European public authorities;  
· Consultation of the social partners : to designate the activities of advisory committees 
and official consultations in the spirit of article 137 of the Treaty;  
· Social dialogue : to designate bipartite work by the social partners, whether or not 
prompted by the Commission’s official consultations based on ar ticle 137 and 138 of 
the Treaty.195 
 
As already mentioned earlier, the activities of the social dialogue at European level can be 
divided between bipartite and tripartite social dialogue.  
 
The bipartite social dialogue  
The bipartite social dialogue includes all the activities carried out  as part of the autonomous 
work programme as well as under the legal procedure created at Maastricht, namely article 
138 and 139. Article 138 of the EC Treaty provides for the compulsory consultation of 
social partners on all matters of social policy mentioned in article 137. The consultation 
process takes place in two stages. Firstly, before submitting proposals for new socia l policy 
legislation, the Commission has to consult workers and employers on the possible direction 
of EU action. Secondly, if the Commission then considers EU action advisable, it must then 
consult workers and employers on the content of its planned propo sal. After the second 
stage, the European social partners can inform the Commission that they wish to open 
negotiations and start the process laid down in Article 139. 196 Article 139 EC Treaty 
addresses the negotiations through which the European social part ners can conclude 
agreements on social policy. Any agreements concluded by the European social partners 
will be legally binding once implemented. The implementation can take one of the 
following forms. Either the ESP ask the Council to implement it through  a Council 
directive197 or they make their national members responsible for implementing the 
                                                   
195 Laeken declaration at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText.do?id=10423  
(Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
196 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/bipartite_en.htm  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
197 However, neither the Commission nor the Council have the right to change the text of the agreement.  
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agreement in line with their national customs and practices. These are known as 
‘autonomous agreements’. 198  
 
Tripartite social concertation  
As outlined above, tripar tite social dialogue happens between the social partners and the 
public authorities. However, this can take place in different policy areas 199 and at various 
levels. Starting with the level of Heads of State and Government , where the European 
social partners meet regularly since 1997 with the troika 200 on the eve of the European 
Council meetings. The conclusions of the Nice European Council in December 2000 
provided for an annual meeting with the social partners before the spring European 
Council. Furthermore the European social partners meet regularly at ministerial level, with 
the troikas of different Council formations, such as culture, education and training or 
employment and social policy. Finally, at technical level , where the social partners are 
invited to present their views in technical committees such as the Employment Committee 
or the Social Protection Committee and advisory committees of the Commission and the 
Member States.  
 
In 2002, the development of the European Social Dialogue took another step b y creating 
the tool of a framework of actions and adding it to the arsenal of instruments at the disposal 
of the European social partners for the common work. This instrument will now be 
analysed in detail. 
 
 
                                                   
198 For an academic analysis of the imple mentation of autonomous agreements see Larsen and Andersen 
(2007). 
199 There are now four fields in which tripartite concertation takes place - macroeconomics, employment, 
social protection and education and training.  
See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/tripartite_en.htm  (Accessed last 9.12.2008).  
200The term troika is actually used in two different ways in relation to the European Union. First of all,  in the 
context of external relations, it refers to the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Member State holding the 
Presidency of the European Union; the Secretary -General/High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy; and the European Commis sioner in charge of external relations. The other use of the term 
refers to the formation of representatives of the current, the following and the next but one Member States 
holding the presidency of the European Union. The latter understanding is used in this thesis.  
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2. Overview of the main interview results with the social partners 
The following results are the key findings of the interviews with the social partners.  
 
Nature 
· The FoA is a soft and flexible tool  as it is legally non- binding. It is soft law, but it is as 
efficient as hard law;  
· The FoA gives flexibility to the European level while respecting subsidiarity  and the 
diversity of the national systems;  
· Concerning the top-down/bottom-up dimension the FoA is a hybrid.  
 
Functioning 
· Elements: Common objectives, good practices, reporting, multiple levels, regula r 
committee meetings at European and national level, and a time limit of three years;  
· Essential role of the individual  to report from and to the European or national level in 
order for the learning to work;  
· Peer pressure works to some extent, as nobody wan ts to be last; 
· National interests  exist but have limited influence and are seen in a European context.  
 
Creation 
· The FoA was a new instrument  and a ‘learning by doing’ process; 
· The FoA was the result of a compromise between the European social partners, ov er 
what type of tool to use; 
· The work is based on national tools, experiences and priorities;  
· The name was only decided at a later stage. The instrument came after the content;  
· The OMC in E&T was no template but rather a parallel process developing at the same 
time. The FoA facilitated the creation of the OMC in E&T;  
· A new paradigm at that time led to the development of governance tools;  
· There were no alternatives, which represented a compromise to satisfy both sides;  
· Different topics need different tools because of their sensitivity and their diversity.  
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Lisbon 
· The Lisbon strategy can be seen as a catalyst for the FoA on lifelong learning (LLL);  
· The FoA was linked to the labour market which is a competence of the social partners.  
 
Governance 
· Framework agreements (FA) look at minimum rights and a FoA looks at actions and 
priorities. The one is not better than the other. The two tools are complementary being 
used for different situations with different objectives. There are different ways of 
implementing them . The attitude does not depend on the tool, but on the topic.  
 
Integration 
· The diversification of ESD tools was an expression of the (new) autonomy of the SP;   
· Soft tools such as the FoA are not replacing the use of framework agreements;  
· Horizontal as well  as vertical integration : More topics for the ESD and more influence 
for the social partners;  
· For some the FoA seems to be a second best option  for the trade unions, but others see 
the instrument as not as important as the political support .  
 
Added value 
· Added value depends on the perspective e.g. national or European;  
· Added value of EU cooperation : looking at common priorities, learning from one 
another, creating awareness, convergence, better mutual understanding, improving 
quality;  
· Added value of the FoA: Labour market approach, cross -fertilisation, common words 
and concepts, joint commitment, more visibility and awareness of SP activities, 
common European approach, drawing attention to common topics, promoting E&T at 
national level.  
 
Consequences and impact 
· It is not easy to isolate: which impact is caused by what;  
· The level of impact varied  across the MS; 
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· Different forms of impact : On the content, on the structure, on the system;  
· Learning is a strong element of the FoA instrument but transferability is difficult; 
· Different forms of learning : from each other, about oneself, about the EU level;  
· The use of concepts is difficult because different national understandings exist;  
· Socialisation and human relations are important aspects and lead to trust. 
 
Evaluation  
· The FoA was successful at European level: Concerning the relation to the Commission 
as well as the development of ESD;  
· The FoA was successful at national level: More cooperation, increased role for E&T, 
learning, reforms, up and downloading;  
· Less successful: Dissemination, limitation in quantitative terms, limited feedback, better 
communication and more responsibility at national level needed.   
 
OMC 
· The SP involvement in the OMC varies  between the different MS and policy areas.  
 
 
3. Results from the interviews with the social partners organised 
thematically 
 
Genesis of the framework of actions  
When developing the FoA, social partners did not have to start from scratch as they have 
been working together on the topic of E&T for years. However this collaboration never 
went further than joint opinions on individual issues. The FoA was a new instrument, the 
first of its kind. It was a ‘learning by doing’ exercise, which also explains the duration, 
lasting from October 2000 to February 2002  (Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Schmitt 2007; 
Suomalainen 2007). Before starting, the two sides had to agree on what they were actually 
aiming at. The trade unions at the time wanted a framework agreement (FA), while the 
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employers were not willing to give the label of a FA on a topic like lifelong learning 
because it would wrongly give the impression that you could decree the improvement of 
LLL and they were opposed to the rights based approach favoured by the TU (André  2007; 
de Liedekerke  2008; Schmitt 2007 ). Some even did not want to talk at all to the TU about 
these sensitive issues (Mayr 2007). Therefore, what ended up as the FoA was the result of a 
compromise (de Liedekerke  2008). The text is written in a way that the diverse national 
systems, those with a rights approach a nd those without a rights approach, were covered by 
the European approach (de Liedekerke  2008). 
 
As the European social partners knew from the beginning that they were not in agreement 
on the type of instrument, they started on the content and saw where th ey could agree on 
how to develop competences and qualification. As the work had to be based on reality, they 
carried out one year of exploratory work and fact finding in the MS trying to create a 
common understanding at European level of the meaning of the  concepts they were using. 
Long discussion on the meaning of the different concepts followed, as in different countries 
these concepts had different meaning. The European level started to ask the national social 
partners for the challenges they were workin g on and for the innovative tools they wanted 
to present. Then, based on these discussions, the European social partners identified the 
important issues from the social partners’ perspective in terms of what role E&T could play 
in improving the functioning  of the labour market (LM). They agreed on focusing on the 
development of competences and qualifications rather than on E&T  (André 2007; de 
Liedekerke 2008;). Finished with the technocratic work they tried to describe together the 
various challenges and fi nd a joint approach to define priorities of actions. The European 
level social partners then started to structure this by taking different issues of the national 
social partners and finding a common denominator. In 2001 they put forward a joint paper 
outlining common priorities. This was then the structure for the negotiations ( de Liedekerke 
2008; Schmitt 2007 ). 
 
The real negotiations took another year. First they agreed on the challenges and described 
the approach they wanted to take. This was placed withi n the context of the Lisbon strategy 
(André 2007; de Liedekerke  2008). The next step was to carry out various workshops on 
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the main issues identified in the joint paper. This bottom -up approach looked at good 
practices from the national level of how compan ies dealt with the issue of LLL in practical 
terms (Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen  2007). The European level started their work, based on 
best practices from the national level, and did not invent anything new ( de Liedekerke 
2008). The SP looked then at which l essons they could draw from this experience and 
identified four specific priorities on which the national social partners should work (André  
2007; de Liedekerke  2008; Suomalainen 2007). These are: 
· To identify and anticipate competences and qualifications n eeds; 
· To recognise and validate competences and qualifications;  
· To inform, support and provide guidance;  
· To mobilise resources. 201 
 
Based on the good examples, the European social partners proposed activities and 
recommendations for each priority. These reco mmendations were not only towards the 
public authorities but also directed to the social partners themselves. This ‘self 
commitment’ is one of the innovative features of this new tool, as until then, the joint 
positions in E&T of the social partners were a lways aimed only at the public authorities. 
The priorities should help promote E&T and LLL in the context of a changing society and 
E&T and should help workers and employers to adapt to this changing world (André  2007). 
Each of these four priorities should  be developed at all three levels: enterprise, sectoral and 
national (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). 
 
Then, a drafting group was convened to make the conclusions (André  2007; de Liedekerke  
2008; Schmitt 2007). As this was the first FoA the spirit was still very mu ch as in 
framework agreements, which was reflected in having a rather short document. 202 The 
name was only decided at the end. They decided not to call it a joint opinion because this 
would send the wrong signal. This was about carrying out actions, so they called it a 
framework of actions ( de Liedekerke 2008). There was nothing scientific about the way 
they named the instrument (André  2007; de Liedekerke  2008; Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 
                                                   
201 See annex six.  
202 Later the FoA on Gender was different and longer.  
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2007). The instrument came after the content (André  2007; de Liedekerke  2008). The 
follow-up was then discussed only at the last stage in the social dialogue committee (SDC), 
which was a very political decision. The trade unions insisted on having a strong follow -up 
procedure (Schmitt 2007). In the end the social partners agree d that “the social partners will 
draw up an annual report on the national actions carried out on the four priorities 
identified” and “after three annual reports, the social partners will evaluate the impact on 
both companies and workers.  This evaluation c an lead to an update of the priorities 
identified.”203 
 
 
Causes 
Context 
When looking at the development of the framework of actions  one has to start by analysing 
the causes for its creation. The political and economic context at the time is crucial. In 2000 
the Lisbon strategy was adopted and had the aim of creating a knowledge -based 
economy/society at its heart, which linked the issue of E&T to the labour market and 
competitiveness. This linkage was important, as the SP have a specific responsibility 
concerning labour market issues (André  2007; de Liedekerke  2008; Menéndez-Valdés 
2007; Volozinskis 2008). Consequently, they wanted to make a contribution to the Lisbon 
strategy. Therefore the Lisbon strategy can be seen as a catalyst for the FoA on LLL.  
 
While in the 1990s Framework agreements generally followed the threat of the 
Commission to come up with legislation, such a threat did not exist on the FoA on LLL 
because the Commission did not have the competence to do so ( Mayr 2007; Windey 2007). 
Nevertheless, because of the ESP role with the labour market the Heads of State and 
Government put huge pressure on the ESP to be active on LLL.  The Nice Council in 2000 
                                                   
203 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/dsw/public/actRetrieveText.do?id=10421  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
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specifically asked the ESP to work on this topic.  204 Additionally, the national members put 
pressure on their respective European organisations because they were eager to see more 
positive and useful results from the European level. For both groups, TU and employers, 
there was the need to legitimate their role by proving to their members that they obtain  
something beneficial (Mayr 2007; Windey 2007). While being a core topic for the Lisbon 
strategy, it is also true that it is a very consensual topic because it is in the interest of both 
sides to have a highly skilled work force ( de Liedekerke  2008; Mayr 2007; Schmitt 2007). 
Therefore the development of the FoA can be seen as a double attempt by the ESP to 
legitimate their role by making a contribution to the Lisbon strategy and showing the 
European Commission and Member States their joint responsibility, a s well as proving to 
their members that they respond to their needs and get something beneficial for them. So it 
was a reactive as well as a proactive approach by the ESP. Moreover, following the Laeken 
declaration in 2001, which led to a new, more autonom ous stage of the European Social 
Dialogue as outlined before, the social partners wanted to diversify their tools and were 
now ready for more integrated discussions (André  2007; Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 2007). 
Consequently, it is possible to identify thre e complementary aims for the creation of the 
FoA in LLL: firstly to gain more political relevance by underlining their joint responsibility 
in this area and contributing to the Lisbon agenda as well as to participate in the debate on 
LLL at EU level; secon dly, to be useful by answering to the existing needs of the member 
organisations as well as companies and workers directly; and thirdly to stimulate the ESD 
on a relatively easy topic (André  2007; Mayr 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Schmitt 2007). 
 
Alternatives to a FoA 
Instead of developing a new tool, two possible alternative approaches could have been 
used. Either they would have continued with (weak) joint opinions or use the (stronger) 
instrument of a framework agreement. Employers ruled out from the begi nning a legally 
binding instrument, which the TU were asking for (André  2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; 
Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 2007). On the other hand, the joint opinions approach was 
                                                   
204 “Improve effective access to life -long education and training, in particular in new technologies in order to 
avoid skills shortages. Strategies in this area should coordinate the shared responsibility of public authorities , 
social partners and individuals, with a suitable contribution being made by civil society. The social partners 
are requested to negotiate measures to improve further education and training to increase adaptability.”  
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rejected by the TU because they wanted something more structured with a follow-up. 
Additionally, this was an area where the EU has no competences and a new instrument was 
needed (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). Therefore there was no real alternative that represented a 
compromise and satisfied both sides ( de Liedekerke  2008). While it could be argued that 
for the trade unions this was a second best option ( Windey 2007), it is also true that the 
instrument is sometimes not important, and it is in fact the political support that matters 
(André 2007). 
 
The OMC as template for the FoA  
The social partners were clearly inspired by the European Employment Strategy and the 
OMC in employment, be it directly or indirectly. During that time there was a certain 
‘paradigm’ (Mayr 2007) which influenced the development of governance tools. It gave 
them the idea to have an own version of the OMC, by using the same or at least similar 
methodology (Schmitt 2007). So it was in the air, but it was not a template ( Volozinskis 
2008). So while being an inspiration, it cannot be considered as a copy -paste exercise, as 
some elements like the indicators and benchmarks were not used, because  the ESP wanted 
to start from practical cases instead of fixing quantitative targets ( de Liedekerke  2008; 
Volozinskis 2008). They wanted to develop a toolkit rather than objectiv es (de Liedekerke  
2008). 
 
The OMC in E&T in particular, was at that time no template, but rather a parallel process 
developing at the same time ( Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 2007). One could even argue that 
the FoA facilitated the creation of the OMC in E&T a nd inspired the work of the 
Commission. The Commission integrated for example one of the concepts emphasised by 
the FoA, namely validation of informal competences’  into their policy programme 
(Decaillon 2007). Commission officials came to meetings with the  social partners to 
observe their work through which they were further inspired.  This correlation can be also 
seen in the fact that the OMC in E&T focused at the beginning more on education and less 
on training, which changed over time ( de Liedekerke  2008; Schmitt 2007). Consequently, 
there was a two-way flow with cross -fertilisation between SP and Commission. The FoA 
was inspired by the OMC in employment and then itself inspired the OMC in E&T. 
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Afterwards this relationship was not fostered and the impact of the FoA on the Commission 
work was not exploited ( Schmitt 2007).205 
  
The social partners did not use the term OMC for their FoA although the instrument is 
more or less the same. As seen earlier the name of the instrument is for the ESP less 
important than the content. Furthermore, the Commission and academics try to “force” 
upon the SP this vocabulary, 206 which would impact on the autonomy of the ESD and is 
therefore rejected by the ESP ( Volozinskis 2008). It is important for both sides and for the 
national members to define the instruments to be used in the ESD themselves (André  
2007). 
 
 
Functioning of the FoA  
Nature and aim of the FoA  
The FoA is generally a flexible and soft tool, as it is legally non -binding (Menéndez-Valdés 
2007; Suomalainen  2007). It focuses on a limited number of priorities, and reinforces 
intervention at various levels with a lot of flexibility regarding the needs of the different 
actors and levels. The strong detailed messages, which were given in the FoA on LLL, 
could not have been  given in a legally binding text ( Suomalainen 2007). So while being a 
soft law instrument, it is considered just as efficient as hard law, sometimes even more, 
because hard law does not help if it is not implemented and ultimately, what is important is 
the level of implementation at national level. Despite its legally non -binding nature, it 
achieves a commitment by the social partners which is self -binding in itself (Mayr 2007). 
The aim, when developing the FoA, was to find a tool that provides sufficient f lexibility, as 
the national situations were very diverse, while respecting subsidiarity in order to get the 
commitment of the national members ( Schmitt 2007). Getting the national members on 
board was crucial but challenging, as it was a topic which was no t directly a European 
competence. That is also why it was linked to the labour market, which is a competence of 
                                                   
205 See SP involvement in OMC.  
206 See Pochet (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/typology_en.htm  (Accessed 
last 9.12.2008) or http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/94/en/1/ef0694en.pdf  (Accessed last 
9.12.2008). 
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the social partners (Volozinskis 2008 ). On the other hand the development of skills and 
competences is a less controversial topic because both t rade unions and employers are 
interested in it (Mayr 2007). Concerning the top-down or bottom-up dimension, the FoA is 
a hybrid. While a framework agreement is a top -down instrument, and a compendium of 
good examples is a bottom -up one, the FoA is both as it is a two way process: The ESP 
identify national examples and base their work on them. The national SP then take 
responsibility and work on the European priorities and report on the subsequent activities 
(Schmitt 2007) (see below). 
 
 
Elements of the FoA  
The FoA is made up of the following interrelated elements:  
· Joint analysis;  
· Good practices; 
· Reporting; 
· Ad hoc working group on education and training.  
 
The joint analysis outlined the challenges and provided arguments why, from the social 
partners’ perspectives, it was necessary to work on this issue. The good practices were thus 
both the basis of the FoA and the result of it. As the priorities were chosen on the basis of 
national good practices they gave inspiration to be applied to countries which did not  have 
them. Then these countries reported how they adapted these tools to their specific national 
conditions which encouraged other national SP to do the same. The FoA has a follow -up 
mechanism made up of annual reports and an evaluation. 207 The reporting was aimed at 
showing how the social partners implemented the tool at national level. The national social 
partners worked on the four priorities in a variety of ways using different tools, such as 
collective agreements or joint declarations, depending on the national situation and SD 
traditions (Mayr 2007; Schmitt 2007 ). For Petri Lempinen (2007), Finnish trade union 
representative, the annual reporting and the evaluation are the most innovative aspect of the 
tool. The annual report was made up of joint replie s by the national member organisations 
                                                   
207 See http://www.ueapme.com/spip.php?rubrique74   (last accessed 22.07.09).  
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of the European social partners to a template provided by the European level. The European 
social partners integrated these national reports in the final document without any changes. 
The European level then made a sy nthesis and identified the general trends of how the 
different national organisations dealt with the FoA, as well as outlining the European level 
developments. 
 
Exaggerations and understatements are difficult to avoid in the reporting exercise, as people 
sometimes are not clear about the link between their actions at national level and the 
European level (de Liedekerke 2008). Sometimes people forget where ideas come from. 
However, it is the general belief that the national social partners reported correctly  on the 
influence of the FoA in their countries. This is also the case because the national TU and 
employers keep each other in balance through the use of joint reports ( Volozinskis 2008). 
 
The European Social Dialogue Committee has an ad hoc Working Group  on Education and 
Training, which was in particular responsible for supporting the follow -up of the FoA. In 
this group social partner representatives discussed the template for the national reports as 
well as the joint trends identified in the annual repor t. This was a more technical group and 
all the political decisions were made in the European Social Dialogue committee.  
 
Peer pressure, national interests and involvement in policy -making 
All respondents agreed that peer pressure (naming and shaming) works  to some extent as 
nobody wants to be last. One can argue that the reporting mechanism was a strong 
instrument for naming and shaming because it showed the countries that replied, and 
whether they did it in a detailed and thorough way ( Schmitt 2007). At the same time Mr 
Menéndez-Valdés, Spanish employer representative, believes that the naming and shaming 
element is not as strong as in the OMC. Others mention that the naming and shaming 
works, but it is not sufficient ( Windey 2007). What is definitely missi ng are specific 
national recommendations to the national members, as is used in the OMC. This is because 
the ESP has no authority to do this ( Volozinskis 2008). While one can identify a strong 
element of peer pressure within the FoA process, it is not clea r to which extent it really 
influences the behaviour of the national social partners.  
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It is generally accepted that national interest always exists. However, while being aware of 
their national interests during negotiations, the national representatives t ry to find a 
common denominator and to see the national interests in a European context while also 
being aware of the policy developments in other countries ( Lempinen 2007; de Liedekerke  
2008; Volozinskis 2008 ). This is also part of the learning and social isation process. So 
while national interests have an influence on the negotiations, they do not dominate them 
(Suomalainen 2007; Windey 2007). When it comes to the implementation they see it again 
from their national perspective ( de Liedekerke  2008; Menéndez-Valdés 2007). An 
additional aspect is that the ESD can sometimes help to find solutions for issues, which 
cannot be solved at the national level, by finding a consensus that does not harm national 
organisations. 
 
The involvement of social partners in th e OMC processes clearly varies between the MS 
and policy areas. This involvement is greater in countries with a strong role for social 
partners, such as Austria or Finland. While some of these SP feel that they are well heard 
by the national administration  (Lempinen 2007; Mayr 2007 ) others point out that you 
cannot influence the national reports because there is nothing to discuss about hard facts 
(Suomalainen 2007). Some respondents pointed out that in Belgium SP are actively 
involved in the preparation an d the follow-up, through a permanent dialogue with 
government representatives. Networks of social partners are therefore a direct result of the 
OMC (Windey 2007). While the education ministry in Spain does not consider SP enough, 
they are relatively well involved in the OMC in employment ( Menéndez-Valdés 2007). 
Other social partners feel better involved in the E&T than in employment ( Decaillon 2007). 
Concerning the European level, some social partners feel sufficiently involved in the OMC, 
in particular the  one in E&T (Volozinskis 2008), while others point out that there is still the 
tendency of using the SP but in the end, all important decisions are taken by a ‘closed club’ 
of national governmental experts in the E&T field. While there are enough possibili ties to 
meet and discuss, there is no real openness to involve the ESP. To a certain extent the ESP 
also do not want to be involved too much because they want to keep their autonomy and 
not be involved in a tripartite exercise ( de Liedekerke  2008). 
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Added value  
General benefit of European cooperation in education and training  
Before looking at the added value of the FoA on LLL it is important to look at why national 
actors agree to cooperate in education and training issues at EU level in the first place.  
European cooperation in education and training can have a number of positive 
consequences, some of the most prominent being: l ooking at common priorities; 
convergence; learning; diploma recognition; mutual understanding; awareness creation; 
as well as improved quality and more involvement of SP in policy -making at national level.  
 
Looking at common priorities  draws attention to common topics and is  stimulating for 
national discussions and reforms. The European level can provide new ideas even to stable 
systems that are not in the need of drastic reforms, by giving some impulses for the further 
evolution and development of the system ( Lempinen 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; 
Volozinskis). This leads also to policy c onvergence  through flexibility and adaptation o f 
policy measures at national level ( Volozinskis 2008). Another important added value is 
found in mutual learning. While the degree of learning varies between countries, as their 
performance level in E&T is different, all of them can learn from each other,  from either 
the good or the bad examples. It also makes the MS and SP reflect on their own systems 
(André 2007; Lempinen 2007; Suomalainen 2007; Volozinskis 2008 ). Through learning 
from one another, the quality of the national E&T tools can also be improv ed (Volozinskis 
2008). This then contributes to the  recognition of diplomas, which  is particularly important 
for small countries and helps fostering mobility ( Suomalainen 2007). Furthermore 
cooperation at European level leads to a better mutual understandi ng (Volozinskis 2008 ) 
and creates awareness so that  social partners at sectoral level are more conscious of E&T 
issues and they are starting to take them more seriously ( Lempinen 2007). Finally, 
enhanced cooperation at European level can also lead in some countries to more 
involvement of social partners in E&T issues at national level, as they play a role in 
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implementing the policies which are initiated by the European level and then reported back 
to by the national authorities  (André 2007; Lempinen 2007 ). 
 
Specific added value of FoA in LLL  
Some of these examples for an added value of the FoA in LLL are necessarily the same as 
the general benefits of European cooperation in general, but deserve to be restated as they 
form essential aspects of the added val ue of the FoA instrument. While they all represent 
some form of added value, one has to be aware that some elements apply more to the 
national level and others are more general in nature. Therefore the following aspects are 
sorted accordingly.  
 
General Added value: 
The general added value of the FoA can be seen in that it: confirmed the responsibility of 
the social partners; identified common challenges; provided a common European 
approach; tackled the issue from a labour market perspective; influenced the OMC in 
E&T; led to a cross -fertilisation of ideas; and created common words and concepts.  
 
For employers it was a way to prove that they could deal with sensitive issues at EU level. 
The TU also benefited from showing that they got a joint paper with the e mployers. This 
was a win-win situation and showed the Commission that SP are capable of working 
together on this topic (Mayr 2007; Suomalainen 2007). Also, it helped to identify and draw 
attention to joint priorities  which are common challenges in all MS. It forced the different 
stakeholders to look at the same issue and what should be done. For example the issue of 
recognition of qualifications  was one faced by all, but not discussed by all MS because of 
the link to salary increases ( Mayr 2007; Schmitt 2007; Volozinskis 2008; Windey 2007). 
The FoA created a common European approach in E&T by the social partners, which did 
not exist until then in the ESD. Until then SP touched on different single issues but never in 
a comprehensive way. They never successful ly discussed issues such as the financing of 
training or the joint responsibility  of the different stakeholders for the training of the 
individual (de Liedekerke 2008). The SP were now able to discuss more sensitive aspects 
of E&T. For the social partners it represented a great added value to have a labour market 
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approach to LLL. So far all the discussions at the European level (not the social partners 
but the EU) were in the hands of E&T professionals, national experts from the Member 
States and the approach was always a systems approach and not from the labour market 
approach (de Liedekerke  2008). 
 
The four priorities of the FoA influenced the Copenhagen priorities 208 and the Commission 
agenda. From this point of view the FoA was an important stepping -stone for what was to 
become the OMC in E&T ( Lempinen 2007; Mayr 2007; Volozinskis 2008 ).  
 
Confronting national ideas with each other and with the European level leads to a cross -
fertilisation process. For example the national level debate in France inspired th e 
discussions at the European level and they then inspired other national debates and later the 
French readapted their discussions in the light of the European developments ( de 
Liedekerke 2008). By having a common analysis the concepts used are then transm itted to 
the national level (Windey 2007).   
 
Added value for the national level:  
The added value particular for the national level is identified as: giving visibility at 
European level; creating a knock on effect; influencing national agenda -setting; providing 
flexibility to the national social partners; helping to promote the topic of E&T; as well as 
creating discussions and giving a structure to the national social dialogue discussions.  
 
The FoA helped to create more visibility and awareness  of social partners towards the EU 
institutions by bringing national level activities to the surface ( Schmitt 2007; Volozinskis 
2008). Furthermore, the European discussions helped national social partners  to address 
this issue together. On the one hand, the FoA helped to show within their own organisations 
the importance of E&T ( Mayr 2007), also because the FoA forced the national social 
partners to put the E&T issue on the agenda ( Lempinen 2007). On the other hand, it led to 
constant discussions at national level, whic h would not (necessarily) be there without it 
                                                   
208 Priorities set by the European Union for the field of VET in its Copenhagen declaration in 2002. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/vocational -education/doc1143_en.htm  (last accessed 22.07.09).  
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(Windey 2007). As the FoA leaves it open to national delegations to adapt measures to the 
needs of the different actors and levels, there is also the possibility to be more ambitious 
than the common objectives (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). This flexibility also opened the door 
for national and sectoral negotiations and to identify the qualification needs of companies 
and workers (André  2007; Schmitt 2007) Finally, by taking a joint  responsibility and 
creating a dialogue, the end product is joint commitment  (Suomalainen 2007; Windey 
2007). 
 
 
FoA impact at national level  
Impact  
When looking at impact one has to be aware that it is impossible to isolate which reason led 
to which impact, because a mixture of instruments a nd initiatives causes changes at national 
level. Additionally, the circumstances in which national discussions take place can be 
significant for the impact. It is always difficult to say that if there had been no FoA, certain 
actions would not have happene d. Social partners agree that they have to be modest and 
realistic when looking at the impact. Sometimes they are positively surprised, and 
sometimes disappointed about the influence on the national level ( Volozinskis 2008). What 
is important for them is that competences are being developed and interesting tools are 
coming to the knowledge of people to use them. It is less important to try to identify what 
exactly led to this (de Liedekerke 2008). There are many parallel processes going on, which 
influence actors, making it very difficult to identify the individual impact. This is 
particularly true when looking at aspects that do not only concern the social partners, but 
also other actors, such as the national E&T systems. A strong convergence can be identif ied 
between the FoA and the work of the Commission, using the same concepts and 
terminology. For example the learning outcome approach  is something they did not have in 
many MS and would not have without the work of the Commission ( Mayr 2007). One can 
observe reforms of the national systems starting but it is difficult to say which of them, if 
any, is the main cause ( Volozinskis 2008; Windey 2007). However, generally it is fair to 
say that the FoA has had an impact at national level and inspired national di scussions 
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between the social partners. However, this impact has taken various forms, and differed 
(sometimes) significantly in its degree between the Member States.  
 
Varied level of impact  
From the responses it can be seen that the level of impact varied a cross the MS, with some 
countries experiencing only little added value from the FoA while in other MS there was 
more impact (Suomalainen 2007). This is understandable when looking at the different 
starting points of the MS. The impact was more limited in M S which (regularly) discussed 
this topic already and which were much more developed on these issues (André  2007; 
Lempinen 2007; Mayr 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007). In addition to the country’s level of 
development on this issue, there are other explanations for a limited impact at national 
level. First of all some good practices are difficult to transfer ( Mayr 2007; Suomalainen 
2007). Secondly, the willingness at national level is important. The heavy reporting 
procedures led to resistance at national level i n some countries and limited ownership of the 
tool (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). Furthermore awareness was limited in some countries and 
might not have reached the national sectoral social partners or the company level 
(Lempinen 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007). The last point shows the great role that the 
transfer of the FoA from European level to national level played. While the capacity 
building exercise of the ESP led to a greater awareness of this tool in some MS ( Menéndez-
Valdés 2007) it could be argued that the  European social partners should have explained 
better to the national members what the instrument was about in order to increase the 
impact (André  2007). At the same time the actual dissemination of the FoA was in the 
hands of the national social partners  and was sometimes carried out suboptimally as Mr 
Mayr (2007), employers’ representative from Austria reported. This was also reflected in a 
poor coordination between SP on some of the national reports. Another factor that 
influenced the impact at national  level is the individual national representative ( Schmitt 
2007). The role of the individual national representative is crucial as he or she is 
responsible for reporting from and to the European or national level, as well as forming the 
link between those who participate at European level discussions and those who are in 
decision-making positions at national level ( Lempinen 2007; Mayr 2007; Schmitt 2007 ). If 
this relationship does not work, the instrument does not either. Consequently, a tool is only 
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as good as the actor using it (like with the OMC). A final explanation for the different 
impact of the FoA at national level is that it was not supposed to be applied in a harmonised 
way. The national social partners should work on the four priorities within the national 
context and take the elements and adapt them to the national situation. This leads clearly to 
varying results.   
 
Diverse forms of impact on policy -making 
In countries where there was a bigger impact, this could take different forms such as 
concerning the content, the E&T systems or the structures of the national social dialogue. 
For some countries the content of the FoA impacted at national level, as for example the 
competences development approach  was new for some countries like Portugal and Spain . 
Some countries were influenced on a systems level, for example the Member States which 
joined in 2004 were reinventing the national training systems at the time ( de Liedekerke 
2008), but also countries like Spain and Portugal have reformed their systems based to 
some degree on the input of the FoA (André  2007). Paul Windey (2007), President of the 
Belgian National Labour Council, argues that for some countries, such as Belgium, the 
impact was more about the follow -up mechanisms and less about the content of the FoA. 
Applying the follow -up mechanism led to constant discussions at national level which 
would not be there without the FoA. In the opinion of Mr Menéndez-Valdés, the FoA could 
impact also on national negotiations on LLL. In France, it helped the n ational social 
partners to get a birds eye view in addition to their national discussions. Some elements in 
the EU text were more beneficial for the employers than the national discussions, and 
therefore helpful (Schmitt 2007). In some countries, like Finl and, the FoA was linked with 
collective agreements ( Lempinen 2007; Suomalainen 2007), quoted by some large firms in 
their company agreements on training or used in discussion with the authorities on the 
needs to reform the national education and training s ystem (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). 
 
Generally it is fair to say that the FoA inspired national discussions between the social 
partners, which then adapted the approach to the national situation and dealt with it in their 
own ways (de Liedekerke  2008; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Volozinskis 2008). This often 
began with the translation from the English text into the national language, which was a 
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very important step and proved to be like a whole new negotiation in itself. It was a 
constructive but difficult element in p reparation for national discussions or negotiations 
(Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Suomalainen  2007). In some cases the FoA was also used in 
discussions with the authorities on the needs to reform the national education and training 
systems (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). 
 
Other forms of impact  
In addition to influencing the policy -making of social partners at national level, the FoA 
also impacted on other aspects, such as language and terminology, learning and 
socialisation . At European level, language is always an issue as people speak different 
languages. It becomes particularly important when talking about concepts, terminology and 
definitions. Even when speaking the same working language (mostly English) the 
understanding of the people of the same concept varies, as th e concept has often different 
meanings, according to the country where the person comes from. Therefore part of the 
discussion at European level is jointly to define concepts and create a clear understanding 
(André 2007; Lempinen 2007; Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 2007). The FoA helped to 
understand new concepts and adapt them to the national level e.g. LLL. Mrs Volozinskis 
(2007), Director for Social Affairs at UEAPME, sees this as an example of convergence 
and of learning from each other. However, the social  partners believe that there will always 
be a difference between the countries and there should not be a harmonisation of this 
language, but rather an understanding of the people for the different meaning of the 
concepts at national level ( de Liedekerke 2008; Volozinskis 2008). Discussing terminology 
also helps to find compromises and is an important aspect for European integration 
(Windey 2007).  
 
The problem starts when those who participate in the negotiations cannot transfer the 
meaning back into the na tional vocabulary, as European jargon is not easy to understand at 
national level (André  2007; Schmitt 2007). Therefore the joint translations are important, 
but sometimes the FoA national translations differ in the use of concepts because they have 
different understandings of them ( de Liedekerke 2008; Mayr 2007). Ms Volozinskis (2007) 
sees this as an additional reason for needing a flexible tool. Not only is it difficult to 
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transfer the concepts, but also the meaning behind the words. People at national le vel who 
were not involved in the negotiations might not know or understand why certain 
formulations were used and what they meant. Therefore the TU gave an interpretation 
guide for their members explaining their understanding of the FoA (André  2007).  
 
All respondents agreed that learning is a strong element of the FoA instrument. This 
learning has various elements. On the one hand, it is about one country learning from the 
good and bad experience of another. Additionally, within the FoA the learning does n ot 
only take place between the different countries, but also within the different groups 
(employers/trade unions). Another learning result for the national members of participating 
in the process  is that they learn that the extreme national position does n ot work in Europe. 
They need to adapt if they want to be influential (Schmitt 2007)  (see socialisation). This 
also leads to the situation that it is mainly the individual who learns as part of this process 
rather than the organisation (Lempinen 2007; Suomalainen 2007). This places great 
importance on the individual, which was outlined earlier. The European level is also 
capable of learning from this exercise and improves the functioning of the tool. For 
example, at the beginning separate national reports ( between employers and TU) were used. 
When this did not bring the desired results, the idea of joint national reports was 
introduced, which had a balanced presentation of the situation as a consequence 
(Suomalainen 2007). Seeing that learning takes place, i t is also important to understand that 
the specificities of the very diverse national systems can make the learning exercise very 
challenging. The main difficulty is transferability and adapting the good practices to the 
national level, because of the spec ificities of the very diverse national systems ( Mayr 2007; 
Volozinskis 2008). While an exact transferability is not possible, this is also not the aim. 
Rather, the learning experience based on the good examples is supposed to be adapted to 
the national level and applied according to their needs and their national circumstances 
(André 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Suomalainen  2007). Furthermore, the development 
level of the country on this issue has been seen as crucial for the learning potential ( Mayr 
2007). A highly developed country is unlikely to learn something from a less -developed 
country. However, even in these cases learning takes place, namely about oneself. When 
preparing their own presentations and reports the national social partners reflect more o n 
  
235
their own national system and sometimes discover that their national ‘good examples’ were 
not as good as they thought (Mayr 2007; Windey 2007). Despite the challenges of the 
learning exercise, one can observe that peer -learning visits (of the Commission,  and 
CEDEFOP209) attract great interest by the national social partners who see an added value 
in participating in them ( Volozinskis 2008). 
 
The results clearly show that socialisation took place between the participants of the 
negotiations and the FoA proce ss. One can argue that this applies not only to the FoA, but 
also to the work in the social dialogue in general and it is difficult to isolate the FoA from 
the rest of the process (Lempinen 2007; de Liedekerke  2008), as they are often the same 
representatives. The consequences of the socialisation between the social partners are an 
important aspect of the FoA as they contribute significantly to the working atmosphere. 
Socialisation leads to a better understanding and development of trust amongst TU, 
amongst employers, between TU and employers, and also with national governments 
(André 2007; Decaillon 2007; Lempinen 2007; Mayr 2007; Suomalainen 2007; Windey 
2007). Even in the cases where the FoA did not create this trust, it contributed to it 
(Lempinen 2007). Especially over time, when meeting regularly and often, socialisation 
takes place. In order to have a true socialisation the surroundings are important. As part of 
the negotiations the participants sit at the same tables, which makes a huge difference 
(Volozinskis 2008). The socialisation was then carried on in the annual reporting exercises 
at national and European level . These meetings were significant for the European and 
national level. On the one hand it helped to show the national level the significa nce and 
influence of the European dimension. On the other hand it improved the atmosphere at 
national level through the national follow -up meetings and discussions between the social 
partners (André 2007). National discussions between the social partners a re very important. 
It is not sufficient to have vertical relations between the European organisation for TU and 
employers respectively with their national members, but also the horizontal dimension 
between national employers and TU. These are two separate networks, and the FoA has 
contributed to them (Volozinskis 2008).  
                                                   
209 CEDEFOP is the European agency for VET. See http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/default.asp  (last accessed 
22.07.09).  
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Impact on the European Social Dialogue and European integration  
The use of new soft tools, in particular the FoA, led to a number of changes in the European 
Social Dialogue, including more vertical and horizontal integration. At the same time it is 
necessary to look at the conditions and limits of using the FoA as well as its relationship to 
other ‘harder’ tools such as the FA.  
 
More topics being used in the European Social Dialogue  
While it is true that the social partners have dealt with the topics even before creating the 
FoA, the tools used for working on them have evolved. As a consequence the social 
partners could deepen their work on these issues and the discussions could go into mo re 
detail than before. Theoretically the topics are still the same, but practically the European 
social partners have now a lot more possibilities. As some subjects cannot be touched with 
a framework agreement, the FoA has helped to improve the work done o n these topics 
because it gave more flexibility ( Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Volozinskis 2008). This then also 
encouraged the national members to intensify their work on other topics using a FoA, such 
as gender (Schmitt 2007). However, this is not only because o f the FoA, but also because of 
the variety of tools and the ESP decision to multiply their tools ( Volozinskis) (see causes). 
 
European level competences   
While officially there is no change of competences for the European social partners in 
respect to their national members because of the use of the OMC, there are certain 
consequences for the European level because of the FoA. It has systemised the follow -up 
and structured the cross -fertilisation between the European and national level (Decaillon  
2007; de Liedekerke 2008). Furthermore, it gave more credibility to the European 
secretariats with respect to their members and the European Commission ( Decaillon 2007). 
This did not really lead to more competences, but the European level uses the existing 
competences differently and therefore has more influence ( Volozinskis 2008). So for 
example it has helped the European level to set the agenda for the national level ( Lempinen 
2007). Also those who work on the messages, mainly the EU secretariats and some 
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individual national members, are supposed to have more influence ( Suomalainen 2007). 
Finally, sometimes the national members need to be encouraged by the European level and 
it is seen as the responsibility of ESP to give the national level the right instruments (A ndré 
2007). 
 
Impact of enlargement on the use of FoA  
It should be noted that some respondents argued that the enlargement from 15 to 27 
members makes it more difficult to use binding agreements ( Menéndez-Valdés 2007; 
Suomalainen 2007; Windey 2007). However, this opinion was not shared by everyone, as 
others pointed out that various FA have been agreed on since the enlargement (André  2007; 
de Liedekerke  2008). 
 
Certain topics are more suitable for a FoA than others  
It seems to be clear that within the Euro pean Social Dialogue different topics need different 
tools and the form is linked to the content ( Lempinen 2007; Schmitt 2007; Volozinskis 
2008). FoA are the right tools for issues where SP have a specific responsibility but not an 
exclusive one. These are  issues where the responsibility lies partly with the public 
authorities and civil society at large but which has a strong labour market dimension to 
justify autonomous involvement of the SP. If there were issues within the exclusive 
bilateral competence o f social partners the FoA would not be the right instrument (André  
2007; de Liedekerke  2008). Other cases where the FoA would not be appropriate would be 
in response to a Commission consultation ( Schmitt 2007). Another explanation for the use 
of a FoA is that some areas are more sensitive than others. The FoA is seen by the social 
partners as an appropriate instrument to deal with sensitive issues (André  2007; 
Suomalainen 2007). Furthermore, horizontal topics which are broader in their nature are 
considered more suitable than specific topics ( Menéndez-Valdés 2007). This can be 
explained by the fact that the FoA is not a prescriptive instrument, but rather points out the 
challenges a policy area is facing and offers different possible solutions.  
 
  
238
The relationship between a FoA and a framework agreement  
The ESD has various tools at its disposal. Two of the most popular ones are the FoA and 
the traditional tool of a framework agreement. While both tools call upon the national 
members to be active on a topic, th ey are different tools with different purposes. A clear 
separation between the use of FoA and FA is when rights are granted. The framework 
agreements look at minimum rights while a FoA looks at actions and priorities (André  
2007; Volozinskis 2008; Windey 2007). For a topic like parental leave a framework 
agreement would be the right tool, while a FoA would be used for issues where the social 
partners cannot or do not want to define rights ( Schmitt 2007; Volozinskis 2008 ). An FoA 
is normally used when there is already a substantial body of (national) legislation on this 
topic in place and the focus is on more practical solutions in order to complement this legal 
framework (Volozinskis 2008). The instrument is therefore chosen depending on the 
content of the work and what one is talking about (André  2007; Volozinskis ). Another 
difference is that framework agreements are mainly addressed to their own members and 
not to others, while the FoA is also addressed to others, such as public authorities (André  
2007). It is important not to see them as replacing each other but rather as being used for 
different situations with different objectives.  
 
Other differences between the two tools can be found regarding their implementation. The 
nature of the follow -up is different concerning the form and level. The FA create templates 
on how to solve issues at company level (micro) while with the FoA you focus on macro 
issues (de Liedekerke  2008; Volozinskis 2008). In many cases the FA are implemented at 
national and sectoral level by agreements which is not the case with the FoA. While one 
could think that framework agreements are taken more seriously in their implementation, 
not least because the national social partners know that the Commission follows up on the 
implementation at national level ( Schmitt 2007), in reality the attitude does not depend on 
the tool, but the topic. If the topic is important, the social partners will be active whatever 
tool is chosen (Volozinskis 2008). Neither tool is considered to be better than the  other, 
they are considered complementary, to be used for different aspects of the same area 
(Schmitt 2007; Windey 2007). Consequently, it is wrong to think that FoA are replacing the 
use of framework agreements. They also do not necessarily represent a fi rst step before a 
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FA. So far no FoA has led to a FA on the same topic. While theoretically possible this was 
not foreseen when creating the FoA instrument ( de Liedekerke  2008; Menéndez-Valdés 
2007; Schmitt 2007). So as they have different foci, if a framew ork agreement followed a 
FoA, it would focus on something else rather than something more ( Schmitt 2007).  
 
The fact that the European social partners will continue to use different tools in the ESD is 
certain (de Liedekerke  2008). However, some social par tners feel that some further 
discussion on the clarification between these tools is needed (André  2007). This 
clarification is needed not between the European umbrella organisations themselves, but in 
regard to their respective national members, as the FoA  tool does not exist at national level.  
 
 
Evaluation 
Success210 
In general the FoA is seen as successful by all of the interviewees. However, different 
aspects and dimensions have been more or less successful, also depending on which area 
one is looking at.  Therefore one should distinguish between the European and the national 
level when evaluating the success of the FoA, although sometimes the issue applies for 
both levels. 
 
European level 
The FoA impacted in a number of ways on the ESP’s relation with the EU Commission. 
The FoA had an important influence on the EU Commission agenda as it influenced the 
development of important issues at EU level. Priorities, such as competence development  
and the validation of informal competences , were integrated at EU lev el. This happened on 
the one hand through direct contact between the ESP and the Commission, but on the other 
hand indirectly through the national members influencing their governments’ position 
towards the Commission (André  2007; Decaillon 2007; Lempinen 2007; Volozinskis 
2008). Additionally, having the FoA increased the SP opportunity to participate in the 
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debate on LLL at EU level. It can also be said that the FoA was a stepping -stone for the 
OMC in the field of E&T ( de Liedekerke  2008). Finally, it also  gave the Commission a 
better overview of the activities of social partners, as it normally gets information only 
from independent experts ( Schmitt 2007; Volozinskis 2008 ). The FoA also influenced the 
further development (integration)  of the European Social Dialogue. The development of a 
new tool (FoA) can be seen as a success, as it gave new impulses to the ESD and has been 
used again for other relatively easy, but sensitive topics ( de Liedekerke  2008; Suomalainen 
2007; Volozinskis 2008). Additionally, it made the role of the ESP more credible as it gave 
some form of coherence at the ESP level ( Decaillon 2007). 
 
National level  
The FoA led to an increased coordination as i t allowed to identify priorities at national level 
and to see if they are the same as the European ones (Decaillon 2007). By bringing social 
partners together at national level it also strengthened the c ooperation  between those  which 
were not used to working together and also created contacts between national SP 
throughout Europe (Lempinen 2007; Mayr 2007; Suomalainen 2007; Windey 2007). 
Furthermore, it increased the role for E&T at national level . The promotion of the FoA 
placed E&T on the agenda of social partners at national level, who until then did not 
discuss this topic together (Lempinen 2007). The various forms of learning resulting from 
that can be seen as a very successful element of the FoA (André  2007; Decaillon 2007; 
Lempinen 2007; de Liedekerke  2008; Mayr 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Suomalainen  
2007; Volozinskis 2008 ). Then the FoA also gave impetus to the national level work on this 
issue and supported reforms of the E&T system. These might have happened anyway, but it 
helped the national level to focus on specific priorities (Decaillon 2007; Menéndez-Valdés 
2007; Volozinskis 2008; Windey 2007). Additionally, a cross -fertilisation process took 
place between the countries as it brought new topics and concepts to the European and 
national level, thereby up- and downloading policy, e.g. it created the notion of co -
responsibility between a workers, companies, and public authorities in the further education 
                                                                                                                                                          
210 As outlined in the methodology chapter, many of the interview quest ions were aiming at subjective 
responses. Therefore ‘success’ is not something defined by this author but rather felt by the individual 
interviewees and might vary slightly between the respondents.   
  
241
and training of employees (de Liedekerke 2008; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Volozinskis 
2008). The FoA also had a real influence on how E&T issues were approached by SP in 
some countries, namely through a labour market perspective ( de Liedekerke  2008). 
 
Shortcomings 
While stressing the success of the FoA, it is important to point out some of its 
shortcomings, regarding: the continuation; the time limit; the level of change; the progress 
towards quantitative targets; the feedback and the ownership; the communication and the 
peer review; and the relationship between the national actors . 
 
As there is  currently no further work being done at European level under the FoA, there is a 
certain lack of continuation (André  2007). As the FoA was limited to only three years, one 
can argue that this time period was too short to stabilise results ( Decaillon 2007). 
Consequently, it also did not result in a high level of change, as this instrument is not 
adequate for drastic reforms (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). Also there is not much progress at 
national level in quantitative terms of LLL as aimed at by the European Unions quantitative 
targets in E&T policy (Lempinen 2007), but this was also not an explicit goal of  the FoA. 
There were also shortcomings in the use of the instrument. First of all, there was only 
limited feedback from some of the member organisations ( Menéndez-Valdés 2007). This 
can partially be explained by the lack of ownership by some national feder ations. The 
follow-up mechanism and evaluation should have been more in the hands of the national 
level (Schmitt 2007; Volozinskis 2008 ). This could also have been improved through better 
communication with the members, which would have been necessary in o rder to explain 
what the instrument was about (André  2007), as well as the better use of peer review 
activities. It was a failure of the ESP not to exploit this more. This shortfall was the result 
of lack of time and resources rather than lack of interest (Schmitt 2007). Furthermore, a 
sub-optimal relationship between the national negotiator and the national decision maker 
can limit the impact of the FoA. It can be problematic if the national leaders do not place 
the same priority on this topic at home, as the negotiators did (see role of the individual and 
socialisation) (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). 
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Future and changes  
Even if the tool was successful, every process needs to be revisited regularly, in order to 
examine if the priorities are still valid in the lig ht of changes in the practical situation. The 
approach as well as the priorities are still valid, nevertheless a time limitation is considered 
necessary, in order to make the exercise not too bureaucratic ( Lempinen 2007; de 
Liedekerke 2008; Menéndez-Valdés 2007; Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 2007; Volozinskis 
2008). In general the FoA could continue in its current form, but some changes would be 
needed (Decaillon 2007). These changes include the better dissemination of outcomes at 
national and European level ( Suomalainen 2007; Windey 2007), better monitoring and 
follow-up (Lempinen 2007; Schmitt 2007 ), and more commitment at national level to the 
follow-up (Menéndez-Valdés 2007). Some believe that the social partners have reached the 
limits of this exercise and should look at some of the issues which they did not concentrate 
on so much before ( Volozinskis 2008) . However, this is rather a change of focus than a 
change of tool, as the majority of employers’ representatives reject the idea of a legally 
binding instrument on this issue completely ( de Liedekerke  2008; Mayr 2007; Menéndez-
Valdés 2007; Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen  2007). Other social partners believe that it 
depended on the subject and objectives and that maybe some elements from the FoA could 
be taken up in a FA (André 2007; Lempinen 2007; Schmitt 2007; Suomalainen 2007). 
Whether the debate on E&T will be restarted in order to try to reach a framework 
agreement (Decaillon 2007) or the topic will be integrated into the debate on flexicurity, 
thereby giving i t a wider perspective than only E&T ( Volozinskis 2008), the FoA has led to  
a significant development of the cooperation between social partners on E&T at European 
level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the development of the European Social Dialogue . The three 
phases in this process show that social dialogue at European level is something rather 
innovative and dynamic, as demonstrated by the development of different ways of carrying 
out social dialogue and the variety of tools used in order to do so.  The FoA itself is a new 
tool, based on a compromise between the expectations of the different social partners and is 
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basically a soft-law instrument in nature. It has impacted on the social partners’ policy -
making in E&T at European and national level, af fecting the content of the E&T 
discussions, the structures of the social dialogue and the national E&T systems at large. The 
impact varied across the Member States, depending on their level of development in E&T 
policy, the previous involvement in specific  E&T issues, and the political support for 
change. It should not be forgotten that the aim of this type of tool was in no way 
harmonisation of E&T policy, but rather to stimulate actions and improvements in those 
areas, seen as a priority from the national  perspective (while working within the framework 
of the European objectives). The context of the Lisbon strategy together with the choice of 
policy instrument made this impact possible in the first place. While certain improvements 
were recommended, overal l the actors involved see the FoA as successful.  
 
The results presented in this chapter have given an additional insight into the functioning of 
OMC-like instruments being used in the European cross -sectoral social dialogue. Some of 
the findings are particularly interesting when relating them to the results of the interviews 
on the OMC in E&T. The next chapter will assess the similarities and differences between 
the results of the two case studies. Afterwards it will examine how well European 
integration theories can explain these results.  
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CHAPTER SIX: OMC-LIKE TOOLS AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION THEORY 
 
 
Introduction 
The first case study illustrated that European integration in European education and training 
policy is deepening through the use of the OMC. The  second case study showed that not 
only the institutions in the EU system use soft forms of governance but also other 
participants in the EU governance system apply OMC -like tools. The aim of this chapter is 
to draw together the results of the previous two  chapters and theorise about them. As this 
thesis is trying to answer different questions in regards to the OMC -like tools in E&T, (how 
it was created, how it functions, and what the outcomes are) a number of theoretical 
approaches need to be consulted in addition to the classical European integration theories 
(neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism) in order to find all the answers. On the one 
hand these will be theoretical approaches coming from the governance perspective and on 
the other hand approaches based on social constructivism. Neither social constructivism, 
nor the governance approaches are competing with traditional integration theories but 
rather complement them. The governance approach is made up of a number of theories 
which have been outli ned earlier. Two of the theoretical approaches in the governance 
‘school’ will be dealt with jointly, namely multi -level governance and policy networks .211 
 
In order to theorise OMC -like tools, the first section will compare the FoA and OMC as 
instruments and outline the similarities and differences of the results. Building on this, the 
second section will look at the governance dimension and examine whether OMC -like tools 
                                                   
211 Using PN together with MLG is justified because the ne twork policy assumptions have striking 
resemblance with MLG (Risse -Kappen 1996; Warleigh 2006). MLG has the presumption that actors 
participate in diverse policy networks, including subnational actors such as interest groups and subnational 
governments, dealing directly with supranational institutions (Marks et al. 1996). The focus on policy 
networks is a reply to the criticism of MLG. The original MLG idea looked at both multiple levels and at the 
governance aspect. Further work concentrated then on the multi-level aspect, but the notion of policy 
networks is already part of the MLG assumptions (Börzel 1997 ; Warleigh 2006). 
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are better forms of policy-making. 212 The third section will take this another step furt her 
and look at what type of integration this is leading to and examine how different theories of 
European integration are able to explain the development, use and consequences of OMC -
like tools. The conclusion will then summarise the findings, argue for t he need to use 
different EIT in a complementary fashion when explaining OMC-like tools and propose a 
matrix for doing this.  
 
 
1. Comparing the OMC in E&T and the FoA 
The previous two chapters have reported on the experience with the OMC and the FoA in 
the European E&T policy area. This section now wants to draw the lessons from this 
experience and evaluate the similarities and differences between the FoA and the OMC (see 
table 6.1), thereby examining the independent variables outlined in the methodology 
chapter: 
· The rationale for applying the OMC and the FoA respectively to the education and 
training policy field (genesis);  
· The way the OMC and FoA processes work respectively (functioning);  
· The ideational /affective factors at work (socialisation);  
· The effect of using these instruments (OMC and FoA) on the national level (impact);  
· The effect of using these instruments (OMC and FoA) for European level (integration).  
                                                   
212 ‘Better’ policy-making is in the literature often defined as more legitimate and/or more efficient policy -
making. Section two will al so examine the OMC in respect to this view. However, better policy -making, as it 
is understood here, starts first and foremost by enabling a deepening cooperation at European level between 
European and national policy -makers.  
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Table 6.1: Similarities and differences between OMC and FoA 
Issue  OMC FOA Level of likeness 
Type of tool     
Nature Flexible, soft, legally non-binding, adapts to the 
conditions of the topic 
Flexible, soft, legally non-binding, adapts to the 
conditions of the topic 
High 
Aim Convergence of systems, To get political 
commitment from the national level 
To get political commitment from the national 
level 
Similar 
Topics Sensitive, subsidiarity, no rights, national diversity Sensitive, subsidiarity no rights, national diversity  High 
Legitimacy Low because only experts, no EP involvement High, as national and sectoral social partners are 
in charge themselves  
Different 
 
Bottom up/top 
down  
Hybrid form because both dimensions (see 
uploading/downloading) 
Hybrid form because both dimensions (see 
uploading/downloading) 
Similar 
Elements     
Objectives European objectives  Joint approach and 4 priorities Similar 
Indicators & 
Benchmarks 
Quantitative benchmarks & indicators No Different 
Follow-up -European and national meetings 
-Annual national reports 
-Joint European reports 
-Present always a rosy picture as edited by national 
level 
-European and national meetings 
-Annual national reports 
-Joint European section 
-Present always a rosy picture as edited by 
national level 
High 
Time Initially until 2010 but will probably be extended 3 years plus one year of evaluation. Currently on 
hold 
Different 
Good practices Use of peer reviews, study visits and the reports Use of seminars at the beginning and later the 
reports 
Medium 
 
Level and players European, national, regional, interest groups and 
civil society (limited) 
TU and employers, European, national  
sectoral (limited) 
Similar 
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Issue  OMC FOA Level of likeness 
Raison d’être213     
Motivation for 
creation 
No real alternative, legally more binding not 
possible, national level not willing 
No real alternative, Compromise, national level 
not willing 
Similar  
Mandate/ 
Request 
Political mandate from European Council Demand/Pressure from the members and the EU 
governments 
Similar 
Integration/ 
Governance 
    
Form Alternative form of integration New tool of the SD Similar 
Hard vs. soft 
law 
Not replacing hard law forms of governance but as 
efficient or more 
Not replacing hard law forms of governance, but 
as efficient or more 
High 
Vertical vs. 
horizontal 
Widening and deepening of topics Widening and deepening of topics High 
 
Relation to 
other more 
legally binding 
instruments 
-Complementary: Used for different aims 
-The one does not (automatically) precede the 
other but can 
Complementary: Used for different aims and 
different topics 
-The one does not (automatically) precede the 
other and hasn’t so far 
Similar 
Features     
Uploading/ 
downloading 
European Priority topics are chosen by national 
level & inspire the national level 
European Priority topics are chosen by national 
level & inspire the national level 
Similar 
Peer pressure Being used and being felt Being used and being felt High 
Socialisation Happens and is important Happens and is important High 
Learning (see 
impact) 
Yes, different aspects 
Good practices not 100% transferable 
Yes, different aspects 
Good practices not 100% transferable 
High 
Nation interest -Exist but are seen in a European context -Exist but are seen in a European context High 
Language and 
concepts 
-Trying to define concepts at EU 
-New concepts are used at national level 
-Different use at National level 
-Trying to define concepts at EU 
-New concepts are used at national level 
-Different use at National level 
High 
 
Role of the 
Individual 
-Crucial role to report to and from the European 
and national level 
-Position of individual NB for impact 
-Crucial role to report to and from the European 
and national level 
- Position of individual NB for impact 
High 
                                               
213 The OMC and the FoA are the best of all possible instruments “This present world is not the best of all possible worlds. But it may be the best way to the best of all possible 
worlds.” Voltaire's Candide-- 
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Issue  OMC FOA Level of likeness 
Added value     
European 
cooperation in 
E&T 
Increased mobility of workers, Transfer of ideas & 
learning, the economy, supporting reforms, 
Creation of networks, the citizen, Common 
attention, improving quality of policy, more 
awareness of own situation 
Having common concepts & terminology, 
Looking at common priorities, Learning from one 
another, creating awareness, convergence, better 
mutual understanding, improving quality  
 
Similar  
Tool Help MS to modernise the national E&T systems, 
creates political commitment of the MS, it gives a 
voice to policy areas where the EU has no treaty 
powers, forces to state policy priorities, reconciles 
the responsible actors of the E&T system, 
convergence, discussing sensitive issues  
Labour market approach, cross-fertilisation, 
common words and concepts joint commitment, 
more visibility and awareness of SP activities, 
common European approach, draw attention to 
common topics, promote E&T at national level 
Similar 
Impact  Difficulties isolating causes Difficulties isolating causes Similar 
European (see 
success) 
-More topics at EU level 
-Influence of the Commission in E&T has 
increased 
- It gave more credibility to the Commission 
-Agenda-setting for the  
Commission 
- Being an initiator for MS action. 
-It has systemised the follow-up and the cross-
fertilisation between the European and national 
level  
-It gave more credibility to the European 
secretariats.  
-It has helped the European level to set the agenda 
for the national level.  
-More competences for those who work on the 
messages 
-The national members need to be pushed by the 
European level.  
Similar  
National -Impact varies across the MS 
-Willingness to discuss,  
-Supporting reforms 
-Learning happens. From others but also about 
your own system.  
 
-The level of impact varied across the MS 
-Different forms of impact: Content, structure, 
system 
-Learning, but transferability is difficult 
-Different forms of learning: from each other, 
about on self, about the EU level 
Similar 
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Issue  OMC FOA Level of likeness 
Evaluation  Generally successful Generally successful High 
Success at EU 
level 
Changing the Commission’s attitude to E&T and 
seeing that it is an integral part of the 
competitiveness agenda, improving the 
relationship between the Commissioner for E&T 
and the national ministers for E&T, everyone 
wants to continue with this method.  
Commission agenda influenced, shown SP can 
live up to their responsibility, improved European 
Social Dialogue 
(see impact) 
Similar 
National level 
success 
Creating reform pressure, enhancing the capacity 
of MS to learn from each other by providing 
structures and methods, making the policy making 
more realistic, improving the cooperation between 
E&T ministers significantly, discussing the topics 
at national level, everyone wants to continue with 
this method. 
Cooperation, increased role for E&T, Learning, 
Reforms, Up and downloading 
Similar 
 
 
Failures Dissemination 
Reaching quantitative targets 
Dissemination 
Improving quantitative situation 
High 
Source: Author
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Raison d’être 
Both processes have similar reasons for being used, namely the absenc e of a real alternative 
for using another instrument. In both cases the actors faced the challenge of having to do 
‘something more’ in this area without infringing on national competences and while 
respecting the subsidiarity principle. Thus the involved a ctors examined what they wanted 
and compared this with what was possible in this policy area. Both the OMC in E&T and 
the FoA on LLL are compromises between the different expectations and needs of the 
participating actors. In both processes there are actor s trying to enhance as well as limit the 
involvement of the European level in policy -making in education and training, in the one 
case study this division is between the European and national level, between the 
Commission and Member States, but in the othe r case study, this division is not between 
levels but between types of actors, namely the trade unions and the employers. Falkner 
(2000) identifies employers as favouring flexible and voluntary instruments and the trade 
unions preferring binding law. This represents a parallel to the preference of the majority of 
MS for flexible and voluntary instruments and the Commission with some MS preferring 
the Community Method. The remarkable finding is that the OMC and the FoA satisfied 
both groups, giving them the belief that this form of governance would fulfil their aim of 
reducing and enhancing European integration respectively. This is typical for EU politics, 
where the various players read different (sometimes contradictory) meanings into common 
agreements. 
 
In order to propose a governance change in E&T, the context of the Lisbon strategy, which 
considers education and training as crucial to the success of the European economy, was 
significant for both instruments’ development. While the Lisbon summit gave a po litical 
mandate for further cooperation in E&T for the European Union, it also created an 
opportune environment for the European social partners to deepen their activities in this 
area, as they have a specific responsibility concerning labour market issues . The importance 
of the Lisbon strategy for both processes can not only be seen in the timing of their 
creations, as both were finalised in 2002 just after the conception of the Lisbon strategy, but 
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also of the language used by both. While the OMC in E&T i s placed in the context of 
becoming the most knowledgeable economy by 2010, the focus of the FoA was to “make 
an effective and specific contribution to the realisation of lifelong learning in the context of 
the strategic objectives established at the Europ ean Councils of Lisbon and Feira on 
employment, social cohesion and competitiveness” (ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME, and CEEP 
2002: 2) 
 
This form of governance is particularly suitable for a policy area such as E&T, with a huge 
diversity of systems and specificities at national level. Kaiser and Prange (2002) outline 
that OMC-like tools are normally used in policy areas with the following characteristics:  
· A high degree of decision -making powers and a significant amount of financial 
resources at different territorial l evels (especially in federal Member States);  
· Considerable differences in the structures of the Member States’ societal subsystems 
(such as the research or education systems);  
· Considerable differences in the performance of these subsystems across Member S tates.  
 
All of these can be found in the E&T area, making it a perfect policy area for using OMC -
like governance, as the tools needed to be flexible and adaptable.  
 
 
Characteristics and functioning  
The OMC and the FoA are flexible, soft and legally non -binding tools, which are able to 
adapt to the conditions of the policy area and to the specificities of the national level. In 
both cases the European level has no possibility of sanctioning the national level if they do 
not work on the issue. Therefore, th e two instruments are not threatening, but rather aspire 
to create commitment from the actors at national level by using voluntary initiatives. 
Consequently, the OMC and the FoA are not tools to be used if one wants to create 
individual rights. The aim is to achieve convergence of the systems without harmonisation. 
The focus lies on sending impulses for change to the national level, trying to cause action, 
lead and support reforms, which then feedback to the European level. This form of 
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governance entails a  bottom-up as well as a top -down approach, where the various levels 
have a say and they mutually influence each other.  
 
The FoA on LLL and the OMC in E&T are not identical in their functioning, but have 
many elements in common, some of them being: joint E uropean objectives, use of good 
practices, peer review and reporting exercise, regular committee meetings at European and 
national level and the involvement of actors at multiple levels (European, national, regional 
and/or sectoral). Both tools are based o n European objectives but then leave it up to the 
national level to specify the priorities. In both cases national good practices provide the 
basis for setting objectives and recommendations, while encouraging new activities and 
initiatives. The OMC and th e FoA involve actors from various levels, which is also 
reflected in their similar follow -up mechanisms with the European level being in charge of 
monitoring, gathering and presenting the information while the national level is responsible 
for the implemen tation and reporting on this. A slight difference is that in the case of the 
FoA there are two equal partners responsible for (joint) actions and the reporting exercise at 
national level, while in the OMC this is in general only the national government. Ho wever, 
this monopoly is in many cases limited by the inclusion of other stakeholders in the 
process, such as the social partners, and the sharing of competences with regional 
authorities, in particular in federal or quasi -federal Member States.  
 
The FoA on LLL and the OMC in E&T also have the same level of potential peer pressure, 
as the national reports are made publicly available afterwards. One difference is that while 
the FoA does not apply indicators and benchmarks (neither European nor national), the  
OMC does have European benchmarks and indicators. A further difference between the 
two processes is the time duration of this reporting, as the FoA foresaw three annual reports 
and one evaluation afterwards (until 2006), while the OMC process expects repo rts on a 
biannual basis until 2010.  
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Socialisation 
Both case studies reported a strong socialisation process between the participants, leading 
to the creation of trust. While agreeing that socialisation is (often) part of long -term 
participation in any group, the socialisation process is particularly important for OMC -like 
tools. In policy areas where other forms of governance (based more on hard law) are 
applied, this trust might not be as important as in this case. First of all, the OMC and the 
FoA are used in a policy area which is very sensitive for the national level, without a long 
history of strong policy -cooperation. In E&T there prevails a certain level of scepticism 
about the E&T systems in other countries and sometimes a superior feeling about on e’s 
own system. Also for the social partners at national level, good cooperation in questions of 
E&T is not always given. Therefore it is crucial to build up trust between the actors, among 
and across the different levels. Socialisation prepares them to lo ok beyond their own world 
and leave behind the attitude that their own system is the best. Secondly, socialisation is 
particularly important in the OMC and the FoA, as they are based on voluntary action. The 
national level cannot be forced to do something if it is not willing. However, if the national 
representatives have been socialised they may look at the greater good rather than at 
national interests and sell it back home. So socialisation plays a role in deciding when 
national interests are considered really significant, and when to be constructive rather than 
obstructive. Consequently, socialisation is very important as the individual representative 
plays a significant role, since he or she is the gatekeeper between the European and national 
(or regional) level. The participants need to be open and willing to cooperate. If individual 
actors are not convinced of the process, they will not transmit the experience and 
knowledge to the national level, and no real policy learning can take place.  
 
 
Impact at national level 
In both cases a significant impact at national level could be observed, resulting from the use 
of the FoA and the OMC respectively. However, it is also true that sometimes initiatives 
that might have happened without the existence of the Fo A and the OMC are attributed to 
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them. The results showed that using the FoA and OMC influenced mainly the content on 
the national agenda, but also changes in the policy context and policy objectives. The 
impact at national level can to a great extent be at tributed to policy learning, either by 
learning from others or learning about oneself.  Furthermore, both case studies showed that 
the impact at national level varied across the Member States. This depended, amongst other 
things, on how developed the nation al E&T policy was, the willingness of the national level 
to learn, the extent to which certain topics have been discussed at national level before and 
on how seriously the national level takes the European objectives. Also, there is in both 
cases an important dissemination function for the individuals who are the link between the 
national and the European level. The fact that there were different results confirms the 
choice of the instruments because the OMC and FoA were not supposed to be applied in a 
harmonised way, but rather adapted to the specific needs of the individual Member State.  
 
 
Impact at European level  
Also in regard to the European level there are numerous similarities between the OMC and 
the FoA in the E&T policy field. First and foremost it led to further integration in a policy 
area with previously only limited policy -making at EU level. In both cases no competences 
were transferred from the national to the European level. However, at the same time the 
European level gained influence in this  policy area, in particular leading to a stronger 
agenda-setting role for the Commission and the European social partners. Furthermore, 
soft-law tools facilitated the expansion of topics being dealt with at European level. It also 
resulted in more credibil ity for the Commission, and the European social partners 
secretariats respectively. This manifested itself for example in a clearly improved 
relationship between the Commissioner for E&T and the national ministers for E&T, and 
has shown that the SP can live up to their responsibility. The voluntary nature of the 
process demanded a good relationship between the European and national levels, which 
was achieved amongst other things, by the former proving to the latter that they were able 
to provide an added va lue for them. Another interesting similarity is the insight that soft 
tools (the OMC and the FoA) have different roles and possibilities than more binding tools 
(CM and framework agreements), but these can complement each other. In any case, 
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neither the OMC, nor the FoA, seem (currently) to be a first step towards introducing more 
binding tools in this policy area.  
  
 
Summary of the comparison between the OMC and the FoA  
In general, the OMC and the FoA are very similar instruments. When comparing the OMC 
in E&T and the FoA on LLL, one could identify a very similar rationale for their use. 
While there are some differences between the functioning of the OMC and the FoA, there 
are sufficient similarities to make them comparable forms of governance. This resemb lance 
can also be seen at an affective level, where in both cases socialisation plays an important 
role in the functioning of this type of policy -making. Furthermore, concerning the impact at 
national level, the results of these two instruments are very al ike, including the variation at 
national level and the shortcomings. This analysis has show that OMC -like tools have 
spilled over from the use by the EU institutions, to the application by non -state actors in the 
EU political system.  
 
The results of this comparison will now provide the starting point for the discussion on 
whether or not/ and how the use of OMC -like tools seems to be a better form of governance 
in this policy area, before section three examines the different accounts that the various 
theoretical approaches provide in respect to the independent variables.   
 
 
2. OMC-like tools as a form of governance 
Chapter one outlined the literature on the OMC and referred to the promises associated with 
this form of governance. Some of these promises will now be revisited in relation to the 
OMC in E&T and the FoA on LLL. The focus of this section lies on the question whether 
or not OMC-like tools in education and training policy deliver as a form of governance and 
if they present a valuable alternative or c omplementary mode of policy -making.  In 
particular its novelty as a governance form, its interaction with other forms of governance 
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and its contribution to (more) legitimate and (more) efficient policy -making, will be 
examined. 
 
 
A new form of policy -making 
The case studies and the previous section showed that the OMC in E&T and the FoA are 
new modes of governance. Their non -binding and flexible nature makes discussions on 
more sensitive topics possible in the first place. This form of policy -making enabled the 
enhancement of European cooperation in E&T without transferring any competences to the 
European level, thereby respecting the subsidiarity principle. Additionally, it left the MS 
principally in charge, while also finding a role for (some of) the Europ ean institutions. This 
confirms that the OMC in E&T is a third way between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism, as outlined by various academics for the OMC in general (Ashiagbor 
2004; Dehousse 2002; Zeitlin 2005). 214 A third way between two extremes i s always a 
compromise. As seen in the last section the OMC in E&T and the FoA are compromises 
between the Member States and the Commission, and between the different social partners 
respectively. It represents a compromise between the need for respecting d iversity and the 
need for unity of EU action (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; Dehousse 2002; Schäfer 2006).  
The compromise was not only about how policy-making should take place but also about 
what the objective of the use of this form of governance was, in par ticularly concerning the 
speed and type of further integration. One of the reasons for the various actors to agree with 
this form of governance is the level of flexibility that comes with the OMC and FoA. 
Flexibility is needed in particular in a policy are a with such diverse systems at national 
level. The OMC in E&T and also the FoA provide this flexibility, but stay within the 
framework of the joint objectives agreed on at European level.  As illustrated in the case 
studies, the use of this type of policy -making enabled progress in European cooperation in 
E&T, as the discussion was depoliticised and the national level felt at ease to discuss these 
topics at European level, as they did not fear the loss of competence.  
 
                                                   
214 This view of the OMC has also been expressed by the British and Swedish gov ernments, traditional 
eurosceptic countries (see Jacobsson and Vifell 2003).  
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Concerning the benchmarking element, it  was shown previously that the FoA does not use 
indicators and benchmarks while the OMC in E&T applies European benchmarks. As 
outlined earlier, some MS use the European benchmarks as national ones, but that is purely 
their decision and not really part of the OMC in E&T. However, as the European 
benchmarks are decided on at the highest political level, they carry a lot of political weight 
and can lead to public pressure at national level. While the joint reports from the Council 
and the Commission are toned  down, as no negative country examples are used, the 
Commission working documents do name the countries performing above and below EU 
average. While this document gets less public attention than the other, it still sends 
messages to the national level and leads to peer pressure for the MS. Consequently, MS are 
very careful about what kind of benchmarks they agree on. Up until now benchmarking 
seems to function, as the European average in all five benchmarks are improving although 
some will probably not be achieved by 2010 (European Commission 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008).215  In this context it is worth briefly looking at the comparison between the 
functioning of the OMC and the OECD type of governance. Putting the OMC at the same 
level with the benchmarking techniques of international organisations such as the OECD or 
the International Monetary Fund is flawed, as already argued in chapter one. The case 
studies have shown that the OMC in E&T, as well as the FoA on LLL, are much more than 
a purely benchmarking exercise à la OECD, because they lead to the creation of political 
commitment and impact at national level. On the other hand, the OECD method is superior 
when trying to identify weaknesses of the national systems, because the data is produced by 
the OECD itself and not by the Member States, as is mainly the case in the OMC, where 
European analysis is nearly exclusively based on the national reports and therefore real peer 
review is limited. However, while acknowledging their differences, one can still bene fit 
from comparing these tools.  
 
As outlined in chapter one, some of the literature on the OMC discusses the superiority of 
soft-law over hard-law and vice versa. The results of the case studies clearly showed that 
every type of law has its purposes. In th e case of education and training there is no aim to 
                                                   
215 While this author acknowledged already earlier that national and international factors influence the results 
as well, one can agree that the OMC at least contributed to the impr ovement of the European average as they 
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granting or restricting rights (which hard law would do) and therefore legally non -binding 
tools like the OMC and the FoA are more appropriate. Furthermore, there exists no treaty 
base to use legally bind ing tools. Some discussion has been on the question whether or not 
the OMC is only a transitional mode of governance or a real alternative able to substitute 
the CM. In the E&T policy field different forms of governance are being applied at the 
same time. The Community Method is also used in E&T, but without legally binding force, 
supporting the OMC. One is not better than the other as the two tools are complementary, 
being used for different situations with different objectives. The OMC creates the technic al 
specificities and gets the political support, while the CM then sends a stronger political 
message than if just the OMC were used. Therefore the CM and OMC should not be 
discussed as alternatives or superior to one another because using them together ha s proven 
very successful in this policy area. The same applies for the ESD, where FoAs and more 
binding instruments are used side by side, the former not replacing the latter. While the 
OMC in E&T and the FoA have led to promising results in enhancing coop eration in E&T 
at EU level, there is no danger that they might fall victim of their own success as feared by 
Hodson and Maher (2001). One of the main reasons for its success was that it is non -
binding and any attempt to change this would jeopardise the ach ievements to date.216  
 
 
(More) legitimate policy -making  
The literature review on the OMC has shown that one reason why the OMC is often 
supposed to be a better form of governance is its claim to enhance the legitimacy of the EU. 
But does this apply to the field of E&T? As outlined earlier, one way in which the OMC is 
expected to enhance the democratic dimension is that decisions would be more adapted to 
the local level and could thus appear more democratic and legitimate than rules imposed 
from Brussels (Trubek 2003). This would represent a decentralised and bottom -up approach 
rather that the traditional centralised and top -down approach. The empirical evidence 
concerning this question suggests that both bottom -up and top-down elements are part of 
the OMC in E&T and the FoA on LLL. Part of the functioning of this tool is that the 
                                                                                                                                                          
create additional incentives for the national level to work on these topics.  
216 The future of the OMC in E&T will be further discussed in the conclusion chapter.  
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European level sets joint objectives and sends messages to the national level but the 
national actors are also involved in formulating European policies at European level. The 
argument that OMC is generally less top -down is based more on the fact that there is no 
treaty base giving the European level this possibility and therefore makes the supranational 
actors step carefully. 
 
Another aspect to examine when evaluating the OMC’s legit imacy discourse is the 
participation of the various actors in the OMC processes. The OMC is supposed to enhance 
democratic participation and accountability through being ‘open’ and allowing participation 
of employers, trade unions and NGO at various levels  in the process. The case studies 
showed that actors’ participation is rather low with the OMC in E&T and that it is an elite 
driven process, including a core group of Commission employees, experts and national 
representatives. Some MS (mainly those with a  federal or quasi -federal structure) integrate 
their regions into this exercise, in particular as E&T policy lies in many MS within the 
responsibility of the regional authorities. Concerning the involvement of social partners, the 
results are very diverse.  In some countries there is a strong involvement in the OMC 
aspects at national level, while in others, the social partners are not integrated at all. 
Additionally, there is sometimes no real desire of the social partners (at least the European 
social partners) for getting further involved in the OMC process, as they have their own 
(stronger) ways of working and prefer to keep their autonomy.  
 
Consequently, these results also help answer the question ‘what does the open actually 
stand for’. In respect of t he three issues that are related in the OMC literature to the concept 
of ‘open’: openness of the content, openness of the results and openness of the 
participation, in the E&T field it is clearly openness of the content and the results, and less 
openness of participation, at both European level and at national level (Hingel 2007). 
Therefore one would have to agree more with Smismans (2004) who argues that the ‘open’ 
nature of the OMC is merely being open ended in its outcomes, instead of Laffan and Shaw 
(2006: 18), who see the OMC as “a truly ‘open’ method in sum.”  
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Regarding the aspect of accountability, there is a slight difference between the OMC and 
the FoA. While the democratic oversight of the European social partners, namely the 
national affiliates, i s an integral part at European and national level, the institution 
representing the European demos, the European Parliament, is barely involved in the OMC 
process, being only informed about the activities. This represents even less legitimacy than 
the Community Method. However, as the OMC and the Community Method co -exist in the 
field of E&T, this is not as bad as sometimes presented, but still far away from reaching 
democratic accountability. Furthermore, the OMC did not contribute very much to the 
transparency of policy-making in E&T. The multiplicity of committees, clusters and expert 
groups makes it difficult for the general public to follow discussions and decision -making 
which does also not help to make the process more transparent. Purely publishing t he 
national as well as the European reports on the European website does not improve the 
situation much either.  
  
 
(More) effective policy -making 
Another point in which the OMC -type of governance is supposed to be better than 
traditional forms of governanc e is in respect of its effectiveness. Particularly through policy 
learning the OMC is supposed to inform national policy changes. Section one has 
summarised and compared the impact resulting from the use of the OMC and the FoA, and 
reported that OMC-like tools could cause different types of change. According to Zeitlin 
(2005: 4) four different indicators can help to categorise this change: substantive policy 
change (including broad shifts in policy thinking), procedural shifts in governance and 
policymaking (including administrative reorganisation and institutional capacity building), 
participation and transparency, and mutual learning.  
 
It has been outlined earlier how the European average in regards to the European 
benchmarks has steadily improved. Identif ying change at national level is a more 
complicated matter. This research did not have the possibility to examine extensively 
national reforms and cross -check them with the OMC and therefore cannot claim to be 
exhaustive. However, certain changes could be identified without an in -depth analysis and 
  
261
can be taken as indications. The recommendation on key competences , which led to 
changes of the curricula in various Member States, as well as the consequences of the EQF 
at national level, are examples that prov e that the OMC can lead to substantial policy 
changes. The same applies for the FoA on LLL, where the novel notion of shared 
responsibility between employers, workers and public authorities, for the further training of 
a worker, represents a significant ch ange to previous ways of approaching this topic. The 
OMC and FoA also led clearly to procedural shifts. On the one hand this applies to dealing 
with the European level, where resources had to be dedicated to the follow -up activities 
(such as the reporting exercise and committee participation) but on the other hand to the 
creation of purely national focuses, structures and procedures concerning the dealings 
between the social partners and the public authorities or between the employers 
organisations and the trade unions.  As seen above, change concerning participation and 
transparency was more limited and diverse across the MS.  
  
One of the main aims of OMC -type governance is to promote mutual learning through the 
exchange of good practices. Some academics b elieve that the OMC not only facilitates 
learning but also helps to incorporate new knowledge (Trubek 2003). The case studies have 
shown that policy learning is one of the most prominent elements of OMC -like tools. The 
case of the E&T policy supports the a rgument used by Szysczak (2006), where policy 
learning is seen as taking place at two levels, namely by first creating a common discourse 
with a common language, which leads to identifying common problems and the diffusion 
of shared beliefs and second, lea ding possibly to policy convergence and policy transfer, by 
defining good and bad policies. Nevertheless, while various forms of policy learning have 
been reported, there are no guaranteed results. There are a number of variables which can 
limit or even prevent policy learning, including the challenge of transferability and the 
crucial role of the individual as an intermediary between the European and national level. 
While the diversity between the national systems is particularly prominent in the E&T 
policy area, the case studies confirm the claim of Kroeger (2006) that policy learning 
depends less on the institutional fit but more on the political will (or the lack of it). While 
OMC-like tools have led to various forms of policy changes, it is also importa nt to 
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acknowledge that some changes have been wrongly attributed to them, as they were 
actually caused by national or international events.  
 
Section one outlined that in both case studies uploading and downloading of policies has 
taken place between the E uropean and the national level. Therefore Zeitlin (2005) is right 
when he argues that the relationship between the OMC process and the Member State 
policies should be analysed as a two -way interaction rather than a one -way causal impact. 
This two-way interaction leads to a cross -fertilisation that makes European policy, 
developed under the OMC -like tools, more relevant to the national level and provides 
therefore also better results . 
 
Summary of OMC-like tools as a form of governance  
This section outlined t hat the OMC in E&T is clearly a new form of governance, 
representing a third way of policy -making between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism. It can clearly help to achieve depoliticalisation in a sensitive policy 
area. When examining whether OMC -type instruments can make European governance in 
E&T a more legitimate and efficient form of policy -making, the results affirm and at the 
same time contradict these claims. While there is evidence that the OMC and the FoA led 
to substantial changes at nation al level, improving the added value of European policies for 
the national level, many of the claims that the OMC would improve legitimacy could not be 
confirmed. 
 
 
3. Placing OMC-like tools in the framework of European 
integration theory  
After comparing and contrasting the results from the case studies and looking at the 
governance dimension, this section will now analyse how the different European 
integration theories presented in chapter two, can help to explain the existence and the 
functioning of OMC -like governance. It will also be examined how the experience with the 
OMC in E&T and the FoA on LLL fit with the general assumptions of these theories.  
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Table 6.2: How European integration theories (would) explain the OMC  
Source: Author  
Variable Theories 
New Institutionalism  Neofunctionalism (Liberal-) 
intergovernmentalism Rational Historical Sociological 
Social- 
constructivism 
MLG and PN 
Genesis Functional 
interdependence, 
Spillover and 
interest groups and 
institutions 
History making events; 
choice of MS in creating 
institutions or delegate 
responsibility in order to 
strengthen the MS at 
national level 
MS 
attempting to 
avoid agency 
loss 
Path dependency 
or Commission as 
policy 
entrepreneur; 
Solution to joint 
decision trap 
  A dominant advocacy coalition 
Functioning Supranational 
actors coordinate 
the networks of 
policy experts and 
have oversight 
Pre-dominance of 
national governments 
+2 level game 
Role of 
institutions 
Role of 
institutions 
Role of institutions Bargaining 
depends on 
communication 
and 
intersubjectivity 
European Governance proceeds 
through negotiations in policy 
networks linking public and 
private actors of different 
levels and dimensions of 
government 
Socialisation Political spillover, 
change of interest 
and loyalties 
engrenage 
Has only limited 
importance; national 
identities remain intact 
Has only 
limited 
importance 
 Participation in the 
EU leads to 
transformation of 
identities while 
keeping national 
loyalties; 
institution needed 
Participation in 
the EU leads to 
transformation 
of ideas and 
identities  
Change of identities can 
happen true persuasion and 
argumentation 
National impact  Stronger role for 
domestic actors; 
direct access to EU 
level 
Limited; only in relation 
to more power for 
governments 
Redistributio
n of power 
between 
actors at nat. 
level 
Policy 
downloading 
Policy learning Policy learning EU policy outcomes are 
determined by how integrated 
and exclusive policy-specific 
networks are  
European 
integration 
Ever more power 
to supranational 
level 
Limitation of power at 
supranational level 
A lesser 
degree of 
agency loss 
Path dependency 
or policy 
entrepreneur 
Normative 
integration led by 
the Commission 
Normative 
integration 
EU policy outcomes are 
determined by how integrated 
and exclusive policy-specific 
networks are 
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As this study aims at examining how the theoretical approaches explain the creation and 
functioning of OMC -like tools as well as the change they create within the EU system, one 
has to bear in mind that this change affects the European as well as the national level.  Of 
the five issues used to compare and contrast the FoA and the OMC (genesis, functioning, 
socialisation, impact and integration) and serving as independent variables for examining 
how European integration theories explain all of these aspects of the OMC,  three look at 
change: one at the ideational change, one at the domestic change and one at the European 
change. In respect to change the concept of Europeanisation is promising. Depending on 
how one defines Europeanisation, this can be applied to domestic change, European change 
or both. Chapter two has outlined the different understandings within the Europeanisation 
literature. From the five understandings of Europeanisation described by Olsen (2002; 
2003) European integration is only one. Another aspect t hat is dealt with is the impact on 
the domestic level. So Europeanisation is a two -way process where European integration 
shapes the different aspects of the domestic political arena while Member States at the same 
time try to influence the development of integration in the best way for their national 
interest (Bomberg and Peterson 2000). In order not to use the Europeanisation concept in 
different fashions, the concept European integration is used when referring to the creation 
of institutions at the Europ ean level and their interaction. 217 Schmidt (2002: 896) captures 
the relation between the two concepts of European integration and Europeanisation 218 best, 
when seeing them as the two aspects of an intertwined phenomenon, with European 
integration causing Euro peanisation, and Europeanisation affecting, through a feedback 
loop, European integration.  
 
Radaelli (2000: 4) summarises the various aspects of the concept and the relationship 
between them. For him “Europeanisation consists of processes of a) constructi on, b) 
diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
                                                   
217 See chapter three.  
218 The understanding used in this a nalysis. 
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defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic (national and sub -national) discourse, political structures and public policies.” 
While one aspect of Europeanisation, which is meant by ‘impact’, will refer to the effect 
the evolving European system of governance has on the politica l institutions, policies and 
political processes of the Member States (Börzel 2003), another dimension of 
Europeanisation concerns the effect on identities and the cognitive component of politics, 
which will be examined more in detail when looking at socia lisation.  
 
Chapter one outlined the division in the literature on how to interpret the OMC. This 
division on the judgement and explanation of the use of OMC -like governance identified by 
Gore (2004) can be (more or less) associated with different European  integration theories:  
· Instead of a vehicle for change, it is seen as a ‘justification discourse’ for existing 
policies and for new initiatives which would have happened anyway (this view can be 
associated with LI or realist schools)  
· A flexible mechanism to limit divergence among Member States, being a new 
supranational form of governance in its own right (related to the governance literature 
in European integration)  
· OMC as a tool to promote convergence between Member States in the long run, 
ultimately leading to the transfer of competences for social matters from national to 
European levels, and returning to classical policy -making approaches (i.e. Community 
Method). (This can be associated with a neofunctionalist view on European 
integration.) 
 
These descriptions show that the various theories not only evaluate the OMC differently, 
but they also concentrate on different aspects of the OMC. The theoretical approaches that 
will be examined now are neofunctionalism, liberal -intergovernmentalism, social 
constructivism, multi-level governance and policy networks, new institutionalism and 
Europeanisation.219 As outlined in chapter two, these theoretical approaches differ from 
each other in their scope, assumptions and in their independent and dependent variables 
                                                   
219 These are the same theoretical approaches as presented in chapter two. They have been chosen because 
they represent the most commonly used theoretical approaches in regards to the EU, covering different 
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(see 2.1). As they ask different questions and look at different aspects, some of them are 
therefore more likely to explain certain variables better than others. As ‘the great debate of 
our times’ in EIT is between constructivism and rationalism (Pollack 200 1; 2009), special 
attention will be paid (where appropriate) to the existence of different but (potentially) 
complementary rationalist and constructivist arguments, when examining the varying 
explanations of the European integration theories for the indivi dual aspects of the OMC -
like tools.  
  
 
The creation of OMC -like tools  
As outlined in the chapter on European integration theory, the causes for European 
integration are mainly analysed by theories with an IR background, while theories 
originating more in  the field of CP, focus on other aspects. As Wendler (2004) argues, 
classical integration theories focus on the causes of institutional evolution and the literature 
associated with the governance approach to European integration concentrates on the effect 
of this institutional change. This is also reflected in the limited number of academics 
looking at this aspect of the OMC, with the majority looking at the functioning and the 
impact of the OMC. Drawn from the general theoretical assumptions, the following  could 
be explanations for the creation of OMC -like tools in E&T (see table 6.2):  
· Functional interdependence (spillover), interest groups and institutions 
(neofunctionalism);   
· Choice by MS in order to optimise their power through history -making events (liberal-
intergovernmentalism);  
· Attempting to avoid agency loss (rational choice institutionalism);  
· Path dependency and Commission as policy entrepreneur (historical institutionalism);  
· A dominant advocacy coalition (MLG and PN).  
 
Zeitlin (2003) sees the expansion of OMC into EU social protection policies as a case of 
spillover from economic and employment coordination. This argument could also be made 
                                                                                                                                                          
aspects of the EU and representing theoret ical approaches from the different phases with different 
independent variables.  
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for OMC-like tools in E&T. The internationalisation of the economy and a spillover effect 
from economic issues to E&T policy can be identified, which would support the main 
neofunctionalist explanation. However, this spillover effect was not automatic but rather 
needed the political support and the willingness of the Member States i.e. through the 
Lisbon strategy. Furthermore, one can identify spillover from EU institutions using OMC -
like tools to non -governmental actors also using these forms of governance. 220  
 
As pointed out earlier, the Member States blocked development in E&T policy at EU level 
mainly because they feared a loss of power. Only when they changed their minds and 
voluntarily participated in this process, further cooperation was possible. How can one 
explain this change of view? Rational choice theorists would see the OMC in functionalist 
terms, an instrument designed to serve the rational self -interest of its creators (Idema and 
Kelemen 2006). In the case of intergovernmentalist assumptions, MS only agree to 
cooperate at EU level if it serves their interest and gives them more control over the 
domestic sphere. Based on rational choice assumptions, Schäfer (2004) argues that 
governments are willing to adopt soft law because it increases their strategic room for 
maneuver in two-level games. Furthermore, one could argue that it helps the national 
governments to shift blame at national level to the EU for unpopular decisions while at the 
same time minimising sovereignty loss (Wendler 2004; Souto -Otero, Fleckstein et al. 
2008). The part of this chapter focusing on impact will examine whether the OMC really 
does lead to more power for governments at national level and if are they are able to blame 
the EU for unpopular policy measures.  
 
Van Riel and Marc (2002) argue that neither intergovernmental nor neofunctionalist 
assumptions can explain the development o f the European employment policy, but they 
have the idea that an advocacy coalition of social democratic EU presidencies at that time 
led to its development. Can this be confirmed for the E&T area? Some of the interviews 
stressed the importance of the pres idencies at this time, while others indicated the role of 
the Commission. It is true that the presidency conclusions promoted the development of the 
OMC in E&T, but the Commission did the majority of the preparatory work for these 
                                                   
220 This point will be further discussed in the conclusion chapter.  
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conclusions. Additionally , the fact that social democratic presidencies were at the helm of 
the EU was less important for E&T policy than it might have been for employment and 
social policy. 
 
Trubek, Cottrell and Nance (2005) provide additional rationalist arguments 221 for the use o f 
soft law, including: 
· Lower “contracting” costs : non-binding norms lower the stakes for the parties 
involved;  
· Lower sovereignty costs: Soft law is better equipped to promote cooperation while 
preserving sovereignty;  
· Coping with diversity:  Different cultu ral and economic structures and interests can be 
accommodated through the subjective application of “soft” language such as 
“appropriate measures,” “best efforts,” “as far as possible,” or “with a view toward 
achieving progressively”;  
· Participation:  In principle, soft law permits the integration of all interested parties in 
the process of transnational law -making;  
· Incrementalism:  Soft law can also represent a first step on the path to legally binding 
agreements or hard law.  
 
In the case of E&T at least th e first three arguments can partially explain the creation of the 
OMC and the FoA, as it is a policy area which is very diverse and sensitive to the national 
level, which wants to remain in charge. So far the latter two arguments have not (yet) 
proven to be correct. 
 
Various academics use different forms of new institutionalism in order to explain the 
creation of the OMC. Some of them apply historical institutionalism assumptions in doing 
so (Ashiagbor 2004; Schäfer 2004; Wendler 2004). From this perspectiv e the deliberate 
choice depends on existing institutional configurations and the importance of purposeful 
choice will change as the degree of institutionalisation at the European level changes 
(Olsen 2002). The existing treaty basis clearly posed such a li mitation when deciding on the 
                                                   
221 The constructivist arguments will be dealt with in the part on socialisation.  
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development of E&T policy and the use of the OMC. Ashiagbor (2004) sees the OMC as a 
response to the joint decision trap  or the competency gap  and Schäfer (2004) argues that 
the OMC was chosen, based on the MS past experience,  in order to avoid agency loss. He 
promotes the argument that the OMC was selected to limit integration and Europeanisation. 
Lodge (2007) also explains the creation of the OMC at Lisbon with the argument that some 
MS (Spain, UK) wanted to move outside of t he CM and reduce the role of the Commission 
as an agenda-setter and eliminate any influence from the EP. Some feedback in the 
interviews suggested that the EU has currently reached a limit in the integration willingness 
of the MS, and a further sovereignty  transfer in additional areas is not conceivable at 
present. Kroeger (2006) believes that the OMC should promote policy learning in a 
politically highly sensitive policy area where further integration was and remains 
undesirable for reasons of institutiona l diversity and political and ideological disagreement. 
This comment regarding the social policy field, also applies to the E&T policy area. The 
national (and regional) education and training systems are sometimes extremely diverse, 
and MS (and regions) do  not want to lose any sovereignty in this policy area. Kroeger 
(2006) points out that the German Laender were very critical of the OMC in social 
inclusion, as they have significant powers in social policy in Germany. The same was 
outlined for the E&T OMC i n the case studies. The use of the OMC, as a type of soft law, 
enables European cooperation in E&T without fear of sovereignty loss by the MS (and 
regions). The same applied to the ESD, where national social partners agreed on 
cooperating at EU level becau se their autonomy was not threatened.  
 
The creation of the OMC in E&T can therefore be seen as an attempt to slow down 
European integration. However, it is also correct that a group of MS and the Commission 
wanted more European level involvement, leading possibly to a competence transfer. The 
MS prevented this for decades, and could have just continued blocking the deepening of 
European E&T policy. As there were obvious limitations based on earlier treaty 
foundations and no threat/possibility 222 of applying a legally binding CM in E&T, another 
way had to be found to advance integration, while circumventing these obstacles. Here the 
role of the European Commission as policy entrepreneur (Pollack 1997; Cram 2001), which 
                                                   
222 Depending on the point of vi ew. 
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was also outlined in the interviews, is u seful and confirms neofunctionalist and 
institutionalist beliefs of the significance of supranational actors. The ESP can also be seen 
in the role of a policy entrepreneur, as they directed the FoA process, despite the fact that 
the ultimate decision power  lay in the hands of the national members.  
 
The results from the case studies showed that the OMC and the FoA were created by an 
incremental process rather than by a history -making event (nevertheless, there were of 
course significant moments, which decide d on the direction the process was going, such as 
the Lisbon summit). Consequently, their use can also be seen as a promotion of further 
integration in an area where integration has not been really advancing so far. The OMC -like 
tools in E&T therefore serv e two different and opposing interests: Further integration and 
keeping things intergovernmental. Consequently the OMC is able to serve diverse interests 
with respect to speed and nature of European integration (Gornitzka 2005). Based on the 
findings one can conclude that in respect to the creation of OMC -like tools in E&T, the 
same applies here as has been argued for the OMC in employment, namely that its roots are 
in a complex mixture of intergovernmental forces, supranational factors and spillover 
effects (Goetschy 2001).  
 
 
The functioning of OMC -like tools  
Chapter one, four and five have presented how OMC -like tools function. This part now 
looks at how the different theoretical approaches would expect their functioning to be. 
Drawn from the general theoretical assumptions, the following could be explanations for 
the functioning of the OMC in E&T (see table 6.2):  
· Pre-dominance of supranational actors (neofunctionalism);  
· Pre-dominance of national governments and two level game (liberal -
intergovernmentali sm); 
· Significant role for the Commission (new institutionalism);  
· Existence of policy networks with public and private actors from various levels and the 
use of advocacy coalitions (MLG and PN).  
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The decision-makers in the OMC are clearly the national gover nments. At the same time 
the OMC is a clear case against the assumption of a strong role of supranational actors in 
policy-making. The EP and the ECJ have close to no part and the Commission has only 
very limited formal competences. While the distribution of power between the actors seem 
to confirm some of the intergovernmentalist claims, Member States appear to be in control 
of this process, with the Council taking the political decisions and the ultimate competences 
lying at national level. However, the l ack of serious bargaining refutes intergovernmentalist 
explanations. Also the notion of a two level game, with the national government as a 
gatekeeper is not convincing. First of all, in various cases regional representatives 
participate in the discussions  at European level. Secondly, national social partners 
participate also in European policy -making independently of their national governments. 
This happens sometimes directly (e.g. in the ACVT), other times indirectly through their 
European umbrella organi sation. What Jacobsson and Vifell (2003: 6) see in the EES, 
namely “a promising example of multilevel governance” , can also be said for the OMC -like 
instruments in E&T. They are right when arguing that “it is not a matter of either 
supranational or intergovernmental policy-making but precisely an interplay between 
different levels of governance ” (italic in original). Furthermore, while the formal power of 
the Commission is limited, it has significant informal powers, which often stem from the 
day-to-day policy-making situations. Supranational actors coordinate the networks of 
policy experts and have oversight, with the Commission being the only actor aware of all of 
the procedures and processes going on, maybe not having all but certainly most 
information. Again, the same is true for the FoA, where the national players have the final 
word, but the European level is steering the process.  
 
Trubek (2003) suggests that networks exist within the OMC because of the cooperation 
between different national ministries,  input from social partners and civil society, the 
developing link between national civil servants with the Commission and Council staff. 
This notion is supported by Borrás and Jacobsson (2004), who believe that networking 
generated by the OMC takes place at various levels: first, coordination between national 
ministries; second, coordination procedures require input from social partners and civil 
society; third, new oversight committees have been created where national representatives, 
Commission, and expe rts exchange ideas and experience. Consequently, the MLG and PN 
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approaches seem promising for explaining the OMC in this respect. This view assumes that 
policy actors are dependent on each other’s resources (Bomberg and Peterson 2000).  The 
role of networks is supposedly more evident in the OMC, given the absence of binding 
decisions (Dehousse 2002). However, in E&T some of these elements are less developed 
than network theory would suggest, as the role of civil society and the SP is low on 
average. The inte rview results confirmed de la Porte’s (2002) argument that SP 
involvement varies across the MS, and depends on whether the social dialogue traditionally 
plays a strong role in the country. Furthermore, de la Rosa (2005) argues that although the 
OMC was believed to be a form of network governance, it seems that managing the OMC 
comes closer to an institutional logic than a network one, because of the strong role of the 
Commission. Nevertheless, the policy networks idea of the Commission as an ideational 
entrepreneur which seeks to socialise domestic actors into new practices of cooperative 
governance by involving them in the formulation and implementation of European policies 
through transnational networks) is useful (Kohler -Koch 2002). So is the concept of a n 
advocacy coalition, where the actors share a set of normative and causal beliefs, and engage 
in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time (Pochet and Natali 2004; Deganis 
2006). As these networks are (supposed to be) made up of true experts, 223 Deganis (2006) is 
right when arguing that policy learning requires the presence of a professionalised forum. 
Consequently, one can argue that policy networks approach is useful in explaining the 
process of policy formulation and later the policy implemen tation phase (Pochet and Natali 
2004). 
 
Just looking at the actors is however only half of the picture. What about the tools the OMC 
uses, such as monitoring and reporting? Idema and Kelemen (2006) propose that in the 
absence of hard law, the naming and sh aming element would be crucial for rationalist 
theory. In their opinion there are three conditions for success: first the Commission has the 
means to see if MS do not comply, second the Commission must be willing and able to 
follow-up on this by shaming th e MS, and third the MS must care about being shamed. 
They also argue that none of these apply in reality. In the OMC in E&T their argumentation 
is valid for the first condition, as the Commission mainly depends on information from the 
                                                   
223 The importance of this will be discussed under the part on impact.  
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MS, although it tries  more and more to get independent information through contractors. 
The second condition is more or less valid, as the main means of shaming is the joint 
Council/Commission report where the MS can limit any direct shaming, as MS who did not 
reach the targets receive support from other MS because they do not want to be shamed 
when they themselves are in the same situation. However, the individual indicator and 
benchmark report ‘does’ name and shame countries.  Furthermore, Idema and Kelemen 
(2006) argue that the Commission has little interest in shaming MS, as the Commission is 
dependent on their willingness to pursue its ambition of further integration in this field. 
This argument bears some truth as the Commission is very careful when and how it tries to 
shame and pressure MS, as it knows exactly its limitations in this policy area. Nevertheless, 
the Commission believes that it gets its messages across and the necessary political support 
for them, which is even more important. Consequently, one can argue that  of the three 
conditions the third one definitely applies in E&T, and that is why the MS make sure that 
condition one and two are limited.  
 
Summing up, Bomberg and Peterson (2000) argue correctly that EU policy transfer is 
governed as much by a network dynamics than by an intergovernmental one. While 
intergovernmentalist assumptions seem to explain some of the functioning of the OMC, 
they fall short in some aspects and need to be complemented by insights from other 
theoretical approaches such as MLG and PN  as well as new institutionalism which do better 
in explaining this aspect. As the Commission cannot do it alone, the combination of the 
concepts of advocacy coalition and policy entrepreneur are useful in relation to the 
functioning of the OMC, as the Com mission is even more dependent on a consent and 
cooperation of the MS than normally (Ahonen 2001).  
 
 
Socialisation  
In the past the effects on the individual from participating in the EU, have not been focus of 
European integration theory, and still today many theorists only look at structural and 
policy changes at domestic level. 224 However, European values and policy paradigms are 
                                                   
224 These types of change will be discussed when looking at impact.  
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also to some degree internalised at the domestic level, shaping discourse and identities 
(Olsen 2002). This is what will be exam ined here. While acknowledging that this is a 
(relative) bias issue, as rational choice theories in general do not leave room in their 
assumptions for socialisation effects, 225 it is nonetheless an important aspect of the 
European integration process and wor thy of examination. Drawn from the general 
theoretical assumptions, the following could be explanations for socialisation as part of 
OMC-type governance in E&T (see table 6.2):  
· Political spillover, shift of loyalties, preferences are based on values and wh ich can 
change (neofunctionalism);  
· Has only limited importance, national identities remain exclusive 
(intergovernmentalism and rational choice institutionalism);  
· Learning, persuasion, language, and participation in the EU lead to transformation of 
ideas and identities (sociological institutionalism and social constructivism);  
· Change of identities can happen through persuasion and argumentation (PN).  
 
Radaelli (2000) is right when outlining that not only formal structures at national level are 
affected by Europeanisation, but these processes can also influence values, norms and 
discourses. In a second step, these preference changes can then feedback into the process of 
European integration (Radaelli 2000; Schmidt 2001; 2002). These effects are analysed 
mainly by scholars favourable to the social constructivist approach. The usefulness of 
constructivist theory when analysing this aspect is outlined by Trubek, Cottrell and Nance:  
 
“Constructivist scholars look at how institutions facilitate constitutive 
processes such as persuasion, learning, argumentation, and socialisation.  
With sustained interaction over the course of time in an institutional 
environment these processes influence actors’ behaviour and eventually 
result in the creation of intersubjective knowle dge and a “norms cascade” 
where a critical mass of states subscribe to new norms and rules. 
Constructivist would also argue that changes in state behaviour can also 
come through processes of socialisation within groups that incorporate new 
members through the expansion of norms, ideas, and principles.  
Constructivist scholars also underscore the importance of transnational 
                                                   
225 Exceptions to this are Neofunctinalism and some of the policy networks literature. While both are 
grounded in rationalist metatheory, they still leave room for socialisation and the change of ideas and 
identities. Also see Zürn and Checkel (2005) who try to explain socialisation by referring to rationalist 
arguments. 
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actors in the institutional and policy processes, and are particularly mindful 
of the role of epistemic communities and transnational net works of policy 
professionals who share common values and causal understandings, which 
often facilitate the development and dissemination of ideas embedded in 
given institution.” (Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2005: 13)  
 
The case studies have shown that socia lisation is a strong element in the E&T process. 
Section one has outlined that this socialisation process is even more important in OMC -like 
forms of governance than in more traditional forms of governance. The creation of this ‘we 
feeling’ between the par ticipants, also fostered by the European level, has led to a joint 
problem-solving approach and sometimes helps national representatives to support 
European policies which are less favourable to their own interests than they had originally 
anticipated. Using a sociological institutionalist approach, Trondal (2002a) argues that the 
participation in EU committees and the consequent socialisation process leads to the 
creation of a supranational identity for the individual participant. This clashes with 
intergovernmental thinking, which argues for the persistence of national identities and 
interests. However, different from neofunctionalist theory, this supranational identity does 
not replace the national one, but supplements it. This approach seems more realist ic 
because it moves away from an either/or approach in respect to identity.   
 
The interviewees for the case studies stressed the importance of socialisation in the OMC -
like tools, but how does socialisation take place? Sociological institutionalism is very  
promising for explaining this, as it looks at how values and norms embedded within 
institutions contribute to shaping the behaviour and preferences of the individual actors. 
Based on this logic, Deganis (2006) identifies the Commission as a norm entrepreneur 
within the European Employment Strategy, as it is capable of moulding the understanding 
and preferences of the national governments. Also within the policy field of E&T the 
Commission has become very skilful in arranging sufficient possibilities for th e participants 
to socialise and in creating a common understanding. Radaelli (2004) identifies the 
Commission as orchestrating socialisation. The same applies for the FoA, where the 
European level can manipulate the socialisation experience. Socialisation is not the same 
for all participants. The intensity of the socialisation of the individual participants can vary 
according to the length and frequency of participation in committees at EU level, whether 
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the individual plays an active role in the committee,  and having informal contacts outside 
the formal committee meetings (Trondal 2002a). There are various examples from the case 
studies that confirm this line of argumentation.  
 
For some social constructivists the concepts of deliberation, discourse and lang uage are 
linked to the issue of socialisation. Various academics also argue that the OMC is both a 
cognitive and a normative tool (Kroeger 2006; Mabbett 2007). Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin 
believe that  
 
“through the OMC, the EU is a new common forum for deba te, and 
contributed to the development of common conceptions of problems and 
solutions, which in turn introduces a new mode of harmonisation which is 
not institutional and constraining but cognitive and normative.” (Bruno, 
Jacquot and Mandin 2006: 532)  
 
This was also supported by some of the findings in the case studies. Sociological 
institutionalism looks at cognitive and normative structures (Radaelli 2000), so do social 
constructivism and (some) writers on policy networks. Dehousse (2002) blends argument s 
from these various approaches when highlighting the attempt by the Commission to create 
a new set of discourse for the policy community. MS preferences are influenced by 
continual discussion and exchange of arguments, which then through expert deliberati on in 
committees can lead to community compatible interests. Ashiagbor (2004) sees that the 
OMC is achieving convergence through the emergence of a common discourse between 
elites. It is arguable that the process of communication and socialisation in trans -national 
political-administrative networks is leading to the development of common perceptions of 
problems and solutions, a form of ‘integration through coordination’. Regarding the field of 
employment, Jacobsson (2004) argues that discourse was crucial f or the development of the 
EES and was accompanied by the creation of a common vocabulary and cognitive 
framework. This can also be identified in the E&T policy area, with concepts such as 
lifelong learning, knowledge society, or learning outcomes being part of a new common 
European terminology. However, Kroeger (2006) reminds the reader that language can also 
pose serious difficulties for supranational learning, be it for simple communication or 
deeper understanding of political concepts. In the development  of European policies 
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through the OMC in E&T language was sometimes a double -edged sword. On the one 
hand, once a terminology is agreed on, this leads then to the common discourse at national 
level using the same expression and concepts. However, on the ot her hand, individual MS 
sometimes opposed certain concepts, not because of the technical implications, but because 
of the ideational value and meaning applied to them at national level. In relation to this 
aspect of the OMC, it is also interesting to consi der the hesitation of MS to allow the EU to 
become involved in E&T. The policy field of education is still seen as nation -building and 
has a strong link to national identities (Trondal 2002b). Olsen (2002) rightly points out that 
control over education is a sensitive issue exactly because it is closely linked to national 
and sub-national identities. While the power struggle between the central government and 
the regions has been outlined earlier, the issue of identity linked to E&T is equally 
important in o rder to understand actors’ motivation.  
 
The OMC in E&T as well as the FoA have led to a substantial paradigm shift in respect of 
the belief of how to carry out certain policies, not because the national level was pressured 
into changing its policies, but i t did so voluntarily because they were convinced that this 
was a better approach to E&T policy. Agreeing on the concept of learning outcomes  rather 
than learning inputs broke down long established traditions in certain countries about how 
to carry out E&T.226 The notion of shared responsibility  for the training needs of the 
individual, between employers, the workers and public authorities did the same for 
industrial relations. Nevertheless, the socialisation effect also has its limits. First, while 
socialisation might be strong with the participants in the OMC process, this only applies to 
a small group and does not reach a broader group at national level. Bomberg and Peterson 
(2000) admit that policy networks, which are mainly elitist and technocratic, do not  help to 
transfer attitudes, political cultures or loyalties of large sections of European citizens to the 
EU. However, while arguing this, participation in the various European community 
programmes (such as ERASMUS, LEONARDO etc.) does in general have a s ignificant 
impact on people’s identities. Thus, while the OMC in E&T does not directly have this 
socialisation impact on the general public, European policy in general can have it. Second, 
even if the participants are socialised, this does not mean that th ey completely cast aside 
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their national interests and agree on everything that is proposed at European level. A third 
limitation can be seen with respect to the strengthening of the open method. Most MS by 
now value European cooperation and acknowledge its  usefulness but still refuse to apply a 
fully-fledged Community Method in E&T. The same holds for the FoA, where the 
employers, while appreciating the benefits from cooperation in E&T at EU level, continue 
their refusal to have binding agreements on E&T. F inally one has to agree that socialisation 
effects are a lot stronger than admitted by most rationalist theories, but not as extensive as 
some constructivist theorist argue. While the socialisation of individuals is (nearly) 
automatic and can be fostered b y ideational (or norm) entrepreneurs, Warleigh -Lack (2008) 
is right in arguing that the MS are only socialised when they find it useful, and not when 
they do not. 
 
Summing up, social constructivist approaches are better suited to deal with this aspect of 
OMC-like tools than their rationalist alternatives for obvious reasons. Sociological 
institutionalism seems to be the most appropriate theory when explaining the socialisation 
effects of OMC-style governance, as unlike social constructivism, it foresees the  need for 
an institution in order to create and anchor socialisation. In the case of the OMC in E&T the 
Commission was this institution, which organised the socialisation process for the 
participants, and in the case of the FoA the European umbrella organi sations played this 
role. 
 
 
The impact of OMC-like tools  
The results from the case studies have shown that there has been impact at national level, 
but the extent and type varied between the different MS. How do the theoretical approaches 
explain this? Drawn from the general theoretical assumptions, the following can be seen as 
explanations for the impact of OMC -style governance in E&T (see table 6.2):  
· Stronger role for domestic non -governmental actors having direct access to the 
European level (neofunctio nalism);  
                                                                                                                                                          
226 Learning outcomes  is what a learner knows, underst ands and is able to do rather than the learning process 
itself know as learning inputs . 
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· Stronger role of national governments; change is caused by coercion or purely national 
reasons (liberal-intergovernmentalism);   
· The impact of the OMC can both be at the level of policy goals and at the level of 
policy instruments (social construc tivism);   
· Uploading and downloading (Europeanisation);    
· Redistribution of power between actors at national level (rational choice 
institutionalism);  
· Path dependency (historical institutionalism);  
· Socialisation and collective learning (sociological insti tutionalism); 
· Stronger interdependence between the different actors; learning; the network form of 
governance being transferred to the national level (MLG and PN; and social 
constructivism).  
 
Before looking at the theoretical assumptions, it is first nece ssary to dwell on what kind of 
impact one can expect. Are we talking about harmonisation, Europeanisation or 
convergence? And what is the difference? Radaelli (2000) rightly stresses that 
Europeanisation is not equal to convergence. Convergence can be a re sult of 
Europeanisation, but so can divergence. So one needs to distinguish between process and 
result. Impact is understood here as change at national level caused by activities at 
European level (i.e. the top -down approach of Europeanisation). However, t his change does 
not have to be homogenous and lead to harmonisation across the Member States. The 
convergence and divergence of national policy -making in response to OMC -like tools has 
been outlined before and will be revisited further on. These different issues regarding 
impact require first a general analysis of (rationalist and constructivist) arguments for 
explaining the impact of OMC -like tools at national level, before examining the 
Europeanisation literature more specifically for explanations. Follow ing, the role of 
learning for impact in more detail, also in relation to the differences between the impact 
across the MS. 
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Rational vs constructivist explanations  
Idema and Kelemen (2006) argue that most claims regarding the impact of the OMC are 
based either on a rational choice perspective or a mixture of constructivist theory and 
learning.227 Rationalist thinking attributes change to the mechanism of shaming and 
shunning, where policy convergence is seen as resulting from actors’ cost -benefit 
calculation (Trondal 2002b). As outlined earlier, intergovernmentalist theory would expect 
impact to be mainly a shift of power at national level in favour of the national government. 
It is true that with the support of the political messages coming from the European policies 
developed as part of the OMC -type processes, the actors can press for reforms at national 
(and regional) level, which were necessary but opposed by strong interest groups 
sometimes including regional governments, other trade unions or other employ er 
organisations. Some of the policies proposed under the OMC in E&T faced strong 
opposition at national level although the development of these policies went relatively 
smoothly within the working groups at European level. Therefore Bomberg and Peterson 
(2000) could be right when they argue that the Member States are strengthened because of 
policy transfer. However, policy convergence can also be interpreted as resulting from elite 
socialisation and epistemic communities (Trondal 2002b). The difference fro m rationalist 
explanations is that the first view assumes that differences are a catalyst for 
Europeanisation, the second sees institutional interaction as well as normative and causal 
consensus among the elites as the driving force behind Europeanisation.  In line with 
constructivist thinking in general, some theories see the OMC and the use of soft law as, 
amongst other things, providing legitimacy to domestic reformers in order to justify their 
policies by inserting possible solutions into the national de bates (Radaelli 2000). Jacobsson 
(2003) argues that the use of joint language, common indicators, the building of common 
knowledge, the systematic diffusion of knowledge and peer pressure are the causes of the 
OMC’s effect on Member States policy in the em ployment policy field.  This can lead to 
policy changes as well as subtle changes in the ways of thinking about policy, and even in 
collective understandings of identities (Jacobsson 2004). Trubek and Trubek (2005) 
identify six constructivist explanations for ways in which change may be caused by the 
OMC: shaming, diffusion through mimesis or discourse, deliberation, learning and 
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networks. These can be divided between the bottom -up aspects (deliberation, 
experimentation, learning and one form of network the ory) and the top-down ones 
(shaming, discussion through mimesis or discourse and another version of network theory). 
Mimesis is particular useful in explaining policy changes in policy areas where coercion 
does not apply. It believes that if a critical mas s of countries agree on a particular model, 
others will join, even if it is voluntary because they feel the force of attraction. This can 
explain why even ‘giant’ Member States, like Germany, participate in EU policies in E&T, 
which are not necessarily in their best interest, even without direct coercion.  
 
Europeanisation literature and impact  
As outlined in chapter two, the Europeanisation literature looks at the impact of European 
integration. Therefore this literature seems very promising when analysing  the impact of 
OMC-type tools, while it may not add any insight into the creation and functioning of them. 
The earlier outlined work on Europeanisation in relation to governance, institutionalisation 
and discourse have different foci and provide different explanations for impact (see table 
2.2). The literature that sees Europeanisation as governance is closely related to MLG and 
PN, as they look at the partnership between private and public actors in a complex layer of 
governance. They also look at the dime nsion of legitimate and efficient governance in the 
EU. The second group sees Europeanisation as institutionalisation and believes that Europe 
only has an effect on the domestic level if it is uncomfortable (see table 6.3). This group 
argues that domestic change, in relation to European policy, occurs under two conditions: 
the first is that there is a certain ‘misfit’ between the European processes, institutions and 
policy and those of the national ones, so Europeanisation must be ‘inconvenient’. The 
second is the need for facilitating factors such as actors or institutions responding to the 
pressure created through the misfit (Börzel and Risse 2000).  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
227 They argue that most analysis do not explicitly associate themselves with a theoretical position, 
nevertheless their analyses tends to be rooted in these two framewor ks. 
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Table 6.3: Europeanisation literature on impact  
Europeanisation literature228 Impact  
 Knill and Lehmkuhl; Radaelli; Schmidt Börzel and Risse 
Depending on form of policy-making229 Goodness of fit: Adaptational pressure because of misfit 
and facilitating factors 
Positive 
integration 
Negative 
integration 
Framing 
integration 
or facilitated 
coordination 
i.e. OMC 
Rational    
Based on the logic of 
consequentialism 
Sociological 
Based on the logic of 
appropriateness 
Prescribing 
an 
institutional 
model for 
compliance 
Changing 
domestic 
opportunity 
structures 
Changing 
beliefs of 
domestic 
actors 
Domestic change as a 
process of redistribution 
of resources 
 
Domestic change as a 
process of persuasion, 
socialisation and collective 
learning 
Goodness 
of fit; 
coercion  
Regulatory 
competition; 
mimesis  
Socialisation 
and learning; 
mimesis 
Misfit: Differential 
empowerment of actors 
resulting from a 
redistribution of resources 
at national level 
Misfit: European policies, 
norms and the collective 
understanding do not fit 
with the national ones 
Mediating factors: Presence of a crisis, 
strong or weak role of the principal political 
actors, fit with existing policies and 
institutions, discourse 
Facilitating factors: 
Existence of multiple veto 
points and formal 
institutions 
Facilitating factors: The 
existence of a political 
culture and norm 
entrepreneurs 
Different effects on the various Member States 
Why is there 
impact? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is this 
change? 
 
 
 
What are the 
mechanisms?  
 
 
 
Why does 
change 
differ? 
 
How much 
change? 
 Inertia: No change, as 
European policy is 
too different. This 
situation is not 
sustainable in the 
long-term  
Absorption or 
accommodation: The 
national level can incorporate 
European policies into the 
national ones either without 
substantially changing 
existing processes or by 
adapting them slightly 
Transformation: 
Member States replace 
existing national 
policies, processes and 
institutions by European 
ones. This includes 
certain paradigm 
changes 
Retrenchment: 
European policies 
actually strengthen 
resistance to 
national reforms 
 
Source: Author   
                                                   
228 The arguments overlap to a great extent. The difference is the way these authors separate different 
instances of Europeanisation.  
229 The authors admit that elements of these different mechanisms can be found in almost every European 
policy area, they argue that different policy types are characterised by a varying mixture of these mechanisms, 
with different logics dominating in different policy types (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999: 3).  
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These facilitating factors can explain the different forms and levels o f impact at national 
level. Both rationalist and sociological institutionalists provide explanations for this change 
at national level. While the former argue a ‘logic of consequentialism’ and see the 
redistribution of power and resources between the actor s at national level as the decisive 
factor, with multiple veto points in a country and formal institutions being facilitating 
factors, the latter emphasise a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and processes of persuasion which 
can be fostered through the existence  of norm entrepreneurs and a political culture 
conducive to consensus -building and cost sharing. It is argued that both of these logics can 
occur simultaneously or dominate different phases of the adaptational process. Radaelli 
(2004) summarises the critic ism of this group, as being too structural, leaving not enough 
space for agency and that there are cases of Europeanisation without adaptational pressure. 
Furthermore, the degree of fit is discursively and socially constructed, and is not an 
objective measure. This is also reflected in the interview results, where the argument that it 
is difficult to carry out European policy in E&T because of the huge diversity of national 
E&T systems and polices, was qualified when stressing that it is the political will and not 
the practical compatibilities which represent the real obstacles. Radaelli (2000) argues that 
soft mechanisms do not create any of the pressures anticipated with the goodness of fit 
argument. In his model he sees learning to be the default explanat ion for OMC-like tools, 
which he calls facilitated coordination , while seeing the goodness of fit for other modes of 
governance based on hierarchy (Radaelli 2004) . While agreeing that the goodness of fit 
argument is stronger in other forms of governance, it is premature to reject this concept 
altogether as a possible explanation for the impact caused by the u se of OMC-like 
governance forms. While it is true that there is only limited coercion, as the OMC and the 
FoA are voluntary and soft tools, it still does not mean that a misfit between European and 
national policy does not lead to policy change. Naming and  shaming can also be interpreted 
as coercion, although this element is limited within the OMC -like processes in E&T. 
Furthermore, in E&T various countries recognised that they needed reforms in this policy 
area and could use the misfit with the European po licy in order to get as much support as 
possible. Additionally, it is important to remember that the topics were chosen mainly by 
the MS, sometimes because the countries were performing well on them and in order to 
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avoid downloading policy, but occasionall y also in order to learn from others and to 
support change.  
 
The third literature on Europeanisation sees this as a process of constructing Europe 
through language and discourse. This interactive process is based on a cognitive activity 
which enables actors to make sense of reality and a more normative activity assessing and 
judging reality (Radaelli 2004). This uses many of the social constructivist arguments for 
change, outlined earlier. The difficulty of identifying this type of change, in particular th e 
socialisation of elites, is that it is a slow process and over time it is difficult to be clear 
whether Europeanisation has overtaken domestic processes or just added to them. While 
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) focus on regulatory policy, their third model,  which they call 
‘framing integration’, resembles the characteristics of OMC -type governance in E&T. Here 
Europeanisation follows mainly a cognitive logic, and instead of prescribing concrete 
outcomes or changing institutional settings it aims at increasin g support for domestic 
reforms that may facilitate future steps towards integration by altering the beliefs and 
expectations of domestic actors. When describing the Europeanisation of the railway sector, 
they point out that integration in this sector faced  difficulties because of the heterogeneity 
of the Member States and the limited legal and institutional power of the EU in this area. 
As there is no direct adaption pressure, the success of these policies and the level of 
Europeanisation depended on the mo bilisation of support for domestic reforms. The 
objective was therefore to establish new thought processes about what the aim of policy 
was and how it should be made in a ‘good’ way. When transferring this argument to the 
E&T case, one can identify that th e aim of this policy was changed at EU level from a more 
social to a more economic approach and various new ways of improving E&T efficiency 
were developed at European level. One could also observe a huge effort on behalf of the 
Commission in mobilising su pport for these initiatives by the various relevant domestic 
actors, by touring the EU attending conferences and seminars in order to ‘sell their 
product’.  
 
When reflecting on the arguments of these three groups of academic work on 
Europeanisation as dome stic impact, one can see that the OMC -type instruments in E&T 
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seem to fit the arguments of both the rational choice and sociological explanations for the 
misfit, while also allowing that discourse and language are causes of change at national 
level. Therefore one should follow Olsen who summarises the types of change that can 
occur in the European context:  
 
“Change may be a result of rule -following and the application of standard 
operating procedures to appropriate situations. It may be an outcome of 
problem-solving and calculating expected consequences, or of conflict 
resolution and confrontation. Change may also be produced through 
experiential learning or competitive selection, contact and diffusion or 
turnover and regeneration.” (Olsen 2002: 924)  
 
Impact caused by learning  
The case studies have shown, that the participants at EU level socialise with each other and 
are socialised by the European level. De la Porte (2002) argues that a sociological 
institutional perspective would see socialisation and coll ective learning as the cause for 
behavioural change. This is supported by Idema and Kelemen (2006) who maintain that 
constructivist theory and learning argues that the impact of the OMC can be both at the 
level of policy goals and at the level of policy in struments. These theories believe that the 
OMC links civil servants and civil society actors from all MS with the Commission and 
Council staff in a multi -level, public/private transnational network through which new ideas 
diffuse, resulting in common polic y positions. This type of theoretical approach sees the 
dissemination of network mode of governance throughout the Member States as the crucial 
effect of Europeanisation (Radaelli 2000).  
 
The case studies outlined that policy -makers learn from each other’s  good and bad 
practices, as well as from reflecting on their own situation. However, learning is not 
something automatic. Checkel (1999: 549) sees the following conditions as fostering policy 
learning: 
· Social learning is more likely in groups where individ uals share common professional 
backgrounds; 
· Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with 
clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure;  
  
286
· Social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and th ere is high density 
of interaction among participants;  
· Social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure 
and exposure. 
 
In the OMC in E&T and the FoA all of these circumstances apply. Within the working 
groups and committees many of the participants have the same professional background 
and technical know-how. The group also feels itself in a crisis. Europe in general is losing 
ground in E&T policy to other regions of the world and mechanisms such as the PISA tests 
foster this feeling of needing urgent reforms. In fact, the E&T performance has been linked 
through the Lisbon strategy to the economic performance of the EU. The number of 
working groups and committee meetings in E&T is impressive and the same national 
experts meet each other every fortnight at some E&T policy discussion at European level. 
Finally, as most of the discussions have a technical nature, they face only limited exposure 
to political pressure. 
 
While the OMC-like tools have made an impact, where idea s are being transferred to the 
national level, they also have led to varying results. Earlier it was shown that this depends 
on the role of the individual participant, but it also depends on the learning potential. 
Learning can be seriously limited by 1) a  limited number of participants from a small 
segment of society, 2) these participants’ limited knowledge or limited capabilities to 
transfer what they have learnt back to the national level 3) they do not get the necessary 
political support to implement c hanges. Furthermore, as constructivists outline correctly, 
for policy-makers, the OMC is only one of many media where they can learn. Other 
international forums like the OECD, academic journals and other publications provide the 
policy-maker with information on good practice which they can learn from (Idema and 
Kelemen 2006). This has been confirmed by the case studies. This view argues that 
learning has an impact, but the OMC and the FoA do not necessarily cause this learning. 
Others added that learning happens now in a more organised fashion than before the use of 
the OMC. Another perspective believes that learning does not lead to policy change. 
Kroeger (2006) summarises why policy learning might not lead to any or improved policy 
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change: learning is not a sufficient condition for policy change; learning from other 
countries is only one, and not necessarily the most important factor in national policy 
change; and learning does not automatically improve performances.  
 
In addition to explaining policy conver gence, Trondal (2002b) delivers valid arguments for 
policy divergence, namely the fact that EU policies are mediated, modified and filtered 
through pre-existing domestic policies, formal structures, legal rules and policy 
instruments. These factors can red uce the path dependency. This view is supported by 
Olsen (2002) who outlines that structural diversity persists and established national patterns 
are resistant, however they are also flexible enough to cope with changes at European level. 
Other explanations come from Kroeger (2006), who sees the lack of support by the higher 
political leadership as the main obstacle. This also reflects the findings in E&T, where the 
impact at national level depends heavily on the role of the individual. Just because the 
national expert is socialised does not automatically lead to further impact at national level.  
This individual must not only be a technical expert, but also have an important role in 
policy-making at national level in order to lead to change.  It depends very often on his or 
her capabilities in argumentation and persuasion at national level, and also if a discourse at 
national level can be created. Börzel and Risse (2000) point out that policy convergence 
seems to be more likely than institutional convergence, as policy changes are more easily 
achieved. Depending on the strength of the different mediating or facilitating factors  (see 
table 6.3), the Europeanisation literature provides alternative scenarios for the extent of 
impact at national level. These can va ry between: Inertia, with no change at all as European 
policy is too different to national one;  absorption or accommodation , where the national level 
can incorporate European policies into the national ones either without substantially 
changing existing processes or by adapting them slightly; transformation , where Member 
States replace existing national policies, processes and institutions by European ones; and 
retrenchment, where European policies actually strengthen resistance to national reforms 
(Börzel and Risse 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000; Schmidt 2002).  
 
Regarding impact at national level, new institutionalism literature uses the concept of 
(institutional) isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) to explain the tendency of 
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political organisations to becoming alike (Radaelli 2000). In general, new institutionalism 
explains change with contextualised, endogenous policy dynamics. Rational choice 
institutionalism would look at bounded rational choice constrained by institutional rules 
and procedures, historical institutionalism uses path dependency and sociological 
institutionalism the mechanism of socialisation, persuasion and learning based on the logic 
of appropriateness (Trondal 2002b). Using an institutional logic one can argue that 
institutions change more slowly than policies because of their stickiness and path 
dependency (Bomberg and Peterson 2000). This argument is confirmed by the findings of 
the case studies, as outlined earlier. Olsen’s explanation for diversified impact at nationa l 
level is even more correct for OMC -like tools, than for the other forms of governance 
because 
 
“European-level developments do not dictate specific forms of institutional 
adaptation but leave considerable discretion to domestic actors and 
institutions. There are significant impacts, yet the actual ability of European 
level to penetrate domestic institutions is not perfect, universal or constant. 
Adaptations reflects variations in European pressures as well as domestic 
motivations and abilities to adapt Eu ropean signals are interpreted and 
modified through domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources 
in ways that limit the degree of convergence and homogenisation.” Olsen 
(2002: 936) 
 
So after looking at the findings and the theoretical explan ations, can one speak of 
convergence of national E&T policies? For Radaelli (2004) convergence is measured along 
a continuum, with the minimum being the existence of a shared ‘European’ vocabulary. 
The next step would be ideational convergence, where Europ eanisation has led to the 
convergence of paradigms, ideas and practices. Even stronger convergence can be seen in a 
similarity of decisions and their implementation. The highest level of convergence would 
be the convergences of outcomes. Along these lines OMC-like tools in E&T have reached 
the first two levels of convergence, while not achieving the other two. Dehousse (2002) 
therefore speaks of cognitive convergence, which results from cooperation between 
networks of experts. Trondal (2002b) distinguishes between far reaching convergence , 
which leads to the replacement of national policies by European ones (and actually is 
harmonisation), and moderate convergence , which implies a merger between national and 
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Community policies. Therefore convergence is under stood here as the advent of similar 
policy goals and policy rationales across levels of governance. Following this definition, 
OMC-like tools led to moderate convergence.  Dehousse (2002) sees convergence as a side 
effect of the OMC, which is actually aimed  at drawing up common objectives and 
identifying best practices.  
 
In the end, the analysis of impact also depends on how impact is presented by the national 
level. Zeitlin (2005) argues that governments may deliberately over or underestimate the 
influence of the OMC processes on domestic policy in reporting to the EU, depending if 
they want to present themselves as ‘good Europeans’ or defend the subsidiarity position. 
This author initially would have supported Zeitlin’s position, based on his own experience  
in OMC processes and the FoA but there was only limited empirical evidence from the 
interviews supporting this hypothesis.  
 
Besides only looking at the impact side of the Europeanisation concept, one needs also to 
look at the feedback aspect. Schmidt (200 2: 894) reminds the reader that European policies 
have tended to follow national policies as much as lead them, and national policies shape 
European ones as often as EU policies have shaped national ones. Radaelli (2004) argues 
that one should see European isation as more than the narrow top -down notion of impact. 
Consequently, Barbier (2004)’s argument that the OMC should not be seen only in a 
context of one-way effects from the European to the national level, but cross -influence 
should be considered. This was also a result of the case studies and will be examined now 
in the European integration part.  
 
Summing up, the Europeanisation literature has proven to be very helpful when looking at 
the impact of OMC -like tools at national level. While writing on Euro peanisation based on 
institutionalist theory seems to be particularly useful, the more rational choice informed 
literature seems very promising when examining policy and structural changes at national 
level, while the sociological variant helps to explain the changes of beliefs and identities of 
the actors involved. The former sees national impact stemming from mimesis and coercion 
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while the latter sees it based on socialisation. Both of them explain certain pieces of the 
puzzle and should be used together.  
 
 
European integration  
The case studies have shown how OMC -like instruments have contributed in enhancing 
European cooperation and policy -making in E&T, thereby deepening European integration. 
Chapter four in particular outlined how the use of the OMC has  deepened integration in 
E&T. The part will now concentrate on how theoretical approaches to European integration 
explain this form of integration and how they anticipate its further development. Drawn 
from the general theoretical assumptions, the followin g can be seen as explanations for the 
impact of the OMC on European integration (see table 6.2):  
· Ever more power to supranational level and spillover (neofunctionalism);  
· Limitation of power at the supranational level (liberal -intergovernmentalism);  
· Leading to a new understanding of how policies should operate; development of 
common conception of problems and solutions (social constructivism);  
· Power (re) distribution between institutions;  (rational choice Institutionalism);  
· Path dependency (historical ins titutionalism);  
· Normative integration through deliberative supranationalism (social constructivism).  
 
Looking at the consequences for the European level of using the OMC in E&T, it is 
important to examine whether it leads to further integration of the giv en policy area or if it 
keeps this policy firmly under the control of the Member States. As Regent (2003) argues 
the OMC [in employment] was originally developed as an intergovernmental commitment 
by MS, but has subsequently developed into somet hing that she labelled ‘supranational 
form of governance’. This observation goes against intergovernmentalist thinking that MS 
stay in full control of the integration process and confirms neofunctionalist and historical 
institutionalist thinking that supra national actors do not only carry out the roles foreseen by 
the MS for them, but use the rules to their advantage in order to further their own interests. 
However at the same time, the research results of this thesis fell short of what would be 
predicted by neofunctionalist theory, namely a strengthening of the EU level at the cost of 
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the MS power. Then again Ahonen (2001) argues that the use of the OMC led, without a 
doubt, to horizontal transfers or spillover of policy -making methods from some European 
policy-making fields to further fields. From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, 
one can explain increased policy activity at European level with the argument that Member 
States have an incentive to upload their policies to the European level in order to minimise 
the downloading costs (Börzel 2001).  
 
While a traditional understanding of European integration would be: “the progressive 
realisation of an emerging system of authoritative rule at the supranational level.” 
(Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 200 6: 472), this needs to be rethought in light of the 
development of the OMC. The work of Trondal (2002b) in the field of research and higher 
education identifies a creeping supranational research and education policy at EU level, 
while also finding that the  EU does not fundamentally challenge the key elements of 
political, juridical, administrative, economic and cultural sovereignty of the nation state in 
this field. Consequently, this form of integration seems to be (slightly) different to the one 
experienced during the last decades, being either a partial or completely new form of 
integration, where integration proceeds along different pathways than before. Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (1999: 10) argue that European policies of ‘framing reform processes’, 
represents a logic of integration different to the one of positive or negative integration, but 
promotes European integration by accommodating national diversity. Rather than dictating 
reforms in a top-down approach, it is aimed at triggering European integration wit hin the 
existing context at the domestic level. This notion is also supported by Wendler (2004) who 
recalls that these new functions do not lead to positive integration, but to a strongly 
extended function for the EU in the setting of political goals and i n the definition of 
guidelines, while at the same time stressing the diversity and autonomy of the MS. 
Therefore Ashiagbor (2004) is correct when he sees the OMC to be an ideal way of 
facilitating further Europeanisation ‘outside existing institutional for ms’.230 The differences 
and similarities with traditional integration will now be illustrated:  
 
 
                                                   
230 Europeanisation understood as European integration.  
  
292
Differences: 
· No transfer of competences through treaty changes;  
· A very different institutional architecture, with no (real) role for the European 
parliament and the ECJ and a new role for the Commission, where its influence is based 
on technical expertise;  
· No legally binding European policies.  
 
Similarities: 
· Increased influence (in E&T) of the European level;  
· Expansion of topics dealt with in E&T at European leve l;  
· Increased policy output;  
· Agenda-setting role for the European level.  
 
It has been suggested that the European Commission’s legitimacy base in the context of 
intergovernmental action is a technocratic one, as a policy broker in the ‘stock exchange’ of 
European policy ideas, being an ‘image entrepreneur’ (Ahonen 2001). This is also argued 
by Dehousse (2002) who proposes that if the Commission wants to maximise its influence 
in the OMC, it should try to establish its credibility in the eyes of the experts , rather than 
forcefully claiming a leading role in sensitive policy areas, which no Member State seems 
prepared to grant. So instead of formal leadership as under the CM, it has to strive for 
informal influence based on technical expertise and its knowled ge of the policy area. This 
was confirmed in the interviews, where it was outlined that the Commission has increased 
its influence because it has built up policy and technical expertise in this area, providing 
good ideas to the MS. Also in order to mobilis e the relevant actors, the Commission was 
dependent on building confidence and trust among the Commission, the Member States and 
the social partners, as legal forces do not apply (Jacobsson 2003).  
 
For Wendler (2004) the new procedures in social policy, s uch as the OMC, have led to a 
strengthening primarily of the intergovernmental and executive institutions, within the 
balance of power of the institutional framework of the EU. Other writers argue this is a 
general trend, especially in policy areas that ar e new to the EU (Bomberg and Peterson 
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2000). Nevertheless, it is not as intergovernmental as one might expect, as it is mediated 
through EU practices, institutions and agents. The same can be said in principle for the field 
of E&T. The fact that the EP and  the ECJ have no real role in the OMC in E&T and the 
Commission has a very different role to the CM, could lead to the assumption that the 
OMC leads to a rebalance of power between the different EU institutions, after many years 
of indented and unintended growth of the power of the community institutions. However, in 
the area of E&T the OMC cannot be seen as a step back for European integration and the 
role of the supranational institutions. Souto -Otero, Fleckstein et al. (2008) present the 
argument that depending on the policy area, the introduction of the OMC can be seen as a 
step forward or backward. One has to agree with them that in the area of education and 
training it is clearly a step forward. The extension of policy topics at EU level without the 
parallel extension of legal powers indicates a widening of integration rather than a 
deepening (if deepening involves competence transfer and legal competences). It was both 
if one considers policy-making as the main criterion, as more and more significant p olicy-
making is taking place at EU level. Through the method of policy transfer, generally a 
voluntary form of policy-making based on soft law, (like the OMC) where MS mimic the 
experience of other MS, the EU has achieved Europeanisation of policy areas wh ich were 
previously out of reach of traditional forms of policy -making (Bomberg and Peterson 
2000). 
 
Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin (2006) argue that new fields of competencies were opened to 
the action of European institutions, but without any new transfer of state power and that the 
dynamic of European integration is no longer solely governed by the traditional 
Community Method. They believe that a process of Europeanisation by figures seems to 
replace Community integration through law, which has until now imp lied that sovereign 
power should be assigned to the supranational institutions. So this form of integration 
differs from the previous forms of integration on both the mechanisms and on the effects. 
The mechanism can be seen as ‘a form of integration throug h coordination’ (Ashiagbor 
2004). The effects of OMC on integration are identified by Szysczak (2006) as a subtle 
penetration into an area of competences outside of Community competences. It is not only 
agenda-setting, but also sets the parameters of how p olicies should operate. This is 
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confirmed by the interview results, where integration was seen not only as the transfer of 
competences but also as the creation of a ‘community of thought’. Borrás and Jacobsson 
(2004) outline that the OMC might unleash new integration dynamics which is to say that 
the OMC might foster new political dynamics at national and subnational level, which 
might have an impact on the EU itself. The impact does not necessarily need to be further 
EU regulation but a process where integ ration is essentially the process of generating 
informal institutions (ideas, routines, unspoken norms of conduct) in a political space 
characterised by formal diversity. Therefore Jacobsson and Vifell (2003) argue that the 
OMC leads to normative integrati on through deliberative supranationalism. This is very 
much in line with social constructivist thought. Jacobsson (2003) outlines that the perceived 
need to view national policies as common concern and a certain level of policy 
convergence has led to speci fic procedures for establishing common policy goals and 
achieving Member States compliance. In the E&T area, having European benchmarks 
rather than national ones, also represents part of the ‘we feeling’ approach.  
 
Whether the use of the OMC leads to a lim ited form of integration or a new type of 
integration depends on its development (see conclusion chapter). Here the question poses 
itself as to which extent is discussing a topic at European level being seen as a (first) step 
towards further (traditional) integration? Jacobsson (2004) sees an additional function of 
soft law, namely preparing the ground for hard law i.e. the Community Method.  While 
agreeing that the OMC leads to further deepening of European integration, Pollack (2005) 
refutes the notion that the OMC is a first step towards a g enuine Community dimension 
even in policy areas that are sensitive and difficult to integrate. In particular resistance from 
regional actors who would fear centralisation would prevent this move. This fear was 
already outlined when discussing the creation of OMC-like tools and the aim of the 
regional actors. Furthermore, the interviews showed the unanimous belief that there will be 
no further introduction (at least) in the medium - to long-term perspective of the (full 
fledged) CM or more binding tools of th e ESP in the field of E&T.  
 
Recalling the reasons for the introduction, where OMC -like tools were  used to enable 
European cooperation while keeping the national level in charge, this aim has been 
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achieved. Various academics describe the OMC as more intergo vernmental and volutaristic 
than the CM (Schäfer 2004). At the same time it is more supranational than 
intergovernmentalism. Therefore Pollack (2005: 389) is right when describing the OMC as 
“a middle ground between communitarisation and purely national go vernance.” 
Consequently, one needs to acknowledge the evolving of the idea of integration, where 
integration is not any longer seen (only) as the substantial transfer of competences from the 
national to the European level, but can be a third way between in tergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism where policy -making (in politically sensitive areas) is being carried out at 
European level but with the decision -making powers resting firmly in the hands of the MS. 
Jacobsson sees the use of the OMC as  
 
“a sign of the fact that the integration process has reached a phase where not 
only the core areas of the welfare state are directly affected, touching upon 
the very heart of national sovereignty, but also where increasingly dense 
cooperation does exert an increasin gly powerful social and moral pressure 
on (elite) actors, politicians and civil servants, to adapt to a common 
framework.” Jacobsson (2003: 5)  
 
Bomberg and Peterson (2000) argue that policy -making through policy transfer is 
supplanting more traditional met hods because of: substantive reasons  i.e. national 
governments becoming dissatisfied with a particular policy and by using tested policies 
from other MS they reduce the uncertainty of policy change; procedural reasons  i.e. 
dissatisfaction with traditional forms of policy-making; and political reasons  i.e. it 
symbolises a consensus on the subsidiarity principle as a guiding principle for EU action. 
While it is true that most of new policy areas use softer approaches to policy -making, at the 
same time, the OMC related integration is not going to change integration in other policy 
area, as the OMC has been utilised not as a replacement for, but as a complement to the 
traditional Community Method in areas where national governments have been reluctant to 
adopt binding regulations (Pollack 2005).    
 
Summing up, while certain assumptions of both neofunctionalism (strengthening of the 
European Commission) and intergovernmentalism (strengthening of the Member States) 
were confirmed, others did not apply (European ins titutions gaining legal competences and 
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MS staying in control respectively). Social constructivism gave some additional insights 
into the European integration dynamics. However, the EU is experiencing the evolution of 
the idea of integration, and the vario us integration theories are (so far) not able to fully 
explain this new type of integration that takes place because of OMC -like tools. 
 
 
Summary of placing OMC -like tools within European integration theories  
This section has outlined that while no one the ory was able to explain all of the aspects of 
OMC-like tools, various theories provided plausible explanations for the individual aspects 
of OMC-type governance (see table 6.4). This was to be expected, as the theories focus on 
different variables and atte mpt to answer different questions While LI, NF and new 
institutionalism explain best the creation of the OMC, governance theories provide better 
explanations when looking at the functioning. Sociological institutionalism and social 
constructivism do better  for obvious reasons in explaining the socialisation aspect than 
more rationalist theories. When looking at the impact, the Europeanisation literature (in its 
various forms) offers significant insight. When coming to European integration, LI, NF and 
social constructivism can explain certain aspects of the developments but all of them 
struggle with this new type of integration. Consequently, in order to get a comprehensive 
picture of the development, functioning and results of OMC-type instruments, one needs  to 
combine different European integration theories (as far as possible).  
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Table 6.4: Theories that explain the results of the aspects of the OMC in E&T  
Issues 
Indicators 
Results from case studies  Best theoretical 
approaches 
Genesis  
Political context  -Lisbon strategy 
-Political mandate from European Council  
LI and NF 
LI 
Main actors  The main actors were clearly the Member States, no role 
for interest groups, but with the Commission being a 
policy entrepreneur  
Different forms of new 
institutionalism 
Aim 
 
-The aim was both to enhance but also to limit integration  
-No granting of rights but causing actions in the MS  
 
-More efficient and legitimate policy -making 
LI and NF 
Europeanisation based on 
framing integration  
Governance approaches  
Sector 
interdependence 
Link between employment and competitiveness and E&T 
crucial (but not automatic)  
Neofunctionalism 
Nature -Incremental process, no one of decision  Neofunctionalism 
Choice of tool -No real alternative, legally more binding not possible, 
national level not willing  
-Tool adapted to the sensitivity of the policy area  
 
Historical institutionalism  
 
LI 
 
Participation  -Voluntary  LI 
Functioning   
Main actors  Member states in charge but with a strong (informal) role 
for the Commission. EP and ECJ sidelined  
Different forms of new 
institutionalism 
Participation of 
other actors  
Regional authorities and social partners are involved, but 
to different extents  
 
MLG and PN  
Levels Tasks are divided between different levels. Monitoring 
EU level; implementation nat ional/regional 
MLG and PN  
Type of power 
 
 
Not only decision making power is important but also 
agenda-setting and discourse  
Social constructivism  
Type of tool Flexible, soft, legally non -binding, non threatening  Intergovernmentalism  
 
Bottom up/Top 
down 
Both: European objectives (based on national input) 
which then influence the national level policy and which 
are then reported back  
 
MLG and Europeanisation 
seen as governance  
Policy development  Through the use of peer -learning activities and working 
groups made up of interest groups, Commission, and MS 
representatives  
Policy networks  
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Issues 
Indicators 
Results from case studies  Best theoretical 
approaches 
Socialisation  
Legitimacy  Elite driven process, no legislative oversight  Social constructivism an d 
NF 
The role of trust  Trust is being built which contributes to the successful 
functioning of the process  
Social constructivism and  
Sociological institutionalism  
 
Learning Learning takes place; about oneself, others and the EU 
system. Transferability i s difficult. Good practices not 
100% transferable  
Social constructivism and 
policy network 
Language and 
concepts 
Trying to define concepts at EU. New concepts are used 
but sometimes different in their use at National level  
 
Social constructivism  
Discourse The OMC is used as a forum to launch national debates  Social constructivism  
Peer pressure  Being used and being felt  Social constructivism and 
policy networks  
National Impact  
 
 
Is there impact  Yes, but differentiated depending on country  
Role of the individual 
Various approaches of the 
Europeanisation literature  
Is the OMC the 
cause 
Difficulties isolating causes  Various approaches of the 
Europeanisation literature  
Manifestation of 
impact: 
-on policy-making 
 
 
 
 
 
-on structures  
 
 
-on content 
 
-increase of-cross-
border cooperation  
 
 
-Willingness to discuss policy at EU level; it supports 
reforms, creating reform pressure, enhancing the capacity 
of MS to learn from each other by providing structures 
and methods, improving the cooperation between E&T 
ministers significantly, discussing the topics at national 
level  
-To a certain extent; trying to use best practices;  
Sometimes new bodies/groups are being created to 
coordinate the work coming from the EU level  
-Topics and concepts are being transferred from t he EU 
to the national level  
-Limited 
 
 
 
Social constructivism and 
sociological institutionalism 
on Europeanisation  
 
 
 
Various approaches of the 
Europeanisation literature   
 
Various approaches of the 
Europeanisation literature  
Various approaches of the 
Europeanisation literature  
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Issues 
Indicators 
Results from case studies  Best theoretical 
approaches 
European 
integration  
 
 
Vertical 
integration231 
No LI 
EU has more 
influence 
Yes, Influence of the Commission in E&T has increased.  
It gave more credibility to the Commission  and lead to 
agenda-setting for the Commission  
NF and different forms of 
new institutionalism  
More policy -
making at EU level  
 
Yes, increased policy output  NF 
Horizontal 
integration232 
Yes, More topics at EU level  NF 
Uploading of 
national policies 
Yes Institutionalist approaches 
on Europeanisation  
First step for more 
integration?  
Probably not, but if so then path dependency, agency 
loss, policy entrepreneur are needed.  
LI and Historical 
institutionalism 
Source: Author  
 
 
Conclusion: a matrix of theories explaining OMC-like tools 
This chapter has shown how the findings in relation to the OMC in E&T and the FoA are 
very similar. The tools were chosen based on the same rationale, function in a comparable 
way and have led to consequences which were very much alike. Based on this comparison, 
OMC-like tools were examined, regarding whether or not they fulfil some of their major 
claims, namely being a more efficient and legitimate form of governance. While some 
aspects apply, others do not, in part icular the claim of being more legitimate. The analysis 
has also shown that European cooperation in E&T has been significantly deepened through 
the use of the OMC and the FoA. While the EU may have found a third way of proceeding 
with integration without going the intergovernmental or the supranational way, this form of 
                                                   
231 I.e. EU got more competences. 
232 I.e. more topics to be discussed.  
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integration is different to previous forms of integration, and consequently its implications 
for theorising about the European integration process need to be considered.  
 
Much of the work on the OMC has only focused on its individual aspects (benchmarking, 
legitimacy, soft-law, etc) rather than trying to explain the phenomenon as a whole. The 
application of European integration theories to OMC -like tools is particular well suited to 
remedy this shortcoming, as theory is used for providing a framework for ordering events, 
processes and set ups, making sense out of them and predicting their consequences for 
future developments (see chapter two). However, most academics nowadays would agree 
that there are cases where one single theory cannot explain all aspects of the phenomenon, 
and therefore different theories might offer the best fit for the individual aspects 
(Rosamond 2007). OMC -like tools seem to be such a case. The analysis of this thesis,  and 
in particular this chapter, where different European integration theories were used in order 
to see how these could explain the creation, use, and consequences of OMC -like forms of 
governance, showed that not all of these aspects could be fully unders tood by one single 
theory. The result showed that while some aspects were more easily explained by rationalist 
theories, others required constructivist approaches in order to understand them. 
Furthermore, for some aspects different rationalist as well as c onstructivist theories 
appeared plausible. Therefore, rather than arguing for one all -encompassing EIT that 
explains all aspects of OMC -style governance, à la grand theory style, a combination of 
different theoretical approaches is being proposed. This com bination needs to include 
theories that vary across the ‘level’ of analysis (examine different aspects of the OMC -like 
tool), thereby using theoretical approaches asking similar questions for the different 
aspects, as well as theories which are on the same  ‘level’ (i.e. examine the same aspect of 
the OMC-like tool), but ask different questions e.g. regarding the impact at national level: 
they would ask ‘how have power relations changed’? As well as ‘how were identities 
affected by this’? This author agrees with Checkel (1999), who argues for a constructivist 
supplement to rationalist accounts in order to be able to ask different questions and use 
different techniques.  
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As outlined earlier, some writers argue that the field of EIT is generally divided between  
rational and constructivist theories, replacing the earlier dichotomies of supranationalism 
vs. intergovernmentalism or IR theory against CP. While one has to agree that the 
discussion over rationalism and constructivism are the main point of disagreement  in EU 
studies at the moment, one can not draw a clear cut line separating these two blocks of 
theories. First of all, as has been outlined earlier, constructivism is no homogenous 
approach (neither is rationalism) and the theories based on this theoretica l premise have 
nearly as many differences between each other, as to rationalism. A second argument 
against this block treatment is that within the individual theories and research agendas in 
EIT one can identify academics and their approaches more inclined  to rationalism or 
constructivism. This can be seen in the Europeanisation literature, in new institutionalism 
and to some extent in PN.  
 
Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003) have put forward a framework for promoting 
integration of -or at least a fruitfu l dialogue between- rationalist and constructivist 
approaches to international relations. Rationalism and constructivism, the authors argue, are 
not hopelessly incommensurate, but can engage each other through “four distinct modes of 
theoretical conversation,” namely: 
 
“1. Competitive testing, in which competing theories are pitted against each 
other in explaining a single event or class of events;  
2. A ‘domain of application’ approach, in which each theory is considered 
to explain some subset of empirical reality, so that, for example, utility 
maximising and strategic bargaining obtains in certain circumstances, 
whereas socialisation and collective preference formation obtains in others;  
3. A sequencing approach, in which one theory might explain a particul ar 
step in a sequence of actions (e.g., a constructivist explanation of national 
preferences) while another theory might best explain subsequent 
developments (e.g., a rationalist explanation of subsequent bargaining 
among the actors); and  
4. ‘Incorporation’ or ‘subsumption,’ in which one theory claims to subsume 
the other so that, for example, rational choice becomes a subset of human 
behaviour ultimately explicable in terms of the social construction of 
modern rationality.” Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2 003: 19) 
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The argument here is that there is first of all no all -encompassing theory in order to explain 
all of the aspects of OMC -like tools. Secondly, even within the individual aspects, the 
findings led to the situation where different approaches appear ed plausible in explaining 
them. Thirdly, the complementary use of rationalist and constructivist research questions 
appears necessary in order to capture all the consequences of using OMC -like tools. 
Consequently, in order to provide guidance for the use of EIT with OMC-like tools, the 
subsequent matrix is proposed (see table 6.5). It divides the aspects of OMC -like 
governance into three different levels of analysis, each with a different research question. 
On these levels, different but equally suited the oretical approaches are suggested to the 
researcher in order to answer the specific research question (aspect of the OMC -like tool). 
These are then divided between more rationalist and more constructivist alternatives, 
depending on the responding theoretic al starting point of the researcher. Based on Jupille’s 
et al. (2003) modes of theoretical conversation t he proposed matrix therefore considers the 
need for a domain of  application approach as well as a sequencing approach. While certain 
domains, or in this case aspects of OMC -like tools (genesis and socialisation) clearly favour 
the explanations from rationalist or constructivist theories respectively, other aspects of 
OMC-like tools (functioning as well as national and European impact) can be explained 
equally well by (a combination of) rationalist and constructivist arguments. The rationalist 
constructivist dimension of this matrix is to show that different explanations are possible 
for the same level of inquiry and by taking both/all of the alternatives at this level into 
consideration, the result will be more comprehensive. Consequently, the use of 
constructivism and rationalism together allows the researcher to widen the research agenda.  
 
Taking the theoretical analysis of this chapter into consideratio n, the conclusion chapter 
will now wrap up this thesis by reflecting on the different findings regarding the OMC -like 
tools in the education and training policy area.  
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Table 6.5: Matrix for the complementary use of European integration theories when examining OMC-like tools 
Most appropriate theoretical approaches Level (scope) and Research 
questions 
Aspect of OMC-
like tools Rationalist explanations Constructivist explanations 
    More  Less  More 
                    
               
1 Integration  Genesis   LI   NF         
Why does integration happen in this form?              
                    
2 Policy-Making  Functioning    MLG  PN PN     
How is policy-making carried out?     RC   HI SI     
               
3 Impact (consequences of 1+2)                   
What are the consequences of this form of 
integration and policy-making?                                                
on the individual                   Socialisation        SI SC    
               
on the national level    National Impact          Europeanisation       
                    
on the European level  European integration                                              LI  NF  SC    
                    
Source: Author 
Explanatory note: Historical institutionalism (HI), Liberal Institutionalism (LI), Neofunctionalism (NF), Multi-level Governance (MLG), Policy Networks (PN), 
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RC), Social Constructivism (SC), Sociological Institutionalism (SI)  
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CONCLUSION  
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter will conclude the theoretical analysis of OMC-like tools in the E&T policy 
field. First it will briefly summarise the main findings of this thesis. Based on this, it 
will re-examine the research questions and see to what extent the findings have 
contributed to answering them. Subsequently, it will be evaluated if this thesis 
contributed to the better understanding of OMC-like forms of governance, by outlining 
its major achievements as well as its shortcomings. Finally, possible further work based 
on or related to this thesis will be suggested. 
 
 
1. Summary of the main findings 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the use of OMC-like tools in E&T as a test case 
for exploring the explanatory and analytical capacities of European integration theories. 
Therefore Chapter one began by introducing the reader to the open method of 
coordination, presenting its main characteristics and outlining its historical 
development. It became clear that the Lisbon summit, which officially coined the term 
OMC, had to be seen in a wider historical framework in order to comprehend the whole 
picture. The examination found that the characteristics of the OMC represent a third 
way between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. However, the OMC is 
applied differently in the various policy areas depending on the time of creation and the 
involved actors. Therefore one has to speak not of one OMC process but rather of 
various processes. A first analysis of the relationship between the open method and the 
Community Method indicated that while there are significant differences between old 
and new forms of governance, such as the role of the European institutions, one cannot 
always draw a clear-cut line between them. The examination showed also that the OMC 
and the CM can be quite complementary rather than being a zero sum game and that the 
OMC is currently far from replacing the CM. This coexistence and cooperation between 
the OMC and the CM was then examined again when looking at the case study of the 
OMC in E&T. The analysis also looked at the reasons for the creation of the OMC, 
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finding that there were multiple causes such as the institutional redistribution of power, 
the balance between the social and economic dimension and the general move towards 
new forms of governance. However, one of the most influential causes for the creation 
of the OMC was finding a solution to competing visions on the speed and type of 
integration. This aspect would be revisited when looking at the case studies and later 
when applying theories of European integration to them.  
 
This chapter also gave an overview on the major themes in the existing OMC related 
literature: OMC as a new mode of governance, legitimacy and democracy, impact on 
national policy-making and integration. Each of them focuses on different indicators 
when studying the OMC. Examining the literature identified also the strong correlation 
between the theoretical starting point of the analyst, the issues analysed, the questions 
asked and the expected results. Therefore the aspect of the OMC under investigation is 
dependent on what the academic believed to be the main cause for its creation, which 
then impacted on emphasising different promising characteristics of the OMC and 
which finally affected its evaluation. As a consequence one can broadly group some of 
the questions asked in relation to the OMC together, according to theoretical beliefs, 
such as rationalism or constructivism. The overview also presented the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different literatures on the individual themes (see table 1.1). It 
showed that a major shortcoming, shared by nearly the complete existing literature, was 
the lack of using existing theories on European integration in order to analyse the 
functioning of OMC-like tools and the form of integration caused by using them. 
 
Chapter two looked at the purpose of theory in social science in general and integration 
theory in particular. It was outlined that there are clearly different purposes of theory in 
social science but some of the most important are: to inform the scientist about his or 
her own pre-assumptions about the world, making him or her see the starting points of 
the other theorists, as well as identifying developments in the research area. It was 
shown that theories differ on their ontology and epistemology and that one cannot 
compare and evaluate them on the same grounds. This chapter also analysed Kuhn’s 
notion of paradigms and paradigm changes, which helped to understand changes in 
social sciences in general and in integration theory in particular. This chapter also gave 
an overview of how the study of European integration theory has differed and evolved 
over time, presented different classification of integration theories based on their focus 
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and scope, and identified three different phases of European integration theory to date, 
each with different dependent and independent variables. The examination also 
identified examples of assumed paradigm changes that occurred within integration 
theory, such as the move from integration to governance. Moreover, it has been argued 
that the relationship between the study of European integration and other fields of social 
sciences is a two-way street, where developments within one area can influence 
theoretical evolution in other fields and vice versa. Furthermore, the crucial relationship 
between the developments in the academic and in the ‘real’ world in advancing 
European integration theory has been outlined. Seeing the object of analysis, in this case 
the EU, as a chameleon, as proposed by Chryssochoou (2001: 15), helps in explaining 
the development of the understanding of sound theory in social science. As the object of 
analysis constantly changes, theories and their understanding have to be constantly 
updated, as they discover new elements, which were previously not considered. This 
overview was complemented, by outlining some of the main theories and theoretical 
approaches on European studies, namely neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, 
multi-level governance, policy networks, new institutionalism, social constructivism 
and the literature on Europeanisation. The theoretical approaches presented varied in 
their scope, assumptions and in their dependent variable. They lead to different results, 
as they were conceptualised at different time periods with different political realities, 
asking different questions, looking at different parts and using different tools. 
Nevertheless, each of them further enriched the study of the EU. After considering their 
strengths and weaknesses, the opinion was reached that no single theory can capture all 
aspects of European integration. Therefore instead of creating dichotomies, it should be 
accepted that different theories could exist next to each other and deepen the 
understanding of European integration. Sometimes, if their ontologies and 
epistemologies allow, they could even be used together in one framework.  
 
Chapter three then presented the methodological structure of this thesis. The chapter 
started by outlining the research problem, the main research question and hypothesis, as 
well as the independent variables and some supporting questions. The chapter also 
showed the potential benefits of this study (which will be discussed in more detail later). 
Furthermore, the theoretical approach of this study was presented. This includes the 
notion that absolute objectivity is not possible and generalising across time and space is 
only limited possible, as values and behaviours, norms and ideologies change over time 
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and differ across space. Based on this epistemological position, the choice for using 
qualitative research was presented and justified. It was shown that the research strategy 
is based on two case studies: the OMC process in the field of education and training, 
and the framework of actions in the European Social Dialogue. Then the methods for 
data collection were outlined, which constitute mainly a combination of an in-depth 
review of the existing literature on the OMC as well as on European integration theory, 
an extensive analysis of primary sources, interviews and participatory observation. 
Thereafter the interview design for this study was outlined, including the choice of 
interviewees and the indicators used for constructing the interview questions. As the 
aim of this thesis was to see how European integration theories can be applied to OMC-
like tools, the indicators focused on whether or not the use of OMC-like tools has 
increased integration, how it has done so and in which way different European 
integration theories explain this. Finally, the methodological challenges that this 
research was facing were outlined, which are mainly research ethics, independence of 
the researcher, as well as data reliability and potential biases, and different ways of 
dealing with them were proposed. 
 
After setting out the theoretical background to this study and its methodological 
approach, it was then time to look at the practical application of OMC-like instruments 
by examining two case studies. The first case study was presented in chapter four, 
which showed the development of the OMC in the field of education and training as 
well as outlining the key elements of this process and its main actors. The nature of the 
OMC in E&T was identified as a flexible instrument based on an elite driven process. 
This flexibility was required because of the huge diversity of national systems, 
subsidiarity and sensitivity of the topic. The analysis showed that the creation of the 
open method in E&T was an incremental process, and while driven by the Commission, 
greatly dependent on the willingness of the Member States. They supported the use of 
the OMC in E&T for different reasons, some wanting to limit the EU’s influence in this 
policy field, others wanting to extent it. While the Lisbon summit was also a 
continuation of earlier developments in the field of E&T policy, it was important to 
make the link between E&T and competitiveness, and giving a political mandate for 
further cooperation in E&T, thereby leading to a non-automatic spillover between these 
policy fields. The feedback from the interviews showed that there was clearly an impact 
at national and at European level from using the OMC as the basis for the cooperation 
  
308
 
in E&T at EU level, arguing that the OMC presents an added value for the European 
level and the Member States alike, despite the fact that the impact varied between the 
Member States and across different aspects. Socialisation and the individual actor were 
identified as being very important in the learning process. It was also pointed out that 
other national and international developments contributed to the changes at national 
level and it is therefore not entirely possible to isolate the impact of the OMC. The 
discussion showed also that the use of the OMC clearly expanded the EU’s activities in 
this policy field, as Member States are now willing to discuss topics in E&T at EU level 
which lie within their competences. While this clearly enhanced European integration, it 
did so not through the traditional way, using the Community Method, but in a new and 
alternative way with new and different roles for the European institutions. 
 
In order to complete the picture regarding the use of OMC-like instruments, their 
application in the European Social Dialogue was also to be examined. Chapter five 
started by outlining the development of the European Social Dialogue, based on the 
findings from the interviews carried out with social partners at European and national 
level. Three phases were identified in this process, showing that social dialogue at 
European level is something rather innovative and dynamic. Following from there, the 
use of an OMC-like instrument in the European Social Dialogue, namely the framework 
of actions, was examined. The analysis looked in particular at why this tool was chosen, 
how it functioned and what results could be observed. The FoA was identified as a soft 
and flexible tool, relatively new to the European Social Dialogue, and based on a 
compromise between the expectations of the different social partners. It has impacted on 
the social partners’ policy-making in E&T at European and national level, affecting the 
content of the E&T discussions, the structures of the social dialogue and the national 
E&T systems at large. The impact varied across the Member States and depended on 
their level of development E&T policy, the previous involvement in specific E&T 
issues, and the political support for change. The Lisbon strategy, together with the 
choice of policy instrument, made this impact possible in the first place. The Lisbon 
summit linked the economic and educational dimensions, thereby bringing the topic of 
E&T closer into the area of responsibility of the ESP. The nature of the tool, being 
flexible, respecting diversity and the subsidiarity principle, made the national level more 
willing to cooperate at European level on this issue. While certain improvements of the 
FoA were recommended, such as better dissemination and more responsibility at 
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national level, overall the actors involved saw the FoA as successful. The findings in 
regard to the creation, functioning and impact of the FoA are particularly intriguing 
when relating them to those of the interviews on the OMC in E&T.  
 
Chapter six assessed firstly the similarities and differences between the results of the 
two case studies, looking at: the rationale for applying the OMC and the FoA to the 
education and training policy field, the way the OMC and FoA processes function, the 
ideational factors at work, the effect of using these instruments on the national level and 
the effect of using these instruments for European level integration. The comparison 
showed that the findings in relation to the OMC in E&T and the FoA are very similar. 
The tools were chosen based on the same rationale, function in a comparable way and 
have led to consequences which were very much alike. Secondly, based on this analysis, 
OMC-like tools were then examined regarding whether or not they fulfil some of the 
major claims of the OMC, namely being a more efficient and legitimate form of 
governance. While some of the promises, such as in regard to policy learning, seem to 
be justified, others do not, in particular the claim of being more legitimate. Thirdly, 
different European integration theories were used in order to see how they could explain 
the creation, use, and consequences of OMC-like forms of governance (see table 6.2 and 
6.3). The result was that while no approach was able to explain all of the aspects of 
OMC-like tools, integration theories such as LI, NF and NI explain best the creation of 
the OMC, while governance theories provide better explanations when looking at its 
functioning. Sociological institutionalism and social constructivism do for obvious 
reasons better in explaining the socialisation aspect of the OMC than more rationalist 
theories. When looking at the impact of the OMC, the Europeanisation literature offers 
significant insight. When examining the OMC in relation to European integration LI, 
NF and social constructivism provide plausible explanations for some aspects, while 
struggling to explain this new form of integration. In order to grasp the full picture, it is 
necessary to combine the use of various European integration theories. In particular 
there is a need to supplement rational choice approaches with more constructivist 
thinking as the former do not look at all the pieces of the puzzle. This was outlined as 
part of a matrix for using different European integration theories in a complementary 
fashion, which proposed different theoretical approaches for different aspects of OMC-
like tools, some based more on rationalist and others more on constructivist thinking 
(see table 6.4). The analysis has shown that European cooperation in E&T has been 
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significantly deepened through the use of the OMC and the FoA. However, this form of 
integration is different to previous forms of integration, and consequently the 
implications for theorising the European integration process need to be considered (see 
further research). 
 
 
2. Revisiting the research question 
The principal focus of this thesis was to examine how European integration theories 
explain the creation and use of the OMC, understand the spread of the OMC to more 
and more policy domains and its application by other actors (i.e. the European social 
partners in the European Social Dialogue). When reflecting on the main question of this 
research project, ‘how do different theories of European integration explain the 
development and use of OMC type approaches in European policy-making and their 
role in the European integration process’, one can identify three distinctive but 
intertwined issues: European integration, European policy-making and European 
integration theory. The results of this thesis must be seen in the light of each. 
 
 
European integration in E&T policy 
One of the supporting research questions for this thesis asked whether the use of OMC 
would lead to Europeanisation of the given policy area or keep it firmly under the 
control of the Member States. Here again it depends on how one defines 
Europeanisation. If we understand Europeanisation, as outlined before, as the evolving 
European system of governance having an effect on the political institutions, policies 
and political processes of the Member States, and also affecting identities and the 
cognitive component of politics, one can see that (a certain degree of) Europeanisation 
has happened in the E&T policy area. Chapters four and five have presented the 
argument that the OMC in E&T, as well as the FoA, have led to changes in European as 
well as national policy-making in E&T. Chapter four outlined in detail the OMC’s 
contribution to the integration of the E&T policy area, as it created reform pressure, 
enhanced the capacity of Member States to learn from each other by providing 
structures and methods, made European policy-making more realistic, improved the 
cooperation between E&T ministers significantly, developed the relationship between 
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the Commissioner for E&T and the national ministers for E&T, led to discussions on 
these topics at national level, and all without transferring competences to the European 
level, thereby keeping MS (largely) in control. They, together with the Commission, 
made the OMC in E&T possible and are mainly in charge of its functioning. Similar 
results were found in the second case study. Chapter five showed that the use of OMC-
like instruments has deepened the cooperation of the social partners in E&T at European 
level and impacted on different aspects of national E&T policy-making, while at the 
same time not infringing on the sovereignty of the national level. One intriguing aspect 
is that all of the players (a different finding from some of the literature on other OMC 
processes) seem to be happy with the use of the OMC, including those who want to 
accelerate the speed of integration and those who want to slow it down.233 So this thesis 
confirms the argument that the OMC is able to serve diverse interests with respect to 
speed and nature of European integration. 
 
When looking at the achievements of the OMC in E&T so far, there are different 
measuring bars (depending on the theoretical starting point). As outlined in chapter one, 
some academics pay particular attention to the use of benchmarks as part of the open 
method, and therefore reaching these benchmarks or not, would seem to be crucial for 
the evaluation of this tool. However, not reaching the benchmarks by 2010, as it is the 
case for the OMC in E&T, is not seen as a failure of the OMC in the eyes of policy-
makers. The figures used as benchmarks were very ambitious and progress was reported 
in respect to achieving them. Additionally, the benchmarking figures themselves are 
less important than the agreement on establishing joint objectives at European level in 
such sensitive policy areas.  
 
In this analysis the judgment of the OMC as a tool in E&T does not depend mainly on 
whether it contributed to the effectiveness and legitimacy of policy-making234 but first 
of all whether it deepened cooperation in E&T at EU level, without transferring 
competences to the EU level and without making MS feel a loss of sovereignty. Cini 
(2001) argued that MS have in the past sometimes been hesitant to transfer further 
competences to the European level, even if it was in their interest, because of 
perceptions of sovereignty and autonomy loss. Here, the link to the Lisbon strategy, 
                                               
233 The exception is the European Parliament, as discussed below.  
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which made the link between economic, employment and E&T issues more explicit, 
was very important for gaining support of the national level in order to deepen 
European cooperation in the E&T field, both in the case of the OMC and the FoA. So 
what about the future E&T policy? Due to the strong link between the OMC and the 
Lisbon strategy, the question arises as to what happens with the OMC processes when 
the strategy runs out in 2010. The best indicator for the success of this form of policy-
making is that European and national policy-makers agree that they want to continue 
with the OMC in E&T even after 2010, as they find it useful. A reflection process on 
how to continue with the OMC in E&T has delivered its (first) results, where you can 
see a strong support for the OMC from all sides. While certain changes are proposed, in 
order to address some of the criticisms and shortcomings, there is no doubt about the 
continuation. The strategic objectives will be updated, working methods are supposed to 
be improved (including strengthening of the peer learning activities), the reporting 
exercise will be improved (making it more visible), and the benchmarks will be updated 
for the period to 2020 (European Commission 2008d). These proposals reflect the 
results of the interviews carried out as part of this thesis. 
 
Although this thesis concentrated on the OMC in E&T, some of its findings can be used 
in order to make assumptions about OMC-like tools as instruments for integration more 
generally.235 Based on the findings of this thesis, and the analysis of the literature on the 
various OMC processes, the question whether the OMC can fulfil the balancing act 
between continuing integration into more and more national policy areas without 
causing backlashes from the Member States, can be answered positively so far. When 
evaluating its success in overcoming the antagonism between further integration and 
leaving MS in control, one can see that all OMC processes have led to a significant 
deepening of policy cooperation at EU level in very sensitive policy fields, such as 
employment, social inclusion, E&T and pensions, all very close to the national identity 
of the Member States. This was of course a result of the approach chosen. Cini (2001) 
argued that there was a shift of approach in European policy-making over recent years 
from harmonisation towards mutual recognition. Now with the use of the OMC one can 
observe a new development and fine-tuning of this approach to the notion of 
                                                                                                                                            
234 See discussion below. 
235 Assumptions for the OMC as a tool of governance will be discussed below. 
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‘convergence’ of policies.236 As pointed out in chapters four and six the use of the OMC 
in E&T has led to a new form of integration which does not necessarily lead to the 
transfer of power from the national to the European level, but also does not function in a 
purely intergovernmental fashion, the main alternative so far when trying to have MS 
cooperate in European policies. Whether the OMC, as facilitator of this kind of 
integration, is only an intermediary tool until MS modify their attitude or if the OMC is 
a true replacement is hard to foretell. Independently of future developments, so far it 
achieved results which were not even imaginable 20 years ago.  
 
In sum OMC-like tools led to further integration in three ways: across policy areas (i.e. 
from employment to E&T), across actors (from EU institutions to other non-
governmental actors; and within policy areas (i.e. increasing the EU involvement in the 
policy-making process). These findings confirm the first hypothesis of this PhD thesis, 
namely that the OMC is a useful tool to enhance the European integration process (in 
the area of education and training policy), especially when discussing sensitive issues.  
 
 
OMC-like tools as forms European policy-making 
An important aspect of this thesis, which also led to the analysis of a second case study, 
was the hypothesis that other actors of the European policy-making process also used 
OMC-like governance tools for their own policy-making processes. Chapter five 
outlined the reasons, the functioning and the impact of using OMC-like tools in the 
European Social Dialogue and chapter six made a comparison between the OMC in 
E&T and the FoA. This showed that while being an OMC-like tool, the FoA also varied 
in its functioning from the OMC template. This variation was not bigger or smaller than 
between the various OMC processes in different EU policy areas. The FoA was adapted 
to the specific needs and interests of its users and the conditions in this policy area at 
European and national level. Exactly this flexibility to adapt is one of the reasons why 
OMC-like tools are becoming so popular.  
 
                                               
236 Convergence is understood as the situation where national policies become more similar, as they are 
based on the same European objectives and concepts, but the national level still has the choice of how to 
achieve the objectives and integrate the European concepts into their existing structures, e.g. EQF. 
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The use of OMC-like tools by other actors of the European Union should not be 
surprising. These forms of governance are used not only in more and more policy areas 
of the EU, but also by an increasing amount of countries and international organisations. 
As outlined in the case study, the FoA was not a ‘copy paste’ exercise of the OMC in 
E&T by the social partners but rather a parallel development, which also influenced the 
construction of the OMC in E&T. However, the use of OMC-like governance by the EU 
institutions created a spillover when non-state actors were reflecting on how to design 
their new forms of governance. The will of non-state actors to apply OMC-like 
instruments indicates that the use of OMC-like forms of governance is a widespread 
phenomenon not limited to certain types of political entities or specific actors.  
Consequently, the spread of OMC-like tools not only to more and more policy areas of 
the EU, but also to other players, indicated that OMC-like tools are valuable forms of 
governance in their own right.   
 
When we divide the EU governance forms between ‘supranational’ and 
‘intergovernmental’, the former meaning that the EU institutions have a powerful 
position and the latter meaning that national governments remain in control (Cini 2001), 
one can truly claim that the OMC is a third way representing a middle ground between 
the two. Therefore one can argue that the use of OMC-type of governance has 
(substantial) consequences for the institutional balance of the EU. While 
intergovernmental institutions are in an even more privileged position than in other 
forms of governance, equally, the European Commission, a supranational institution, 
has a significant role within the OMC process. This role is at first sight (and maybe 
even at second) weaker than its traditional one, but the Commission managed to find 
and secure itself a crucial function. Cini (2001) argued that part of the explanation of 
why the Delors Commission was so successful, was because it provided ideas to a 
fragmented European Community. This role as ‘idea-broker’ was also stressed by many 
of the interviewees. Consequently the authority of the Commission in the OMC process 
is not based on legal competences but on expertise. On a balance sheet, which compares 
the role of the Commission in an OMC dominated policy and in a CM dominated 
policy, the result would be in favour of the CM. However, this comparison would not be 
adequate, as one needs to compare the role of the Commission in a specific policy area 
before and after the use of the OMC. Here one can see a clear strengthening of the 
Commissions position. At the same time it is true that this does not apply for the EP and 
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the ECJ. The EP in particular deplored its current role within the OMC in E&T 
(European Parliament Culture and Education Committee 2007). The EP also voiced 
concern about its role within some of the other OMC processes, and called on the 
Council and the Commission to open up opportunities for a real involvement of the 
European Parliament in the post-2010 Lisbon Strategy (European-Parliament 2006; 
2007; 2008). A particularly strong attack on the use of soft law instruments was raised 
by the EP in an own initiative resolution, disputing the usefulness and desirability of 
‘soft law instruments’ in general and considering “the open method of coordination to 
be legally dubious”, and calling for a reflection on “how Parliament might become 
involved in the procedure” (European Parliament 2007: 6). So far the EP has not reacted 
to the Commission’s communication ‘an updated strategic framework for European 
cooperation in education and training’ (European Commission 2008b), due to the 
termination of the last legislative period by the recent EP elections in June 2009. This 
discussion should be worth following up.  
 
So while this form of governance is more supranational than before, it represents a 
(certain) move away from extending supranational policy-making. If the other 
supranational institutions are not better integrated into this form of policy-making, then 
the cooperation between this form of governance and other forms would be even more 
important, as the latter would keep the EP involved and could provide an additional 
legitimacy that is (currently) missing in the use of the OMC. 
 
Another question asked at the beginning of this thesis was whether the OMC represents 
a valuable alternative or complementary mode of policy-making for further European 
integration. Chapter one outlined in detail the differences and similarities between the 
OMC and the CM, while chapter four identified the existence of a limited form of the 
CM in the field of E&T and analysed the practical coexistence and cooperation between 
the OMC and the CM. Based on the results from the interviews and also taking the 
literature on other OMC processes in other policy areas into account, one cannot see 
OMC-like tools as a replacement for governance forms based more on binding 
processes, but see it as a complementary mode of governance, enabling the cooperation 
in a specific policy field. In a follow-up, some elements could then be discussed in more 
traditional forms of governance. However, the OMC and the FoA cannot automatically 
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be seen as a first step for other forms of governance, as many of the issues they deal 
with are not (yet) possible to discuss in more traditional forms of EU governance.   
 
Although the focus of this thesis was not to evaluate the OMC on its effectiveness and 
its legitimacy, it was worth looking at this aspect as well. The OMC is heralded in the 
literature often as a new and better form of governance. Chapter one and six outlined the 
theoretical and practical realities of this. While there is evidence that the OMC and the 
FoA led to substantial changes at national level and improved the added value of 
European policies for the national level, many of the claims that the OMC would 
improve legitimacy could not be confirmed. Therefore the notion of de Búrca (2003: 2) 
that “a new model of European constitutionalism may be emerging which is less top-
down in nature than before and which is premised on a more participatory and 
contestatory conception of democracy,” may be a bit premature, at least for the 
education and training policy area, but looking at similar feedback from other policy 
areas show that this E&T experience represents the norm. In the end one has to take a 
pragmatic approach. The OMC seems to be (at the moment) the best form of 
governance for European E&T policy because currently (and for the foreseeable future) 
this is the only acceptable form of governance which would lead to any noteworthy 
impact at European and national level. Whether or not OMC-style governance is a better 
form of governance for all policy areas is rather doubtful. There are certain policy areas 
where the use of the OMC is supposed to be more appropriate than in others. But what 
makes them more appropriate? Policy areas which have similar preconditions seem to 
favour an OMC-like governance style. They are generally policy areas which are still 
mainly in the hands of national governments (or even regional authorities), reflecting a 
lack of legal basis for EU involvement, the issues dealt with are considered to be 
sensitive, great national diversities prevail and generally a coordination leading to a 
convergence of policies is sufficient. Even for those policy areas where the OMC seems 
appropriate, the OMC template cannot be used in the same way but has to be adapted to 
the specific conditions of the particular policy area. As outlined above, OMC-like 
instruments are appropriate tools for deepening integration (where further integration is 
deemed necessary) without transferring competences to the EU level.  Nevertheless, the 
appropriateness of OMC-like governance for a policy area might change one day, 
namely when the national level modifies its willingness to integrate the particular policy 
area in a more traditional way. Whether or not this type of policy-making can in the 
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long run result in more efficient and legitimate policy-making cannot be predicted at 
this stage. One has to agree that while certain shortcomings exist in all of the OMC 
processes, the OMC has the potential of being a better form of governance in respect of 
more legitimacy and more efficiency. However, the current applications of the OMC 
template do not reach this potential (yet) and some of its elements, such as increased 
actor involvement, need to be implemented more rigorously in order to reach this 
potential.  
 
 
European integration theory  
Another of the main research questions asked how OMC-like tools can be explained by 
theories of European integration. Right from the outset of this thesis it became obvious 
that no single European integration theory would suffice in explaining all of the 
independent variables (genesis, functioning, socialisation, impact and integration). The 
choice of such a variety of independent variables was made purposely, as each looks at 
a different stage in the process of OMC-like tools, asking different questions, some 
related more to rational choice, others more to constructivist research agendas and some 
to both. The second main hypothesis of this thesis proposed that as the OMC is mainly 
based on soft/informal procedures, more constructivist approaches are more likely to 
explain this phenomenon than rational choice approaches.  
 
The results of applying European integration theories to the findings of the case studies 
showed the OMC is a phenomenon which does not fit easily into any existing EIT. 
While there is at best a limited legal base for EU involvement, leaving the decisions in 
the hands of the MS, the OMC gives at the same time the European level, in particular 
the Commission, a role as image and policy entrepreneur which is far more significant 
that in any intergovernmental form of governance. In order to understand the OMC, one 
needs to look at its creation, which saw some form of spillover from one policy area to 
another, even if this was not automatic, and the simultaneous attempts to deepen and 
restrict traditional EU integration. One could identify the use of networks in its 
functioning and the contribution from actors at different levels. The use of soft law 
instruments such as the OMC in E&T and the FoA have lead to changes at European 
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and national level, even without the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. This can be explained 
through policy learning and socialisation. 
 
The OMC is a phenomenon which, if it is to be understood in its entirety, requires the 
insights of different theoretical approaches, focusing on various aspects, such as 
integration, policy-making, impact (at European and national level). Therefore a 
combination of theoretical approaches needs to be applied when attempting to analyse 
such a wide range of issues. Table 6.4 summarised which theoretical approach can help 
best for the different issues. This study showed that OMC-like tools do not only require 
different theoretical approaches but also certain collaboration between rationalist and 
constructivist thinking. In his study on eastern enlargement Schimmelfennig (2001) 
argues that rationalism can explain the input into the decision for enlargement but not 
the output. The output can be explained by sociological institutionalism. When applied 
to the case studies of this thesis, one can see a similar situation where the reasons for the 
creation can be explained by theories grounded in rationalism, but when looking at the 
impact of the OMC, theoretical approaches that include some constructivist thinking 
need to be applied in order to complement the analysis of the whole picture. This is 
actually what is behind the ‘constructivist turn‘ in European studies. This thesis outlined 
repeatedly that some authors deal with the rationalist-constructivist issue as an either/or 
approach. This was never the intention of mainstream social constructivists, as they 
believed that one could not rely exclusively on rational choice political science but also 
needed to include insights from sociological thinking (Wendt 1992). Trubek, Cottrell 
and Nance (2005: 17) argue that “there has as yet been effort to develop a synthetic 
approach that would allow scholars to deploy rationalist and constructivist insights 
simultaneously to deal with situations that call both for change and stability, flexibility 
and uniformity, change and constraint, and thus hard and soft law.” As shown in chapter 
six, Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003: 19), have put forward such a framework for 
promoting “four distinct modes of theoretical conversation”: competitive testing,  
‘domain of application’ approach, a ‘sequencing’ approach, and ‘incorporation’ or 
‘subsumption’. Some theorists, such as Zürn and Checkel (2005) explore the path of 
competitive testing in order to overcome the rationalist-constructivist divide, testing the 
explanatory power of one school (rationalism) on a research question (socialisation) of 
the other school (constructivism) and come to the conclusion that rationalist approaches 
can be applied to some of the new questions of social constructivism and produce valid 
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arguments. This thesis takes another approach by promoting a combination of ‘domain 
of application’ and a ‘sequencing’ approach in order to capture the full extent of OMC-
like tools.  
 
Chapter six showed that rational choice theories have some explanations for the use of 
OMC-like instruments. This makes the hypothesis only valid for some of the aspects of 
the OMC, as only some of the findings are explained better by constructivist theories, 
while others fit better with rational choice explanations. In other instances both 
approaches provide plausible arguments while focusing on different elements and 
therefore coming up with different explanations. Sometimes the combination of both a 
rational as well as a constructivist element only truly shows the whole picture. This was 
not expected when designing this research hypothesis. However, the expected need for a 
supplemental use of constructivist approaches has proven correct. Consequently, one 
can see that both ways of thinking reflect part of reality, and should be used together in 
order to capture all aspects. Therefore instead of creating dichotomies it should be 
accepted that different theories can exist beside each other and that bridge building 
needs to be pursued further in order to enrich the understanding of European integration 
(see further research). Sometimes, if their ontologies and epistemologies allow, they 
could even be used together in one framework. While promoting the idea of a 
framework approach for European integration theories, this framework should be seen 
rather as a flexible collaboration of theoretical approaches with varying scopes and 
functions than an attempt to built one grand overarching theory for European 
integration. OMC-like tools illustrate the need to return to the ambition of grand 
theories i.e. explaining the whole picture, without relying only on one theory but rather 
using various approaches in a complementary fashion. This thesis therefore proposed a 
matrix where various theoretical approaches are used together in order to complete the 
understanding of OMC-like governance  (see table 6.5). In addition to using EIT in a 
complementary fashion, the field of European integration theory needs to open itself 
and incorporate the new forms of integration (created by OMC-like tools) into the 
different theoretical approaches.   
 
As outlined earlier the appearance, use and consequences of OMC-like tools, did not 
and probably will not lead to the disappearance of other forms of governance used in the 
EU. One consequence would be that as the EU and its policy modes are so varied and 
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ever changing, different theories are needed to explain different forms of the EU. 
Moreover, the OMC is a mix of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, 
representing a new and third way of policy-making. Therefore studying the OMC could 
contribute to overcoming the dichotomy between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism in the field of European studies. Consequently, European 
integration theories need to adapt to the possibility of EU policy-making methods which 
are neither purely intergovernmental nor fully supranational.  
 
Furthermore, the OMC is an ideal case for an intra-disciplinary approach, as on can 
examine the OM from various aspects: legal (soft law vs. hard law), political analysis 
(old vs. new forms of governance; power distribution between institutional), economic, 
European integration theory (traditional integration vs. new forms of integration). 
 
 
3. Evaluating the research 
After looking at the responses to the research questions, it is appropriate to evaluate the 
findings of this thesis. When reflecting on the added value of this thesis a number of 
aspects deserve specific mention.  
 
This thesis has in a number of ways carried out original work. It has added to the 
existing body of work on the OMC and contributed to the further understanding of the 
creation, functioning and impact of OMC-like forms of governance in the European 
Union. Part of its originality consisted in examining the application of OMC-like tools 
not only by the EU institutions, but also by other actors in the EU polity, namely the 
European social partners, and comparing them with each other. Thereby it also provided 
further insight into the developments of the European Social Dialogue. Additionally, it 
shed further light on the E&T policy field, an area which has so far been under-
researched in relation to European integration. The focus on the E&T policy area was 
particularly suitable as it represents a core area of national competences and identity, 
with very diverse national structures, which are typically policy areas where this type of 
governance is applied. Moreover, it is a policy area where different forms of governance 
exist beside each other, and the findings added to a better understanding of the 
cooperation between them. It also brought further insight into one of the most recent 
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policy areas which applied OMC-like forms of governance, E&T, which is at the same 
time one of the most successful, in relation to deepening policy cooperation at EU level. 
More specifically it showed that the deliberations of the European institutions and the 
social partners were happening at the same time, which allowed for an appreciation of 
the mutual influence on each other, rather than seeing the one as a copy of the other. 
This thesis also addressed the under-application of EIT to the case of the OMC, which 
is a major shortcoming of the currently existing literature. An additional benefit was the 
use of the EIT not only for the OMC but also for the OMC-like tools in general, thereby 
extending the field of application of European integration theories. This extension could 
even go beyond the EU, as OMC-like governance is used also by international 
organisations and nation states alike. 
 
As outlined earlier, the OMC could be analysed from many different perspectives, 
focusing on several of its characteristics and elements. No single thesis could hope to 
examine all of them. However, there are a number of elements worth mentioning which 
this thesis did not address or did not do so in sufficient detail. While acknowledging the 
use of OMC-like forms of governance outside the EU, at national and international 
level, this thesis concentrated on comparing different applications of this type of 
instrument by various EU actors, to the same policy area. Consequently, one of the 
shortcomings of this thesis includes the lack of an in-depth comparison of the use of the 
OMC in E&T with similar forms of governance outside the EU political arena in E&T 
policy. Furthermore, while outlining that there are various OMC processes used in EU 
policy areas, this thesis did not go into detail when analysing the specific differences 
between them. Furthermore, this research did not attempt a comprehensive analysis of 
tracing individual policy changes at national level to OMC related policy decisions. 
Additionally, as the focus of this thesis was integration and European integration 
theories in relation to the OMC, other elements that are often examined in the OMC 
literature, such as benchmarking governance, were neglected. Also while this thesis 
addressed the aspect of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the OMC, this could have 
been done in more detail or even be the main focus of a thesis itself. These can be 
starting points for possible follow-up work to this thesis (see below). 
 
When evaluating the methodology used in this thesis, the results of the interviews 
confirmed the choice of a qualitatively based research approach. The data gathered gave 
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a more profound insight into the reasons for the creation as well as added value in the 
eyes of the users, which a quantitative research design would have not been able to 
achieve. The use of participatory observation was particularly useful, as it helped to 
identify key players to be interviewed as well as finding relevant issues to follow-up on 
in the interviews. The selection of interviewees proved to be very successful, as it 
reflected a balanced number of actors from the European, national and regional levels as 
well as different sides of the social partners, representing different roles in the OMC-
like processes, namely those who were involved in the creation and those who are now 
responsible for the functioning and confronted with the impact. The full potential of this 
method was slightly reduced, as the researcher ceased to be a participatory observer 
before the end of the research project. However, at this moment in time the interviewing 
process had already started and after informing the interviewees about this thesis the 
added value of being a participatory observer would have been reduced anyway. The 
methodological challenges of this thesis have been avoided or dealt with adequately, by 
using the necessary safeguards as described in the methodology chapter. Contrary to 
earlier apprehensions, the interviewees were rather more open and willing to discuss 
this topic than if the researcher had been a stranger to them. There was also no difficulty 
regarding confidential information as no confidential documents were used and all 
interviewees were given the possibility of being quoted anonymously, which nobody 
made use of. 
   
While this thesis brought further insight into various aspects of the academic work on 
the European Union, it also opened up additional avenues which deserve further 
attention.   
 
 
4. Future research  
Based on the findings of this thesis, but also taking its shortcomings into account, 
subsequent follow-up work seems necessary and promising, and the following research 
aspects being recommendable: 
 
· Comparing the OMC in E&T with other OMC types within the EU 
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Future work could include placing the findings for the E&T policy area into a wider 
analysis of the use of OMC instruments within the different EU policy areas. As part of 
the interviews carried out for this thesis, some interesting comparisons were made 
between the OMC in E&T and other OMC processes, in particular in employment and 
in social inclusion, as some interviewees were previously involved with other OMC 
processes. While this empirical data is not enough on its own for a comparison, it forms 
a good basis for designing a more in-depth one. 
 
· Comparing the EU OMC governance forms with governance forms of other 
international organisations and countries 
As one of the shortcomings of this thesis includes the lack of an in-depth comparison of 
the use of the OMC in E&T with similar forms of governance for E&T policy at the 
international level, a further examination would be recommendable. In particular the 
OECD provides a good case, as it does significant work in the area of E&T policy 
which also impacts on the national level.237 While being aware of the differences in 
nature between the OECD and the EU, further research could also include a 
comparative analysis of the use of the OMC in E&T in the European Union, with 
possible uses of OMC-like instruments in the E&T policy of other countries.238  
 
· Institutional balance and cooperation between forms of governance 
The findings showed that intergovernmental institutions (the Council) and executive 
institutions (the Commission) benefit from the use of the OMC, while the EP and the 
ECJ lose out. A follow-up investigation into whether or not this trend continues or if the 
EP will pursue its criticism on its role in the OMC, would be promising. Related to this 
is also the aspect of the cooperation between the OMC and the CM in the field of E&T. 
A subsequent study could look more in-depth at the complementarity between the OMC 
and the CM, where the EP is involved, and the extent to which this can balance the 
shortcomings of the OMC in respect to its legitimacy. This analysis could also address 
the issue of whether this would lead to a more efficient policy-making.   
 
· Carrying out more work on the social partners 
                                               
237 Similar work is being undertaking in relation to a comparison between OECD and EU benchmarking 
and peer review in general see Schäfer (2006) and Groenendijk (2009). 
238 For similar work in the area of social policy and a comparison with Canada see Wood (2009). 
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Since the use of the first framework of actions by the European social partners, this tool 
has been applied numerous times on different topics as part of the European Social 
Dialogue. Similar to subsequent work on the OMC, it seems promising to examine the 
other FoAs and see if the findings are comparable to the case study of this thesis. Also 
the relationship between soft tools and more legally binding tools, which are still used 
regularly in the SD, despite the increased use of FoA, appears worthy of further 
investigations. 
  
· Looking at the new E&T policy after 2010 
As the completion of this thesis coincided with the reflection process on the future of 
the OMC in E&T, further work should examine to which extent the OMC will be 
changed, in particular which elements will be strengthened or neglected, and if these 
changes have any influence on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the OMC. 
 
· Overcoming the rationalist-constructivist divide 
The thesis has argued that OMC-like tools need insights from rationalist as well as 
constructivist thinking in order to fully understand this form of governance. Therefore 
further theoretical work on OMC-like tools can enhance the understanding of how to 
benefit from the advantages of both schools of theories and overcoming false 
dichotomies.  
  
· Applying the theoretical findings of the case studies to other OMC-like tools 
This thesis argued that a combination of EIT would be needed in order to fully capture 
the entirety of the OMC process. It took the first step by proposing a matrix for the 
complementary use of different European integration theories for examining the 
creation, functioning and impact of OMC-like forms of governance, based on the 
findings in the case studies in the field of E&T. This matrix should now be further 
elaborated and tested in regards to the other OMC-like processes in the EU and could 
also serve as a template to gain further insight of the OMC-like tools of international 
organisations and states. In particular the avenue of bridge building between rationalist 
and constructivist explanations needs to be further pursued, as only by considering the 
questions of both it is possible to see the whole picture. 
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· Comparing the use of the OMC with the possibility of enhanced cooperation 
While the interviewees did not see any alternative to the use of the OMC, theoretically 
the enhanced cooperation procedure could have been used instead. This thesis showed 
that while a deepened cooperation in E&T was the aim, the MS did not predefine the 
use of the OMC in E&T. Therefore it might be interesting to look at possible 
alternatives to the use of the OMC in E&T, such as the use of the flexibility procedure 
(enhanced cooperation), also when one takes current discussions on the use of enhanced 
cooperation in EU social policy into consideration. 
 
· Impact on integration process 
This thesis showed that the OMC-like tools in E&T have led to a new type of 
integration. This result should be followed-up by 1) seeing if this type of integration is 
sustainable and 2) whether other policy areas have similar developments. If this is the 
case, then in a third step European integration theories should be updated in order to 
integrate this new form of integration into their assumptions (if possible).    
 
These are only a few ideas for further research on OMC-like tools, but on the basis of 
this thesis they seem to be worth further exploration. This shows that the thesis has 
contributed to an expanding research agenda, thereby succeeding in one of its main 
purposes.
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1: The list of interviewees and operational plan 
 
I List of interviewees 
The subsequent, people were pre-selected to be interviewed and are expected to make 
the following contribution to the research:  
 
Name Organisation and 
Position 
Benefit, contribution 
Mrs Perril Anderson Danish national experts 
DG EAC 
European Commission 
 
Giving a national and a 
European perspective on 
the creation and use as 
well as the national impact 
of the OMC in E&T 
Mr Michele Aribaud French national experts on 
E&T policy 
DG EAC 
European Commission 
Previously involved in the 
Rolling Agenda as one of 
the French representatives 
Giving a national and a 
European perspective on 
the creation and use as 
well as the national impact 
of the OMC in E&T 
Mrs Maria Helena Andre Deputy Secretary General 
formally responsible for 
Education and training at 
ETUC 
Potentially outlining the 
ETUC position for 
creating the FoA and the 
OMC  
Mr Wilfried Boomgaert  Belgian regional 
Representative for 
Education and Training 
 
Potentially outlining the 
national position for 
creating and using the 
OMC as well as the impact 
at national level 
Mr Gordon Clark Head of Unit DG EAC 
European Commission 
In-depth knowledge of the 
development of EU E&T 
policy. Potentially 
outlining the Commission 
position for creating and 
using the OMC in 
education and training 
Mr David Coyne Director in DG EAC 
European Commission 
(previously) Responsible 
director for the OMC in 
E&T. 
In-depth knowledge of the 
development of EU E&T 
policy. Potentially 
outlining the Commission 
position for creating and 
using the OMC in 
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education and training.  
Mr Denis Crowley Special Advisor to 
Director General DG EAC 
and formally responsible 
for the SPC secretariat 
European Commission 
As one of the veterans in 
the European Commission: 
potentially outlining the 
Commission position for 
creating and using the 
OMC in general and 
comparing the OMC in 
social protection with the 
one in education and 
training 
Mr Joel Decaillon Responsible for Education 
and training at ETUC 
Potentially outlining the 
ETUC experience with the 
FoA  
Mr Anders Hingel  Head of Unit DG EAC 
European Commission 
Responsible for EU 
indicators and benchmarks 
In-depth knowledge of the 
development of EU E&T 
policy. Potentially 
outlining the Commission 
position for creating and 
using the OMC in 
education and training 
 
Mr Peter Kreiml Austrian Government 
Representative  
Education and Training 
Potentially outlining the 
national position for 
creating and using the 
OMC as well as the impact 
at national level 
Mr Petri Lempinin Finnish trade union 
representative responsible 
for Education and Training 
Potentially outlining the 
national trade union 
position for creating the 
FoA and evaluating its 
impacts 
Mrs Therese de 
Liederkerke 
Director for Social Affairs 
and Education in Business 
Europe 
Potentially outlining the 
BusinessEurope position 
for creating the FoA 
Mr Thomas Mayer Austrian national Member 
of UEAPME responsible 
for education and training 
Potentially outlining the 
national position for 
creating the FoA and 
evaluating its impacts 
Mr Juan Mendez Spanish national Member 
of BE responsible for 
education and training 
Potentially outlining the 
national position for 
creating the FoA and 
evaluating its impacts 
Mr Adam Pokorny Head of Unit DG EAC 
European Commission 
Potentially outlining the 
Commission position for 
using the OMC in 
education and training 
Mr Michele Richonnier Director in DG EAC 
European Commission 
In-depth knowledge of the 
development of EU E&T 
policy. Potentially 
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outlining the Commission 
position for creating and 
using the OMC in 
education and training 
Mrs Jeanne Schmitt Senior advisor for Social 
Affairs and Education in 
BusinessEurope 
Potentially outlining the 
BusinessEurope position 
for creating the FoA and 
the use of the OMC in 
Education and Training 
and evaluating its impacts 
Mrs Heiki Suomalainen Chair of Education and 
Training Committee 
Business Europe and finish 
national representative  
Potentially outlining the 
national position for 
creating the FoA and 
evaluating its impacts 
Mr Michael Teutsch DG EAC 
European Commission 
Responsible for reporting 
exercise. 
Potentially outlining the 
Commission position for 
using the OMC in 
education and training 
Mr Peter Thiele German Government 
Representative  
Education and Training 
Potentially outlining the 
national position for 
creating and using the 
OMC as well as the impact 
at national level 
Mr Nikolas van der Pas Director General DG 
Employment formally 
Director General of DG 
EAC 
European Commission 
Potentially outlining the 
Commission position for 
creating and using the 
OMC in education and 
training  
Mrs Liliane Volozinskis Director for Social Affairs 
and Education in 
UEAPME 
Potentially outlining the  
UEAPME position for 
creating the FoA and the 
OMC in Education and 
Training 
Mr Paul Windey Chair of the negotiations 
of the FoA on Gender 
Equality 
He brings potentially a 
neutral perspective on the 
negotiation on a FoA. His 
experience with the social 
partners and EU politics in 
General make him a 
suitable candidate to 
compare FoA and OMC 
 
 
II Choice of interviewees 
The choice of potential interviewees is generally based on four dimensions: 
1. Organisation 
2. Experience 
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3. Position 
4. Level 
 
Organisation 
The pool of potential candidates successfully covers the various groups, which are the 
European Commission and the Member States on the one side, and the employers’ 
organisations and trade unions on the other, involved in the creation and utilisation of 
the OMC in E&T and the framework of actions respectively. Furthermore, there are a 
limited number of external observers which through their experience and function can 
shed additional light from a neutral perspective on the FoA and the OMC respectively. 
 
Experience 
The selected candidates were chosen for their significant experience and knowledge 
either on the creation, development, day-to-day operation and /or impact of the OMC in 
education and training, and the FoA respectively.  
 
Position 
This is an additional but crucial factor to the experience dimension. The position within 
their organisation is determining if and in which way a candidate can give valuable 
information. On the one hand if the position is to low he or she, while having a good 
technical knowledge of the policy area, would not know about the political and strategic 
decisions of the organisation. On the other hand, if the position were too high, the 
candidate would not know about the specificities of the policy area.     
 
Level 
The proposed interviewees represent a balanced selection from the European as well as 
from the national level, which includes a broad range of Member states. This has 
various advantages. The European level can give a more general and comprehensive 
overview while the national representatives can give a more detailed presentation of the 
effects and changes in their specific country. 
 
Based on these criteria, the selected interviewees would complement each other as they 
could shed light on the creation of the OMC in education and training, or the impact at 
national level and add their specific perspectives of their organisation and their opinion 
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on the perspective of other actors. They also form a balance between European and 
national actors, from various Member States.  
 
Timing of interviewees 
Generally there are two types of potential interviewees, those located in Brussels and 
those based in the different Member States. Concerning the first group access is relative 
easy and an appointment can easily be changed if necessary. The candidates for the 
second group are more difficult to reach. However, part of the reason why they have 
been chosen as potential interviewees is that the researcher knows that he would sooner 
or later meet this people either in Brussels in conferences or committee meetings or in 
some conference organised in the different member states.  
 
While the interviews in Brussels can be done within a month, the external interview 
would need anything between 3-6 months.  
 
Timing of participatory observation 
As many of the important meetings and events happened only periodically, it is 
important that he time frame for the participatory observation is rather broad. Therefore 
the timeframe January 2005- January 2008 was chosen. In order to provide 
supplementary and complementary information to the interviews, the data from the 
participatory observation will cover in addition to informal information on the creation 
and use of the OMC, also the general institutional and organisational setting, 
impressions, side activities and comments, informal conversations. The additional use 
of the participatory observation method is important to cross check with information 
gathered through interviews and substitute information which were not obtained in the 
interviews (because interviewee was not willing or able to talk about them or the 
interview was not given in the first place).   
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Annex 2: Questions on the OMC in E&T 
 
1 Warm up 
· Briefly outline the OMC process in E&T in your own words 
· Could you single out the most significant element of OMC process in E&T?  
 
2 Origins 
· Why in your opinion was the OMC method applied in the field of education and 
training? 
o Why was not another form of governance such as the community method 
(EP, Council, Commission) chosen? 
· Which actors were behind/supporting the creation of the OMC in education and 
training? 
· Has the (good) experience of using the OMC in employment been influential on the 
decision to us it in Education and training? 
 
3 Actors 
· Which actors and institutions are mainly in charge in the OMC process in your 
opinion?  
o What is the role of the Commission in this process? 
o Is the activity/work of the EU Commission really only “supporting” national 
reforms or is it also promoting and leading them?  
o What is the role of the Education committee (council) in the OMC process 
and what is its relation to the ETCG. 
· Who are the main supporters of the OMC?  
 
4 Process and added value 
· What is the added value of having European cooperation in Education and training 
in general? 
· What is the specific added value of the OMC at European level in addition to 
national policies for Member states to participate in it? 
· What is the de facto work division between Commission, Council Committees in 
preparing documents, guidelines, indicators, and benchmark? 
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· Do national governments include other actors in this process (social partners, civil 
society or regional authorities)?  
· How is the relationship between the Member States? Do they start to work on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis together as part or as a follow-up of the work under the 
OMC? Did this lead to the creation of networks? 
 
5 OMC in relation to European integration 
· In your opinion did the OMC enhance or slow down the European integration 
process. 
· Did the OMC in education and training lead to further transfer of competences, from 
the national to the European level or does it ensure that national governments stay in 
charge?  
o Where there any significant moments/events or was it more an incremental 
process? 
o Is the increase of policy output at European level an indicator for increased 
EU activity and a stronger role in E&T? 
· Is the OMC replacing the community method or is it rather preparing the arrival of 
the community method to policy areas where the Member States are still mainly 
responsible for?  
· Attitude of the regions in your country towards further European involvement, 
supportive or opposed? 
· In your opinion what is the single most important issue the OMC contributes to? 
· Does the enlargement to 25 and 27 member states make the use of OMC more 
necessary in future?  
 
6 Impact 
· Has there been any direct/visible impact at national level as a result from 
participating in the OMC at European level?  
o Can one distinguish between certain Member States, groups of Member 
States where the impact is more significant? 
· Are there any other processes which have more impact on national policy making 
than the OMC?  
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· Do you feel that national policy making is becoming more similar as a result of the 
OMC? 
· Do you think that Member States really learn something from each other? 
· Did Member States manage to get national topics on the European agenda? 
 
7 Discourse  
· Do you feel you speak the same (working) ‘language’/terminology? 
o Has the OMC contributed that these concepts from the European level are 
also being used in the national context of education and training policy-
making?  
· Do you think that some Member States play down or exaggerate the 
impact/influence of the OMC on their national policy making?  
· Does the participation in the OMC impact on how the participants view each other 
and the policy issue 
· Do national interests dominate the OMC process or are other factors influential? 
 
8 Changes and developments 
· How significant was the Lisbon Strategy for the development of Education and 
Training policy at European level?? 
o How significant is the link to other topics?  
· Did the Commission manage to use the OMC for its own interest which might vary 
from the original aims and objectives of the Member States for using the OMC in 
this policy area? 
· In your opinion was the OMC successful? 
· How will cooperation in Education and Training continue? 
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Annex 3: Questions on the framework of actions  
 
1 Warm up 
· Describe briefly in your own words the FoA process in education and training  
 
2 Origin of the framework of actions (FoA) 
· Why did the social partners decide to work on this issue in the first place? 
· Why did your organisation support the creation of the FoA 
o What alternatives did you have? 
· For an employer/ trade union what is the added value of the FoA? 
· To which extend was the OMC a template for developing the FoA? 
o Why were no indicators and benchmarks used? 
 
3 Open method of coordination 
· Do you feel sufficiently involved in the OMC processes at national and European 
level, in particular the E&T OMC? 
 
4 Process and added value 
· What is the added value of having European cooperation in Education and training 
in general? 
· What is the specific added value of the FoA at European level in addition to national 
policies? 
 
5 FoA impact at national level 
· What kind of consequences did the FoA have for the national social dialogue in 
your country? 
o Did it bring national social partners for the first time together on this topic? 
· Was the FoA seriously discussed by SP in your country? Prompt:  If not why not? 
· To which extend did the FoA lead to policy changes and new activities at national 
level? 
· Are there any other (European or national) processes which have more impact on 
national policy making than the FoA? 
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· Did your organisation on its own or together with the other social partners apply 
some of the good practices of the FoA and the follow-up reports? 
· Was the availability of the FoA report only in English a limitation for the learning 
experience of other countries? 
· Has there been any policy learning between national authorities and national social 
partners? Did the national social partner disseminate their work nationally and did 
the public authorities used some of it for their policy making? 
· Do you feel that national policy making/the way the national social partners deal 
with this topic is becoming more similar as a result of the FoA?  
o If yes, On the content? On the procedural side? On the institutional side? 
o Why do you think this is the case? 
 
6 Further cooperation at European level of social partners 
· Are there certain topics more suitable for a FoA than others?  
o Which ones and why? 
· Is the FoA replacing the use of framework agreements (voluntary or implemented as 
EU directives)?  
o If so why? Or would you rather see the FoA as a first step before using a 
framework agreement? 
· Is it easier to extend the topics being used in the European Social Dialogue because 
the use of the FoA?  
o Or was it the case that more topics arrived in the European Social Dialogue 
and one had to find instruments to deal with them? 
· To which extend has it given more competences to the European level rather than 
the national one?   
· Does the enlargement to 25 and 27 member states make the use of FoAs more 
necessary in future? (Prompt: are national diversities so strong that Framework 
agreements would be less effective?)  
· Do you see a difference between the national implementation of a framework 
agreement and a FoA? 
o How do you explain this? 
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7 Discourse 
· Do you feel you speak the same (working) ‘language’/terminology  
· Do the participants understand the same things when talking about the various 
concepts? 
o Has the OMC contributed that these concepts from the European level are 
also being used in the national context of education and training policy-
making?  
· Do you think that some social partners play down or exaggerate the 
impact/influence of the FoA on their national policy making?  
o Why do you think this is the case? 
· Does the participation in the FoA impact on how the participants view each other 
and the policy issue? Prompt: Does it lead to socialisation between the different 
representatives? 
· Do national interests dominate the FoA process or are other factors influential? 
o Do national social partners change their interest as part of participating in the 
FoA? 
· In your opinion how useful/important are the meetings between the different 
national social partners as part of the FoA process for the overall policy learning? 
· Have there been any follow-up activities between different national social partners? 
 
8 Development and continuation of the FoA 
· Did the SPs in your country get more involved with the FoA over time? 
· Did you discuss more sensitive issues over time? 
· In your opinion was the FoA successful? 
· Should the FoA be continued in the form it is but without a time limitation?  
· Should it be continued in an adapted form? 
o together with national benchmarks? 
· Should the FoA be replaced by a more legally binding instrument i.e. Framework 
agreement? EU directive? 
 
9 Final 
· In your opinion is there anything else I should look at as part of my studies?? 
· Is there anybody else you think would be specifically knowledgeable on this 
subject? 
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Annex 4: Treaty base for European education & training policy 
CHAPTER 3 
EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND YOUTH 
Article 149 
1.   The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member 
States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their 
cultural and linguistic diversity. 
2.   Community action shall be aimed at: 
· developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching 
and dissemination of the languages of the Member States, 
· encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter alia, the 
academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study, 
· promoting cooperation between educational establishments 
· developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the 
education systems of the Member States, 
· encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of 
socioeducational instructors 
· encouraging the development of distance education. 
3.   The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international organisations in the field of education, in particular the 
Council of Europe. 
4.   In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, 
the Council: 
· acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt 
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incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States, 
· acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt 
recommendations. 
Article 150 
1.   The Community shall implement a vocational training policy which shall support 
and supplement the action of the Member States, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational 
training. 
2.   Community action shall aim to: 
· facilitate adaptation to industrial changes, in particular through vocational training 
and retraining, 
· improve initial and continuing vocational training in order to facilitate vocational 
integration and reintegration into the labour market, 
· facilitate access to vocational training and encourage mobility of instructors and 
trainees and particularly young people, 
· stimulate cooperation on training between educational or training establishments 
and firms, 
· develop exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the training 
systems of the Member States. 
3.   The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international organisations in the sphere of vocational training. 
4.   The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
shall adopt measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in 
this article, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States. 
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Annex 5: Treaty base of the European Social Dialogue 
Article 138 
1.   The Commission shall have the task of promoting the consultation of management 
and labour at Community level and shall take any relevant measure to facilitate their 
dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties. 
2.   To this end, before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission 
shall consult management and labour on the possible direction of Community action. 
3.   If, after such consultation, the Commission considers Community action advisable, 
it shall consult management and labour on the content of the envisaged proposal. 
Management and labour shall forward to the Commission an opinion or, where 
appropriate, a recommendation. 
4.   On the occasion of such consultation, management and labour may inform the 
Commission of their wish to initiate the process provided for in Article 139. The 
duration of the procedure shall not exceed nine months, unless the management and 
labour concerned and the Commission decide jointly to extend it. 
Article 139 
1.   Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community 
level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements. 
2.   Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and 
the Member States or, in matters covered by Article 137, at the joint request of the 
signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission. 
The Council shall act by qualified majority, except where the agreement in question 
contains one or more provisions relating to one of the areas for which unanimity is 
required pursuant to Article 137(2). In that case, it shall act unanimously. 
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Annex 6: Framework of Actions for the Lifelong Development of 
Competencies and Qualifications  
 
European Trade Union Confederation* 
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe – 
UNICE/UEAPME** 
European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of 
General Economic Interest 
 
14 March 2002 
 
I./ CHALLENGES 
 
1. The 21st century is beginning with changes, the extent of which it is difficult to 
assess at present for enterprises and employees, as well as for society as a whole. 
  
2. New information and communication technologies represent one factor in 
speeding up trade flows. Markets globalise and simultaneously segment in order to 
retain increasingly mobile customers. Businesses will have to adapt their structures 
more and more quickly in order to remain competitive. The intensive use of team-work, 
flattening of hierarchies, devolved responsibilities, as well as greater multi-tasking are 
leading to the growth of learning organisations. This contrasts with the Taylorist work 
organisations, which still operate in a number of enterprises in Europe. Public service 
enterprises are confronted with the same challenges. 
 
3. The ability of organisations to identify key competencies, to mobilise them 
quickly, to recognise them and to encourage their development for all employees, 
represents the basis for new competitive strategies. This allows enterprises to keep in 
line with customer expectations and employees to improve their employability and 
career prospects. 
 
                                               
* The ETUC delegation includes representatives of the Eurocadres/CEC Liaison Committee 
** UEAPME - European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
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4. In the context of technological developments and of diversification of work 
relations and organisations, employees are confronted with greater mobility, internal 
and external to the enterprise, geographical and occupational, and to the need to 
maintain and improve competencies and qualifications levels.  
 
5. Against this background of rapid pace of change, the social partners at European 
level affirm the development of competencies and the acquisition of qualifications as 
major challenges of lifelong learning. 
 
6. The ageing population and the social expectations, which have resulted from 
higher levels of education of younger generations require a new way of approaching 
learning systems, ensuring that there are opportunities for all age groups – both women 
and men, skilled and unskilled – if significant increases in competencies and 
qualifications levels are to be achieved. Lifelong learning contributes to the 
development of an inclusive society and the promotion of equal opportunities.  
 
 
II./ SOCIAL PARTNERS’ APPROACH 
7. Whilst lifelong learning encompasses all learning activity undertaken throughout 
life, the focus of this initiative by the European social partners is to: 
 
· make an effective and specific contribution to the realisation of lifelong learning 
in the context of the strategic objectives established at the European Councils of 
Lisbon and Feira on employment, social cohesion and competitiveness; 
· give impetus so that the development of competencies and the acquisition of 
qualifications are perceived as a shared interest by both enterprises and 
employees in each Member State;  
· affirm the joint responsibility of social partners at all levels with regard to 
competencies development and promote their cooperation; 
 
· acknowledge the broader dimension of the challenge, which calls for a close 
concertation with public authorities as well as education and training institutions 
at all levels. 
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8. In addition to social dialogue, the success of this initiative depends on: 
 
· each enterprise making the development of its employees’ competencies crucial 
for its success;  
· each employee making her/his own competencies development crucial for the 
management of her/his working life; 
· the State and local communities fostering learning opportunities in the interest of 
competitiveness and social cohesion.  
 
9. The social partners call for the creation, within the institutional framework of each 
Member State, of conditions, which will further encourage the concerted development 
of competencies and qualifications, in addition to existing unilateral approaches to 
learning. 
 
10. The lifelong development of competencies depends on the existence of a solid 
foundation239, with which individuals are equipped during their initial education.  
 
11. This solid foundation should be jointly defined and updated by the national 
education systems and the social partners. It is necessary to reflect further on the 
subject, in order to specify the content and the conditions needed for each young person 
to obtain this solid foundation. The social partners must be associated with this 
reflection. 
 
 
III./ DEFINITIONS  
12. For the purpose of this initiative, 
 
· “Competencies” are the knowledge, skills and know-how applied and mastered 
in a given work situation; 
                                               
239 The following elements have been identified as forming part of the solid foundation: reading, writing, numeracy and 
at least a second language, problem-solving ability, creativity and teamwork, computing skills, ability to communicate, 
including in a multi-cultural context, and the ability to learn how to learn, etc. 
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· “Qualifications” are a formal expression of the vocational or professional 
abilities of the employee. They are recognised at the national or sectoral level. 
 
 
IV./ FOUR PRIORITIES 
13. The social partners assert the principle of shared responsibility of players with 
regard to four priorities and call for the intensification of dialogue and partnership at the 
appropriate levels. The social partners believe that the lifelong development of 
competencies depends on the implementation of the following four priorities: 
 
· identification and anticipation of competencies and qualifications needs; 
· recognition and validation of competencies and qualifications; 
· information, support and guidance; 
· resources.  
 
1. IDENTIFY AND ANTICIPATE THE COMPETENCIES AND THE 
QUALIFICATIONS NEEDED 
 
14. Identifying competencies and qualifications needs and anticipating their 
development represents a complex task given the numerous socio-economic factors, 
which must be taken into consideration, but it is imperative nevertheless. The social 
partners regard this identification and anticipation as taking place at two levels: 
 
The enterprise level:  
 
15. Identification of competencies at enterprise level must become a main axis of 
human resources policies covering all employees in enterprises and an issue for in-depth 
social dialogue: 
 
· responsibility lies at the highest managerial level for deciding the overall 
competencies development plan necessary for the success of a company’s 
business strategy;  
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· defining and answering competencies needs require the joint involvement of 
employers and employees; 
· individual competencies development plans jointly elaborated by the employer 
and the employee are important to foster joint efforts to develop the employee’s 
competencies; 
· developing a learning environment is also important for success; professionals 
and managers play a crucial role in this respect. 
 
The national and/or sectoral level: 
 
16. The collective analysis of competencies needs and of the development of 
vocational or professional qualifications is a priority in relation to what is at stake for:  
 
· young people in the context of their career guidance and integration into 
working life;  
· employees in the management of their careers and their capacity to remain in 
employment; 
· job-seekers, in view of the developments on the labour market; 
· companies, in terms of their competitiveness. 
 
17. In order to put this identification and anticipation into practice, the European 
social partners consider it necessary to:  
 
· work in partnerships with education and training providers at all levels;  
· develop networks to collect information and exchange experiences, including by 
making effective use of existing European instruments such as the European 
monitoring centre for change or Cedefop.  
 
2. RECOGNISE AND VALIDATE COMPETENCIES AND 
QUALIFICATIONS 
 
18. The European social partners regard the recognition and validation of 
competencies as essential, in order that: 
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· each employee is aware of and encouraged to develop her/his competencies in 
the course of her/his occupational life;  
· each enterprise has the tools to better identify and manage the competencies in 
the company. 
 
19. The social partners consider it necessary to deepen dialogue with the aim of 
improving transparency and transferability, both for the employee and for the enterprise, 
in order to facilitate geographical and occupational mobility and to increase the 
efficiency of labour markets: 
 
· by promoting the development of means of recognition and validation of 
competencies; 
· by providing a system for transferable qualifications; 
· by identifying the possible links and complementarities with recognised 
diplomas.  
 
20. At European level, social partners will contribute to on going discussions on 
transparency and recognition of competencies and qualifications. 
 
3. INFORMING, SUPPORTING AND PROVIDING GUIDANCE 
 
21. In order that both employees and enterprises can pursue a strategy for 
competencies development, it is necessary:  
· to enable each employee and each enterprise to access all the necessary 
information and advice;  
· to provide SMEs with suitable information and to assist their managers through 
the creation of customised support. 
 
With this aim in mind, the social partners call for:  
· the development of facilities allowing employees and enterprises to be supported 
in their choices of learning, and to tailor the content according to competencies 
they have already developed, for example through a one-stop-shop facility in 
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Member States, including a database on lifelong learning possibilities and 
opportunities for career evaluation;  
· these facilities to be easily accessible and relevant with regard to labour market 
developments.  
 
22. To promote a lifelong learning culture, both trade union and employer 
organisations have a key role to play in informing, supporting and advising their 
members and need to develop in house expertise to perform this role.  
 
4. MOBILISING RESOURCES 
 
23. Mobilising resources for the lifelong development of competencies is a key 
question, which cannot be regarded as depending exclusively on social partners. Other 
players have also an important role, notably:  
· public authorities in order to promote labour market integration; 
· the enterprise in order to develop its key competencies; 
· the employee in order to play a part in her/his own development.  
 
All players (enterprises, employees, public authorities, social partners) need to seek new 
and diversified sources of financing. 
 
24. As regards the social partners, they consider the lifelong development of 
competencies as a priority and assert the principle of shared responsibility for 
mobilising and optimising resources. The social partners want to promote co-investment 
and to encourage new ways of resourcing lifelong learning, through the effective and 
creative management of funding, time and human resources. 
 
25. They call upon the whole range of players in this effort and advocate that it 
should operate in the following directions:  
· to promote exchanges between national social partners and public authorities 
within Member States, with the aim of ensuring that the taxation of enterprises 
and individuals encourages investment in competencies development activities;  
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· to direct the use of structural funds, and particularly the European Social Fund, 
towards giving a stronger encouragement to social partners to develop initiatives 
and innovations.  
 
 
V./ ACTIONS AND FOLLOW-UP 
 
26. The member organisations of UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC240 will 
promote this framework in Member States at all appropriate levels taking account of 
national practices.  Meetings can be organised at national level for presentation of this 
document.  Given the interest of the matter under consideration, the social partners also 
decide to transmit this document to all interested players at European and national 
levels. 
  
27. The social partners will draw up an annual report on the national actions carried 
out on the four priorities identified.   
 
28. After three annual reports, the social partners will evaluate the impact on both 
companies and workers. This evaluation can lead to an update of the priorities 
identified. The ad hoc group on Education and Training will be entrusted with this 
evaluation, which will be presented in March 2006. 
 
29. When preparing the structured work programme of the social dialogue, the 
social partners will take account of this framework of actions.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
240 The ETUC delegation includes representatives of the Eurocadres/CEC Liaison Committee 
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